On Thursday, the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), in partnership with Libya Outreach, the Libyan Council for North America, and the Libyan Emergency Task Force hosted an event entitled “Supporting a Democratic Transition in a Post-Gadhafi Libya: What Can the U.S. Do?” Stephen McInerney, POMED’s Executive Director moderated the event. The panelists were: Manal Omar, Director of Iraq, Iran, and North Africa Programs, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace; Hafed Al-Ghwell, Libya Outreach Group; Amira Maaty, Program Officer, Middle East and North Africa, National Endowment for Democracy; and Christopher Blanchard, Middle East Policy Analyst, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service.

Notes on the event are located below or can be accessed in PDF form here.

Christopher Blanchard, speaking in his official capacity, began his remarks discussing the halting transitions within Libya that had begun under Moammar Gadhafi. He noted that significant opportunities remain in Libya for social and economic development. He stressed that the vital decisions about security, cease fire, terms of justice, etc will be made by Libyans, not outside powers, but the U.S. and other international partners can assist in the decision making process. Blanchard specifically cited items that Congress can do to help including:

• Encourage the Obama Administration to show results in their aid packages
• Allocate humanitarian and security assistance
• Assist in funding international peace keeping missions and other international operations
• Lay the ground work and follow through on longer term economic and trade partnerships

Blanchard also cited human resource development as a critical challenge facing Libya. He noted other serious complications that will need addressing, including: damage to key infrastructure, the exodus of skilled foreign oil workers, immediate conflict resolution needs regarding participation during the conflict, the need to build experience living in an open society, the need to define terms of representation in Libya (i.e. rural vs. urban, poor vs. wealthy), and the need to determine terms of participation and accountability for former regime officials.

The discussion turned to Manal Omar, who spoke in a personal capacity, but who has recently returned from Benghazi. She noted the strong discussion about the role of civil society in post-conflict Libya, including the establishment within the Transitional National Council (TNC) of a Public Engagement Committee. She also noted the Islamic character of Libya and the importance of incorporating religion into the new government in a manner that is in line with democratic best practices.

Omar described four ‘lessons learned’ from the Iraq experience that must be implemented to prevent similar problems in Libya. These lessons include:

• Avoiding early elections because early elections fueled divisions within Iraq
• Including former regime elements to prevent divisive witch hunts, she cited South Africa’s truth and reconciliation process as a model, but good leadership and a good, trusted transitional justice system are critical
• A focus on women is required and necessary, but not one focused on women’s ‘liberation’
• A need for basic services across the country, in addition to the political needs

Omar noted hopeful differences between Iraq and Libya relating to territory and the indigenous TNC.

Hafed al-Ghwell spoke of specific items that the U.S. is capable of doing to help the Libyan transition including:

• Providing the right set of technical help and expertise in institution building
• Make human rights an issue that is publically addressed with any future government
• Encourage the development of a robust private sector

He also noted a lack of international understanding about the depth of social, political, and security fragmentation within Libya caused by Gadhafi. Al-Ghwell specifically cited the issue of personal property as being a critical issue in the reconciliation and compensation process. This stems from a 1970/80’s directive from Gadhafi for all people to move into vacant or empty homes nearby as part of his political ideology. Al-Ghwell also noted the need for any future political system to be anchored in the culture of Libya; however, international partners can assist by insisting on transparency, inclusion, and systemic accountability.

The final panelist was Amira Maaty. Maaty discussed positive reports of civic and political engagement in Libya. She noted a need for international technical assistance in several areas including: political and good governance, constitutional assistance, legal and regulatory reforms, independent and professional media, and monitoring and defending journalist’s rights. She noted that an accountable transitional justice system, with “public buy-in,” is critical, as well as the need for security sector reform.

Matty closed her remarks discussing the need for dialogue about the proper sequence and the establishment of priorities for change in Libya. She noted the need to build institutions with a solid foundation and the need for independent think tanks.

The event concluded with a Q&A session. Christopher Blanchard noted that the degree of unity within Libya is still unknown and will ultimately be determined by how the conflict ends. Amira Maaty and Hafed al-Ghwell noted the critical role that youth play in the revolution and that they will play a critical role in strengthening civil society. Al-Ghwell also noted the need to incorporate newly armed and battle hardened groups into the post-conflict Libya. Many of the panelists described the post-Gadhafi situation as being entirely dependent on how the violence ends.

Manal Omar noted a widespread awareness of the need to avoid tribalism. She is encouraged by discussions currently taking place within Libya to this effect. The panelists also discussed the lack of legitimacy that the African Union holds in the eyes of many Libyan people and the need for any economic development assistance to be tied to job creation and growth.

Muslim-Christian clashes in a poor Cairo neighborhood on May 7 left twelve dead and provoked allegations of inadequate protection and intervention by security forces.  After protestors stormed the State Security building in Cairo in March, seizing documents that revealed alarming surveillance tactics as well as grave human rights abuses, the government formally dissolved the notorious State Security Investigations apparatus and replaced it with a new “National Security” apparatus.

How different will the new security apparatus be from the old one in terms of personnel, mission, and methods? Should former security officials accused of human rights abuses be brought to account individually, or should Egypt undertake a comprehensive transitional justice process? What should a new security agency look like and how can further human rights abuses be prevented?

 

Featuring:

Mohamed Kadry Said
Military and Technology adviser and head of military studies unit,
Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo

Omar Afifi
Former Egyptian police officer and Supreme Court lawyer

Speakers:

Mohamed Kadry Said, Ph.D., Maj.Gen.(ret.) is the military and technology adviser and head of military studies unit at Al- Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. He also serves as the center’s coordinator at the Consortium of Research Institutes’ Project for Regional Security in the Middle East and North Africa. Dr. Said is a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, various Euro-Mediterranean Security and Cooperation working groups, and numerous scientific organizations.

Omar Afifi Soliman, is a former police officer and Supreme Court lawyer in Egypt. He is the author of an extremely popular book about how to avoid police torture in Egypt, So You Don’t Get Hit on the Back of Your Neck, that was banned by the Mubarak regime. He was also recently a Reagan-Fascell Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy. More recently, Afifi was active on the Internet and elsewhere in helping organize the January 25 protest movement that led to the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak.

Robert Perito directs USIP’s Security Sector Governance Center under the Centers of Innovation. He also directs the Haiti and the Peacekeeping Lessons Learned Projects. Before joining the Institute, he was a Foreign Service officer with the U.S. Department of State, retiring with the rank of minister-counselor. He was deputy executive secretary of the National Security Council (1988-1989).

Michele Dunne is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and editor of the online journal, the Arab Reform Bulletin. A former specialist at the U.S. Department of State and White House on Middle East affairs, she served in assignments including the National Security Council staff, the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, the U.S. embassy in Cairo, the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem, and the department of state’s bureau of intelligence and research.

For for a summary of this event please continue reading below, or click here for the pdf.

(A video of the event is available here.)

On January 25, Egypt’s youth activists, using new media technology, succeeded in launching a protest movement that eventually forced Hosni Mubarak to resign the presidency. Since that time, these activists have retained an important role during the transition period and continue to pressure the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to undertake reforms. Many key questions remain, however, surrounding Egypt’s ongoing transition to a civilian government. How are Egypt’s youth movements adapting themselves to the evolving political dynamics during this transition period? How do they view the actions of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces? What new political forces are emerging in Egypt? What are the most important steps that must be taken in the months ahead? And what role can the United States play during this period to support Egypt’s transition to democracy?

Featuring:

Esraa Abdel Fattah
Leading Egyptian democracy and human rights activist

Commentator:

Jason Brownlee
Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center and Associate Professor, Department of Government,
University of Texas at Austin

Moderator:

Stephen McInerney
Executive Director,
Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

For full notes, continue below.  For pdf version, click here.

Stephen McInerney began by stating that this was a historic and exciting time for observers and democracy activists and stated that the policy community had underestimated the chance for change in the region and underestimated the abilities of the youth movement spurred by online activism.  Egypt’s revolution has proven that Washington’s previous dismissal of the potential of youth movements was mistaken, he said.  McInerney also stated that he saw a generational divide in Egypt as a response to the Tunisian revolution.  Whereas elder established human rights activists were unsure of how to handle a possible response, youth activists immediately set forth trying to replicate Tunisian success in Egypt.  The youth movements were fully ready to seize the opportunity.  He also said that what happened in Egypt would not have happened without the years of groundwork of activism in Egypt including Fattah’s work.  McInerney called her, “one of the best possible spokespeople for the youth movement,” in Egypt and mentioned that her April 6^th protests were a direct precursor to the January 25^th revolution.

Esraa Abdel Fattah mentioned she was speaking at the panel on the third anniversary of the April 6^th protests and her subsequent arrest and imprisonment by Egyptian authorities.  She described the protests as a general strike entirely organizes through Facebook and social media; which she said was the only way to campaign and get the message out to others.  Fattah called the campaign a success and said that it taught other activists and people who to successfully organize protests using social media.  She also outlined the buildup of the Egyptian protest movement starting in 2004 with the Kefaya movement that continued to the 2008 protests and ultimately the 2011 revolution.  The 2011 campaign drew inspiration directly from the Tunisian revolution.  Fattah said that she did not originally expect for the movement to crystallize so quickly nor did she expect Hosni Mubarak to step down 18 days after the protests began.  She continued by stating that organizers and activists have been adamant about holding continuous Friday rallies at Tahrir Square to ensure that protester demands are being met by the transitional military council.  She also outlined the main priorities of the youth movement which are to ensure free and fair elections with equal opportunity for all candidates.  Fattah also expressed some concern about the very short five month run-up to new parliamentary elections.

Jason Brownlee mentioned that the recent constitutional referendum vote, which many of the youth activists campaigning against the proposed reforms, was passed with an overwhelming 77% majority vote.  Brownless stated that had there been more polling stations, the voter turnout would have been much higher than 41% and still would have turned out overwhelmingly in favor.  He said this was due to the desire of many Egyptians for a return to normalcy and stability.  Given this setback, Brownlee posed the question of how the youth protest movement would reach out to new groups and do a better job in getting their message across in the upcoming parliamentary elections.  Fattah responded that she and other organizers and activists were trying to quickly set up a new political party and establish a social-liberal coalition to run an effective list for the upcoming elections.  She stated that it would be difficult to unify disparate groups together in such a coalition but said it was necessary for the groups to succeed in parliament.  She also reiterated the need to encompass old parties, like al-Ghad, as well.  Fattah stated that the announcement about the new party would be released in about two weeks and that there would be a meeting on May 1^st to select a unified list.  She also discussed the importance of reaching more people through civil society education and training.

In response to a question posed by McInerney on what steps the U.S. and international community could take, Fattah stated the need for a new balancing of the relationship between the U.S., the Egyptian government, and Egyptian civil society.  She reiterated the need for more support for civil society NGOs and criticized the U.S. for its “late statements” during the protests.  Fattah said that the U.S. and international community should not wait to see “who will win” before deciding to support democratic principles.  She also said that the U.S. could help with its technical expertise in election organizing in addition to monetary aid programs.  Help retraining the police force to protect instead of harm people, was also welcome.  The international community must also ensure that frozen assets of the Mubarak family are returned to the Egyptian people as it was an issue of dignity for Egyptians.

In response to audience questions, Fattah stated that she was not asking the U.S. or the international community to get involved but merely providing them guidance if they wished to help.  She said she believed that the Egyptian could move forward on their “own power.”  Brownlee stated that Egypt needed help from international partners because the protests and revolution in Egypt had cut GDP in half.  He stated that for this reason the U.S. should forgive Egypt’s debt that was incurred under Mubarak.

Fattah also spoke about the Muslim Brotherhood stating that she did not see the group as a threat or a problem.  She speculated that organizational infighting and fault lines that have been emerging within the group would hamper its performance at election time.  She also stated that she is worried about whether the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF) will live up to its promises but does not actively distrust the military council.  She reiterated her belief that Egypt needs a civil authority to ensure democracy.  She also said that the country needed a new communications law to secure privacy, particularly with internet/e-mail accounts, and prevent a future internet shutdown.  Fattah also said that Egyptians and activists were not focused on foreign policy issues like the peace treaty with Israel, but solely focused on internal issues.

McInerney, speaking about U.S. foreign policy post-revolution, said that American policy toward the Middle East would not instantly change overnight.  However, the events in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere would have lasting impacts for the long term.  One immediate effect, he said, would be a re-evaluation of the type of “casual relationships” the U.S. maintains with authoritarian regimes.  Brownlee commented that despite the events on the ground, the U.S. still maintains the same interests for much of the region and that it will take time to truly assess any substantive changes in U.S. foreign policy.

Fattah closed by commenting that the protest movement was working more strenuously on political issues but that economic issues were still very important for activists and organizers.  She also declared her optimism on the role of the judiciary in the transition citing the former regime officials who are already on trial for corruption and other regime related offenses.

Presented by the Carnegie Endowment and the Project on Middle East Democracy

When Egyptian opposition groups called for a “Day of Rage” on January 25, few predicted that the protests would escalate into a full-fledged uprising that threatens to unravel Egypt’s existing political order.  As hundreds of thousands of Egyptians call for an end to President Mubarak’s 30-year rule, the crisis unfolding in Egypt has the potential to fundamentally transform Egypt’s political landscape and the balance of power in the Middle East.  Will these protests ultimately lead to a more transparent and democratic political processes in Egypt?  What impact may we expect across the  Middle East?  And what do these events mean for U.S. relations with Egypt and the region?

Featuring:

To read full notes, continue below or click here for pdf.

Michele Dunne opened by mentioning the clashes in recent days between pro-regime and anti-regime demonstrators and the arrest and detainment of human rights activists by the security forces. She noted the growing uncertainty of the role of the military in these clashes. Given the strong statements issued by Vice President Omar Suleiman and Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq condemning the attacks and vowing to investigate the attacks, Dunne questioned whether there was a rift forming in the regime or if they were seeking to manipulate the populace with a “good cop-bad cop” tactic. Dunne also noted the conflicting reports surrounding negotiations between Suleiman and the opposition parties and ambiguity surrounding the U.S. government’s definition of “transition” in the Egypt context.

Amr Hamzawy, speaking from Cairo, spoke about the concessions made by the government, such Suleiman saying that they are open to constitutional amendments beyond Article 76 and 77. Furthermore, Hamzawy optimistically discussed the road map for the transitional period stating the Suleiman was entering into dialogue with all opposition groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood. He made mention of Suleiman’s speech in which he promised to investigate and punish the organizers of the attacks and release all detained protesters and activists not involved in violence on Wednesday.

Hamzawy stated that Suleiman’s unwillingness to dissolve the parliament, out of the interest of having enough time to make constitutional amendments before the transition period ends, will likely be a point of contestation among the different opposition groups, which had demanded dissolution of parliament after the blatant election violations by the regime last November. He also states that going into this transition period constitutional and political safeguards need to be put in place to ensure that the regime does not violate its commitment to reform and that the army will play a key role in ensuring stability during this period as well.

When asked about Mubarak’s role, Hamzawy states that many of the opposition groups, not including the Muslim Brotherhood or Mohamed ElBaradei, have agreed to have Mubarak continue on as an “honorary president,” with all essential powers delegated to Suleiman. He calls this a “face-saving” method that reaches out to the sentimentalities of Egyptians and will help manage a safe transition. It is clear, however, that some people will be upset, but others are willing to make the compromise for stability and in hopes of returning to normality.

Responding to a question on amendments to Article 88 on judicial supervision of elections, Hamzawy said that the new amendment will lead to the formation of an independent election commission made after consultations with independent judges, legal experts, and scholars.

When asked how a parliament full of members of the dying NDP can be expected to make full constitutional amendments demanded by the people, Hamzawy states that Suleiman has offered to re-run elections into those areas where the Constitution Court found to have suffered from voting fraud; this means over 250 seats will be contested. Until these elections are run the parliament has been suspended.

Hamzawy states that while debates still continue, many protesters are moving towards no protests tomorrow and supporting the road map. He states that the transition period will be tough as some try to backslide into the old regime, but he believes the protesters are resilient and will ensure demands are met credibly.

Bahey al-Din Hassan began by stating is respect and pride for Egyptians who continue to struggle in face of the violence which has killed at least 500 and injured thousands more. He went on to discuss the arrests of journalists and human rights activists that occurred on Thursday, noting that this the first time the military police has participated. Not only did the military police arrest activists with the thugs, they also closed all outlets in Tahrir Square leading Hassan to believe that in coming days we may see a humanitarian crisis take place on the streets.

The opposition Hassan said is divided and weak as they have been under severe and continuous repression under Mubarak, and really, in his opinion, since July 1952 when the “Free Officers” coup took place. Currently, he states, Egyptians have a minimum consensus over who the leader of the opposition should be and that is ElBaradei. He states that the opposition groups really need to stick behind him instead of engaging in independent consultations with Suleiman. He also argues that while ElBaradei refused to negotiate until Mubarak had departed, he should shift his position given the realities on the ground.

Neil Hicks began by discussing past opposition movements in Egypt, stating that in the 1980s the groups were smaller and tended to include lawyers and members of the middle class, who had limited objectives. In recent years, he says, there has been a change in the ambition of the people. The youth have constructed their own networks and outreach tactics, which older generations did not support or see as useful. But demonstrations on the 25th showed the value of the youth networks, especially those put in place to monitor the November elections; they were able to mobilize the masses effectively. Hicks credits this transformation with the maturation of human rights groups and NGOs in Egypt and labels ElBaradei as the father of this change, which is indigenous and authentic to the people, not imposed by the U.S. or the West.

Addressing U.S. policy in the region, Hicks said that the administration and congress are behind the curve. Mubarak’s early comment that the Egyptian people can choose between stability and chaos was misinterpreted in the West, Hicks said; the statement was meant as a threat, saying that if things don’t go his way there will be chaos. And as protesters failed to give into his demands chaos ensued as he shut down the internet and sent tourists home, costing the country billions of dollars. The regime, Hicks says, was fraying; it was beginning to lose its ability to maintain stability and control as demonstrated by the beating of Khalid Said and the blatant rigging of elections; they were scared they would lose. The blatant violations during the elections should have garnered a stronger response from the Obama administration, Hicks said.

If Mubarak stays in power, he will do so as the Mugabe of Egypt. Hicks called on the administration to make clear that it does not see Mubarak as having an effective or useful role in the transition and have him step down. While appreciative of Hamzawy’s optimistic assessment of Suleiman, Hicks cautions against quickly embracing him as a leader. The U.S. also needs to ensure the army protects demonstrators and make it abundantly clear to the military leaders that the army must  not be involved in violence as it will lead to cutting aid and a deterioration of their relationship, which the Egyptian army values highly. He also calls on the administration to push for the release of activists arrested today.

Answering a question on the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan stated that while they are the most organized there is a great deal of exaggeration on their actual weight and influence. This protest movement was organized by the youth with a labor background, not an Islamist one. The Brotherhood, he says, lacks any real influence on what’s happening in the streets much like the Islamic group Ennahda does in Tunisia. The state, Hassan claims, has issued exaggerated claims in the hopes of shifting international opinion in their favor instead of in the favor of protesters who are demanding political reform. He goes on to say that if the protest movements fail to bring real reform to the country, the tides will turn in the favor of the Islamists.

Addressing questions over the military, Hicks stated that the U.S. and Egyptian military officials have been communicating and that the U.S. should continue to encourage the army to protect protesters and live up to the ethos of professionalism. When it comes to cutting off aid, Hicks says the U.S. should draw clear red lines that if crossed would lead to cuts in aid. Hicks also addressed the possibility of a military coup in Egypt, stating that essentially that is what took place in Tunisia as protests grew though the possibility remains unclear in Egypt.

Dunne answered a question over the lack of democratic terms in Suleiman’s speech by stating that she is skeptic of what Suleiman said. While he has offered some change and reform it is unclear whether he will allow free and fair elections to take place or if he is attempting to pass limited reform aimed at quelling the unrest. Hassan states that in Egypt it is better to have a quick transition towards democracy as true democracy will decades to build in the country and that movements need to start sooner rather than later. Hassan believes that demonstrations will continue tomorrow as people push for transition knowing that this is the best way to have their demands realized.

When asked about rifts between the NDP and the military, Hicks stated that we had seen a fracturing between the two groups as Mubarak became aligned with the economic elite members of the NDP. In recent weeks he has attempted to make a shift back towards the military as seen by his selection of Vice President and Prime Minister. Hicks also questions whether Mubarak’s abandonment of the business elite could lead to the formation of new party.

Addressing questions regarding skepticism that the U.S. will cut aid, Hicks stated that he too was skeptical but given that the events on the ground are changing so rapidly, U.S policy will have to adapt. What is clear is that the reluctance of the U.S. to call out violations of close allies will no longer be accepted.

Finally, answering a question on whether a new party will be able to survive if they cannot address the domestic economic issues facing the country, Hassan stated it is unlikely. However, he said that the people recognize that economic reform cannot take place without political reform; it is a key first step.

For POMED’s full notes, continue below or click here for the pdf.

Nawara opened his prepared remarks by providing basic context for the current parliamentary elections. Over previous decades, while much has changed on the surface the “same people and same mechanism” have remained in place, Nawara said.  The Egyptian political process is a carefully scripted play in which the outcome is predetermined. Since the 2005 election, there has been an increase in social activism in Egypt. The judges, labor, and youth movements have all grown and the involvement ofMohammed ElBaradei has invigorated the liberal opposition. During the same period, however, the government has become more sophisticated in its ability to crackdown on the activists. According to Nawara, the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) shrewdly crushed the liberal opposition while allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to participate. This has allowed the Mubarak regime to argue in the West that “it is either us or them.”

Nawara then turned to the argument about the proposed election boycott. Those against the boycott say that participation is the only possible “positive action,” will expose electoral fraud, and will allow opposition parties to engage the population and train activists. Also, in their view, the boycott is unlikely to work and will simply make the government’s job easier. Proponents of the boycott, which Nawara said he is, argue that opposition parties should not participate in what they know will be a flawed process. Abstention will delegitimize the outcome and regardless of how many seats the opposition wins, the parliament itself is basically just a rubber stamp for the Mubarak regime. To be clear, Nawara said, the boycotting parties are not advocating for complete inaction and plan to engage in acts of civil disobedience, e.g. the formation of a parallel parliament.

Both sides face one significant question: what should they do the day after the election? For those that boycott, two key issues will be restoring trust among the opposition parties and making sure that social activism translates into campaigns that actually have the power to change political institutions. The parties that participate, on the other hand, face other challenges. Corruption and vote buying are normal, oppression by state security is widespread, and opposition parties generally face a host of “independent” challenger who are actually back by NDP.

At the end of the day, Nawara said, even if the elections are technically perfect, it would mean very little in the Egyptian context. NDP has designed a system where even if the opposition wins seats in parliament, any attempts to play a real role in the political process will be stymied. Nawara feels that the Obama administration has yet to settle on a strong strategy for how to deal with Egypt. “We have to be confident that there are alternatives,” to NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood he said, adding that U.S. can uses positive incentives to motivated Egypt to open its political process. Seeking stability through the Mubarak regime is not in the U.S.’s long-term interest.

In his remarks, Mohamed described the challenges facing domestic electoral monitors in Egypt. Election monitoring is not new to Egypt, he said. During the 2005 election, local monitors played an active role in the election. Since then, civil society organizations have exerted pressure on the government to expand election monitoring efforts and ostensibly the government has obliged; the process surrounding domestic monitoring efforts has improved significantly. The issue, however, will be implementation. For example, it is unlikely that more than 10% of the election monitors who apply for government credentials will receive them. According to Mohamed, the Egyptian government must also amend the law to codify the rights of electoral monitors to enter and inspect polling places.

Egyptian election monitors face two significant challenges, Mohamed said. First, there is very little information about the registration process, where the polling places will be located, and a host of other important issues. Second, cooperation between the high electoral commission and civil society remains problematic. According to the law, election officials must cooperate with local election monitors, but thus far they have not been forthcoming. For example, it is very likely that of the thousands of electoral monitoring permits civil society organizations have applied for, only a few hundred will be filled and those that are will probably only be approved hours prior to the election.  Moreover, police oppression is still a huge issue. This year, registration will take place in police stations and it is highly likely that those election monitors attempting to observe the process will be rebuffed, have their equipment confiscated, or worse.

In his response, Albertson made two points: First, we must look at the Egyptian parliamentary election in the regional context. This fall, Jordan and Bahrain are also holding elections. What we see when we look at these three countries is that authoritarian regimes are using an ever evolving arsenal of weapons to clamp down on freedom of association and information before elections. Interestingly, we also see that some countries in the region have been more open to international election monitors than others. Lebanon, Jordan, and Sudan for example, have opened their doors to international monitors, while Egypt and Bahrain have refused.

Second, Albertson said that “we need to crush the myth about Egyptian non-participation.” If we put ourselves in the Egyptians shoes, we begin to see how hard participation is. Alternative voices have largely been eliminated, there is little information about candidates or their platforms and voters must go police stations to register, a highly unpleasant experience by any measure. Far too often U.S. officials excuse the behavior of the Mubarak regime by saying that the Egyptian population has some sort of innate aversion to political participation.

Dunne then opened the floor for questions. The first questioner asked how Mohamed felt about international election monitors and if he ever consults with international organizations. Mohamed responded that he believes international monitors could play an important role in the election, first by providing the world with a clear picture of the political environment in Egypt, second by giving support to domestic monitors, and finally by making it harder for the Egyptian government to rig the elections. There has been some discussion in the government about allowing some sort of low level election monitoring like in 2005 when representatives from embassies and international NGOs were allowed to visit polling places briefly. Mohamed added that international monitoring organizations have provided excellent training for Egyptians monitoring NGOs. Today Mohamed’s election monitoring alliance has over 12,000 monitors prepared to observe the election.

Another questioner asked Nawara what he thought the Obama administration should do to motivate Egypt to change. Nawara responded that the U.S. must develop a package of positive incentives for the Egyptian government including partnerships and special trade agreements that are predicated on political reforms. According to Nawara, this deal would be similar to Turkey’s EU accession process.

Next, an audience member asked where the line was between helpful international assistance and meddling in Egypt’s internal politics. Mohamed responded that while he clearly supports Egypt’s sovereignty, free and fair elections are an international norm and thus when the international community works to promote them in Egypt, it does not constitute meddling, as some in the Egyptian government argue.

In closing, Albertson said that it is important to remember that elections are fundamentally about accountability and the Egyptian government has failed to be accountable to its citizens. The Mubarak regime has not brought about development and Egyptians want real change. The question for the international community is how to play a role in this process. “We can’t stand on the sidelines,” Albertson said, adding that we must stand up and declare what we care about and what we stand for. Dunne added that how the U.S. handles the parliamentary election will almost certainly have implications for next year’s presidential election and ultimately the transfer of presidential power, however that occurs.

Over the last several months, Washington has voiced growing concerns that Turkey, under the leadership of its AKP government, may be turning away from the West.  The country’s foreign policy moves in 2010 – partnering with Brazil to co-sponsor an alternate nuclear deal with Iran and threatening to cut ties with Israel after the Gaza flotilla raid – have prompted heated discussions about its regional alignments.  At the same time, domestic developments, including the ongoing “Ergenekon” trial of retired military officers and the recent lawsuit against the Dogan media group, have raised questions about the country’s political trajectory.  The government’s proposed constitutional amendments, to be voted on next week, have only added fuel to the fire of this debate.  Critics have gone so far as to claim that after years of positive democratic development, Turkey’s current leadership is making the country less democratic.

The purpose of this event is to focus on Turkey’s political development.  Do the government’s domestic moves represent efforts to further entrench rule of law or a new quest to undermine it?  What is the state of civil and political liberties in the country today? And how would the proposed constitutional amendments impact Turkey’s political development?

Featuring:

POMED’s full notes continue below or read them as a pdf.

The panel focused on recent political developments in Turkey and explored recent concerns in Washington that Turkey, under the leadership of its AKP government, may be turning away from the West. The passage of a series of constitutional amendments on September 12th has added fire to a host of debates about the future of Turkey’s government and policy, both domestic and foreign. Panelists were asked to address the state of civil and political liberties in the country, as well as how the new constitutional amendments might affect Turkey’s political future.

In her prepared remarks, Gonul Tol contended that recent claims that Turkey is turning eastwards are simplistic and cliché. She asserted that Turkey is in many ways closer to the West than ever before, and pointed out that while considerable attention is paid to Turkey’s improved relations with Iran, little is said about Turkey’s improved relations with Serbia or other European states. She cautioned against assuming that Turkish leaders make decisions based merely on ideology, rather than national interests.

Tol said that it is important to look at the changing internal dynamics in Turkey. Although strained relations with some of its neighbors historically meant that the security establishment was the most influential actor in Turkish government, new regional dynamics have changed Turkey’s security perception. She asserted that Turkey now stresses the civil side of the civil-military balance and has prioritized the use of soft power in foreign policy. This has meant the de-militarization and de-securitization of Turkey’s relations with other states.

In addition, Tol recommended that observers not put too much stock in superficial debates about Turkish ideology. Turkey-Israel relations, for example, are based on Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, and Tol pointed out that any Turkish government would oppose attacks on Palestinians or, in another example, a military strike on Iran. She stressed that Turkey’s foreign policy reflects changes in the region, not changes in ideology. She seemed optimistic that the current leadership wants to build a more democratic Turkey – although there are still shortcomings in areas such as minority rights, Turkey is more democratic than it was 10 years ago. Tol concluded that “Turkish democracy is on the right track,” and that Turkish leaders have the same goals as Western ones, including seeing a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and arriving at a just peace of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Daniel Brumberg spoke next, and he also expressed the sense that Turkey is better off today than in the past, but that there are still some worrisome trends taking place in the country. He asked whether Turkey is more liberal today, as well as whether the recent constitutional amendments contribute to or undermine the liberalization of Turkey. Brumberg noted that democracy flourishes best when there is a clear and unified conception of national identity, and that governance becomes difficult when political winners and losers are defined along cultural or ethnic lines. In the Middle East, Brumberg asserted, societies are “profoundly divided,” and debates about the role of religion in government pervade the region. He outlined three models of how states manage difference: 1) through autocracy or totalitarianism, by which one group completely represses the other; 2) through liberalized autocracies, in which there are surface-level political processes, channels for self-expression, and elections, but in which the ruling party is always guaranteed to win; and 3) through the liberal democratic model. In the Middle East, Dr. Brumberg asserted, the dominant model is the liberal autocracy model.

He asked whether the new constitutional amendments will undermine the balance of power in Turkey, as well as whether they will have an overall liberalizing effect. Although the answer is yet to be seen, Brumberg indicated that recent events point to reasons to be concerned: for instance, the Turkish government has been aggressive in prosecuting and repressing dissent.

Next, Ambassador Pearson expressed confidence that the Turks can and will solve any domestic disagreements that they might have. He argued that recent developments in Turkey represent fundamental changes in Turkish politics, and that Islam has been a growing force in the domestic sphere for decades. The Kemalist revolution was, Pearson stressed, truly revolutionary in that it created a totally new national identity and narrative. Although the original spirit was deeply democratic, however, he noted that Kemalists began acting as a more elite cadre over time. The September 12th vote on a series of constitutional amendments, in Pearson’s view, represented a genuinely democratic move because they were generally free and fair, and there were no charges of fraud.

Pearson also reminded the audience that the U.S. understanding of internal dynamics in Turkey comes largely through the military establishment, since that is the group with which the U.S. government speaks. Pearson outlined four factors that he thinks will affect the future of Turkish politics: 1) The Kurds will try to broaden their base; 2) Institutions will need to adapt – specifically, Pearson asked what will happen in schools and the courts; 3) The anti-Americanism and even some anti-Semitism that exists in Turkey is harmful for democracy and may reveal broader trends that will hinder Turkey’s liberalization; and 4) Turkish leaders will continue to strive for EU membership.

Looking forward, Pearson predicted that Prime Minister Erdogan wishes to lead the government and will seek to become president in the 2012 elections or beyond. He also indicated that the AKP might propose a completely new constitution and use that constitution as a platform for the next elections. Pearson ended with a recommendation for U.S. policymakers: to support “a good opposition” in Turkish politics, so that alternative voices can be empowered to offer better ideas to Turkish voters.

In the question-and-answer session, Schneider asked whether any part of the referendum vote was undemocratic. Pearson responded that one shortcoming was that there was no thorough explanation of each of the 26 amendments to voters, and Tol stated that some of the amendments may be detrimental for separation of powers in the Turkish government (for example, the granting of additional executive control over the judiciary). She added that judicial impartiality is essential in Turkey, especially since Turkish courts have shut down political parties in the past. Brumberg, similarly, suggested that the courts may merely become an apparatus of the executive branch. Later in the question-and-answer session, an audience member brought up that although there was no evidence of fraud during the vote, the government has increased control over the media – to this, Pearson responded that media control was also a source of concern, both in general and in the run-up to the referendum.

Schneider also asked whether Turkey can be considered a model for democracy in the region, or an exception. Brumberg responded that Turkey is unique and should not necessarily be held up as the model of a liberal, democratic model in the Middle East. He argued that every state’s political system is path-dependent, and that Turkey should be analyzed in light of its unique history and development. Tol and Pearson responded, similarly, that Turkey is a unique case, and Pearson added that calling Turkey a model for democracy in the region would distort the role that Turks actually seek to play in the Middle East.

Schneider also asked whether the U.S. should be concerned about the referendum in terms of the implications it might have for the role of religion in Turkish politics. Tol noted that religiosity is on the rise globally and that Turkey is no exception. However, the emergence of a new identity that involves religion should not be perceived as threatening to the U.S. Brumberg said that the exact role of religion in the Turkish government will be determined by the ruling party – as such, we will have to wait and see what factions win out, and how internal decisions about the party’s identity and platform play out in policy.

One audience member asked whether the new constitutional amendments strengthened civilian control of the military, as well as minority rights. Tol responded that it is a shortcoming of the constitutional reforms that they do not address minority rights; the amendments do, however, empower civilian courts, and hold military courts more accountable.

Overall, the panelists’ remarks provoked thoughtful discussion and provided a fruitful launching point for understanding the current political dynamics in Turkey, as well as how Turkish domestic and foreign policy might develop in the near future.

The Project on Middle East Democracy and the Heinrich Böll Foundation co-hosted an event on Capitol Hill to mark the release of a new publication, The Federal Budget and Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2011: Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East. What are the most significant changes in these portions of the budget request, as compared with the appropriations made in previous years? How does the budget impact U.S. efforts to support democracy in the Middle East and North Africa?

Featuring:

Click here for POMED’s notes in PDF, or continue reading below.

Michele Dunne opened by praising Stephen McInerney for his work in producing a “very satisfying document,” one which reflects the true understanding that democracy promotion is not only about the money, but about how these programs interact and whether they reinforce or contradict each other. The report, Dunne said, does a tremendous job interpreting “the signal that the U.S. is sending to people in the Middle East – to reformers, oppositionists, young people – about where the U.S. stands in terms of democracy and human rights.”

Dunne then handed off to McInerney, who detailed particular points interest or significance within the report, and delineated a few conclusions derived from the administration’s FY11 budget request. A thorough summary of these findings can be found here.

Next, Geneive Abdo spoke about the broader issue of civil society programming through the lens of funding directed toward Iran. She observed that the “tension in the Obama administration is to not destroy relationships with regimes while also supporting democracy – this tension is most acute as it regards Iran.” Obama’s early overtures toward Iran created a lot of confusion internally. The government didn’t know how to respond to the way that the U.S. attempted to reconfigure the relationship: downplaying the commitment toward civil society, and thereby downplaying the democracy promotion component of U.S. policy that was so prominent under President Bush.

More specifically, Abdo referenced the Near East Regional Democracy (NERD) program, which addresses the issue of Internet freedom in Iran, among other countries. She highlighted one particularly poignant line in the report – which emphasizes that the decision by the Obama administration not to specifically earmark funding for Iran has some advantages, as it allows the administration flexibility to adapt to changes on the ground in Iran – to argue that the NERD program has enabled the administration to fund what it deems to be more effective. Because the regime invests vast amounts of money to severely limit online access, NERD is a very smart effort by the administration to address very specific civil society issues without bringing on the “same sort of baggage” as democracy promotion policies. Abdo believes that there is a real practical application about how the NERD funding can be used.

Shifting the discussion to the relationship between budget and policy priorities, Scott Carpenter contended that it’s still unclear to determine how strongly the administration prioritizes democracy funding relative to other forms of aid. Like the other panelists, he was rather concerned with the drastic reductions in democracy assistance funding to Egypt from FY 2006 to FY 2011 (specifically between FY08 and FY09). And even for countries with increased assistance, Carpenter worried that the nature of the bilateral assistance – specifically that it must be coordinated with internal ministries of social cooperation – might dilute some of the power of civil society and democracy programming. “It’s important to consider how those relationships are being structured,” he said, “to make sure that how the money is being used isn’t working against either our interest or their interest.”

Programs matter, Carpenter said, only to the extent that they are in support of policy – and policy needs to be directed toward expanding/enabling those programs to have an impact. “So they need to work hand in hand. Simply saying that you’re going to spend money on something, and are therefore making it a priority… I disagree with that assessment to some extent.”

He then highlighted five points that either pleased or startled him:

1. He was pleased with the administration’s decision to consolidate its support for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). “They’ve appointed real leadership to it (in the form of Tamara Wittes), they’ve increased the budget for it. So MEPI is here to stay.” However, he noted that the budget increases for MEPI are still very small, and he expected to see much larger funding given the president’s rhetoric on strong Muslim-world engagement.
2. An area of concern, he said, is that aid is “increasingly going out of business in the democracy area,” meaning that democracy promotion funding is being slowly removed from bilateral channels (USAID) under the argument that MEPI is more equipped to handle such responsibilities. However, Carpenter believes that MEPI simply isn’t being given the resources necessary to accomplish those goals – he insisted that it’s important to continue having programming through USAID since it’s still the biggest administer of aid in our foreign policy apparatus.
3. Peace and security funding makes up over three-fourths of the total Near East request. With regard to Iraq, the fact that we are significantly increasing military funding while cutting the Governing Justly and Democratically objective by half is rather concerning.
4. Although support for Internet freedom is way up – which is great – it should not cause us to ignore the “real world.” For example, Carpenter feels that the U.S. should be heavily engaged in the draft NGO law under discussion in Egypt.
5. Continuing on Egypt, Carpenter argued that the orientation of the Obama administration’s relationship with Egypt is fairly instructive for the broader Middle East. Because a transition is likely, sooner rather than later, cuts in civil society programming are problematic, as is the notion of ceasing support for “non-registered” NGOs. The “genuflection to this idea of a Mubarak endowment” may be problematic as well, since it would largely remove congressional oversight on massive amounts of funding designated for Egypt.

Next Dunne asked McInerney about the Obama administration’s shift toward giving governance assistance as opposed to civil society or political competition assistance. McInerney responded that this shift has somewhat been reversed in FY11, but not enough to nullify the larger reallocation one year ago. He thinks that it’s not entirely a conscious effort by the administration to prioritize governance aid over other programs, but this FY11 request “doesn’t do enough to dispel some of those concerns.” He also acknowledged a comment from a USAID representative who defended the cuts in civil society funding for Egypt as simply the result of much broad cuts in all economic aid to Egypt from FY08 to FY09. McInerney explained that, while accurate, this assessment doesn’t account for the Bush administration’s programmatic plan in 2009 that sought to preserve democracy and civil society funding disproportionately over other programs that were to be cut. The Obama administration changed this plan, he said, which meant that civil society and democracy promotion funding was cut alongside other elements of the budget.

In response to a question regarding the role of the U.S. and the National Endowment for Democracy in monitoring the upcoming Egyptian elections, McInerney argued that the NED has fairly strong support, but it’s unclear how actively involved it will be in the upcoming elections. If the draft NGO law is passed, that will tremendously increase Egypt’s restrictions on an already heavily restricted NGO community.

One audience member asked if military spending for Egypt is a “sacred cow,” to which McInerney replied that military aid to Egypt has been constant at $1.3 billion every year since 1987, and it’s now part of a 10-year agreement that began in 2008. With regard to restrictions on NGOs in Egypt, Carpenter maintained that the U.S. government shouldn’t be focused as much on programs, but rather on policy – “saying clearly to Egyptian officials that this is something the president is very concerned about.”

McInerney responded to a question about the West Bank and Gaza by reporting that democracy programming has increased overall, particularly for institutions within the Palestinian Authority. “Generally speaking,” he said, “there’s a perception there’s been in some senses progress on rule of law in the two territories, but maybe a deterioration with regard to human rights.” This reflects the notion that the administration has focused more on rule of law and less on human rights and political expression.

Finally, a representative from the Egyptian embassy challenged earlier assertions about Egypt’s Emergency Law and draft NGO legislation, saying that there is little evidence that the 6 April Youth protesters were arrested under the Emergency Law or that the government is making the NGO law a priority. Carpenter responded that “from political perception point of view, whenever such arrests take place, emergency law issues always come up. So in the context of Mubarak’s own campaign pledge, we’d think that maybe he’d want to have a deliverable for the Egyptian people [of a new anti-terrorist law].” On the NGO law issue, Carpenter noted that no one from the ruling NDP has publically stated opposition to the legislation. And when we see these kinds of leaks, it’s natural to see a huge reaction from the human rights community because it fits with a pattern of behavior.

The Project on Middle East Democracy and the Safadi Foundation USA hosted an event to discuss the implications of “connection technologies” for U.S. foreign policy. The year 2009 witnessed an explosion of Internet-based activism in the political cultures of the Middle East. The Use of information and communication technology (ICT) has been a transformative tool in strengthening civil society and expanding the outreach of independent voices. What types of U.S. assistance are needed to empower young reformers committed to non-sectarian politics? What is the role of ICT in promoting inter-faith dialogue and peace building? To answer things questions, Mona Yacoubian, Director of the Lebanon Working Group at USIP, moderated a discussion featuring Jared Cohen, a member of Secretary Clinton’s Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State. Elias Muhanna, the other expected panelist and publisher of the widely read blog www.qifanabki.com, was unable to attend due to the recent birth of his daughter.

For full notes in PDF, click here. Otherwise, continue reading below.

Jared Cohen opened by chronicling the massive proliferation of ICT in the Middle East over the last seven years. “The Middle East has the second fastest growing internet market in the world,” he reported, “and one of the fastest growing cell phone markets.” Noting the significant generation gap between demographic usages of technology, Cohen stressed that young people in Lebanon and elsewhere “will learn to use [these technologies] more innovatively than others” – a dynamic which may present new opportunities for U.S. policymakers.

Although he conceded that “technology doesn’t itself choose sides and can be used for good or bad,” Cohen suggested that it would be unwise for the U.S. to withdraw from this emerging space out of fear that ICT can be used for nefarious purposes. “Technology is impacting civil society,” he said. “It’s not changing how big it is, but rather how visible, expansive, and inclusive it is.” For that reason, and with the understanding that young people increasingly share a universal ICT language, he urged a much more serious engagement in this area in order to influence and perhaps even control the orientation of these forces. Groups like Hamas and Hezbollah aren’t shy about using these tools to recruit and disseminate propaganda, and Cohen sees the need for a counterweight to push back and provide similar tools to those who strongly disavow extremism.

“Where does this leave us in the context of U.S. policy?” he asked. “It used to be that when we talked about new media, it meant using technology to connect people with information, which is great for things like government advocacy and messaging. The second stage was social media – connecting individuals with each other – and that started to impact how the U.S. thought about civil society. It impacted the sort of democracy assistance we gave to grassroots organizations; connecting traditional grants with non-traditional civil society entities that wouldn’t even exist without technology. The third phase of this development was connection technologies – the larger universe of technologies — which provided a way to connect to people, resources, and other forms of information simultaneously. There’s not a single part of U.S. policy toward Lebanon that should not have a connection technology element.”

Cohen also insisted that both traditional and non-traditional civil society entities can learn from each other’s expertise – “I’ve always said that the 20th century could use a swift kick in the butt from the 21st century, and the 21st century could use a swift kick in the butt from the 20th century.”

With that said, he does see some challenges in how the U.S. can integrate technology vis-à-vis Lebanon. But he thinks that if the U.S. truly wants to provide better access to various social services to defuse the power of extremist groups, it needs to work with NGOs to make ICT more accessible.

Perhaps most importantly, Cohen contends that emerging technologies and social media facilitate a free exchange of ideas, empowering individuals in ways they wouldn’t be otherwise and allowing them to hold officials accountable for their actions. And as it relates to violent extremism, “If connection technology is an increasingly used tool by Hamas and Hezbollah, there’s no reason not to try to influence this space.”

Following Cohen’s presentation, Mona Yacoubian shared what she believes are three crucial points:

1. We need to understand this as a value-neutral tool, not a transformative force – in order for them to facilitate an agenda or ideology, there need to be the following preexisting conditions: a vibrant civil society; an engaged public; and a government that, even if not pro-reform, is not capable of quashing reform.
2. Emerging media can also be a force for ill, helping to accelerate authoritarianism and religious extremism.
3. With respect to Lebanon and sectarianism, it’s important to be aware of the power of emerging media to entrench sectarianism as well.

In a response to a question about the wisdom of U.S. officials continuing to use radio and television even though those mediums are increasingly competitive, Cohen insisted that policy-makers need to focus upon dissemination – “if no one sees it, it doesn’t matter,” meaning that if emerging technologies are more easily accessible to large swaths of the population, those tools need to be prioritized. He also addressed a question on technology in the Palestinian territories by proposing a plan for “micro-engineering loans,” which would encourage people and companies in the U.S. to request coding services from anyone around the world, particularly in the W. Bank and Gaza where there’s an abundance of talented software engineers looking for work.

Cohen also addressed the issue of online chat rooms serving as forums for radicalization, saying that while it’s certainly a concern, at least it’s happening in the public domain “where people can monitor and stop it.” He pointed to an organization in Great Britain that enters these forums to provide a counterbalance and pitch moderate views, but conceded that there’s no perfect solution. Nonetheless, he maintained that the prerequisite for U.S. ICT support “should not be whether individuals like our policies or not – it should be whether they are pro- or anti-extremism.” Sometimes the most credible people are adamantly opposed to our policies, he said, but we need to empower them as voices of moderation to provide counter-narratives.

On July 28th, POMED and the Heinrich Böll Foundation released a new publication, The Federal Budget and Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010: Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East, written by POMED’s Director of Advocacy Stephen McInerney.  McInerney presented the report’s findings, launching a discussion with Thomas Melia of Freedom House and Marina Ottaway of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Andrew Albertson, Executive Director of POMED, moderated.

McInerney highlighted the report’s key conclusions, that the Obama administration’s first annual budget requests significant increases for overall foreign assistance to the Broader Middle East and North Africa, including large increases for democracy and governance assistance.  These increases are especially focused in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, but the remaining countries and programs in the region also receive increased democracy and goverance funding, with the notable exceptions of Egypt and Jordan.

Tom Melia warned against drawing conclusions too broadly based on budget numbers alone, and he asked whether this budget can truly be seen to represent the approach of the new administration, which has yet to fill many key positions, including the administrator of USAID.  Marina Ottaway questioned the effectiveness of spending large sums of money on democracy and goverance programs in the region if they are unaccompanied by diplomatic pressure and other policy support.

Click here for POMED’s notes on the event, or continue reading below:

Stephen McInerney began by arguing that the numbers in the FY2010 foreign operations budget indicate the priorities of the Obama administration. This assuaged prior fears that the administration would distance it self from democracy promotion to avoid any policy echoing the parlance of President Bush. McInerney highlighted the report’s main conclusions:

• The budget request contains large increases for democracy and governance across the broader Middle East and North Africa. The proposed funding for the region ($1.54 billion) is more than double the FY2009 request.

• Democracy and governance funding comprise 14 percent of total assistance for the region, the highest percentage yet.

• The most dramatic increases in funding for democracy and governance will be to Afghanistan and Pakistan, which includes a tenfold increase in aid to civil society groups. This signals that the administration’s priorities in these countries are not limited to military operations, but will also focus on building government institutions and supporting independent civil society actors.

• Increases for civil society are seen in the Arab world, where funding for civil society is cut by 29 percent, and is cut most severely in Egypt and Jordan. This demonstrates that the administration, while committed to funding for democracy across the region as a whole, is shifting toward working directly with governments.

• The budget contains robust funds for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), both signature initiatives of the Bush Administration that have shown success after initial difficulties.

• In recent years, Congress has granted less than requested for MCC and MEPI. The appropriations process shows that this Congressional outlook has changed and that Congress is more amenable to granting funding under the Obama Administration.

• McInerney also examined the Near East Regional Democracy Fund (NERD), introduced in March. At the outset, NERD funds will be directly particularly toward Iran, but the program will enjoy a great deal of flexibility, allowing it to adapt readily to conditions on the ground and shift funds elsewhere as necessary.

Tom Melia reviewed his observations about the budget request, noting his hesitation in drawing large conclusions about policy from budget numbers. Nevertheless, he conceded that the request conveys to domestic and international audiences U.S. public diplomacy and foreign policy priorities.

Given the twin crises in Honduras and Iran, Melia asserted that President Obama’s appreciation for democracy has “crystallized” a conclusion that elections by citizens matter, even if the victor is a party with a platform unaligned with U.S. interests. But he warned that well-intentioned civil society aid in the Middle East that is traced back to Washington can undermine the credibility of civil society actors the U.S. is trying to help.

Melia focused on the budget request’s major funding for USAID initiatives, asking who at USAID—where there are many vacant political appointments—wrote the budget request. He questioned whether the request actually signals a shift in policy or if it is political inertia continuing from the previous administration.

In reference to the request’s Governing Justly and Democratically category, Melia commented that major increases in the war zones in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq amount to 47 percent of all global GJD spending. While this demonstrates a focus on democracy in important post-conflict countries, it also draws funding away from successful democracy promotion programs in other countries. The policies are counterintuitive, claimed Melia, as aid is going to war zones with bad democratic records rather than to key allies such as Jordan and Egypt.

Marina Ottaway questioned how effective the funds for democracy and governance allocated to the Middle East are, in light of the closing of political space across the region in recent years. Doubting whether outside funding could successfully trigger domestic reform, she emphasized the “closure” of any sort of the “Arab Spring” that was heralded five years ago.

Attempting to gauge U.S. policy in the Middle East under the Obama Administration, she argued, is much like “reading tea leaves.” Ottaway nevertheless agreed with McInerney’s description of an emphasis in state-to-state relations. When it comes to democracy promotion, however, the relationship of society to the state must also be taken into account. When we ask governments to make “confidence building” steps toward accountability and reform, which requires massive concessions from their perspective, the U.S. cannot then pressure them to simultaneously cooperate with the U.S. For example, in Egypt, the U.S. has dropped democracy promotion efforts to enhance its relations with the regime, she claimed.

“Closure” in the Middle East political landscape, in conjunction with a U.S. diplomatic track focusing on state-to-state relations, means that funding for democracy programs are unlikely to have much impact, she argued. Optimists will endorse democratic aid nonetheless, continuing to “wave the flag of democracy” in all weather, but pessimists, she said, think it is a waste of time.

Andrew Albertson asked the panelists what they hoped to see in the budget request for next year. Melia expressed hopes that the FY2010 funds will be praised as having been “spent well,” while Ottaway insisted that a clearer statement of U.S. policy priorities for democracy beyond the request will be necessary. McInerney noted that he hopes to see further increases in democracy and governance spending accompanied by diplomatic and policy tools, as well as a reversal in cuts to democracy and governance funding in Egypt and Jordan and to independent civil society actors.

As the most populous Arab country, Egypt has long played a unique role in the Middle East and has been an important U.S. ally in the region. Egypt was also seen as a key focal point of the Bush administration’s “freedom agenda,” with U.S. pressure to reform hailed as leading to political openings by 2005. However, more recently, the Egyptian government has taken a series of regressive steps with regard to respect for human rights and the rule of law.  Numerous political activists and dissidents remain in Egyptian prisons on dubious charges, including former presidential candidate Ayman Nour and members of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Most recently, leading political reform activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim was sentenced in absentia to two years in prison on charges of “tarnishing Egypt’s reputation.”

What is the extent of Egypt’s regression on human rights and rule of law? What actions has the Egyptian government taken in this regard? Against what political backdrop are such steps being taken? What has been the role of the Egyptian judiciary in this regard? What are the consequences of such steps on the Egyptian political scene and the prospect for stability in Egypt? How has the U.S. government reacted to the deterioration of the rule of law in Egypt? What policy options are available for addressing these issues?  And what may we expect in the months and years ahead in Egypt?

Panelists:

Michele Dunne, Senior Associate and Editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of the September/October 2008 article “A Post-Pharaonic Egypt” in the American Interest

Neil Hicks, International Policy Advisor for Human Rights First and former Director of the Human Rights Defenders Program

Marc Lynch, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where he teaches courses on Middle Eastern politics and international relations

Ambassador Nicholas Veliotes, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt and Jordan

Moderated by Stephen McInerney, Director of Advocacy, Project on Middle East Democracy

Event Details:

Wednesday, September 10, 2008
2:00 – 3:30 pm
Cannon House Office Building, Room 210

Click here to read a summary of the event

Click here to view a video recording of the event

For POMED’s full notes on the discussion, click here.

Thursday, July 24, 2008
2:00 – 3:30 pm
Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2212

In Turkey, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) stands accused of undermining Turkish secularism and is currently embroiled in a legal case that could see the party closed down and its leading figures, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül, banned from party politics for five years. In what some are calling a “judicial coup d’état,” the legal case against the party is widely expected to succeed. Such an outcome would likely have far-reaching consequences not only for Turkey’s fragile democracy, but also for a variety of other countries and political actors across the Middle East.

Just how likely is it that the AKP will be shut down? What might the domestic consequences be for Turkey to see its ruling party closed down and the country’s democratically elected leaders removed from office? What impact could this have on the ongoing Israel-Syria negotiations facilitated by the AKP-led Turkish government? How might Turkey’s bid to join the European Union be affected? How would the banning of the AKP be viewed by other political actors across the region? How has the United States reacted to the closure case, and what effects could this issue have on both U.S.-Turkish relations and on the credibility of American efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East?

Please join us for a panel discussion with:

Abdullah Akyuz, President of TUSIAD-US, the United States office of the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. He was previously the Executive Vice-Chairman of the Istanbul Stock Exchange.

Bulent Aliriza, Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Director of CSIS’s Turkey project. He was previously a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and also served as a diplomat in New York and Washington.

Ömer Taşpınar, Professor of National Security Strategy at the U.S. National War College and Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, where he directs Brookings’ Turkey Project. He is also the author of the 2005 book, Political Islam and Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey.

Moderated by Stephen McInerney, Director of Advocacy, Project on Middle East Democracy