Bahrain at the Boiling Point? Failed Reforms, Mounting Frustration

Thursday, May 3, 2012
3:00-4:30pm
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

Despite claims by the Government of Bahrain that it is implementing the recommendations of last year’s Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report, ”reforms have only scratched the surface,” according to Amnesty International, and the situation on the ground in Bahrain has clearly continued to worsen. Prominent human rights activist Abdulhadi Alkhawaja remains in detention and has entered his 11th week of hunger strike, having declared: “dying with dignity is better than living in humiliation.” His case has helped bring protesters to the streets en masse in Bahrain and around the world calling for his release. Meanwhile, the Government of Bahrain’s insistence on holding the recent Formula One Grand Prix as planned sparked “Three Days of Rage” demonstrations across the country, which were met with violence and involved the killing of at least one person. All of these events have heightened fears that escalating tensions could soon erupt in more widespread violence and more serious internal conflict.

What steps towards reform has the Bahraini regime taken, and how meaningful are those steps? What remains to be done, both to address immediate human rights concerns and and to move towards broader institutional reforms? What are the central demands of activists and protesters in Bahrain today? At this point, what are the prospects for genuine dialogue between the government and the opposition? What are the risks if genuine political progress is not made? And what steps can the U.S. administration take to help encourage the implementation of needed reforms and to support the nonviolent resolution of political conflict in Bahrain?

Featuring:

Joost Hiltermann
Deputy Program Director for the Middle East and North Africa, International Crisis Group
Khalil Al-Marzooq
Former Member of Parliament (Al-Wefaq), Former First Deputy Speaker of Parliamentand Assistant Secretary-General of Al-Wefaq for Political Affairs
Tom Malinowski
Washington Director, Human Rights Watch
 Moderator: Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, POMED

For notes on this event, continue reading below.

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On Thursday, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted an event by the Project on Middle East Democracy titled “Bahrain at the Boiling Point? Failed Reforms, Mounting Frustration.” In light of recent developments in the Gulf Nation, the event was held to address the progress toward reform thus far, the steps that need to be taken next, and the role of the U.S. in moving toward a peaceful political solution. Panelists were Joost Hiltermann, deputy program director for the Middle East and North Africa at the International Crisis Group, Khalil Al-Marzooq, Former Member of Parliament and now a member of Al Wefaq, and Tom Malinowski, the Washington director of Human Rights Watch. The panel was moderated by POMED Executive Director Stephen McInerney.

For the full text of the notes, continue reading below or click here for the PDF

Joost Hiltermann acknowledged that the recommendations set forth in the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report take hard work and extensive effort, but said the government has fallen too far short of implementation. Hiltermann saw three salient issues: there are political prisoners still in jail, there is no level of accountability for security forces (particularly high level), and there is no minority representation in the security forces. Discussing the reforms, he said, “the regime does not seem to have its heart in it, and I assure you, it doesn’t.” He then discussed the opposition, and said the Bahraini government has changed the narrative: last year, Bahrain’s uprising was simply the next chapter of the Arab Spring. Today, the government has pushed a sectarian narrative that portrays the opposition as a Shia movement that is Iranian-backed. “The notion that Iran is involved is without evidence,” he said. In closing, Hiltermann emphasized that the regime must seriously consider implementing the BICI recommendations and make solid strides toward political dialogue. Regarding the opposition, he urged clear and public condemnations of any violence from protesters to maintain credibility of a peaceful movement.

Khalil Al-Marzooq stressed the sincerity of the opposition in wanting a democracy. He said Bahrainis are living in a state that does not provide security for its citizens, and oppresses anyone that opposes it. He stated that every element of the government and society are formed in a way that serves the ruling family, not the people. He blamed this institutionalized flaw for the failure of John Yates and John Timoney to truly reform the security system; “the system doesn’t allow for that,” he said. Al-Marzooq asked the international community: what do you want to see? You can wait and see how this “match” plays out, or you can support the calls for democracy. He concluded by emphasizing that the opposition is very open to dialogue as long as it is credible – such as the one the international community is calling for.

Tom Malinowski recounted his arrest during his most recent trip to Bahrain, in which he believes the foreign presence deterred any mistreatment. Based on interviews he did with Bahrainis during his visit, he can confirm the ongoing mistreatment of protesters and detainees. One positive result of the BICI report, he said, is that there has been a significant reduction in abuse and torture within police stations. However, that abuse has now been pushed out into the streets, and protesters continue to be mistreated after being arrested. Malinowski said reform implementation has “hit a brick wall,” citing Abdulhadi al-Khawaja and other political prisoners still detained as an example. He reminded the audience: when demonstrators are met with violence, they do not run away; they become more desperate and more determined. He concluded with four recommendations: the King must begin by releasing all political prisoners in order to pave the way for further reforms; the U.S. must unwaveringly call for all BICI recommendations to be implemented to the fullest; the U.S. should, at least in private, explain that time is running out for the Bahraini government to reform; the Fifth Fleet gives the U.S. leverage to say that the navy presence is not sustainable if a peaceful political solution is not attained.

Egypt’s Transition: Military Rule, Human Rights Challenges, and U.S. Policy Choices

Wednesday, March 28, 2012
12:30-2:00pm
Stimson Center

The Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East co-hosted a panel discussion about Egypt’s ongoing transition and U.S. policy options. Under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), thousands of civilians have been tried in military courts, bloggers and activists have been imprisoned for criticizing state policies, detainees have been tortured, tensions between Muslim and Christian communities have risen, and nongovermental organizations have been harassed and prosecuted. Tensions between Egypt’s military and the U.S. have also been exacerbated recently by attacks on international and Egyptian civil society organizations. There will be a new Egyptian president elected in May and the military will formally relinquish control, but the U.S. must decide now whether to continue aid to the military.

What are the military interests that have shaped the first year of Egypt’s transition from authoritarianism? How will they change once Egypt has an elected president and new cabinet and the military formally returns to the barracks? What are the U.S. interests that guide the longstanding relationship with the Egyptian military? And how should the U.S. look at the relationship with Egypt once there is a new civilian government?

We were particularly excited to welcome Egyptian blogger and activist Maikel Nabil to the panel. Maikel has been outspoken about human rights violations committed under the SCAF’s rule and about corruption inside the military, and he founded the ‘No Compulsory Military Service’ movement in 2009. After being arrested in March 2011 and undergoing a form of hunger strike for over 5 months, Maikel was finally pardoned and released in January 2012.

Featuring:

Maikel Nabil
Egyptian Blogger and Activist
Shana Marshall
Research Fellow, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University
Michele Dunne
Director, Hariri Middle East Center, Atlantic Council
 Moderator: Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, POMED
For notes on this event, continue reading below.
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On Wednesday, The Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East co-hosted a panel discussion focused on Egypt’s ongoing transition and U.S. policy options. The panel featured Shana Marshall, research fellow at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Maikel Nabil, an Egyptian blogger and activist, and Michele Dunne, Director of the Hariri Middle East Center at the Atlantic Council.

For the full text of notes, continue reading below or click here for the PDF

Shana Marshall discussed the role of the military in both the domestic and international economy of Egypt. Marshall focused on incentive contracts (also known as offset agreements), which is a component of international defense trade that requires a portion of the defense contract sale value to be reinvested in the domestic civilian economy of that country. The issue with Egypt, however, is that “arms contracts are providing complementary incentives to the Egyptian military over and above what the arms contract transfers.” She also said Egypt’s military has a strategic method of diversifying its economic portfolio, and that as a result, it has a significant amount of control and influence over the economy. The question then, she said, is “to what extent can the military steer politics in Egypt when it has so much influence in different markets?”

Maikel Nabil discussed three points: Egypt is not adhering to the peace treaty with Israel, or the Camp David Accords; Egypt is not undergoing a real democratic transition; there is no foundation for a long-term U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship. Nabil argued that there is still significant anti-Israel propaganda in schools and state-run media, which is in violation of the peace treaty, and the continued crackdown on freedom of speech is a violation of the Camp David Accords. He said, “Democracy is more than a polling booth,” and using his own arrest as an example, he insisted that divergent opinions are considered a crime. Lastly, he described the continued relationship between the U.S. and Egypt as “strange,” particularly given the deterioration of the NGO situation as the crisis continued. Nabil argued that U.S. citizens are not safe in Egypt, U.S. organizations cannot operate peacefully, Egyptian state media runs propaganda campaigns defaming the U.S., and there are few shared values between the two countries. While wanting to enhance the relationship between the U.S. and Egypt, Nabil said that in order to solve the problem one must recognize that there is one.

Michele Dunne spoke about the uncertainty of Egypt’s future, especially politically. The U.S.-Egypt relationship is off-balance and too dependent on the security sector, and Dunne believes that relationship may get worse before it gets better. Dunne argued that the U.S. is missing the moment of getting involved in Egypt’s transition in a meaningful way by not voicing its willingness to revitalize the bilateral relationship and work toward long-term transition goals. By failing in this regard, “The U.S. is clinging to old assumptions about its relationship with Egypt, and is reluctant to rethink it.” Drawing on recent polls, Egyptians are frustrated with the lack of U.S. support, and not just concerning military aid.

During Q&A, an audience member asked about the steps that can be taken to move the economy away from being militarily dominated, and panelists were asked to comment on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’ (SCAF) pardon of Ayman NourMarshall said there is nothing “inherently wrong” with a military dominated economy, rather, the problem arises when that influence is used as political leverage.  Dunne said Nour’s pardon is positive, because it restored his political rights; however, Dunne does not see Nour as being a front-runner in the upcoming Presidential Elections.

Another question was raised about the. Dunne addressed the U.S.’ ability to use its military aid as leverage that aid could definitely have been used as leverage to push along democratic reform, but Secretary of State Hillary Clinton chose to not use that leverage when she waived the conditions.“What is the point of having leverage of we’re never going to use it?” asked Dunne. 

The Success Story of the Arab Spring? An Update on Tunisia’s Transition

Wednesday, February 29, 2012
12:30-2:00pm
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Following Tunisia’s widely applauded elections for a National Constituent Assembly last October, the country has made considerable progress towards writing a constitution and has initiated much-needed reforms of some state institutions. A number of challenges remain, however, as ongoing economic difficulties and high unemployment continue to bring frustrated demonstrators to the street, media freedom remains a source of concern, and essential reforms to the security sector have yet to take place. What have been the most significant political and economic developments in Tunisia since its elections? What achievements have Tunisians made, and what challenges remain? What are the main priorities of the country’s National Constituent Assembly and of local civil society? And what role can international actors continue to play in supporting the transition?

We are especially excited to welcome Tunisian activist and former candidate for the National Constituent Assembly Omezzine Khelifa to speak on these and other issues. Ms. Khelifa is also one of three recipients of POMED’s 2012 Leaders for Democracy Award.

Featuring:

Omezzine Khelifa
Tunisian civil society activist and former candidate for Tunisia’s National Constituent Assembly (Ettakatol Party)
 Mohamed Malouche
President, Tunisian American Young Professionals
 Alexis Arieff
Africa Analyst, Congressional Research Service
 Moderator: Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, POMED
For notes on this event, continue reading below.
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On Wednesday, the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) hosted a panel at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to address the progress that Tunisia has made thus far in its democratic transition, and to discuss the challenges that lie ahead. Panelists were Omezzine Khelifa, Tunisian civil society activist and former candidate for Tunisia’s National Constituent Assembly (Ettakatol Party), Mohamed Malouche, president of Tunisian American Young Professionals, and Alexis Arieff, Africa Analyst at the Congressional Research Service. The moderator was Stephen McInerney, executive director of POMED.

To read the full text of the event notes, continue reading below or click here for the PDF

Omezzine Khelifa described the current situation as very delicate, and discussed both the accomplishments of Tunisia’s transitional government to this point and the challenges it must address to successfully move forward. In talking about the latest electoral dynamics and the constitutional drafting process, Khelifa said 27 percent of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) seats were allotted for women, which is a significant step toward democracy. Furthermore, a positive relationship has been established between the transitional President Moncef Marzouki and the NCA, similar to that of the U.S. President and parliament. Marzouki was elected by members of the NCA to lead the country in holding future elections and drafting a new constitution. Khelifa said there are three challenges facing the transitional government: security reform, unemployment, and transitional justice. “Tunisia’s youth are very educated,” she said, but employment opportunities are scarce and the youth are losing hope in their government. In addition, Tunisians are unaccustomed to trusting their judicial system; therefore the government must implement the rule of law and alleviate their fears. Lastly, Khelifa said freedom of expression is still limited and the media should be free to criticize the government without concern of threats or being shut down.

Mohamed Malouche spoke mainly about the dire need for economic growth in Tunisia. Foreign investment has decreased by 30 percent, which is expected he said, “but now investors are in a ‘wait and see’ mode.” Malouche described a negative “feedback loop” where sit-ins and protests about high levels of unemployment are not conducive to economic growth and in fact are counterproductive for achieving those desired outcomes. While importantly noting that there is no single panacea to Tunisia’s economic woes, Malouche offered some possible solutions to the crisis, including a recommendation that the government clearly outline  goals to provide employment opportunities and immediately begin  its planned infrastructure projects (which provide tangible and visible evidence of progress), and that it encourage an environment that fosters entrepreneurship, particularly among the youth. He also recommended that the government utilize its electoral legitimacy more to reassure local and foreign investors that Tunisia is “predictably stable” (meaning that it may not always have stability in the short-term, but that its highly educated and pacifistic population grants Tunisia stability over the long term). Finally, Malouche emphasized the support system that the Tunisian diaspora in the U.S. has developed, actively backing investment and economic growth to encourage long-term sustainability.

Alexis Arieff discussed the U.S. and international community’s policies toward Tunisia as they relate to supporting its democratic transition. She began by statingprior to 2011, bilateral aid to Tunisia was very modest by regional standards, but the Obama administration has been supportive of democracy in Tunisia and is hopeful that its transition will continue to serve as a leading model for its neighbors and will grant opportunities to deepen the U.S-Tunisia bilateral relationship. As Tunisia’s regional role grows (the Friends of Syria meeting held in Tunis being one example), the challenge will continue to be anticipating new events and being able to support them financially when necessary. Some ways the administration has creatively developed more support for Tunisia (without needing Congress to make new appropriations- a great challenge given the strict budget climate) is by re-establishing the Peace Corps program there, making Tunisia eligible for support from the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and expanding educational and cultural exchange programs. In addition, the U.S. has continued to back the efforts of multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund. The E.U. is also reworking its outreach framework toward the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries to create stronger partnerships than it had in the past. The biggest challenge facing the international community, Arieff argued, is coordination, but she believes it is a challenge that will be overcome.

During the Q&A session, the moderator first asked about the perception of international actors from Tunisians’ points of view. Malouche said the reputation of the U.S. is improving even post-revolution, as it has been regarded as a fair and supportive external actor. Both Malouche and Khelifa emphasized the need for technical and training support as well as civil society empowerment and civic education. Khelifa said there is a lack of cultural discussion and would like to see more cultural exchange both within the different regions of Tunisia and internationally. On a related note, a question was raised about the fine line between international support and international interference. Khelifa said transparency in foreign aid both from the U.S. government and the Tunisian government would help ameliorate skepticism that there are hidden agendas or personal motives involved.

Another audience member asked the panel to elaborate on security sector reform and transitional justice. Khelifa said that to some degree, Tunisians want to see some level of accountability for their actions, especially for high-level authorities who worked for former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.. Arieff agreed with Khelifa that security sector reform is one of the most difficult challenges ahead, particularly because of the extensive network throughout the country Interior Ministry had established over the years. Another audience remark was made about the importance of praising the army for indirectly causing Ben Ali’s ouster by refusing to attack protesters, and for subsequently not seizing political power when an opportunity presented itself during the revolution.

There was a question raised about the role of women in the Tunisian revolutions and how those roles will remain the same or change with post-revolution rebuilding. Khelifa agreed with Malouche’s assessment that Tunisian women are carefully scrutinizing every action of the government, and would never sacrifice their rights or freedoms. She also explained that women’s rights are very progressive relative to the rest of the region. Polygamy is outlawed, and women have had the right to vote and have abortions, just to name a few long-standing freedoms, she said. Although there are undoubtedly challenges that face women, 62 percent of Tunisians with degrees are women, and in terms of gender, it is a very united and integrated society. 

Turkish Democracy: A Model Abroad, Troubled at Home?

Wednesday, February 22, 2012
10:00am-11:30am
Stimson Center

In the past few years, Turkey has played an increasingly important role on the world stage and in particular, the Arab world, where it has supported democratic uprisings in the region and become an attractive model for Muslim countries undergoing transitions. With increasing repression at home, however, there seems to be a widening gap between Turkey’s international image and its domestic record. The ruling Justice and Development party (AKP) won its third straight parliamentary elections this past June, but has veered away from the reforms that made the party so popular ten years ago. Indeed, the imprisonment of journalists, Kurdish activists, and other government critics threatens to undermine the tremendous strides Turkey has made on its path toward democracy. Now as Turkey strives to become a regional power, it is important to take stock of Turkey’s own democratic credentials. What is the state of Turkey’s democratization process? After ten years of single party rule, what are the dynamics between the AKP and other centers of power? How can the U.S. capitalize on its improved relations with the AKP government to play a constructive role in Turkey’s democratic development?

Featuring:

Sinan Ciddi
Executive Director, Institute of Turkish Studies

Howard Eissenstat
Assistant Professor, St. Lawrence University;
Turkey Country Specialist, Amnesty International

Ambassador Ross Wilson
Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council

Moderator: Daphne McCurdy
Senior Research Associate, POMED

For full event notes, continue reading below or click here for the PDF

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Daphne Mccurdy introduced the topic to the panel, summarizing the current state of Turkish politics. Turkey’s role in the region is expanding and Turkey has recently received a lot of positive attention do to its “dynamic” foreign policy. However, “we should not lose site of the developments of their [Turkey’s] own democracy,” said McCurdy. A series of arrests and subsequent detentions have called into question the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) commitment to democratization.

Dr. Sinan Ciddi delivered a series of criticisms concerning the AKP’s behavior with regards to the promised development of a new constitution, the state of judiciary, and the National Intelligence Organizations’ recent wave of arrests. He stated that the AKP’s dominance of Turkish politics has “shocked even the most speculative of analysts.” The same analysts have begun to project Turkey as a model for the transitioning Arab countries to follow due to its ability to develop a strong, secular national government that is built on economic strength. However, Ciddi is skeptical of the idea that Turkey can and should be used as a model to be exported internationally. “Three quarters of the constitution implemented in 1982 has been amended,” according to Ciddi who referred to the process as a “sham.” Cidi said he was “skeptical” that the AKP promise of a more open society, increased civil liberties, and minority freedoms will ever come into fruition due to suspicion surrounding the intentions of the party and the general feelings of the public that the government is attempting to expand its own power by transforming the political body from a parliamentary to a presidential system. Ciddi stated that the real opposition to the AKP is the judiciary, which he said has challenged the authority and has even threatened to “shut it down.” In response, the AKP party has attempted to change policies on the appointment of judges and prosecution figures. In doing so, Ciddi believes that the government has corrupted and politicized the judiciary “in order to get its own way.” Ciddi briefly discussed the “Ergenekon” controversy in which the AKP has arrested multitudes of high profile leaders, academics, students, and journalists for unsubstantiated charges of attempting to “bring down the government.” Unwarranted arrests, Ciddi said, are “deteriorating credibility” of the AKP in the electorate. The AKP, said Ciddi, is focused on “bringing down the opposition” instead of focusing on democratization.  Other controversies such as the alleged split between the AKP and the Gulen movement have been discussed in the press but nonetheless remain unsubstantiated.

Howard Eissenstat credited the AKP party with making huge strides in political and economic development. “Close to 100% of the Turkish people believe that free elections are the only way to have a government,” said Eissenstat. Over the last 20 years, the AKP party members have proven that they are not Islamists and Putin-style cronyism does not permeate their bureaucracy. According to Eissenstat, much of the problems the AKP faces are “intrinsic of Turkish political power.” He believes that the AKP’s turn to nationalistic/militaristic rhetoric is historically characteristic of Turkish politics. Eissenstat alleged three parts to the latest crackdown on political dissidents. First, he contended that the initial arrests did prosecute actual criminal activity, but he sees the latest crackdown as a result of hysteric investigation that “has gone badly off the rails.”Secondly, he noted that thousands had been arrested for affiliation with violent movements or individuals, but have not plotted or perpetrated a violent crime. The arrests are wide-ranging, people are detained without trial or access to evidence, and more and more are being held for being critical of the government. Finally, he concluded by saying that the AKP party is creating a “culture of censorship” as media outlets become increasingly hesitant to criticize the government.

Ross Wilson discussed Turkey on two fronts: Turkey as a model in the region and internal issues of democracy and human rights. Wilson said Turkey’s history is “much too troubled to wish that model on anybody.” However, the model is nonetheless successful and thus makes it an attractive aspiration of the people in the Arab world currently undergoing political transitions. Turkey has achieved an “astounding” amount of economic success and developed a representative government. However, Wilson stated that Turkey still is “not a liberal democracy” and reminded the audience “not to lose sight of Turkish politics as being ‘a contact sport.’” Wilson voiced serious concerns with respect to human rights abuses. The attacks on the freedom of the press, with hundreds of journalists sitting in jail, stretch the credibility of the party. “The most effective driver of democracy in Turkey are the Turks,” said Wilson. The “vibrant debate” that exists on all issues in Turkish society is an encouraging sign, according to Wilson. Wilson concluded saying that the U.S. role, although complicated, needs to be aware of “becoming partisan” in Turkish political battles. He clarified this position responding to a question about how the U.S. could capitalize on AKP dominance. He stated that the U.S. should speak with a “high degree of generality” concerning issues like freedom of the press, and should refrain involving itself in micro-level issues, which Wilson said could be construed as “U.S. meddling.”

The panel answered questions from the audience concerning the rights of women and minorities in Turkey, allegations concerning the dispute between the AKP and Gulen movements, and prospects for intervention in Syria. Eissenstat stated that while women’s rights have improved, women still face an increase in violence and prejudice with respect to equality in society and the judicial system.Wilson responded to a question concerning the prospect of military intervention in Syria. He said that while “military-led regime change” is not an option, Turkey may be looking at setting up humanitarian corridors in the periphery. Ciddi concurred and said that any intervention would involve the use of Turkey as a “credible source” and said that through support of the international community, Turkey’s apprehension of intervening would be alleviated. Eissenstat “does not see the Turkish military going across the border,” but noted the extent to which the intervention movement was supported by some constituencies in the AKP base.

After the Uprisings: U.S. Policy in a Changing Middle East

Thursday, February 10, 2012
1:00pm-2:30pm
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 419



On Thursday, the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) hosted a discussion on recent and ongoing events in Tunisia and Egypt and their influence on U.S. relations with the region’s governments and people and what steps the U.S. government can take to support democratic transitions in Egypt and Tunisia. POMED Executive Director Stephen McInerney made opening remarks and introduced panelists: Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at Hoover Institution at Stanford University and founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy; Tom Malinowski, Washington Director at Human Rights Watch; and Mona Yacoubian, Special Adviser at the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, United States Institute of Peace. 

To read full notes continue below, or click here for pdf.

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Stephen McInerney opened by stating that for years many have been calling for reform in the Middle East, which has been largely ignored. The young and restive population which has now been mobilized calling for change and reforms which needs to be addressed. He pointed to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s speech in Doha in which she stated that the region’s foundations are sinking into the sands and that “those who cling to the status quo may be able to hold back the full impact of their countries’ problems for a little while, but not forever.” Nowhere is this clearer, McInerney stated, than in Egypt and Tunisia. He went on to say that there is a long road ahead as both countries move into a transition period. McInerney also alluded to rumors that Mubarak would be stepping down in the coming hours.

Tom Malinowski began by stating that Mubarak stepping down would satisfy one of the central demands of the people and that for the military establishment it seems that “the time has come to concede the dictator while saving the dictatorship.” He cautioned that transitional military government will likely attempt to spread power amongst itself while slowing down the fundamental structural reforms which are necessary for true democracy to take a hold. With the military, you will have the same players in power that will fight to the death to defend it

Malinowski also applauded President Obama’s approach to the situation as he has focused and clearly expressed the United States’ demands for reform instead of focusing on who the next leader is. Amid the euphoria, it is important, Malinowski states, to stay focused on reforming the concrete legal structures. The relative restraint shown by the Egyptian government and the military also shows the effective “all hands on deck approach” of the Obama administration. He states that whether it’s true or not, many Egypt perceive the U.S. to be a key player in how these protests unfold and our actions have a psychological effect on protesters’ moral.

He also stated that it is vitally important that the transition goes well. If the transition occurs smoothly with the fundamental structural problems being addressed, Egypt and Tunisia will be a model for the rest of the Middle East and will positively affect the way foreign policy is conducted. However, if it goes poorly, opposition groups around the world will be disheartened and it will be likely that U.S. foreign policy advisors will point to Egypt as an example of the futility of our efforts. He also noted that these protests have had a large impact on people all around the world by giving hope to suppressed opposition movements and scaring governments. He states however, that this may have negative consequences as authoritarian governments initiate crackdowns in hopes to stave off similar protests calling for change.

Larry Diamond began by noting the historical importance of these uprisings which have been sustained due to the enterprising efforts of the tech savvy youth who have encouraged all segments of society to rally behind their cause. He also noted the lack of ideology in the protests thus far, which “gives lie to Mubarak’s rhetoric that democracy will lead to Islamists coming to power.” Diamond pointed to a recent telephone poll conducted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy which shows that only 15% of Egyptians support the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite inaccuracies of polls, Diamond stated that the Muslim Brotherhood does not have majority support and is not a driving force behind these protests.

Diamond also echoed Malinowski’s concerns that the structural corruption will continue as the military and elite attempt to maintain the status quo and continue to collect rents as they have in the past. He noted however, that there is a possibility that concessions may need to be made include amnesty for certain government and military officials. He stated that “political transitions to democracy have many steps” and that he worries that Suleiman will try to subtly subvert the transitional process. As such, he states, it is vital that the opposition unify and serve as a counterweight to Suleiman and his power structure that the international community employ constant vigilance to ensure backsliding does not occur and that human rights violations do not continue.

“The one thing Egypt needs to succeed is Freedom.”  You cannot suppress the climate of freedom, he says. The protesters have made clear that they will not accept “Mubarak Light” and neither should we. We need to push for reform and the opposition should form a coalition, pool their strategies and nominate a president. He also stated that the country needs to move away from a presidential system to a parliamentary one, in which it is harder to manipulate power—as seen in Iraq—, and prevents the possibility of well organized groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and the NDP will win many of the seats. He states that it also makes sure that it is not life or death for the old power players making them more likely to agree to transition.

On U.S. foreign policy, Diamond stated that we need to continue to support freedom publically and more forcefully in private. He argues that Obama’s strong calls for freedom and restraint are evidenced by the army’s actions and that his diplomatic efforts will be looked at favorably in history. He also states that in the future the United Nations will need to have on the ground monitoring of human rights.

Discussing Tunisia, Diamond states that events are still changing on the ground and nothing can be taken for granted. Although Egypt may fail or have a hybrid government, the success of Tunisia will have powerful diffusion impacts in the Arab World which is ripe and ready for change.

Mona Yacoubian stated that “this is a watershed moment in the region from which there is no going back.” However, she states we need to be careful not to overstate the contagion effect. She stated that there are 6 characteristics which define the protests. First, she says, the uprisings were popular, organic grassroots movements that were homegrown which has led to its sustained momentum. Second, they broadly reflected society; here we were able to see the “fabled Arab street” make an appearance. Third, the uprisings were not driven by Islamists, but by the youth. Fourth, social media and technology played a significant role, but it is important not to overplay it. This was not a Twitter revolution. Fifth, the protests in Egypt and Tunisia were not bread riots. The people were demanding changes in governance, freedom, human rights, and protesting corruption; thus, they could not be bought off. Lastly, she states it is important to note the non-violent attitude of protesters; this was not al-Qaeda and was not a call for jihad. Instead, what is more likely, she says, is that Al-Qaeda is feeling terrified right now; these mass protests are the most powerful antidote to groups like Al-Qaeda.

Addressing the impact on the region as a whole, Yacoubian stated that a number of states including Algeria, Jordan, Yemen, Iraq and Syria, have implemented a number measures and have made concessions to its people in hopes of staving off similar protests. She states that while there are many common economic and political factors within the Arab world, each country differs. The intangibles, such as the loss of fear, are critical, Yacoubian states. It is uncertain where the tipping point is or what will cause the people’s anger to be more powerful than their fear, but it’s vital.

She also states that monarchies tend to be more insulated and protected from mass protests than republics though Jordan may prove to be the exception given its proximity to Israel and the large number of Palestinian refugees. Algeria and Yemen may see more precipitous change, she notes, however, given the crushing levels of poverty and the fractured nature of society she does not believe that Yemen will see the kind of uprisings we see in Tunisia and Egypt. She also noted that this is not the first time we have seen democratic revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa. Algeria experienced democratic change as did Lebanon which successfully kicked out the Syrian military from the country. However, these movements have faded from memory because they faltered. Here the U.S. needs to make sure to pay attention and prevent such reversals from occurring again.

She called on U.S. policy makers to leverage their influence with our European allies and work with them to support these movements and also to reach out to groups in the Middle East that want change including the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan.

Addressing a question on the role of the military, Malinowski stated that there will not be a substantial change in policy if power is transferred to the military and that their takeover of power will not constitute a coup as military officials had growing roles in the government. However, if they assume power, the Egyptian military will need to be responsible for what the state does, including torture and reform; it can no longer blame the government for certain policies and actions, as it will have large implications for what U.S. relations and policy will be. Yacoubian stated that whether the term coup can be applied will be dependent on what they do as the military establishment has been just as vested and entrenched in the status quo as Mubarak was. Moving forward, she states that it will be essential for the U.S. to leverage its military to military relationship and our aid package to ensure reform takes place. Diamond notes that the U.S. does not have the close personal ties to Egyptian military leaders, like we have had with previous military leaders who have heralded in democratic transition in the past. “The military is a black box, an opaque institution.” Additionally, the military suffers from generational cleavages due to the fact that the military leaders have benefitted from rents, themselves instead of spreading the wealth. He believes that these cleavages may have also prevented the military leadership from issuing orders to initiate a crackdown as they doubted the loyalty of their troops. Diamond also stated that we need to make sure that whoever takes control, immediately, will only be in power until presidential elections take place.

In response to a question on how to unite opposition groups, Diamond stated that the opposition of the streets and the “council of wise men” need to merge and elect a leadership committee of 3-4 leaders which will engage in negotiations. He states that potential members may include Wael Ghonim, the recently released Google executive and “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook page, Mohamed ElBaradei, and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. While such a mass mobilization cannot be sustained in the long run, these opposition groups can threaten to organize one again, if the government fails to comply. It is important, Diamond states, that the regime does not have the ability to choose which opposition groups to work with as Suleiman and Mubarak are “experts at the divide and conquer.” McInerney also notes that now is the time for these groups to merge as the main demand of the protesters—Mubarak stepping down—is being addressed.

Responding to a question on what Congress can do to help, Malinowski stated, “Do not listen to the Livingston Group,” alluding to a lobbyist group which advocates on behalf of the Egyptian government. Additionally, he states they need to watch what happens and leverage their aid. It is helpful for the administration, he says, for Congress to say their relationship is dependent on what the government does as we can then employ the “good-cop, bad-cop strategy.” Yacoubian, on the other hand, states that it is helpful for Congress to work with the administration and “put politics aside” to ensure the opportunity is not lost and the ball continues moving forward. She also cautions against “fear mongering associated with Islamists.” Diamond states that we need more far reaching rules against conflict of interests and states that rules should be drafted which prevent former members of Congress and high ranking government officials from lobbying on behalf of foreign governments for 10 years following the completion of their post.

When asked why Tunisia and Egypt have succeeded where Iran did not, the panelists cautioned against overstating the importance of social media. It is a tool that allowed activists a place to organize and take the initial steps. The panelists also noted that there was not a breakdown of fear in Iran the same way there was in Egypt as the Iranian government was not afraid to use violence against their citizens. Diamond also pointed out that regime change was very close to occurring in Iran, but the opposition lacked adequate leadership and organization.

Addressing a question by former POMED Executive Director Andrew Albertson on how U.S. diplomacy can change to support gradual reform in the region, Malinowski stated that Obama needs to realize the strong impact his words can really have on the people and these governments. He also calls on the U.S. to use more pressure on governments to address corruption. Diamond stated that for too long there has been too much of a focus on the Middle East Peace Process and maintaining stability instead of reform, however, he states that he no longer believes in gradual reform and calls for expeditious and genuine change. Yacoubian states that the Egyptian uprisings are a watershed moment for the foreign policy apparatus because of the way it took everyone by surprise and also because of its dynamism. She also states that we need to look at how much our old policies really helped or did not help and that the U.S. needs to take adopt a long term vision when addressing issues in the Middle East.

The Unfinished February 14 Uprising: What Next for Bahrain?

Thursday, February 9, 2012
9:30am-11:00am
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 106

As the February 14th anniversary of the start of mass protests in Bahrain approaches, now is a critical time to analyze events over the past few months and discuss expectations for the coming weeks. With the release of the BICI report in late November, which detailed systematic human rights abuses and a government crackdown against peaceful protesters, the Government of Bahrain was tasked with a long list of reforms and recommendations. At this juncture, nearly two months after the release of the report, it is essential for the United States to debate the Kingdom’s reforms and how to move Bahrain forward on a path of democratic progress. Human rights groups continue to raise significant human rights concerns with respect to the situation on the ground. What are some of these concerns? What are the current realities on the ground in Bahrain? What are the strategies of the country’s political opposition parties and revolutionary youth movement, and how is the monarchy reacting? What are some expectations and challenges regarding the palace-led reform process? And, importantly, what constructive roles can the U.S. play in encouraging meaningful reform at this time?

Featuring:

Senator Ron Wyden
(D-OR)
Elliott Abrams
Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Joost Hiltermann
Deputy Program Director, Middle East and North Africa, International Crisis Group
Colin Kahl
Associate Professor, Georgetown University; Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security
Moderator: Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy

For full event notes, continue reading below. Or click here for a full text of the PDF

Full text of Senator Wyden’s speech can also be found here

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Ron Wyden reminded the audience that despite some reports that the situation is improving, January 2012 saw the highest death toll since March of 2011, which was shortly after the uprising started. He commended the King of Bahrain for the creation of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, describing it as a show of willingness to reform and change. However, Wyden said the changes have been cosmetic, and when NGOs are not let into the country or when protestors are still dying from government crackdowns, more needs to be done. Therefore, Wyden stated he is not in support of the arms sales to Bahrain that the Obama administration is pushing forward because “an arms sale of any kind sends the wrong message at the wrong time … not just to Bahrain but to the world.” He said the U.S. should not reward the government with any support until sincere and more integral changes are made. Wyden ended on a positive note, saying he sees the Bahraini government as having an opportunity to initiate honest dialogue to choose peace and reform instead of violence. He also vowed to work toward the U.S. federal government being a partner in human rights promotion. During a brief Q&A session with the Senator, it was asked how the Obama administration could balance its short- and long-term interests when it came to Bahrain. Wyden responded that he would let the administration speak for itself on that, but emphasized that the facts cannot be disputed, and the situation on the ground must be addressed. “At the end of the day, [an arms sale] is still a big important message, and it happens to be the wrong one,” he said.

Joost Hiltermann began by speaking about the observation and report that Cherif Bassiouniconducted in Bahrain, saying the report was filled with documentation about oppression, destruction, and repression of free speech and media. He also mentioned the website the Bahraini government has setup to illustrate all the BICI recommendations it has implemented. However, Hiltermann echoed Senator Wyden’s sentiments that the changes have been relatively small in comparison to what really needs to be done, and described the Bahraini government as playing a “game of charm” targeted at the international community to mold foreign policy. For example, the website is in English, not Arabic, which means it is meant for the international audience, not the internal Bahraini one. Hiltermann concluded by saying that the problems go beyond human rights violations. Bahrain needs dialogue, accountability, and judicial reform – especially electoral law reform.

Elliott Abrams said he believes that greater pressure from the U.S. could have lessened the extent of the crackdown from the Bahraini government. He expressed his disappointed in the Obama administration’s “almost complete inability to ameliorate the violence in Bahrain.”Abrams also said that Bahrain risks being the only monarchy in the region that will not have the majority of its people’s support, and unless major reforms are implemented, the situation will only deteriorate further. He mentioned the need for a level of power sharing between the government and the people as one positive step toward change. With regard the arms sale, Abrams said he may be more supportive of it had the U.S. government been more candid about the reasoning and content of the sale, but as the situation stands, he has high levels of concern for the anniversary of the uprising approaching, and reminded the audience that time is running out for the U.S. to apply pressure on the regime.

Colin Kahl said he sees the Obama administration as having two goals for Bahrain: reform and partnership. Reform in many sectors (security, electoral law, human rights, etc) may sound idealistic, but that is necessary for the nation’s long-term stability. Partnership refers especially to security. Bahrain is a key ally for the U.S. in an area of the world where there is economic interest and a high level of terrorism threats. Kahl said the U.S. must learn to navigate these two goals by “deploying its values pragmatically.” Regarding the possibility of cutting off aid to Bahrain to push reform, Kahl said it could never work because the stakes of losing the ally relationship are bigger for the U.S. than for Bahrain. Asymmetrical stakes make a threat such as cutting off aid impractical and ineffective. He concluded by saying the U.S. must emphasize that Bahrain’s stability is in everyone’s long-term interest, and in the absence of reform, the future will hold “deep turmoil.”

During Q&A, many questions surrounded concerns about the arms sale and about how U.S.-Iran tensions would influence U.S. policy toward Bahrain. Regarding the arms sale, Kahl said cancelling the sale of arms would not make a difference – it would not trigger the Bahraini government to make grandiose reforms overnight. Sending these arms, provided they are truly used for Bahrain’s external defenses, could be in the interest of the U.S. because it could mean better security and stability for Bahrain. Showing some support now could increase the leverage the U.S. has to apply pressure for reform. Regarding the U.S.-Iran tensions, Kahl said that he did not feel it would make much of a difference in shaping U.S. policy toward Bahrain, but did say that it raises concerns about the prevalent sectarian tensions in the region.

After the BICI Report: What Next for Bahrain?

Monday, December 5, 2011
12:30-2:00pm
Kenney Auditorium, SAIS

The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report, released on November 23, described “the use of excessive force by police officers,” as well as “a systematic practice of physical and psychological mistreatment, which in many cases amounted to torture” and sometimes death. Secretary Clinton expressed “deep concern” over the report’s findings and stressed the need for the Bahraini government to address the reported abuses “in a prompt and systematic manner.” In his response to the report, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa said that his government is “determined…to ensure that the painful events our beloved nation has just experienced are not repeated, but that we learn from them.”

In the wake of the report’s release, a number of questions remain. In addition to the numerous findings of the report, what if anything was missing? What has been the reaction of the Bahraini government and on the Bahraini street? What has been the Obama administration’s reaction, and what can we expect to see of the proposed arms sale that was delayed pending the outcome of the investigation? Lastly, if this report is to lead to much-needed political reform and substantive progress toward resolving the continuing crisis in Bahrain, what should the next steps be: for the government of Bahrain, for the Bahraini opposition, and for the U.S. administration?

Featuring:

Senator Ron Wyden
(D-OR)

(click here for Senator Wyden’s full statement)

Brian Dooley
Director, Human Rights Defenders Program, Human Rights First

Andrew Exum
Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security

Toby Jones
Assistant Professor of History, Rutgers University

Moderator: Matt Duss
Director, Middle East Progress, Center for American Progress

For notes on this event please continue reading below.

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On Monday, the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) hosted an event entitled “After the BICI Report: What Next for Bahrain?” Matthew Duss, director of Middle East Progress at the Center for American Progress, moderated the discussion. The panel featured Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR); Brian Dooley, director of Human Rights First; Andrew Exum, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security; andToby Jones, assistant professor of history at Rutgers University.

For full event notes, continue reading. Or, click here for the PDF.

After a brief introduction from Duss, Senator Wyden discussed the report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), asserting that “the Commission has confirmed what others have been reporting about the human rights violations that took place during the protests that began earlier this year […] the repression was systemic and widespread.” He added that the BICI report has “shown the wisdom of stopping” the proposed $53 million arms sale to Bahrain: “America should not be rewarding brutal regimes with arms. It’s that simple.” Wyden urged the Bahraini government’s swift implementation of the report’s recommended reforms, while noting that the BICI’s recommendations are “not sufficient,” and that “progress must also be made in areas not covered by the Commission’s Report.” Wyden also argued that while some may claim that Bahrain’s status as a U.S. ally constrains the U.S.’s ability to coerce the Bahraini regime, “being friends with Bahrain should make it easier for us to point out when they go astray, not harder.” He concluded by stating that the report provides a good starting point for progress and a transition towards a more democratic, inclusive society, and that he is hopeful that Bahrain will move forward and “the alliance between our two countries will endure.”

Then, Dooley echoed Wyden’s sentiment that the BICI report confirmed what many already knew: the Bahraini crackdown was characterized by a systemic practice of acts that amounted to torture. He noted that the report does not list the names or ranks of any responsible individuals. Dooley added that the Government of Bahrain must implement all of the report’s recommendations, release all political detainees, and grant access to non-governmental observers and international journalists.

Jones argued that “Bahrain desperately needs a game changer,” as “the situation is dire.” Bahrain, he said, needs a set of political tools that provide for reconciliation. Jones added that he sees nothing in the BICI report that provides for this set of tools. Furthermore, Jones noted that the report does not include a “set of mechanisms for making clear what the responsibilities of the government are.” The report, he asserted, has accomplished one thing: it has produced a “damning narrative of the excessive use of force,” implicating the regime as the responsible party. Meanwhile, the report has been a political failure thus far, as it has failed to achieve its implicit political goals, or to even discuss political steps. Duss interjected, highlighting the apparent tension in U.S. policy between values and national interests, a false dichotomy that is apparent in the case of Bahrain.

Exum addressed this tension between ideals and interests, stating that the U.S. is in a “difficult position” in terms of its policy in the Gulf: whereas popular protests call for democratization in the Gulf, the U.S. is most invested in the nations that are not democratic and that, furthermore, are actively obstructing democratic reforms. He posed the question of whether reducing U.S. involvement with a given regime will help or hurt the cause of advancing U.S. interests. Exum posited that there exists a middle ground that will allow the U.S. to affect a regime’s behavior and disposition without harming U.S. interests.

During the question and answer session, the speakers agreed that the uprisings of the Arab Spring have proven that ideals and interests are compatible, and that the U.S. advances its interests in the region by advocating its ideals. While this compatibility has been proven in theory, U.S. policy has not yet caught up. Jones noted that it will be interesting to see how the U.S. will define its interests in the era after the Arab Spring. For now, however, the American response remains trapped: U.S. support for democracy may advance its interests in the long term, but concerns remain for policy makers in the short term. Jones was sure that the benefits outweigh the risks in the short term. Panelists also warned that the Government of Bahrain will surely find ways to talk about reform while doing something else; in other words, the regime will use new strategies in an attempt to out-maneuver calls for reform. Jones concluded by stating, “It’s not 2010 anymore. This is a totally new era in Arab politics.” Dooley warned that the tone of Bahraini protests is changing, and that if the regime fails to reform or offer a space for expression, unrest is likely to escalate toward extremism.

Beyond Morocco’s Elections: Prospects for Genuine Reform?

Friday, November 18, 2011
2:00pm-3:30pm
SEIU Conference Center

Video footage of this event is available here.

Overshadowed by the dramatic political transitions underway in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, political events in Morocco – including parliamentary elections scheduled for November 25th – have received very little attention in Western media. This belies the fact that the Moroccan political arena has been quite active in recent months.  In July, Moroccans approved in a referendum constitutional reforms put forward by King Mohammed VI in an effort to respond to demands of protesters.  Nonetheless, the youth-led February 20 Movement views these efforts as insufficient, calling for a boycott of the upcoming elections and resuming weekly protests to revive popular demand for further reform.

POMED is excited to host an event examining the Moroccan political landscape, including expectations for the upcoming parliamentary elections. Who are the main parties competing, and who is likely to perform well? What political forces are supporting the calls for boycott, and how might this affect results and the voter turnout?  How are these elections likely to impact the opportunities for substantive political reform including shifts in the balance of power between elected institutions and the monarchy?  And what steps can the U.S. and other international actors take to encourage meaningful reform in Morocco rather than merely superficial changes?

Featuring:

Ahmed Benchemsi
Visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
Anouar Boukhars
Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies, McDaniel College
Marina Ottaway
Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Moderator: Charles Dunne
Director for Middle East and North Africa Programs, Freedom House

For full event notes, continue reading. Or, click here for the PDF.

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Dunne offered introductory remarks in which he noted that although Morocco does not receive ample attention, it is an important “test case.” Morocco can demonstrate whether “any authoritarian government can respond effectively to the upheavals of the Arab Spring through a process of managed, top-down change.” Dunne added that the monarchy faces many challenges, including continuing protests from the February 20 movement among others, as well as the persistence of the economic problems that sparked the unrest. He also mentioned that many Moroccans are wary of sweeping change, and are “cautious” about “embracing it.” Lastly, Dunne stated that the fate of Morocco’s internal stability holds implications for the region and the U.S.

Boukhars analyzed the challenges facing political parties, arguing that voter confidence in existing political parties to effectively utilize the “greater mobility” allowed by Morocco’s new constitution is scarce. “Pluralities are still skeptical,” he said, and enthusiasm is lacking among the populace. Boukhars also mentioned several possible outcomes of Morocco’s parliamentary elections, asserting that concern that the PJD will win a vast majority is “overblown.” One reason the PJD will not fare as well as some analysts predict, he said, is that the Islamist vote is divided. Furthermore, “districting laws disadvantage Islamists.” If the PJD were to win, it would likely experience great difficulty in forming a coalition to govern, effectively lending credence to the claims that voting will fail to change the political landscape in Morocco. Boukhars added that given the new constitutional reforms, political parties have an “unprecedented opportunity” to push for democratic reform. He concluded by posing the question of whether Morocco’s political parties would take advantage of this opportunity.

Then, Ottoway addressed the question of whether top-down reform could work, asserting that “it always depends on the push from the bottom.” “Is there going to be enough push from the society within the political system” to push for change “that would allow the most democratic provisions of the constitution to actually be put into practice,” she said. Ottoway stressed that the constitution is “an extremely ambiguous document at this point,” which “could be implemented in an array of different fashions.” The constitution, she added, does not clearly provide for a constitutional monarchy; rather, it allows to king to govern. Ottoway noted that Moroccan political parties have not been utilizing the political space allowed by the new constitution. She stated that regardless of the election results, the parties will not put much pressure against the monarchy.

Ottoway then discussed the February 20 movement, noting that it is a loose group without a clear leadership hierarchy: “It’s almost too democratic for its own good in the sense that it really doesn’t have a strong leadership structure,” which makes it “very difficult to have a coherent direction.” She stated that the leftist parties in Morocco are “leftovers” from the past, “more of a marginal factor.” The Justice and Charity party, while more likely to be a significant force, is not likely to participate in the elections.

Benchemsi disagreed with Boukhars’ argument that the upcoming elections would reveal whether or not parties could effectively utilize their newfound mobility. Benchemsi asserted that these elections are “not that important,” as “the main factor in Morocco is the balance of strength between the monarchy and all other forces.” He also stated that the king’s introduction of constitutional reforms was a “skillful play” intended to crush momentum on the street rather than a genuine promise of change. Benchemsi added that the official statistic of 98.5% of voters in favor of July’s constitutional referendum revealed egregious fraud. He called the new constitution “perverse,” and enumerated the ways in which a “smokescreen” created the illusion of change while protecting the king’s hegemony.

During the question and answer session, Boukhars stated that among the trends indicating positive change in Morocco is that youth within political parties are beginning to challenge political veterans in their organizations. An attendee asked whether continuing economic woes would “be a push for another major uprising.” Benchamsi affirmed the power of economic problems to fuel unrest, adding that the “regional spirit of the Arab spring” could be reinvigorated in Bashar al-Assad were to fall.

Ottoway said that “Morocco is ahead of any other monarchy” in the region in terms of responding to calls for reform. “This is the one Arab monarchy that has at least taken small steps,” she added. An attendee inquired about Moroccans who oppose the constitution as well as the monarchy. Benchemsi and Ottoway agreed that those who “want the fall of the Monarchy in Morocco,” also known as republicans, are “marginal.”

Egypt’s Parliamentary Elections: Expectations and Challenges

Tuesday, November 15, 2011
9:00am-11:00am
Woodrow Wilson Center

Egypt’s parliamentary elections will be a critical test for Egypt’s fragile transition and will be watched closely throughout the region and the world. On November 28th, the electoral process will begin with elections for one-third of the seats in the lower house of parliament, the People’s Assembly.

In the pre-election environment, incidents of media censorship, politically-motivated arrests, restrictions on civil society activity and ongoing military trials of civilians have all been cause for serious concern. The field of political contenders has been unclear amid frequently-shifting alliances and the rapid formation of new parties. Moreover, some uncertainties remain about the voting process itself, due to complicated election laws, restrictions on election monitoring, and suspicions regarding the aims of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces during the ongoing transition.

What might we expect to see on election day? Which parties are expected to perform well, and which parties may be disappointed? What steps have been taken to ensure that the voting process is free and fair, and what remains to be done? How are civil society organizations in Egypt involved in the pre-election environment, whether through voter education, candidate trainings, or other efforts? Who are the “actors to watch” in Egypt in the run-up to the elections, and what challenges do they face? What actors or events may jeopardize the process? What can the U.S. do to help ensure that the elections go smoothly?  What is the  role of Egypt’s new parliament likely to be, and what key challenges will remain after these elections?

Featuring:

Ibrahim Houdaiby
Freelance journalist and researcher (to be joining the conversation via Skype from Cairo)
Magdy Samaan
Freelance journalist and a 2011 MENA Democracy Fellow at the World Affairs Institute
Michele Dunne
Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council

For full event notes, continue reading. Or, click here for the PDF.

An audio recording of this event is available here.

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Speaking from Cairo via Skype, Houdaiby expressed several aspects of the upcoming elections on which to focus. He relayed that the elections are significant because they are the “first step” to transfer power to the Egyptian people, but he also enumerated a number of challenges including security concerns, an undemocratic media, and a suspect judiciary. There is currently a leadership vacuum, according to Houdaiby, in Egypt’s political landscape which has resulted in a fragmented population. He stressed that the threat Islamic parties pose to democratic development is over publicized, and that Egyptians are seeking coherent approaches to security and economic issues while they formulate a new identity. Houdaiby also said his optimistic estimate for election turnout is approximately 40 percent, which he concluded would be a vast improvement from previous elections. Additionally, he asserted that there is a noticeable lack of media objectivity which has stunted some of the election measures.

Next, Magdy Samaan spoke about the restraints placed on freedom of expression since the SCAF took over for Mubarak. He asserted that freedom of expression has shrunk immensely since the revolution, directly referring to several of the activist bloggers who have been detained and arrested in recent months.Egyptian television has reverted back to Mubarak-style coverage by promoting sectarianism, particularly during the protests at Maspero, according to Samaan. He believes that the SCAF is “playing with Mubarak’s cards” when it comes to freedom of expression. Samaan added that the upcoming elections represent a “dress rehearsal” for the subsequent steps toward democracy, though he warned that the value should remain reasonable because the results will illustrate the political weight of many parties and individuals, though they will not rule the country. Samaan also said there is an opportunity for Egypt to follow and learn from Tunisia’s positive democratic elections.

Michele Dunne addressed the topic next, agreeing that the elections will illuminate Egypt’s political layout but will not guarantee political transition. We “must watch the larger story,” Dunne said, noting that violence during and after the proceedings is a legitimate concern. She also expressed that the SCAF’s actions indicate that it intends to “shape” the constitution, and she said that the role of both the parliament and the cabinet remain unclear. Additionally, Dunne was concerned that the developing institutions will in fact be powerless once they are formed, but she stressed that it was far too early to “give up” on Egypt’s transition.

Stephen McInerney added several remarks as well, stating that the complexities of the election proceedings may cause immense confusion among the population, particularly because some of the results will be delayed which may arouse suspicion. He also detailed many of the coalitions that have been formed in the run-up to the elections, including the Democratic Alliance, the Egyptian Bloc, and the Alliance to Continue the Revolution, among others.

During a question and answer session, Houdaiby and Samaan agreed that the SCAF has shown a willingness to negotiate many aspects of Egypt’s transition, though altering the military budget may prove difficult. Houdaiby also stated that most Egyptians are paying close attention to the upcoming elections, though many feel betrayed by the SCAF and pessimism has started to cloud Egypt’s initial confidence in the proceedings. Regarding the logistics once the votes are tallied, McInerney expressed that there is a “lack of clarity” regarding how parliamentary seats will be portioned to election winners, and Dunne added that this characteristic may have a negative impact on the public’s perception of balloting procedures.

Regarding the attachment of conditionality to financial support based on the success of Egypt’s democratic transition, Dunne stated that it may in fact be a positive idea, even though she objected to it in the past. However, McInerney stressed that U.S. Congress and the Obama Administration need to agree on how to institute conditionality since each entity has shown disparate strategies in the past. Both domestic and international non-governmental organizations will also play an important role at Egypt’s polls, the panel agreed. However, it remains unclear the amount of access that will be granted to these actors since Egypt has not officially approved many of the requests to observe the elections. Houdaiby added that thus far campaigns have been focused on individuals rather than specific ideologies, and that many parties should address the role of Islam in Egyptian democracy.

After the Tunisian Vote: Analyzing the First Elections of the Arab Spring

Friday, October 28, 2011
9:00am-10:30am
New America Foundation
In the first open elections in the Arab world since this year’s uprisings rocked the region, Tunisians went to the polls in very high numbers to elect a National Constituent Assembly on Sunday, October 23rd. This was a historic moment, not only for Tunisia but for the entire region. As Tunisia enters the next stage of its democratic transition, the New America Foundation and the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) are pleased to co-host a discussion examining the outcomes of these critical elections as well as exploring the challenges for Tunisia and its international partners.How did the major parties competing in the elections perform? What are the platforms, ideologies, and base constituencies for the election’s main winners, and how might this affect the upcoming process of writing a new constitution? Were there any significant irregularities in the process? How were the electoral process and results viewed by the central actors, as well as by the Tunisian population more broadly? How were the elections perceived elsewhere in the region? What are the main challenges facing the new National Constituent Assembly, and what can the international community do to support the transition as it continues forward?

Featuring:

Daniel Brumberg
Senior Adviser to the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, United States Institute of Peace
Leila Hilal
Co-director, New America Foundation Middle East Task Force
Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, POMED
Moderator: Steve Coll
President, New America Foundation

Footage of the event is available here.

 

Previewing Tunisia’s Historic Elections

Friday, October 14, 2011
10:00am-11:30am
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

On October 23, Tunisia will hold the first open elections in the Arab world since historic uprisings swept the region this year.  Tunisians will elect a 218-seat National Constituent Assembly (NCA) that will write the country’s new constitution and play a leading role in the next stage of Tunisia’s transition.  With Tunisians exercising their rights in competitive elections for the first time, there are many key questions to be addressed:

Who are the major parties competing in the elections and how are they likely to perform?  What are the differences between those parties in terms of ideologies, campaign strategies, political positions, and constituencies? What are the major concerns regarding the elections? What is needed in order for the elections to be regarded as a success? How might we expect independent candidates to perform? What might be expected after the elections, in terms of the make-up of the constituent assembly, and any coalitions that are likely to formed within it? What will be the role of the NCA in guiding Tunisia’s transition, and what are the major challenges that it will face following the elections?

Featuring:

Chiheb Ghazouani

Attorney at Law and Vice President of the Tunisian nongovernmental organization Afkar

Mongi Boughzala

Professor of Economics, University of Tunis El-Manar, and Research Fellow at the Economic Research Forum

J. Scott Carpenter

Principal, Google Ideas

Stephen McInerney

Executive Director, POMED

Speakers:

Chiheb Ghazouani, an attorney at law, is the Vice President of the Tunisian nongovernmental organization Afkar (“ideas”), which analyzes the political and economic programs of the main political parties and provides recommendations. He is also the Vice President of the Tunisian Association of Governance and the President of Atlas Leaders, a charity organization in Tunis. Ghazouani holds a PhD in e-commerce law and has taught at the Sorbonne University in Paris, where he also worked as a lawyer.

Mongi Boughzala is a professor of economics at the University of Tunis El-Manar and holds a PhD from the University of Minnesota. He focuses on monetary economics, macroeconomic policy and labour economics. Boughzala’s work has been published in the International Labour Review, Saving and Development Quarterly Review, and the Annales d’Economie et de Gestion. He is also a research fellow at the Economic Research Forum and a board member of the Forum Euroméditerranéen des Instituts de Sciences Économiques (FEMISE).

J. Scott Carpenter is a Principal with Google Ideas in New York. He was formerly the Keston Family fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and director of its Project Fikra. Previously, Mr. Carpenter served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, was coordinator for the State Department’s Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiatives, and served in Baghdad as director of the governance group for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

Stephen McInerney is POMED’s Executive Director. Previously, he was Director of Advocacy at POMED. He has more than six years experience in the Middle East, including graduate studies in Middle Eastern politics, history, and the Arabic language at the American University of Beirut and the American University in Cairo.  His work has been published in the Arab Reform Bulletin, The Daily Star, Foreign Policy, The New Republic, and The Washington Post, among other outlets.

For full event notes, continue reading. Or, click here for the PDF.

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J. Scott Carpenter began with opening remarks by praising the Tunisian electoral system, characterizing it as a politically inclusive system with impressive gender parity. Mr. Carpenter cited the electoral system, the transparency of the elections, and recent explosion of civil society as reasons to label Tunisia as the “best opportunity for success” in the Arab Spring.

Mongi Boughzala began by explaining that while the Tunisian revolution surprised many, it is important to realize that the social/political situation before the fall of Ben-Ali was non-sustainable. Tunisia was highly educated, modern, Mediterranean, and  a comparatively wealthy for a MENA nation. At the same time, the nation was part of the Arab world, ruled autocratically for 30 years, and faced high unemployment—especially among the highly educated youth population. Furthermore, corruption had become ubiquitous and plainly visible throughout the country. The hidden poverty and corruption alongside and educated and modern youth made Tunisia unstable. Tunisians chose a risky path to democracy by breaking with the old constitution/institutions. The Constituent Assembly will have to simultaneously govern and write a new constitution. Looking ahead to the elections, he laid out some positive indicators along with existing challenges.

On the positive side, the election process is likely to be run smoothly. An independent, trusted commission has been planning for 7 months. They have coordinated with (now neutral) security forces, and they have maintained the public trust. The country has remained fully functional throughout the transition period (all major services are still in place), and the interim government has written good legislation (such as the election law). Finally, all major parties have expressed commitment to conducting the elections in a free and fair manner and accepting the results.  The most significant challenges facing the transition elections stem from the uncertainty created by the explosion of candidates/parties, worries about el-nahda, and managing the expectations from politicians, voters, and parties.

In conclusion, Tunisia will need good leadership, cohesion, credible institutions, and help from abroad. These elections will be determinative for Tunisia’s transition, and they will be important for other transitions underway because they will demonstrate if democracy can work for the Arab world.

Chiheb Ghazouani reiterated that Tunisia events in Tunisia have a demonstrative effect across the Arab world, citing the reforms in Morocco and Saudi Arabia as examples of responses. The elections will be another signaling event about the broader prospects for MENA democracy.

Chiheb suggested there is a “Tunisian exceptionalisim” in the Arab world. It is uniquely western, has closer cultural and historical ties to the US and Europe, has proposed peace agreements between Arabs and Israelis (which got the country banished from the Arab league), and has always been a haven for women’s rights.   Mr. Ghazouani grouped parties into two principle groups, conservatives (Islamists) and progressives (seculr, social democratic). In line with Tunisian exceptionalism, the principle Islamist party, Nahda embraces the market economy and is in favor of maintaining the Code of Personal Statutes. He compared it to the Turkish Islamist Party. The leftist parties also generally favor the market economy, and while secular parties are smaller than Nhda, there is a fair likelihood of them building a coalition. All parties think that the US can have a positive role in Tunisia’s future (as opposed to meddling). This is particularly true concerning the economy. Because the US did not support Ben-Ali during the revolution—as opposed to France—America has not burned any bridges in Tunisia.

Given that Tunisians are open to greater US involvement, Mr. Ghazouani suggested that the US should help support elections while staying neutral towards any individual party, invest in long term Tunisian growth (factories rather than foreign aid), consider a trade agreement, facilitate the access of American Universities to Tunisian students, and continue Peace Corps work in Tunisia. He emphasized education, even suggesting that we build an American University in Tunis. He views education as the most important thing for Tunisia’s future and the best way to create

Steve McInerney noted there has been insufficient attention paid to Tunisia in DC and Egyptians are rather envious of the progress in Tunisia. While Egypt is lead by the SCAF, which is trying to steer the transition to protect its own power, Tunisia is lead by a weak, technocratic, civilian government that has no power to protect and has an interest in handing over the government to a legitimately elected parliament. Furthermore, Tunisians understand the hard road to democracy much better than Egyptians. They know the transition is ongoing; the revolution is not complete, etc. Therefore, Tunisians actually have more reasonable expectations of the immediate future than Egyptians. Many things that Tunisians see as problematic are actually positive. For example, Tunisians are uncomfortable with campaigning and political attacks, but the organizing and work that parties are doing are great signs for transition. The issue DC has forgotten is that Tunisians wants to be stronger internationally, and they welcome a US relationship. This is unique in the Arab world. With such mistrust of the French (who supported Ben Ali during the revolution), the US must capitalize on this.

McInerney cited a few challenges moving forward. Again, these elections are massive and confusing for average Tunisians. In addition, while the electoral commission made some good changes on the fly, like allowing people who did not register to vote if they have a national ID card, these changing rules are further complicating the elections. There are no reliable polls/predictors for how the election will turn out. Thus, many parties will be very disappointed. However, if 10 or 11 of the biggest parties accept the results, then the elections should turn out fine.

Boughzala started the question and answer section as he expanded on the agreement over a freer market. The agreement is not a convergence of attitudes. Fiscal discipline will be a huge challenge as Tunisians demand greater public sector employment, health care, more equitable (regionally speaking) economic growth. Chiheb Ghazouani responded to a question about why youth are not at the head of political parties despite driving the revolution by saying that while party leadership is mostly older people in a fight over egos, the youth are largely participating through political civil society.

In response to a question about the economy and unemployment, unions, and the business community, Boughzala argued that the new business union will lead to greater competition with the main labor unions in Tunisia, the business community is strong and representing itself well, and good business/worker communities are important for Tunisian democracy. The main challenge to the government is the structural unemployment in Tunisia.

In response to a question about the role of women, Ghazouani said he was optimistic about the future of women’s rights. Given Tunisia’s history, and the statements of the Islamic party, he sees no reason why there will be a scaling back of women’s rights. Steve echoed this, noting the gender parity requirement on the electoral lists…highlighting that Nahda has put women on top of many of its lists.

In response to a question about the urban/rural economic disparity, Ghazouani again emphasized that education is the best way to solve that problem. He noted that the Constituent Assembly will only be temporary, so it will not need to have a cohesive long-term economic plan

In response to a concern about the history of instability associated with the likely multi-party parliament that Tunisia will have, Mongi restated that nearly all parties have demonstrated respect for the democratic process, a willingness to negotiate, and a willingness to compromise.

 

The Federal Budget and Appropriations for FY 2012: Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East

Tuesday, July 19, 2011
2:00pm-3:30pm
Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2200

POMED Presents: The Federal Budget and Appropriations for FY2012: Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East from Cliff Matheson on Vimeo.

On Tuesday, the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) hosted a panel discussion with the Heinrich Böll Foundation of North America to announce the release of a new publication, The Federal Budget and Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2012: Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East.  The full report can be accessed online.

Featuring:

Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, POMED

Daniel Brumberg
Senior Adviser to the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, United States Institute of Peace

Michael Ryan
Senior Research Associate, The Jamestown Foundation

For full notes, continue reading. Or click here for the pdf.

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Cole Bockenfeld began by introducing the panelists and Sebastian Graefe, Program Director for Foreign and Security Policy with the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Washington. Graefe provided background on the foundation’s work in the Middle East and commented on the need, as outlined in the report, for the U.S. to adjust its programs in the region. Bockenfeld identified public rhetoric, strategic pressure, and funding as the three pillars of U.S. democracy promotion in the Middle East. While the first two are “thoroughly debated” in D.C., the third is not. Discussion on funding must move beyond the question of numbers, and instead focus on the use and effectiveness of funding.

Stephen McInerney first outlined the major challenges with compiling this report. The budget process has become “quite dysfunctional,” resulting in significant delays in Congress and within the administration. These delays have been detrimental to programs in the Middle East. And the Arab uprisings further complicated the report, as it has been difficult for the administration to react to political developments while dealing with funding cuts. A revised report will be released in September, after the FY11 budget is finalized.

Next, some of the major conclusions of the report were discussed. McInerney generally gives the administration credit for making the MENA region a priority in light of budget cuts and a difficult political environment. Egypt and Tunisia have been top priorities for the administration, and funding for MEPI has increased. Additionally, a regional response fund has been established, reflecting the administration’s recognition of the need for flexibility in responding to upcoming political developments in countries such as Yemen, Syria, and Libya.

The significant imbalance between military and development aid, present throughout the region, remains a serious issue in Egypt. But McInerney noted that discussion on a shift towards development assistance is taking place. This is “rather unprecedented,” and a shift in funding in Egypt could set a precedent for the region. Furthermore, since the revolution, a USAID ban on funding local organizations not approved by the government has been reversed. Yet within Egypt there is significant resistance to foreign aid.

In Morocco and Jordan, no considerable change has occurred, but aid programs are being reconsidered and McInerney hopes for adjustments in the future. Morocco is an example of a country with few impediments to civil society and many active organizations. The U.S. could provide more democracy assistance to countries such as Morocco, yet programs are minimal at present. In Iraq, civilian assistance programs have been cut “quite considerably,” and this is disappointing. Overall, there is “a lot less U.S. support” for civilian and military assistance in Iraq. Finally, it remains to be seen if U.S. aid to authoritarian allies will be impacted by the Arab uprisings. In the past, the U.S. feared tackling politically sensitive issues with allies, yet these issues contributed to uprisings in Bahrain and elsewhere.

Next, Michael Ryan praised the report for accurately and transparently demonstrating the real struggles that occur within the government regarding funding. Ryan argued that down budgets force creativity, and “small, flexible, well-targeted programs” can be the most effective. At present, small programs are in fact the most important for U.S. goals. And for this reason, small programs can have a disproportionately large impact when cut.

In general, funding has both political and strategic purposes. It is necessary to work with governments directly, in addition to working with the private sector. And strategically, aid can be used to counter extremism. Programs promoting good governance and economic growth should be supported by the U.S., but must be locally designed and without a U.S. “footprint.” In regards to the Arab uprisings, Ryan argued that the U.S. should not wait until the next crisis before providing assistance. Rather, programs that collaborate with civil society, support independent judicial processes, and promote good governance are “perhaps the most important element” of the United States’ work in the region.

Finally, Daniel Brumberg argued that the U.S. strategy of supporting civil society in authoritarian regimes in order to indirectly promote democracy has been ineffective. And foreign aid must be supported by sustained diplomacy and rhetoric pushing for democracy. In regards to Egypt, there must be a more robust discussion of the lopsidedness of military versus development assistance. And a major program is needed to reform the security apparatus in Egypt and in Tunisia as well. Finally, it is a very bad idea, and would be counterproductive, to cut U.S. aid to Egypt if the Muslim Brotherhood gains power in the upcoming elections. Rather, the U.S. should provide funding for youth in Egypt to engage across ideological lines in a real dialogue. The U.S. must make clear the principle that foreign aid is a fundamental right, not a sign of U.S. interference or imperialism. Finally, Brumberg reiterated the sentiment that discussion of U.S. aid should focus on how to spend assistance money rather than the amounts.

During the question and answer, McInerney noted the importance of security sector reform, recently named Ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson’s interest in supporting this reform, and the need for the U.S. to be cautious in making sure the effort is led by Egypt. And McInerney recommended that the U.S. should slowly show its support for the Egyptian people rather than relying on public diplomacy to defend U.S. policies that have been controversial in the past. Ryan agreed that the Egyptian people want to like the U.S., this desire can be supported by funding and actions, and public diplomacy will be ineffective. Ryan also recommended that the U.S. promote police reform by providing training and support rule of law and judicial reform initiatives.

In response to a question on financing aid programs, McInerney argued that budget cuts provide creative ways for the U.S. to stretch its resources. The U.S. can expand trade programs and promote regional trade. And the U.S. can also work multilaterally with Gulf allies that have financial resources available. This cooperation would be difficult and potentially dangerous, but the potential nevertheless exists to collaborate without compromising on democracy issues.

Brumberg noted the need to work with youth in Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere to build institutional capacities to absorb funding assistance. Since institutional capacity is currently low and fragmented, dumping large amounts of aid would be counterproductive and dangerous. Ryan agreed on the need to support institution building, and noted that small as opposed to large aid programs are not entirely bad given the lack of institutional capacity in many countries. McInerney contextualized this discussion by citing the need to support civil society development in Libya.

Finally, McInerney argued that in Bahrain, U.S. interests are more aligned than usually understood to be. No serious reforms have occurred, the National Dialogue is a farce, and without significant changes it is possible that violence could erupt. This breakdown would of course be very dangerous for U.S. interests.