Presented by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), the American Tunisian Association, the Middle East Institute, and the SAIS Conflict Management Program

Monday, February 10, 2014
11:00 am – 12:30 pm
Rome Auditorium, Johns Hopkins SAIS
1619 Massachusetts Ave, NW

Three years after the actions of a 26-year-old Tunisian helped bring about the overthrow of a 23-year-old dictatorship and usher in free elections, the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly has ratified a historic constitution guaranteeing various rights, including equality between men and women and freedom of conscience. Three leading experts will explore how diverse political parties succeeded in building consensus around the constitution; key debates about executive power and women’s rights; and Tunisia’s prospects for maintaining a democratic constitutional order.

With:

Duncan Pickard
Nonresident Fellow,
Atlantic Council Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East

Dr. Nathan Brown
Professor of Political Science
George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs

Dr. William Zartman
Professor Emeritus
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

For a summary of the event, continue reading below or click here for a pdf.

Bill Lawrence, POMED Nonresident Senior Fellow and President of the American Tunisian Association, gave opening remarks and introduced the panelists. William Zartman then gave an introductory statement, prompting the featured speaker, Duncan Pickard to begin. Pickard began by giving a recent history of the events in Tunisia leading up to the finalization of the constitution last week. He highlighted four main points that were unique to Tunisian’s newly established Constitution saying that the constitution is the “birth of the second Republic of Tunisia.” He highlighted that this is the first “tangible fruit,” of the revolution, the constitution is the first sustainable constitution in the Arab Spring, the constitution was consensual and agreed upon by all parties, including the Ennahda (Muslim wing of the Tunisian government), and that success came after a series of immense roadblocks. Pickard then zoomed in on two main points of the success of the Constitution, those being a genuine commitment to consensus and a commitment to the rule of law. Pickard then explained the progression and transition of the Tunisian government beginning with the explanation of the Ben-Al Shur commission that initially strove to amend the constitution with the help of the constituent assembly and the Ennahada coalition that formed late in 2011. He explained the early debates about the constitution, those being the division of executive powers and the role of religion in society and the constitution. Pickard explained that the Ennahda party wanted a strong parliament and a weak executive where the secularists wanted a strong executive and weaker parliament.

Additionally, Pickard mentioned two other roadblocks caused by the assassinations of two prominent Tunisians in 2013 that marked the lowest point in the Tunisian transition. Following this low point, Pickard explained the rise of the National Dialogue that sought to resolve the appointment of the members of the elections commission, an agreement on the constitution, a date for elections, and who would take over the government if the Prime Minister was to step down. Pickard concluded his in depth history and analysis by looking forward in Tunisia’s transition with the new Prime Minister, Mehdi Jomaa, and the success of a finalized constitution that established a new constitutional court, included “progressive language” on women’s rights, healthcare, climate change etc., and was not based on Islamic law. Pickard said he is optimistic and happy about Tunisia’s accomplishments but stressed that the implementation process remains to be seen.

Nathan Brown then began his analysis by making some comparisons and contrasts to Egypt, highlighting that the process and structure in Tunisia was far more successful than in Egypt. Brown touched upon a comparison between the Ennahda party in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, stating that he believed The Brotherhood was more experienced at “enacting state power,” but that Tunisia successfully came to a consensus. He also highlighted the strong military presence in Egypt but weak presence of the military in Tunisia. He then pointed to the fact that Tunisians made enormous changes to their system and began a difficult process of inclusionary politics but that the “real democracy” and “real politics” are ugly, and Tunisia has yet to see these “real processes.” He described the greatest challenge will be when social issues are not codified into the constitution but fall into the hands of politicians during the political process and this will be the start of “ugly politics in Tunisia.”

William Zartman then made a few brief comments stating that the “constitution is something to be proud of,” but that the liberal side thinks there are things in the constitution that Islamists will take advantage of if they come into power in the next election cycle, and Islamists think liberals are trying to keep them out of elections. Zartman also predicted that Ennahda will be less popular in the parliamentary elections and that there will be enormous difficulties if the Prime Minister and President are of different parties.

Tunisian Ambassador to the U.S. M’hamed Ezzine Chelaifa then gave a brief statement, saying that the constitution in Tunisia is a historic breakthrough but the success remains “fragile and unfinished.” He highlighted two problems, one being that despite democratic and secular elements, the constitution is not valuable if not accepted by the people and, additionally, that the “emerging democracy” needs to be consolidated and protected and it cannot rely solely on “western allies.” He concluded by saying that Tunisia hopes to build a mutual strategic agenda with the U.S. through security, economics, trade, and investment, which would help Tunisia’s democratic transition.

The floor was then opened for questions and New York Times journalist Thomas Friedmanasked if it was a coincidence that the country with the least U.S. involvement had the greatest success out of the Arab Spring. Pickard responded saying, “correlation doesn’t equal causation,” and that Tunisia was out of the spotlight for a number of reasons, which gave them more space to make internal, independent decisions. He added that now there is a greater call for U.S. involvement in Tunisia for mutual economic benefits. Brown added, in response to Ambassador Chelaifa’s ambition to form a greater relationship with the U.S., “It’s not too late for U.S. involvement and investment.”

Presented by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and OneVoice

Tal Harris
Executive Director
OneVoice Israel

Samer Makhlouf
Executive Director
OneVoice Palestine

Moderator: Stephen McInerney
Executive Director
Project on Middle East Democracy

For a full summary of the event, continue reading below or click here for a pdf.

Samer Makhlouf began the discussion expressing that his work “is more than a job, it’s a mission.” Makhlouf mentioned that OneVoice Palestine’s vision “is to create a movement.” He explained that this type of movement sought non-violent activism that supported a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He added that OneVoice Palestine works under the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s mandate that seeks a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders and one of OneVoice Palestine’s major goals is to connect grassroots youth activists with Palestinian political leaders. Next, Makhlouf discussed the current negotiations between Israel and Palestine, which left him both happy and sad. He was happy because negotiations to establish two states in historic Palestine were underway. He was sad because the majority of Palestinian youth were skeptical of the negotiations ability to succeed and angry the way negotiations began. In particular, he emphasized the humiliation the leadership faced by returning to negotiations without acquiring a settlement freeze. Makhlouf finished his remarks explaining that his organization is focusing on answering questions like, “What if negotiations fail?” and “What are our alternatives?” and “What is the strategy if Abbas brings a peace deal back?”

Tal Harris mentioned the excitement he felt for the current negotiations, but discouragingly mentioned, “It is not very exciting for most Israelis.” First, he describes the secrecy of the talks making it “hard to get on the peace train.” He did preface that the secrecy played a positive role in the negotiations, but it made it difficult to motivate the public. Second, many Israelis see no partner on “the other side” and think, “negotiations don’t work,” according to Harris. Third, he suggested, that for many Israelis “negotiations don’t matter,” because they are “used to the status quo.” Fourth, he argued some Israelis believe peace “might hurt Israelis,” particularly those that support the concept of “Greater Israel.” Next, Harris addressed the need to overcome Israeli’s lack of excitement. He emphasized the importance of including the youth voice in the conversation surrounding negotiations as the first step in overcoming the lack of excitement, and noted that OneVoice brings youth activists to meet with members of the Knesset to engage on this very issue. Also important, Harris argued, is the need to frame the negotiations around issues important to the youth, like jobs and travel, as well.

During the Q&A, Stephen McInerney asked the first several questions. He led by asking the degree to which the youth led movements of Israel and Palestine interact with youth movements across the region. Harris responded by indicating that following the initial wave of protests across the Arab world, Israeli youth led protests in Tel Aviv trying to change domestic priorities. He noted that present in the protests were signs declaring, “We are Tahrir.” Makhlouf added that as a Palestinian he was jealous of the Tunisians and reminiscent of the First Initifada. Palestinians, he argued, responded to spread of protests across the region by “looking internally” and focusing on reconciliation between the Hamas and Fatah.

McInerney then asked what the panelists would like to see from international actors in support of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations beyond the U.S.’s efforts as a mediator. Makhlouf referenced President Barack Obama’s remarks—during his recent visit to Israel and Palestine—where he cautioned the citizenry that politicians would not act without pressure from constituents. He indicated that pressure from the international community needs to be applied on all sides of the conflict to influence negotiations positively. He concluded by stressing the need “to inject hope through non-violent activism,” in order to empower “the silent apathetic majority.” Harris rhetorically asked the audience if the international community hears the “voice of the youth.” Then he thought it was important to remind people why a resolution to the conflict was important and emphasize a “better future” was possible.

McInerney’s last question focused on the perceptions Israelis and Palestinians have on the dramatic changes occurring in the region. Makhlouf suggested that many on both sides have entered “bubbles” preferring the status-quo, but time was running out on such perspectives. Harris initially stressed the enduring security cooperation with Egypt and the relative calm along the Syrian border; but implying the regions movement could be coming to the conflict, he argued that the occupation could end once Netanyahu’s government decides to reach an agreement.

The remaining questions came from the audience. In response to a question on the work of OneVoice, Makhlouf indicated that a 2009 poll conducted by OneVoice showed overwhelming support for a two-state solution: 74% for Palestinians and 76% for Israelis, but a more recent poll showed that 52% of Palestinians now support a two-state solution.  He cautioned though that the support is not for a one-state solution—support for that being 25% in both polls—but rather apathetic to a resolution of any kind. Harris reiterated similar themes suggesting that Israeli’s think peace is not practical. As an example, he mentioned the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, but argued resettlement was “small potatoes” compared to the absorption of one million immigrants from the former Soviet Union. In addressing a question about Palestinian-Israelis, Harris indicated that OneVoice Israel continually addresses democratic concerns within Israel and reach out to more than just Jewish-Israelis in their youth engagement.

The panelists were then asked about re-inspiring the apathetic. Makhlouf suggested that OneVoice Palestine focused on the quality and quantity of its activists. He hopes to expand the current 700 members to 1,500 within a year and provide the activists with the tools to become active. Makhlouf concluded by providing an example of OneVoice Palestine bringing hope back to the population. Makhlouf said they successfully organized 500 youth and the local community in an effort to combat Israeli land grabs by planting trees on the proposed land in order to stop the land acquisition.

POMED and the Heinrich Böll Foundation of North America are pleased to invite you to attend a public panel discussion to release an annual publication, The Federal Budget and Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2014: Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East. This report, authored by POMED’s Executive Director Stephen McInerney and Advocacy Director Cole Bockenfeld, offers a detailed look at U.S. funding and assistance for democracy and governance in the Middle East, the congressional appropriations process, and implications for U.S. policy in the Middle East during a turbulent time. With difficult political transitions underway in some Arab countries, while others continue to protest authoritarian rule, it is important to examine U.S. funding for the Middle East and the impact on Washington’s relations with the region.

This publication focuses on several key questions: What does U.S. funding tell us about the priorities of the Obama administration and its policy response to the events in the Middle East? How are transitions in some states – and troubling trends in many – affecting U.S. assistance to the Middle East and North Africa?  What are the most significant elements of U.S. funding and appropriations this year, particularly when compared to previous years? What has been the impact of ongoing budget cuts and sequestration on funding for the Middle East?  And what might we expect from Congress during its ongoing appropriations process?

Cole Bockenfeld
Advocacy Director, Project on Middle East Democracy

Shadi Hamid
Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center
Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution

Steven Heydemann
Senior Adviser for Middle East Initiatives, United States Institute of Peace
Research Associate Professor, Georgetown University

Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy

Moderated by: Sebastian Gräfe
Program Director for Foreign & Security Policy and Transatlantic Issues,
Heinrich Böll Foundation

For a full summary of the event, continue reading below or click here for a pdf.

Presented by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East

Wednesday, September 18, 2013
2:00 pm – 3:30 pm
Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2200

Following the Egyptian military’s July 3 ouster of the country’s first freely elected president and other troubling indications of democratic reversal, the debate surrounding U.S. military and economic aid to Egypt is heating up again.  Some in Congress argue that the U.S.-Egypt relationship should adapt to a changing Egypt, while others contend that linking U.S. assistance, especially military aid, directly to Egyptian democracy may not be in line with U.S. security interests.  As the end of the current Fiscal Year approaches on September 30, decisions hang in the balance regarding assistance not yet delivered to Egypt’s military.

Beyond pressing questions regarding the continuation or suspension of aid, broader questions regarding the structure and nature of U.S. assistance to Egypt remain.  The U.S. aid package to Egypt has remained essentially unchanged for decades, and many argue that it no longer serves U.S. interests effectively. Some in Congress want to strengthen democracy-related conditions in recent spending bills and limit the ability of the State Department to waive them.  At the same time, others argue that the primary basis for U.S. aid to Egypt must continue to be Egypt’s upholding of its peace treaty with Israel and its cooperation on regional security issues.

Presented by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), Freedom House, and the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

September 11, 2013 will mark the one-year anniversary of the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi and the tragic loss of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans. Since then, a deteriorating security situation and growing political chaos signal a country plunging into a deeper state of crisis. Yet Libya’s transition remains critical to the security and political development of the region.

What are the main challenges confronting Libya’s transition? Who are the key players in the political realm, and what are the key political dynamics? What are the prospects for the National Dialogue? What role can the United States play to positively influence Libya’s transition? Please join us for a discussion of these and other questions appraising developments in Libya since the tragic events in Benghazi and the crucial steps the U.S. can take to help Libya establish itself as a stable, secure democracy.

Mustafa Abushagur
Founder and Chairman,
Libyan Policy Institute

Manal Omar
Director of Iraq, Iran, and North Africa Programs, Center for Conflict Management,
United States Institute of Peace

William Taylor
Former Special Coordinator for the Office of Middle East Transitions,
United States Department of State

Moderator: Karim Mezran
Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East,
Atlantic Council

For a full summary of the event, continue reading below or click here for the pdf.

Charles Dunne argued that despite many events drawing attention in the Middle East, maintaining focus on Libya is essential to both the Libyan transition and international stability. Dunne summarized five key recommendations made in a policy letter addressed to John Kerry, released by the Libya Working Group on Tuesday. The letter lays out a series of five policy recommendations to increase U.S. engagement in Libya including: support for the National Dialogue initiative to empower diverse voices and incorporate expensive outreach to each region; pledge support and expertise for the constitution writing process; expand cooperation and funding to address justice and security sector reform; increase diplomatic engagement and public diplomacy, including a visit by Secretary Kerry; and encourage the Libyan Government to resolve contract disputes and sign OPIC and Ex-Im agreements. Dunne concluded by noting that these actions would constitute, “an important step forward in U.S. policy towards the promise—not just of the Libyan transition—but of the promise of the Arab Spring.”

Mustafa Abushagur discussed the internal developments in the country from his perspective as a high level observer. Dr. Abushagur said that Libya’s “glorious revolution” had made unprecedented steps towards democracy and noted that while the General National Congress (GNC) faced ongoing challenges—including unachievably high expectations on behalf of the public to see immediate results—that such challenges cannot be overcome in only two years. According to Dr. Abushagur, security is the primary challenge, as “the government does not have the force to enforce law in the country.” The government has no formal military, and government-backed militias (known as Shield Brigades) are untrained groups of revolutionaries who ally with the government “when convenient for them.” Dr. Abushagur noted that security concerns, in addition to other major concerns such as slow economic growth, and the closure of oil fields can only be resolved through the National Dialogue. On political developments, he argued that time constraints on the constitution writing process should be removed to allow sufficient deliberation, and a national dialogue should take place on the constitution itself in order to increase participation in the new democracy. Dr. Abushagur concluded that he is optimistic about the future of Libya’s democratic transition.

Manal Omar struck a note of cautious optimism by calling Libya one of the most successful Arab spring countries, highlighted the major successes and ongoing challenges of the revolution, and discussed the critical importance of Libya to the United States. Omar argued that the number of transitions in Libya through institutions—rather than in the streets—in the aftermath of the Arab Spring is evidence of support for developing institutions in the country, and praised civil society development and the announcement of the National Dialogue initiative as key steps towards progress. Turning to remaining challenges, she agreed with Dr. Abushagur that resolving security concerns (particularly concerning border tensions and reconciliation), managing high expectations, facilitating economic growth and overcoming the mentality that “the government should be the primary provider” are crucial to the democratic transition. Omar also explained that successful democratization could provide insight into the effectiveness of light intervention as a strategy for carrying out the responsibility to protect by demonstrating the U.S. can “build partnerships…without having to commit to a large programming in the country or on the ground.”

William Taylor agreed that Libya is an important country for the United States and others in the region, and said Libya does have the capacity to be a success, and therefore needs support from the United States. Ambassador Taylor advocated that the current United States policy to provide assistance on a “demand-driven basis” for military training and border security assistance, civil society and election support is a productive strategy in Libya.

In the Q&A period, the panel offered opinions about strategies to enhance the effectiveness of international assistance. Dr. Abushagur explained that the international community is failing to provide security and constitution writing expertise, and urged further support. Karim Mezran bemoaned weak participation in the GNC as a challenge to the legitimacy of the new government; Manal Omar elaborated that coordination between international organizations needs to be enhanced and emphasized Abushagur’s argument that Libya understands the concept of achieving security through national dialogue, but has struggled to find international support that can assist with putting that into action. William Taylor argued that the host country must become the driver of international coordination. Panelists also addressed questions about training troops in the military, border security, economic development, resolving the difficulty of maintaining governmental legitimacy during a lengthy constitution drafting period, and overcoming political opposition to funding democracy assistance to Libya in the aftermath of the tragic attacks on the American Consulate in Benghazi.

Presented by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

Thursday, June 27, 2013
2:00 – 3:30 pm
1777 F Street NW

• What groups have been mobilized by transitions in their respective countries, and who has been sidelined in the transition process?
• What fault lines in each nation are driving trends in political processes, and how does each country compare to others in the region in this respect?
• What is the relationship between demands for economic welfare and those for religious and political expression?
• How can transitional politics lead to improved participation, accountability and governance?
• And how can the U.S. and the broader international community help each of these transitioning countries to become a robust, sustainable, and inclusive democracy?

Ellen Lust
Associate Professor of Political Science,
Yale University

Jakob Wichmann
Founding Partner,
JMW Consulting

Moderator: Stephen McInerney
Executive Director,
Project on Middle East Democracy

For a full summary of the event, continue reading below or click here for the pdf. 

In his opening remarks, Jakob Wichmann outlined the methodology of the three surveys conducted in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. He mentioned that in Egypt there were nearly 4,000 respondents to the survey, in Tunisia there were approximately 1,100 and just fewer than 1,000 in Libya. He also outlined the main themes for the discussion. The discussion covered three main topics: (1) perceptions of democracy among voters, (2) the success of the Islamist vote and how voters viewed the role of religion in the state, and (3) the similarities and differences in survey results in the three counties covered.

Ellen Lust began the conversation on competing perceptions of democracy in the three countries. She started her remarks by saying the between 80-90 percent of Arabs view democracy as a positive thing and support democratic reform despite its deficiencies. She then pointed out that “democracy means different things to different peoples.” She explained her statement by showing survey results that revealed that in Egypt the rural and the poor associated democracy with economic issues rather than strictly political ones. For instance, those from impoverished or rural backgrounds overwhelming associated democracy with greater equality and the government providing basic services to the population. However, those from more affluent or urban backgrounds were more likely to associate democracy with political rights such as being able change the government through elections or freedom to criticize your government. She went on to say that understanding what democracy means to people is very important for understanding political behavior and that the “rural poor need to be recognized.” She also discussed various breakdowns of voter participation based on age, gender, education, and whether voters lived in rural or urban settings. The results of the survey revealed little differentiation in political preferences based on age and gender lines, but urban and educated voters were significantly more likely to vote than their counterparts.

The conversation moved back to Wichmann, who began the second theme of the discussion. He explained the different means through which he and Lust defined their participants’ religiosity. The first was through self-identifying. This way, they could see how those who chose their religious identity above other identities (national, tribal, occupational) acted politically. The second means of defining religiosity was behavior. This way, they could see if those who went to mosque more frequently or participated in the five daily prayers regularly were more or less likely to vote in a certain manner. The final means of defining religiosity was through questions related to what the nature state and its relationship to religion. Wichmann discussed how the results of the survey differed in Egypt and Tunisia. In Egypt, the survey revealed strong correlations with political values and voting for Islamist parties whereas in Tunisia there was no correlation between political values and voting practices. In Tunisia, there was a strong correlation between religious behavior and voting for Islamist parties. In Libya there were no correlations that predicted voting for an Islamist party.

Wichmann continued his remarks discussing the surprising performance of Egypt’s strongest Salafi party al-Nour in parliamentary elections. He attributed al-Nour’s success to their strong showing rural areas. He pointed out that the secular parties mostly ignored rural areas turning them into a two-party contest between al-Nour and the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Nour was able to capitalize on traditional cleavages between Mubarak’s NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Salafis used the old regime’s voting networks to increase their share of the vote. Jakob also mentioned that al-Nour enjoyed better access to resources than did other secular parties. Speaking on the success of Islamist parties he said, “We do not see in the numbers that Islamists will dominate for eternity.” He finally discussed how all three countries have large moderate sectors of the population but that the secularists were unable to organize and capitalize on this sector.

In her closing remarks, Ellen Lust discussed the two different types of conflicts in the region and how they relate to identity. The first type of conflict she defined as “universal conflicts,” where the parties involved see “identity as malleable” and therefore subject to change. This conflict is a fight for people’s allegiances and support rather than over land or resources. This kind of conflict often leads to support for illiberal policies or authoritarianism. The second type of conflict is “particularistic conflicts,” which is defined by zero-sum conflicts, such as when when people fight over resources or land. People see identity as static in particularistic conflicts and therefore do not fear losing members of their cause to other groups. These conflicts often lead to threats of secession or group conflict. Ellen then discussed how both Egypt and Tunisia in their current state are more prone to universal conflicts due the polarization of the populations and the undercurrents of Islamist versus secularist. Libya on the other hand is more prone to particularistic struggle due to the strong tribal tradition and the religious homogeneity. Following Ellen’s remarks the panel was opened up to questions from the audience.

Responding to a question on voter turnout, Lust discussed how the transitional phase differently affects different voters. Traditionally some Egyptians voted for a local known candidate in order to curry favor and to seek some form of patronage. After the fall of Mubarak and the emergence of free elections, some of these local politicians became marginalized and thus severed their traditional ties with their constituencies. This may have led some Egyptians, particularly in rural areas, to refrain from voting in elections.

Presented by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
and the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) 

Friday, June 14, 2013
8:00 am – 2:45 pm
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Root Room, Floor 2
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW

What are the drivers of the political, societal, and economic change reshaping the Arab Gulf states? Do old paradigms about the region’s perennial stability still hold true? Scholars, analysts, and activists from across the Middle East, Europe, and the United States will tackle these questions to examine the oft-neglected forces at work in this strategically important region.

8:00 am – 8:30 am: Check-in and Continental Breakfast

8:30 am – 8:45 am: Introduction and Opening Remarks
Speaker: Frederic Wehrey, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

9:00 am – 10:30 am: Continuity and Change in the Gulf: How Stable…and For How Long?

Moderator: Frederic Wehrey, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Speakers: Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, London School of Economics
Bernard Haykel, Princeton University
Steve Simon, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

10:30 am – 10:45 am: Coffee Break

10:45 am – 12:15 pm: A New Ruling Bargain? Reform and Gulf Elite Dynamics 

Moderator: Marc Lynch, The George Washington University
Speakers: Andrew Hammond, former Reuters correspondent, Saudi Arabia
Ali Al Shihabi, author, Saudi Arabia
Abdulhadi al-Khalaf, Lund University, Sweden

12:15 pm – 1:15 pm: Lunch Break

1:15 pm – 2:45 pm: New Trends in Activism: Youth, Women, and Islamists

Moderator: Stephen McInerney, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)
Speakers: Ahmed Al Omran, Saudi blogger, Riyadh Bureau
Kristin Smith Diwan, American University
Jane Kinninmont, Chatham House 

For a summary of the event, click here for a pdf of Panel 1 – Continuity and Change in the Gulf and here for a pdf of Panel 2 – Dynamic Gulf: Forces of Change in a Strategic Region. 

Presented by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

Nazila Fathi
Former New York Times Journalist in Tehran
Research Fellow, Harvard University

Ambassador John Limbert
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iran, Department of State
Distinguished Professor, United States Naval Academy

Mariam Memarsadeghi
Co-Founder and Co-Director, E-Collaborative for Civic Education,
Parent Organization to Tavaana: E-Learning Institute for Iranian Civil Society

Moderator: Stephen McInerney
Executive Director,
Project on Middle East Democracy

Presented by the Project on Middle East Democracy and the U.S. Institute of Peace

Thursday, May 9, 2013
10:00 am – 11:30 am
United States Institute of Peace
2301 Constitution Avenue NW

Between 2012-2013, Tunisia’s political scene has witnessed increasing polarization and occasional violence, culminating in the assassination of Chokri Belaid in February 2013. In this context, Tunisia’s National Constituent Assembly is considering the third and perhaps final draft of its proposed constitution.  The constitution-writing process has been protracted by disagreements about allusions to Islam and cultural values, and the primacy of human rights as they are internationally defined.

As Tunisia is led by a provisional government, how does the country rank on human rights, addressing political violence by intolerant groups, protecting freedom of expression and the rights of women and minorities, and writing a constitution that safeguards the rights of all Tunisians?

With

Amel Azzouz
Member, Tunisian National Constituent Assembly
Member, Ennahda’s Internal Shura Council

Amna Guellali
Tunisia Country Representative,
Human Rights Watch

Daniel Brumberg
Senior Adviser on Middle East Initiatives,
U.S. Institute of Peace

Stephen McInerney
Executive Director,
Project on Middle East Democracy

Chair: Joyce Kasee
Program Officer, North Africa Program
U.S. Institute of Peace

In a time when the Middle East has been experiencing unprecedented political change and opportunities for democratic openings, many observers and analysts have turned to Turkey to be a model of democratic transformation throughout the region. As Turkey rises as a regional power, however, its domestic political scene and record on basic rights have increasingly come under scrutiny. With the highest number of imprisoned journalists in the world and highly publicized cases of repression, Turkey’s crackdown on journalists, activists, and artists threatens to hinder the country’s democratic progress.

What policies and political forces have driven these restrictions on freedom of expression and backsliding on fundamental rights? What repercussions and connections do they have on other spheres of Turkey’s domestic politics, such as the nation’s ongoing constitution-writing process? How have Turkey’s domestic and international concerns, such as Kurdish issues and the Syrian crisis, affected the domestic political environment? And what can the U.S., European Union, and other international actors do to encourage Turkey to uphold basic freedoms and rights and to prevent further reversal in Turkey’s democratic progression?

Please join us for a discussion of these topics with:

Howard Eissenstat
Assistant Professor of Middle Eastern History, St. Lawrence University

Yigal Schleifer
Independent Journalist and Analyst,and Author, The Turko-file

Susan Corke
Director for Eurasia Programs, Freedom House

Presented by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

Presented by the U.S. Institute of Peace, Georgetown University, the Conflict Management Program at SAIS, and the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED).