This event was co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and the Legatum Institute.

Monday, November 16, 2015
12:00 pm – 1:30 pm
Open Society Foundations
1730 Pennsylvania Ave NW, #700
Washington, DC 20006

Despite the immense progress Tunisia has made in its transition since the Jasmine Revolution, significant challenges—both internal and external—threaten the future of Tunisia’s democracy. As major terrorist attacks have negatively affected the country’s security and economic stability, Tunisia’s government has struggled to find an appropriate and effective response to counter the threat of terrorism.

The Legatum Institute’s upcoming publication Tunisia at Risk: Will counter-terrorism undermine the revolution? analyzes successive Tunisian governments’ responses to terrorism and considers the relation between these responses and the future of the country’s democratic transition.

How can governments effectively counter terrorism without threatening civil liberties? What reforms are needed to make Tunisia’s security sector effective, accountable, and in line with international human rights standards? And how can the United States and the international community play a productive role in encouraging and facilitating these reform efforts?

A discussion with:

Fadil Aliriza
Visiting Senior Fellow, Legatum Institute

Daniel Brumberg
Co-director, Democracy & Governance Studies, Georgetown University

Querine Hanlon
President, Strategic Capacity Group

Moderated by:

Cole Bockenfeld
Deputy Director for Policy, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

With opening remarks by:

Anne Applebaum
Director of the Transitions Forum, Legatum Institute

On November 16, POMED co-hosted an event with the Legatum Institute titled “Countering Terrorism in Tunisia: Prospects for Security Sector Reform.” Panelists included Fadil Aliriza, Visiting Senior Fellow at the Legatum Institute and author of “Tunisia at Risk: Will Counterterrorism Undermine the Revolution?”; Daniel Brumberg, co-director of Democracy and Governance Studies at Georgetown University; and Querine Hanlon, President of the Strategic Capacity Group. The discussion was moderated by Cole Bockenfeld, Deputy Director for Policy at POMED, and opening remarks were provided by Anne Applebaum, Director of the Transitions Forum at the Legatum Institute.

In his opening remarks, Fadil Aliriza explained that in writing his report on Tunisia, he sought to answer the question of what the response to terrorism has been in Tunisia. This includes the two terrorist attacks this year, the assassinations in 2013, and the insurgency beginning in spring 2013. Aliriza contends that Tunisia’s response has been politicized. The security sector, he argues, and in particular the Ministry of Interior (MOI), views security through the lens of how it can best serve its own interests. While the revolution itself was against a police state, the MOI has set about a counter-revolutionary project to re-image itself, using the media to change the discourse from one of revolution to one of counterterrorism. Furthermore, Aliriza noted that there has been some lobbying by the security forces to counter some of the gains of the revolution. For example, the anti-terrorism law has increased pre-trial detention from six days to fifteen days. Within this counter-terrorist discourse, there are groups of politicians who see all opponents of the state, not just violent ones, as terrorists, painting all critics with a terrorist brush. In addition, as the MOI is not entirely under civilian control, civil society members are concerned about its lack of checks and procedural protocols.

The result of these factors, argues Aliriza, is that counterterrorism actions counterintuitively might be creating an environment conducive to terrorism. Employees of the MOI, for example, are letting arms into the country, and employees have intelligence on terrorist attacks that never makes it to civilian chiefs. Additionally, between January and July of this year, 100,000 arrests were made, according to the MOI. The problem with these arrests, however, is that they seem to be arbitrary, with many people arrested based on appearing to be Salafists. Furthermore, torture still occurs. Working together, these factors can lead to threats of radicalization. The solution to this, Aliriza contends, is to change the way people think. The problem goes beyond a problem of lack of training and equipment for the police, and the situation is so dire that Tunisians are starting to see the national military as a potential solution.

Following Aliriza’s opening remarks, Querine Hanlon laid out some challenges to the security sector and potential reforms. According to Hanlon, the central challenge is that the security apparatus in Tunisia was created for regime protection and preservation, and this security sector design remains largely intact today. Reforming the internal security sector, not the military, needs to be a priority, and reform faces four main challenges. First, the security apparatus, Hanlon argues, is “Byzantine in its complexity.” The MOI is the “black box” of the security sector, where there is excessive duplication of duties and departments. The structure is so complex that most Tunisians do not know how all the sector and divisions work, and more importantly, the information is not publicly available. Second, there is limited to no coordination among and between institutions. Serious tensions exist between the military and police. The police were the most resistant to the revolution, as they had the most to lose when Ben Ali lost power, and are now generally reviled by the populace. With these significant tensions, the police and military do not coordinate, cooperate, or share information. Furthermore, for any serious decision-making, all decisions must go through the capital of Tunis, giving forces at the border and in the interior limited capabilities and no real autonomy. Third, there is the fundamental problem of the mission. The security sector in Tunisia does not operate on the idea of civilian protection. There is no understanding, particularly in the police force, of what it means to serve the population. Fourth, there is a culture of secrecy and distrust. There is no real and practical way for civil society organizations to request a meeting with anyone from the MOI. Furthermore, when it comes to information-sharing with the police, citizens are unwilling to share their intelligence due to a lack of trust and not wanting to be perceived as informants, and the police do not have a mechanism in place to change this perspective. Moving from the perception of serving as informants to a trusting partnership with the security apparatus is a significant challenge. Since the revolution, the regular police have been ignored more and more in favor of specialized forces, which has security implications in and of itself. While they are better trained and better equipped, these forces are militarized units, not the equivalent of a police force. The overarching solution to these challenges, argues Hanlon, is to generate an “ethos of service.” While it is true that the forces need better training and equipment, changing the overall perspective of the security sector is essential to creating any sort of real and long-lasting change.

Finally, Daniel Brumberg highlighted the importance of democratization in countering security threats. He argues that there is a race occurring in Tunisia between two dynamics: securitization versus democratization, and the race for securitization is escalating more quickly. However, there is a necessary connection between fighting terrorism and democratization, and democracy and security must go hand in hand. The deep state in Tunisia is expanding; the businessmen, members of the old regime, and smugglers are all merging into one block. Furthermore, the failure to establish advanced democratic institutions and processes has led to the exploitation of laws to support the security sector. This lack of democratic institutions and processes, the failure of the establishment of the Supreme Constitutional Court, for example, has led to the security sector employing outdated laws to justify its actions. In addition, reflecting Aliriza’s previous points, there is no active, effective opposition. Opposition members who questioned the anti-terrorism law were themselves accused of terrorism. There is a paradox developing where the middle class who supported the revolution are now shifting back to supporting authoritarianism. Brumberg’s central question is how to reform the state when the state itself is the problem. He believes the solution requires finding allies within state institutions who want to reform, and he argues that demonizing the MOI will not be productive. He also believes that mobilizing regional networks of reformers is essential. Finally, in the global fight against the Islamic State (ISIS), the United States needs to support Tunisia and its democratization and stop supporting authoritarianism.

Following the opening remarks from the panelists, Cole Bockenfeld asked them how the U.S. and international actors can aid the security sector and ministries to reform. He also asked if the previous efforts to establish a Fusion Center, an initiative to bring together the Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Justice to better coordinate their actions, had helped at all. The panelists distinguished between assistance and reform, noting that reform needs to come from within. While it can be encouraged by outside actors, reform cannot be imposed, and the solution needs to involve finding areas where the government has the political will to change. The agents of this change will likely not be found at the senior level within the ministries. However, lower-level staff are trying to determine what operational changes can be made, so the political will to change might be encouraged through them. Regarding the Fusion Center, while it was an attempt to tackle the problem of information sharing that plagues Tunisian institutions, progress has been stalled because the MOI has not come to an agreement on who to name to work at the Center. The panelists argue that the U.S. needs to get involved in encouraging political will, perhaps through conditionality-based aid.

Subsequently, audience members were invited to ask the panelists questions. First among those, a member of the audience argued that the problems in Tunisia are not particularly unique and asked what solutions to these problems have worked in other countries. Qualifying that security sector reform is a relatively new field with few potential areas for success, Hanlon contended that the most obvious cases of success are in Eastern Europe. However, she argued that these cases are not comparable to Tunisia because those countries in Eastern Europe had the political will to reform in order to gain membership to NATO and the European Union. Tunisians themselves, she said, look to the cases of reform in Taiwan, Chile, and South Africa. One of the central issues they must address, though, is what the security sector is, which will require a public dialogue and sharing of information, and civil society organizations need to work to keep these issues in the public space.

Further questions broadly asked whether there were other actors in the MOI and security sector who would be interested in pushing forward reforms. Hanlon’s answer highlighted that the MOI contains both those who were uninterested in reform and information sharing and those who wanted to work towards reform but may not necessarily know how. First she emphasized that everyone within the MOI has their own private archive of information, and this information moves with him or her – there isn’t a culture of information sharing. So divided is the MOI that people who work in the same hallway or have worked in the same space for years may not know each other. Further, the police force views themselves as being above the politicians, which creates problems itself. However, there are those members of the police force who do genuinely want to change but do not know how. For example, Hanlon shared a story of talking to a police chief who asked with genuine curiosity how he could make someone confess without the use of torture. Part of the problem rests with Tunisia operating on a confession-based system of justice. While there are individuals who see that the system does not work, they do not know how to fix it.

Subsequent questions focused on what kind of incentives the U.S. can offer Tunisia to encourage reform. Is there any sort of leverage comparable to NATO or EU membership that can be offered? Can economic incentives be attached to security sector reform? The panelists noted that to join NATO, there is an exhaustive list of requirements a state accedes to, which inherently creates security sector reform, and there are no comparable incentives in Tunisia. Offering conditionality-based aid is an option, but there is no guarantee that the aid is put to effective use. Furthermore, economics are likely not enough of an incentive when asking institutions to give up some power, which the MOI would have to do in order to implement meaningful security sector reform.

This event was co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).

Date: November 3, 2015
Time: 2:30 – 3:45 pm
Location: Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 562

As Tunisia has democratized since its 2011 Jasmine Revolution, its frail economy remains a danger to social peace, with unemployment even higher than when the country’s mass protests began in late 2010. Terrorist attacks this year killed more than 50 foreigners, undercutting tourism, the country’s third-largest industry. On November 3, Houcine Abassi, Tunisia’s most prominent labor leader, and leading U.S. analysts will discuss these economic challenges and their implications for the country’s evolution. Abassi heads the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), part of the National Dialogue Quartet that was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October.

What should the priorities for spurring economic recovery in Tunisia be? What policies should the Tunisian government adopt to improve employment, especially for youth? What role can Tunisia’s labor unions play in the country’s political and economic environment? And how can the United States and the international community help Tunisia make difficult reforms and recover economically?

Abassi will discuss Tunisia’s situation with U.S. experts in a forum co-hosted by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, and the United States Institute of Peace.

A conversation with:

Houcine Abassi
Secretary General, Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT)

Brad Cunningham
Economist, Millennium Challenge Corporation
Research Fellow, Center for International Development, Harvard University

Amy Hawthorne
Deputy Director for Research, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

Moderated by:

Ambassador William Taylor
Executive Vice President, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

This event was sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED).

With the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed upon, the international community has begun to focus on the implementation of the nuclear deal. During the course of negotiations, the human rights situation inside Iran failed to improve, and it remains unclear how such issues may be affected by the signing of the nuclear agreement. It also remains to be seen whether the nuclear agreement will now create any additional space for the international community to address its human rights concerns.

What changes can we expect to see in Iran’s domestic politics as sanctions are relieved and attention moves beyond nuclear negotiations? What role can the international community play in addressing human rights concerns in Iran? What changes might we expect in U.S. policy toward Iran post-nuclear deal, and how—if at all—can the United States play a constructive role in helping open space for domestic activists?

A discussion with:

Nazila Fathi
Author, The Lonely War: One Woman’s Account of the Struggle for Modern Iran
Former New York Times Correspondent, Tehran

Dokhi Fassihian
Senior Program Manager, Freedom House

Suzanne Maloney
Deputy Director, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution
Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution

Moderated by:

Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

On October 14, POMED hosted a public panel discussion titled “Human Rights in Iran After the Nuclear Deal.” Panelists included Nazila Fathi, author of The Lonely War: One Woman’s Account of the Struggle for Modern Iran; Dokhi Fassihian, Senior Program Manager for the Middle East and North Africa at Freedom House; and Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director of the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution and Senior Fellow in the Brookings Center for Middle East Policy. Moderating was Stephen McInerney, Executive Director of POMED.

In her opening remarks, Nazila Fathi stated that her prior expectation that the human rights situation in Iran would deteriorate has come to pass. She distinguished that it is not the government writ large leading the crackdowns, but instead the judiciary. However, President Hassan Rouhani is incapable of stopping these crackdowns on the whole. While he was able to curtail the “modesty police” last year when they were targeting primarily women (and even some men) who were deemed to be immodestly dressed, he is unable to put an end to the targeted arrests and detentions. Meanwhile, the judiciary has continued its systematic repression of various sections of society, including those of the Baha’i faith and unions. The hardliners are clearly feeling vulnerable, evident in all of their harsh repressive moves. Fathi believes that the most pressing situation, however, is that of women. It was primarily lower class women who supported the Revolution and were therefore able to climb up the socioeconomic ladder due to regime support. These “Islamist feminists” have been rewarded with quotas for women in employment and university acceptance. If the regime tries to backtrack, the number of women employed and in school will decrease, thus reversing the gains in female empowerment.

Following Ms. Fathi, Dokhi Fassihian shared in her opening remarks that there was a hope that if the nuclear negotiations were resolved and diplomatic discussion occurred, there would be an “opening.” Through economic re-engagement and cultural exchanges, Iran would come out of the extreme isolation it has put itself in and repression would therefore be more difficult. Fassihian gives three main reasons why the human rights situation has instead deteriorated since President Rouhani came into office. First, during the nuclear negotiations and engagement with the international community, the government has actually taken the opportunity to crack down. As the government consolidated a crackdown, there was no reaction from the international community due to the emphasis on nuclear negotiations, essentially giving the regime a green light. Second, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has been working to weaken opponents ahead of the 2016 parliamentary elections. It is in his interest not to see an opening on human rights, and repression of those who would bring human rights into the discussion is therefore in his interests. Finally, the international community as a whole has weakened its stance on human rights in Iran over the past few years, again emphasizing nuclear negotiations over the issue of human rights abuses.

In addition, Fassihian argues that another obstacle to democracy and human rights promotion in Iran is the “narrative Iranians are force fed from a young age,” which emphasizes that Iran is always a victim of bigger powers and the United States in particular. Therefore, there is a belief among Iranians that trusting the international community will lead to the weakening and breakdown of the country, so Iran remains isolated for fear of state collapse. While Iranians are ready to “counter that narrative”, they are not necessarily empowered to do so, and the international community is not clear on how to do so. While Iranians have tried to improve their situation themselves through voting and peaceful protest, the structure of the government makes it extremely hard for citizens to have any actual influence. The powers of Supreme Leader Khamenei and the Guardian Council are simply too strong and with these powers they are “micromanaging” domestic policy.

To conclude, Fassihian gave a few recommendations for what the international community can do to help improve the human rights situation in Iran. While various resolutions related to human rights in Iran have been passed at the United Nations since the 1980s, with monitoring missions occurring in the 1980s, the monitoring discontinued in the 1990s with the election of former president Mohammad Khatami, whose platform promised reforms that never came to pass. In 2011, the U.S., along with Brazil, Sweden, and the European Union worked to establish a stronger monitoring mechanism, which reported the deterioration of human rights in the country. However, nothing was done because, again, the international community was more focused on nuclear negotiations, which sent the signal that human rights were of secondary importance. Therefore, Fassihian proposed three steps the international community must take. First, the consensus from 2011 needs to be rebuilt, with a coalition strengthened by and organized around a “real human rights agenda that charts a path for progress.” Second, the international community needs to sanction human rights violators, particularly those high level members of the judiciary and Guardian Council who are directly responsible for human rights violations. Finally, a Commission of Inquiry needs to be launched, following the models of the successful Commissions on North Korea and Eritrea.

Finally, in Suzanne Maloney’s opening remarks she expounded upon U.S. policy towards Iran, highlighting that regardless of the will of members of the policy community to improve the human rights situation in Iran, they have relatively few tools with which to do so. With the beginning of nuclear discussions over a decade ago, Washington realized it had almost no leverage with Iran, so the administrations of former President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama worked for years to build this leverage. While former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did work to unite the international community in their views on Iran, there is still no multilateral consensus on human rights being on the agenda in discussions about Iran, as Russia and China are unwilling to entertain discussions related to human rights. Therefore, Maloney suggests that the U.S. must work to rebuild and sustain a common position with its European allies. While the U.S. and Europe once had opposing views on Iran, the decade of nuclear negotiations has brought them to the same side. Finally, the U.S. needs to do more to talk about political prisoners, because it is international attention that ultimately changes their status. For example, the international community has ignored that opposition candidates from the last election who have now been under house arrest for four and a half years, and bringing international attention to these matters is what can possibly work to change such predicaments.

Next, Stephen McInerney asked the panelists what could be expected in the upcoming 2016 elections. Ms. Fathi said she expects some surprises, and that what she believes is more important than the elections themselves is whom the Guardian Council announces as eligible to run. In the past, anyone who posed any sort of threat to the regime was barred from running, and because of this, the current parliament is ineffective at bringing about change; the only people who are in power are those who are willing to comply with government orders. However, she was surprised by the last presidential elections. She expected that the votes would not even be counted and Rouhani’s victory was a shock. She believes he won because the government elites sensed that a prospect for change was required. Therefore, she believes that in the upcoming election there is a possibility for more independent candidates due to this sense among elites that a small space needs to be opened for liberalization. She also notes that as people move up socioeconomically, their political affiliation tends to change; people who started out in the lower classes and supported the regime have moved up to the middle classes and no longer support it. Also noteworthy is that the younger generations’ views do not always align with that of their parents. For example, Ali Jannati, Minister of Culture, is considered to have more moderate views than his father, Ahmad Jannati, Chairman of the Guardian Council, considered to be a hardliner.

By contrast, Fassihian argued that she expects no surprises in the upcoming elections. While the sophistication of the factions and coalition building in the last election improved, elections continue not to be free and fair, and the Supreme Leader has made it clear that the Guardian Council will look extremely closely at the candidates. Maloney meanwhile emphasized that repression is likely to decrease in the run-up to the elections. Historically with international press attention comes less repression, followed by serious crackdowns once the international attention wanes.

Subsequently, audience members were given the opportunity to ask the panelists questions. First among these was whether there were openings for international assistance to Iranian civil society groups, whether this assistance was wanted, and also what overall role international attention can play. First, the panelists noted the importance of “naming and shaming,” which works to publicly shame those who are directly involved in human rights crackdowns and makes more people in Iran reluctant to join groups enforcing harsh repressive policies. Second, international attention does generally work to improve the conditions for civil society activists in prison. It has been found that when international attention is brought to their case, their prison conditions improve. For example, they are moved from solitary confinement to a larger cell with other people, whereas those prisoners whose cases are not public knowledge always end up staying in prison longer. Finally, while there is a desire for international attention and aid for the civil society organizations, this is a double-edged sword. Receiving international help automatically sets them as being allied with the Western “enemy.” Not providing assistance, however, feeds into the Iranian victimhood narrative.

Next, a question was posed about how the U.S.’s ability to bring international attention to human rights abuses in Iran is hindered by its inconsistent record on human rights worldwide. The consensus among all panelists was that this does hurt U.S. efforts. The U.S. has bundled the myriad concerns it has about Iran, including the nuclear issue, regional designs supporting terrorism, and human rights, into one blanket issue. However, these must all be tackled separately. Historically, it looks as though the U.S. drops human rights concerns in favor of other issues and politicizes human rights as a whole. Furthermore, there is the problem of feeding into Iran’s victimhood narrative. By calling attention to Iran’s human rights abuses and not Saudi Arabia’s, for example, Iran can manipulate this to be a narrative of the West playing favorites and marginalizing Iran.

Another question was if there was any way positive inducements could be more effective than pressuring the government into human rights improvements. The panelists believed that the Iranian government was afraid of its own people, as evidenced by the harsh repressive moves. For the Supreme Leader and those who support him, they view the end of Iran’s isolation as the end of the regime, so they are afraid of any opening that could change the isolation. Also, animosity towards the U.S. is one of the remaining principles from the Islamic Revolution, therefore leaving no opportunity for positive inducements.

A final question posed was why dissent from Ali Motahari has been tolerated by the regime. Generally, the panelists believe he has been tolerated because he can be used as the “token politician” the government can look to in order to be able to say that dissent is tolerated. He also happens to come from a prominent family tied to the Revolution and is generally unpopular due to his very conservative social notions. He lacks a real support base and is unpopular among the youth and women, as he wants to go back to radical societal restrictions on women.

Despite the repressive environment that existed for Egyptian civil society and NGOs in the Mubarak era, pre-2011 Egypt nonetheless had one of the most vibrant civil societies in the region, which included a variety of professional and respected human rights organizations.  Following Egypt’s 2011 revolution, many hoped to see a more democratic Egypt emerge, with greater political openness and space for civil society to operate.  Unfortunately, the reverse has been true, and Egypt’s civil society in particular has faced an increasingly repressive and hostile environment since 2011.

POMED is pleased to invite you to attend a public panel discussion in conjunction with the release of a new publication, Under Threat: Egypt’s Systematic Campaign against NGOs. This discussion will focus on several key questions: What threats does Egyptian civil society currently face? What are the options for Egypt’s embattled NGO community? What forces have led this ongoing campaign against NGOs? What impact does the ongoing campaign against civil society have on Egypt’s broader political trajectory? And what role may the international community be able to play in supporting Egypt’s threatened civil society?

A discussion with:

Michele Dunne
Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Bahey Eldin Hassan
General Director, Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

Kristen McGeeney
Senior Legal Advisor, Middle East and North Africa, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL)

Todd Ruffner
Advocacy Associate, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

For full notes of the event’s proceedings, continue reading or click here for a PDF.

Mr. McInerney introduced the panel and explained that the Egyptian government’s ongoing campaign against non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should be a major concern for Western observers. While repression of civil society in Egypt is not a new phenomenon, McInerney explained, certain developments undertaken by the regime of President Abdelfattah al-Sisi in the past year, combined with lessening pressure on human rights issues from Washington, pose a very dangerous threat to the future of NGOs in Egypt. McInerney cited previous successes that international pressure on the Egyptian government regarding the treatment of NGOs has had in the prevention of a large public crackdown in Fall 2014, much like the one that occurred in late 2011. At the same time, he noted that the Sisi government has now switched to quieter and more subversive tactics to suppress civil society, posing an equal if not more dire threat to Egyptian NGOs. McInerney detailed some of the results of these subversive tactics; NGOs have had to significantly reduce their staff and activities, move their operations outside of Egypt, or even suspend their operations entirely in fear of a government crackdown. NGO partners in Egypt are extremely appreciative of the international attention and support they receive, McInerney reported, but many on the ground fear that the focus of Western attention has drifted over the past year and that the Egyptian government no longer feels restrained in its tactics. The goal of POMED’s report, McInernery concluded, is to draw attention back to these tactics undertaken by the Sisi government and to spur the conversation about what can be done by the regional and international community.

Mr. Ruffner, the author of the new publication, began his remarks by mentioning that the findings of his research on the current climate for civil society were much darker than he expected. He outlined five different tactical styles the government has employed to undermine NGO work since President Sisi came to power in June 2014. He mentioned that many of these tactics are not unique to the Sisi regime, but they have been undertaken by previous Egyptian administrations and other governments across the region. The first tactic undertaken by the government is the hindering of the NGO registration and government authorization process. Ruffner mentioned a July 2014 announcement by the Ministry of Social Solidarity in al-Ahram newspaper, which mandated that NGOs had to register under new guidelines within 45 days or face severe legal consequences. One of the ways in which the government derails NGO activities is by not responding to NGO application requests. Civil society groups are automatically registered if the government does not provide a response within 60 days, but they do not receive a registration number which limits the scope of their organizational activities, such as opening bank accounts. Ruffner mentioned a women’s economic rights group who tried to register with the word “empowerment” in their mission statement; their application was not accepted until that word was removed from their mission statement. A second tactic used by the Sisi regime is making issue of foreign funding received by NGOs – specifically, how private funding of NGOs has been targeted. Ruffner asserted that NGOs are afraid to take action on any project with even a “hint” of a rights component for fear of government investigation into their finances. A third tactic is direct intervention into daily operations; this includes mandating meeting agendas, shutting down meetings entirely, and sending undercover informants disguised as civil society partners to investigate organizational activities. The fourth tactic is an ongoing defamation campaign against NGOs and their employees. Civil society has long been the target of a pro-state and pro-government campaign which labels NGOs as instruments of United States and Zionist infiltration into Egyptian domestic affairs. Even POMED has been targeted in an Egyptian media campaign, Ruffner explained. The fifth tactic is coercion, including death threats issued by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry against groups who refused to speak positively about their experience in civil society at the United Nations Periodical Review in Geneva last fall. Police raids on NGO offices have been very graphic and brutal. These threats do not just affect Egypt’s NGO community, Ruffner said, but they have a broader impact on the marginalized communities that NGO tries to defend as well as civil society writ large.

Mr. Hassan analyzed the conclusions of POMED’s report on civil society in the context of what daily life is like for civil society employees in Egypt. Hassan asserted that in his long tenure in civil society work, the oppression that the sector faces has been by far the worst under President Sisi. Most of the laws issued under Sisi have further institutionalized the repression of human rights. More than 3,000 Egyptian citizens have been killed since the 2011 revolution. 40,000 Egyptians are currently in prison with rare access to due process trial – this is compared to 20,000 prisoners under the Mubarak regime, when legal rights were more accessible. Hassan noted a massive deterioration of the performance of the judiciary; during the Mubarak era, NGOs and the judiciary were allied in maintaining independence from the government, but now, the “front line” of defending civil society from government has collapsed. The oppression of civil society, Hassan said, reflects the oppression of the greater Egyptian populace. The new Terrorist Entities Law is a prime example. This law has much less to do with fighting domestic terrorism, Hassan argued, than the suppression of civil society, independent journalists, critical political parties, and related actors. Many of the human rights defenders that Hassan has worked with are suffering in Egyptian detention due to repressive laws and politically motivated trials. While ongoing repressive tactics are justified by a fight against terrorism, Hassan believes that these actions create an environment that is dangerously more welcoming to the recruitment of terrorism in the Sinai.

Ms. McGeeney placed the current situation that NGOs in Egypt face into a larger global context. She explained that while the laws governing civil society activity in Egypt have not changed since 2002, different approaches to implementation of the laws have resulted in a more hostile civil society climate. Since 2012, 150 draft laws to replace the current legislation governing civil society activity in Egypt have been proposed since 2012. Seventy-five percent of those laws have been negative in terms of their intended impact on NGO activity. An additional 46 percent of those negative laws have been focused directly on limiting civil society organizations’ operational capacities – including registration processes and funding restrictions. 34 percent of the negative laws called for further government oversight in funding, and 17 percent dealt with the right to public assembly. McGeeney said that while the crackdown against civil society in Egypt was intensifying, other countries in the Middle East and North Africa have taken important steps towards preserving the integrity of their NGO sectors. There is a rising global fear of foreign interference and terrorist infiltration that has served as justification for the curtailment of civil society. McGeeney said the legal community is worried that penalties against NGO workers will only increase in severity, a threat which will detour groups from working. Unfortunately, McGeeney concluded, Egypt has served as a model for a growing global trend to curtail civil society work. She asserted that the international community must stay engaged on the issue to increase the visibility of rights encroachments, as well as to advocate for societal and legal reforms.

Ms. Dunne explained the scope of US policy towards Egypt’s treatment of civil society.  She highlighted two misconceptions in the American policy debate. The first is the idea that the US has to strike a balance between promoting stability in the Middle East and North Africa and promoting democracy or freedom, both of which are destabilizing. The second misconception is widespread confusion about the size and nature of US influence in Egypt. Some think that President Sisi will do whatever the US wills him to, while others think the United States no longer has any influence in Egypt. Dunne believes these conversations are not binary. She cited President Obama’s remarks at the recent Countering Violent Extremism summit in Washington, D.C. as the signaling of a realization that the United States’ is struggling to address terrorism concerns. She said it has not recognized that the larger problem of radicalization cannot be suppressed with military and financial action. The United States is used to working bilaterally with governments to fight terrorism, but this will not work in the Middle East because many of those governments, with Egypt being a prime example, are implementing policies in their countries which exacerbate the threats of extremism – such as the crackdown on civil society. Many would think that civil society organizations would be a natural government ally in the fight against terrorism because they have similar social agendas, but this is not the position of the Sisi regime. Dunne asserted that the United States needs to distance itself from the either/or question of fighting terrorism or upholding human rights and instead focus on ways to fight radicalization by promoting freedom, pluralism, and diversity, which will eradicate the issues that draw Middle Eastern populations to radicalism. On the second point of United States’ influence in Egypt, Dunne pointed out that public opinion has shifted from believing the idea that the United States can accomplish anything it wants in Egypt to the idea that the country can have no influence or impact on Egyptian policies. She claimed the reality is somewhere in the middle.

There has been tension between the US and Egypt in the last few years, especially since the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, which has been exacerbated by the partial withholding of U.S. military aid. Secretary of State John Kerry recently remarked that a decision on whether to resume military aid to Egypt will be made “soon,” but nothing is for certain. The United States has sent a lot of mixed signals to Egypt regarding civil society in the past few years. In the case of the raids on U.S. organizations and the detention of American NGO workers in late 2011, the reaction of the United States was much weaker and ambivalent than it should been. Dunne noted that a similar crackdown on civil society in the Arab Gulf states has begun, modeled off of Egypt’s tactics, and encouraged the United States to respond more vocally. She stated that the United States has recently tried to bring up the issue of civil society in Egypt more consistently, which is a move in a positive direction. For example, in November 2014, around the time the Egyptian government threatened to close NGOs for a second time, the United States made a statement at the Geneva Periodical Review of Egypt by the United Nations Human Rights Council Review calling for the repealment of the controversial civil society and assembly laws–much to the surprise of the Egyptian government. Dunne praised the trend imposing more conditions related to democratic reform on American aid to Egypt in the last few fiscal years. She reiterated the severity of the current threat against civil society organizations; while the Mubarak government did not want NGOs to engage in “edgy” or controversial work, the Sisi government does not want NGOs to engage in any work at all, and is hoping to eliminate them quickly and quietly. The United States needs to seriously consider what the impact of the disappearance of civil society would have on Egypt’s dynamic, young, and restive population.

This event is co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), the Institute for International Law and Human Rights, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, No Peace Without Justice, and Minority Rights Group International.

This event is co-sponsored by POMED and the Heinrich Boell Stiftung (HBS).

Wednesday, February 4, 2015
12:30 pm – 2:30 pm
Stanhope Hotel,
Brussels, Belgium

A sandwich lunch will be available between 12:30 and 1:00 pm. The discussion will start at 1:00 pm and will be held under Chatham House Rule.

The ongoing political turmoil in much of the Arab World–coupled with the simmering budget and debt crises in the West–have posed great challenges for foreign aid and democracy support across the region. While the hot button issues of the Middle East have grabbed much attention, the transitions in the Maghreb countries have received far less interest in the U.S. and Europe. The political trajectory of the Maghreb countries of course varies significantly, ranging from Libya on the verge of becoming a failed state, to Tunisia which has embarked on a relatively successful trajectory of democratic consolidation and reforms. While Tunisians just completed their second orderly electoral process since their 2011 revolution, significant challenges remain including a weak economy, high levels of unemployment, and an increasingly divided political climate. Meanwhile, Morocco has averted significant upheaval by quelling reform movements through small concessions approved in a constitutional referendum held in July of 2011. While this referendum granted nominal changes to the division of power between the executive and the legislative bodies, these reforms have done little to protect and expand civil liberties.

Within this context, the discussion will take a closer look at U.S. and European democracy promotion and human rights in the Maghreb region, focused primarily on Tunisia and Morocco. The discussions will be framed around the joint POMED/ hbs report on the U.S. foreign assistance budget in the fiscal year 2015 for the Middle East and North Africa. This report closely examines how far the Obama administration has adjusted its engagement and policy toward greater democracy in the Middle East as a result of the Arab Spring. By means of comparison, the panel will analyse the EU’s tools for democracy support in the Maghreb. The panelists will discuss the tools’ main focus and funding levels, and if they actually reflect a change in strategy towards the region. Furthermore, local perceptions of U.S./ EU democracy support and its impact on the ground will be highlighted from a Moroccan perspective.

A discussion with:

Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, POMED

Lora Borissova
Deputy Head of Division, EEAS, Democracy and Election Observation

Nicolas Rougy
Executive Director, European Partnership for Democracy

Aboubakr Jamai
Moroccan journalist and publisher

Moderator
Klaus Linsenmeier
Director, Heinrich Böll Stiftung European Union

This event is co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch, Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB), the Gulf Center for Human Rights, and Civicus.

November 14, 2014
10:30 am to 12:00 pm
Human Rights First
805 15th Street NW, suite 900

For a full summary, keep reading or click here for the PDF.

On Friday, November 14, POMED co-sponsored a discussion on the repression of pro-democracy and human rights activists in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The panel included Maryam Al-Khawaja, Co-director of the Gulf Center for Human Rights (GCHR); Brian Dooley, Director of the Human Rights Defenders program at Human Rights First (HRF); Melanie Gingell, human rights lawyer; Khalid Ibrahim, Co-Director of the Gulf Center for Human Rights (GCHR); and Nabeel Rajab, President of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR), via Skype. The discussion was moderated by Joe Stork, MENA Division Deputy Director at Human Rights Watch (HRF). Participants offered their thoughts on how to promote a U.S. policy that can address the threat ISIS presents to the region while also countering the criminalization of peaceful dissent.

This event is co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).

Thursday, November 6, 2014
12:00 pm – 2:00 pm
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Floor 2
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW,
Washington, DC 20036

Under Threat: Egyptian Press in Peril (Full Version) from Committee to Protect Journalists on Vimeo.

Since the Egyptian military took power in July 2013, Egypt has become one of the most dangerous countries for journalists. At least six journalists have been killed and dozens of others have been detained, including three affiliated with Al Jazeera, despite a continued international campaign for their release.

In his September speech at the United Nations General Assembly, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said his “new Egypt” would “guarantee freedom of speech.” Although there have been other similar promises made to protect the basic rights of Egyptian citizens, unprecedented arbitrary detentions of activists and journalists—and an expanding crackdown on civil society organizations—permeate the country. As Egypt prepares for parliamentary elections later in the year, many of its citizens remain uncertain about their country’s future as they face an increasingly repressive environment.

What threats currently exist for the press and civil society in Egypt? To what extent can the U.S. push back on the Egyptian government’s abuses against its citizens’ basic freedoms? And what should be the priority issues that could help facilitate a free and open press and allow necessary debate ahead of the elections?

Please join POMED and CPJ for a screening of the short documentary “Under Threat,” a joint production of CPJ and Egyptian See Media Productions. The screening will be followed by a panel discussion with the following guests:

Michele Dunne

Senior Associate, Middle East Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Muhammed Mansour

Freelance Journalist,
Egypt Independent

Sherif Mansour

MENA Program Coordinator,
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)

Stephen McInerney

Executive Director,
Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

After the screening of “Under Threat,” Stephen McInerney introduced the panelists and presented opening remarks on the state of journalism and press freedom in recent years. He highlighted a trend of instability for space in Egypt reserved for free expression over the past decades. But since the uprisings in 2011 that led to the ouster of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, journalists and media figures in Egypt have come under intense scrutiny in a number of ways. As the space for freedom of expression wanes, the panel will discuss the threats that to open press and civil society in Egypt, the contradiction between President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s promises of a “new Egypt” and guarantees of free speech and the recent crackdowns on the press, and the actions the United States can pressure the Egyptian government to open more space for free association and discussion.

Muhammed Mansour discussed his own background and experiences as a journalist in Egypt. He provided a background from his perspective of the events leading to the current state of press affairs. In 2002 it was completely taboo to speak against the Mubarak regime. The situation in Egypt now has regressed back to the way it was under Mubarak nearly 15 years ago. In his own work, Mansour focused on human rights issues, and by the 2011 revolution, journalistic circles were experiencing a kind of euphoria from the space the uprisings provided them to express themselves freely. However, these advances were quickly reversed, either in name or in practice. SCAF, the ruling military council after the ouster of Mubarak, oversaw a culture that was suspicious of journalists. The Egyptian population began to see journalists as spies or agitators, and the military viewed critical publications as acts of chaos. In this way, journalists adopted the practice of self-censorship to protect themselves. Further, under Morsi’s rule, critical press flourished, but after the military coup that ousted him and eventually led to the Sisi presidency, the media has been restrained by both a self-imposed censorship in support of the military, and government policies enacted by the military regime that seek to root out all challenges to their narrative of Egypt.

Sherif Mansour followed Muhammad’s remarks with an account of Egypt’s current state of press freedom. Egypt’s recent crackdown on, harassment, and detention of journalists critical of the regime is set today against the backdrop of upcoming elections. Mansour recounted that in every election, and with every new president, there are promises that the government will stop interfering in media and that it will make the privatization of the media a priority. Yet, in reality, the result has been the opposite. Each new president who assumes office appoints bureaucrats and ministers to oversee media activities and installs allies in state-run media outlets. Even if the private media sphere is not legally restrained, it is marginalized by the state-run media’s access to a near-unlimited budget. Despite promises of fewer police powers to arrest, detain, or search journalists, the repeal of such laws in practice translates into journalists being arrested or detained under different charges, such as trespassing or protesting. Unfortunately, Mansour added, the lack of journalistic freedoms is particularly prominent in election periods when voters need information to decide between what often looks like a very polarized spectrum of possible decisions. To the ruling regime, critical journalists represent a challenge to the narrative that Egypt’s only choice is between military rule and Islamist terrorists.

Michele Dunne provided the panel with a series of policy implications and recommendations. After the removal of Morsi, she said, the only media operating were voicing pro-military perspectives. Although there have been efforts to activate journalistic voices, the government is also making concerted efforts to control the narrative of what is happening in the country and how it got there, both for domestic and foreign audiences. The Sinai, a particularly volatile region in Egypt where a terrorist attack recently claimed the lives of 31 people, used to be a site of particular interest to journalists. However, the Sinai is now “a black hole.” The Egyptian government is either driving away or jailing dissident voices with detentions, torture, or harassment. The important question for policymakers is, “What are the consequences of this?” Dunne argued that not only is the closing of media space toxic to U.S.-Egypt relations, as conspiracy and anti-American stories surface time and again, but the grand narrative of an Egypt engaged in an existential struggle against terrorists is beginning to solidify in the minds of everyday Egyptians. The aforementioned terrorist attack that killed 31 people shook up the media status quo, as the government silenced even the discussion or reporting of the story by some of its greatest supporters. The United States needs to understand that it cannot be silent while the ruling regime allows the demonization of America and flaunts its ability to threaten and drive away American civil society workers and foreign journalists. Journalists not only provide Egypt with important news, but their work informs the policymakers who directly engage Egypt on a regular basis.

Co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy and the Congressional Tunisia Caucus

Friday, October 17, 2014
10:00 am – 11:30 am
Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2325

Due to security procedures at Rayburn House Office Building, guests are asked to add additional time to their travel plans to enter the premises.

POMED and the Congressional Tunisia Caucus are pleased to host a public panel discussion in conjunction with the release of a new POMED publication, “Previewing Tunisia’s Parliamentary and Presidential Elections.” This report offers a detailed look at the context for the upcoming elections, the parties running for parliament, notable presidential candidates, and potential concerns facing the elections. With few success stories coming out of the Arab Spring, Tunisia stands as an example of the power of the democratic will of its people, and its elections represent the potential for peaceful, consensus-based transfers of power in the region.

This discussion will focus on several key questions: What steps has Tunisia taken in its transition to arrive at these elections, and in what political and economic context are the elections occurring? Who is running for parliament and president, and how are they expected to perform in the elections? What should we expect to see from political actors should they be elected to office? And why should these elections matter to U.S. policymakers?

His Excellency M’hamed Ezzine Chelaifa

Alexis Arieff

Jeff England

Stephen McInerney

Cole Bockenfeld

For a full summary of the event, continue reading below or click here for a pdf.

In his opening remarks, Ambassador Chelaifa underscored how admiration for the Tunisian democratic transition experience should not overshadow the complexity of the process, and he called on the U.S. to continue supporting the transition. Chelaifa then identified several dimensions that might affect the election: voter turnout; the proliferation of electoral lists that might spread out votes; the attitude of Tunisian voters; the polarization of the political landscape; the presence of Ben Ali regime members; and the role of civil society, media and lobbying in the electoral process. Chelaifa underlined that, following the elections, politicians will face serious challenges and will also have to decide whether they want to build a coalition, share power between parties and form a national unity government. In terms of policy, the new government will need to elaborate a national security strategy, tackle economic reforms, and most importantly, resolve the issues that drove the revolution in the first place in 2011. The Ambassador emphasized that Tunisia is a promise for democracy in the Arab World as it can provide a “proof of concept.” However, Tunisia’s transition is vulnerable and therefore needs international and U.S. support. Finally, he argued that support for Tunisian democracy will give the U.S. an effective public argument that the U.S. does genuinely support democracy in the region.

Alexis Arieff highlighted key aspects of the United States’ role in supporting Tunisia’s democratic transition, such as the decision by Congress to authorize the appropriation of $500 million to Tunisia since 2011 and the creation of the Tunisian American Enterprise Fund. She noted, however, that most funds appropriated specifically for Tunisia have been focused on military sales and equipment. Arieff pointed to the threat of extremism both in Tunisia and on its borders, although she noted that most groups in North Africa have domestic agendas and only a few seem to have targeted Western interests. Arieff also mentioned that Tunisian security forces have engaged in a recent campaign to arrest potential suspects in order to secure the elections, focusing in particular on designed terrorist groups AQIM and Ansar al-Shariah and the spillover from neighboring Libya.

Jeffrey England spoke next, highlighting Tunisia’s relatively smooth path to democracy. While he reiterated that this is not the end of transition, the elections will present an opportunity to build off the 2011 experience and formalize the legitimacy of the constitution. Observation is a key element to the success of the upcoming elections, and Tunisia has done well to maintain a transparent framework, England noted. The challenges Tunisia will face in this election season have nothing to do with transparency, but rather with ensuring that political contestants will have the professionalism to accept outcomes that are not in their favor and that accusations against the integrity of the elections will only come with sufficient evidence. Another challenge England foresees for Tunisia is overcoming voter apathy. Beyond a lack of basic voting education, many Tunisians appear to have unreasonable expectations for what will happen after the elections. The critical question is whether a coalition approach to governance will take place and involve a constructive opposition. Healthy competition is a good thing, England argues, and must be used to build up institutions rather than tear them down. `

Stephen McInerney noted that though the political system today was more established compared to 2011, there remains much uncertainty surrounding the electoral process. As of today, upwards of 50 percent of Tunisian voters appear to be undecided. The new POMED publication, “Previewing Tunisia’s Parliamentary and Presidential Elections,” focuses on the seven highest polling parties and presidential candidates, though McInerney emphasized that there is a strong possibility that others will perform well at the elections. He also expressed his personal thoughts based on his recent trip to Tunisia, where he met with several actors involved in the democratic transition. The outlook in Tunisia is mixed, and more Tunisians are disillusioned with their political elite and pessimistic than they were in 2011. The country’s economic outlook is also a particular area of concern. He emphasized the need for the next government to undertake serious reforms rapidly after the elections in order to turn around Tunisia’s economic decline. McInerney is hopeful that the upcoming elections will be a high point in Tunisia’s transition, though the main challenge will be for parties to fight disillusionment and regain the public’s confidence. He noted that the populous appears to be more focused on presidential rather than the parliamentary elections. The likely result of the elections is that a coalition government will have to be formed. He mentioned that in Tunisia, there has been talk of forming a “national unity” government that will see Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes sharing power; however, it remains clear that both parties would rather be leader of their own coalition.

During the Q&A, Cole Bockenfeld started the discussion by asking where Tunisia stood with regards to security threats and what the chances were of an attack during the elections season. Arieff responded by explaining that, unlike in many countries where electoral violence is a concern, the threat of an attack in Tunisia does not come from the state or those running in the elections. Tunisia’s primary concern is non-state actors involved in terrorism along the Algerian border, as well as the increasing numbers of Tunisians going to fight abroad who could return home and carry out attacks. While the size and role of the security apparatus in relation to civil society in Tunisia remains a topic of ongoing debate, the fact that the military is under-resourced could lead to problems in the long term as well as the short term.

Bockenfeld then fielded a question concerning feelings of disillusionment on the part of youth with Islamist leanings and potential support for Moncef Marzouki. McInerney responded by describing how Tunisian youth feel as though they made change happen during the revolution, but now they have little political representation. Because Marzouki is seen as outside of the traditional political elite, he may be appealing to youth who feel disenfranchised. England added to the dialogue by questioning how the term “youth” is even defined. He emphasized that it is not that the youth in Tunisia lack political interests, but rather they are not represented in government. England suggested prioritizing how to take the energy of this population and make it a part of the political discussion.

With respect to concerns over the impact of the economy on elections, McInerney responded by saying that there is real danger for the destabilization of democratic gains unless economic reform happens soon. The international community needs to be more engaged and grant more economic aid, he continued. England concurred with McInerney, adding that while the economy will not improve quickly, the next leader will have to “swallow the poison pill” and undertake politically unpopular but serious reforms in order to bolster the economy in the long term. Because Tunisia’s political parties generally lack platforms with a clear and in-depth agenda for how to reform the economy, England suggests the new leader start by aiming for “low-hanging fruit” that will satisfy the Tunisian masses with some small reforms for the time being. Also concerned with the disconnect between short-term and long-term needs, Arieff highlighted that what analysts want and what any elected government official will be able to achieve are very different.

This event is co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB). 

Thursday, June 5, 2014
10:00 am – 11:30 am
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington DC

At the beginning of 2014, a new phase of political negotiations was launched by Bahrain’s Crown Prince. With the reported full backing of the King, the formal opposition parties in Bahrain and international community were encouraged by the potential to break a nearly two-year stalemate in negotiations to seek a political compromise to the national crisis. But the fanfare of the announcement has since faded, with many observers fearing that a window of opportunity may soon be missed.

Parliamentary elections in Bahrain are tentatively planned for the coming months, and Bahraini political elites and voters must soon decide whether to participate in the polls. Without a breakthrough in the country’s long-standing political stalemate, the alternative – the election of a parliament devoid of opposition voices for another four-year term – will only contribute to Bahrain’s negative trajectory.

What are the main obstacles to political reform and reconciliation in the country? What steps need to be taken by political actors in Bahrain to make these elections credible and meaningful? And what diplomatic options does the United States have to encourage genuine reform and address deepening divides in Bahrain?

Please join POMED and ADHRB for a discussion of the political dynamics in the country, including the state of political negotiations in Bahrain and the role of the international community in spurring long-delayed reform.

Les Campbell
Senior Associate and Regional Director, MENA Programs
National Democratic Institute

Matar Ibrahim Matar
Former Member of Parliament,
National Assembly of Bahrain

Dr. Dafna H. Rand
Deputy Director of Studies & Leon E. Panetta Fellow,
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)

Moderator: Stephen McInerney
Executive Director,
Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

For a summary of the event, continue reading below or click here for a pdf.

Matar Ibrahim Matar began by providing background on Bahrain and its government, speaking first about an al-Wefaq human rights report that described crimes against humanity, such as the torture of detainees. There are more than 7,000 detainees in Bahrain, noting that in targeted areas of the country, one in ten Bahrainis have experienced detention. The abundance of these abuses, Matar says, place Bahrain as the third worst country in the Middle East in terms of human rights abuses, a fact demonstrated in the country’s rapidly declining democratic status, according to the Index of Democracy. Bahrain’s prime minister, who has been in power since the early 1970s, appoints the Upper House as well as the Council of Supreme Judiciary. The PM can also assign citizenship and grant land without constraint, allowing him to manage the demography of Bahrain. Furthermore, the Crown Prince has not compromised for political representation of Bahrainis. Matar went on to say that all leaders of the opposition party al-Wefaq are currently under trial, showing that the government is “shutting all doors.” However, al-Wefaq says they are ready for the transition, and that there is an agreement in place on a roadmap to reform. Next, Matar spoke on potential policy recommendations for the U.S. government to take to move forward. He suggested that if the U.S. can push reforms, Bahrain could serve as a regional model for democracy promotion. As it is time for the ruling family to call on the prime minister to step down, Matar believes the U.S. must cease recognizing him in an attempt to isolate the regime. He suggests that if the U.S. can confront the likes of Russia, then it can confront Bahrain. Matar stressed the urgency of action in Bahrain in light of problems such as sectarian tensions, growing national debt, increasing violence, and terrorism.

Dr. Dafna H. Rand spoke next, first making the case for U.S. involvement in Bahrain and then describing two different “forks” which U.S. foreign policy towards Bahrain could follow. She explained that “there are many reasons why it makes strategic sense” for the U.S. to invest in diplomacy in Bahrain. The first ‘fork’ thinks in the short term. She outlined a number of reasons short term involvement would be beneficial. First, terrorism showed the Bahraini government that time “was not on their side.” Second, modest reconciliation would have positive repercussions for resolving other partially sectarian conflicts. She described how “a lot of sectarianism in the Arab Spring has been manufactured from the top,” and depicted reconciliation in Bahrain as a possibility to show that sectarianism is “not embedded in the DNA of the Middle East.” Third, al-Wefaq should participate even if their needs are not all met, as it would empower Shi’a members in the Bahraini government. Rand said that if al-Wefaq earns even just a few seats in parliament, they will become “the people the U.S. government looks to work with.” The second ‘fork’ thinks in the long term and ponders how much long-term leverage the U.S. government actually has beyond arm sales, to influence transition internally. In this respect, there has been some degree of success by the U.S. government with bureaucratic reforms.

Les Campbell spoke last, emphasizing that “this has been done before,” as the same things were said in 2002 about accepting undemocratic constituencies. He believes that compromise should be advocated. He suggests that it is better to accept limited powers, like when land reform was examined during the limited opening by parliament, but was then shut down by the government when the government realized that it was giving parliamentary members independence to interact with foreigners. A law was then passed prohibiting international actors to come in and interact with parliament without approval of the government. However, fair action should be pushed, as events of the Arab Spring gave every country the motivation to have election observers. Although elections are still “farcical,” like in Egypt, the rigging of elections is more obvious. In conclusion, Campbell says the National Democracy Institute is “extremely skeptical and probably cynical” towards prospects for reform because the Bahraini government has always closed openings.

Stephen McInerney began the Q&A section by asking each panelist a question. First he asked Matar what the opposition needs in order to make progress. Matar suggests they want to be part of the negotiation process, which currently is nonexistent. Next he asked Dr. Rand who exactly in the current administration would make the decision to get involved in Bahrain, and how would they do it. She first reiterated the debate of how invested should the U.S. be in brokering agreements. She then recommends that someone from the State Department should be paired with someone from the Defense Department, and with White House support they should travel to Bahrain and speak on Bahrain policy, while not dictating policy. However, she stresses that scrutiny towards potential human rights violations should continue. McInerney asked Campbell what the international community could have done differently. Campbell suggests that it is and was counterproductive to make recommendations of governance to other countries. He also noted, near the close of the event, that he has “skepticism” towards the potential for possible change because “all of the same leaders are still in place.” Answering a question on the influence of opposition participation changing the power dynamics, Matar noted that the government always chooses Sunni representatives that do not necessarily represent the Sunni community in Bahrain; the majority of Sunnis are looking for an opening to act upon. Addressing a question on opposition participation, Campbell says that the involvement of the opposition would serve to marginalize the real centers of power like the president and PM, and thus have a positive short-term effect.

On the question of potential U.S. policies towards Bahrain, panelists discussed the role of the U.S. 5^th Naval Fleet as well as past actions on the part of the embassy. While McInerney said the implications of the Fleet as being mixed, Matar described the Fleet as decidedly “negative” for Bahrain’s potential reforms. Citing Sarah Chayes of the Carnegie Endowment, he said that the 5^th Fleet is a “shield for Kleptocracy” in Bahrain. He also emphasized the importance of the U.S. having a clear, widely known policy on Bahrain. Rand said the U.S. Embassy has been doing a good job “being in the room” with different actors in the political process. Les Campbell said the U.S. government has failed the Bahraini people by not condemning laws which violate human rights.

Tunisia has recently completed the historic milestone of approving a new constitution, representing a remarkable achievement of consensus-building in a difficult climate of political polarization. This important step has also been accompanied by an unprecedented peaceful transfer of power from the Ennahda-led government to a caretaker government. Despite this momentous progress, however, enormous challenges remain – both on the economic and political sides.

At this critical juncture in Tunisia’s transition, what obstacles lie ahead in implementing and solidifying democratic rule? What role can the United States play in aiding Tunisia economically and politically? And what opportunities exist for the international community to cooperate with Tunisia to help it serve as a model for the rest of the Arab world?

With

William Roebuck
Deputy Assistant Secretary,
U.S. Department of State

His Excellency M’hamed Ezzine Chelaifa
Ambassador of the Tunisian Republic
to the United States

Emna Jeblaoui
Former Advisor to the President of the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly
for Civil Society and Democratic Dialogue

Stephen McInerney
Executive Director,
Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

Moderator: Reuf Bajrovic
President,
Emerging Democracies Institute (EDI)

Wednesday, February 26, 2014
3:00 pm – 4:30 pm
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW

For a summary of the event, continue reading below or click here for a pdf. 

Reuf Bajrovic opened the event by describing the current situation in Tunisia. Bajrovic said that Tunisia is undergoing dramatic changes and that it’s “landmark” constitution gives hope to people in other countries affected by the Arab Spring. After Bajrovic finished his introduction, he introduced the rest of the panel members— M’hamed Ezzine Chelaifa,William Roebuck, Emna Jeblaoui, and Stephen McInerney.

M’hamed Ezzine Chelaifa started by saying, “It’s good to be a Tunisian ambassador these days in Washington.” He spoke about Tunisia’s “historic breakthrough” in establishing a democratic, non-partisan government with an electoral board and a liberal, secular constitution. Chelaifa cautioned that Tunisia’s democratic transition “remains unfinished and fragile and needs to be protected.” He acknowledged that the way forward will have risks and challenges. On the political level, Chelaifa suggested that the people work to keep the “spirit of dialogue alive.” He also mentioned the necessity of having free and fair general elections. In terms of security challenges, Chelaifa spoke about terrorism and the proliferation of weapons from neighboring countries. Lastly, Chelaifa spoke about Tunisia’s economic and social challenges, saying that the real challenge for the next government is going to be balancing long-term reforms with the immediate social demands of the people. Chelaifa then discussed the U.S. role in Tunisia, saying that Americans have a stake in Tunisia’s success and that the two countries should work together to foster a strategic partnership that is “program based” and “results-oriented.”

William Roebuck spoke next and began by saying that “Tunisia remains the best hope for a democratic transition in the region.” Roebuck said that youth empowerment remains a top priority for the U.S. government. He also spoke about Kerry’s recent visit to Tunisia, stressing that the U.S. will stand with Tunisia throughout its democratic transition. Roebuck agreed with Rached Ghannouchi that there is a young, fragile democracy in Tunisia in need of a series of elections and consensus building efforts. Roebuck then spoke about Tunisia’s strengths including its inclusive national dialogue, liberal constitution, vibrant governmental and non-governmental institutions, and independent government. Roebuck also said the U.S. and Tunisia signed an agreement to build operational capacities, create a more transparent system, and work with the Tunisian armed forces to help them address Tunisia’s threat environment. Roebuck concluded by briefly talking about economic issues, saying that one of the underlying causes of unrest in the Middle East is a lack of economic opportunity and jobs. Roebuck asserted that the U.S. will continue to support Tunisia’s commitment to economic reform and its promotion of private sector development. He also mentioned that bilateral trade between the two countries has grown steadily.

Emna Jeblaoui spoke next about her experiences working with the constituent assembly throughout the national dialogue process. Jeblaoui discussed the achievements of the new constitution as well as the challenges that it faces in the long-term. She mentioned the need for both independent election monitoring and press freedom. Jeblaoui also said that political parties need to be able to organize in a secure environment, which includes strengthening Tunisia’s borders and security forces. She concluded by saying, “we still have a lot of work to do, but we are very happy to have the support of our American friends.”

Steve McInerney opened by pointing out how rare it is that countries in the Middle East and North Africa enjoy positive international attention. McInerney called for more of a focus on Tunisia from the U.S. administration. While he welcomed Kerry’s visit to Tunisia, McInerney pointed out that it was the Secretary’s first visit to the country and that it only lasted for a few hours. McInerney then said, “By the end of this year I hope that Tunisians and everyone across the Arab world will see that the U.S. is committed to supporting Tunisia’s democratic transition on par with our support for other goals or agendas in the region.”

McInerney continued by presenting his policy recommendations. He spoke about the State Department’s travel warning on Tunisia, acknowledging that the attacks in Tunisia were certainly frightening, but saying, “I feel that the reaction has been somewhat disproportionate to the events themselves.” McInerney believes the State Department should reevaluate the threat status of Tunisia because removing the travel warning could expand tourism, trade, and investment. McInerney suggested that the U.S. use its leverage and provide economic assistance in a way that encourages Tunisia’s leaders to make difficult decisions on security sector reform and the restructuring of old institutions.

Reuf Bajrovic then opened the floor for Q&A. In response to a question about whether or not Tunisia can serve as a model in the region, McInerney said that the establishment of the Troika in Tunisia is indicative of a willingness to compromise that other actors in the region lack. He also said the Tunisians benefitted from higher levels of education and the military’s choice to let political forces emerge and handle the transition. Mr. Roebuck added that, from the beginning, Tunisia had a more diverse and successful economy than other countries in the region.

In response to a question about the Tunisian government’s tolerance for U.S. engagement on the issues of transitional justice and security sector reform, Ambassador Chelaifa acknowledged that Tunisia needs “big and deep reforms” related to decentralization and job creation. Roebuck added that the U.S. will be very engaged, particularly regarding security sector reform.

Presented by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB):

Wednesday, February 12, 2014
10:00 am – 11:30 am
U.S. Capitol Visitor Center, Room SVC 203-02

Bahrain, home to the U.S. Navy Forces Central Command and the Fifth Fleet, is a vital security partner of the United States. As a result, events on the ground in Bahrain could have profound implications on long-term U.S. security interests in the region. In November 2011, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) confirmed that the Government of Bahrain had engaged in systematic human rights violations in response to peaceful protests that began in February of that year and recommended 26 legal and policy changes intended to prevent a recurrence of similar events, which were publicly accepted by King Hamad. The BICI report was welcomed by the international community as a potentially critical step toward resolving the country’s escalating political crisis.

Yet two years after the release of the BICI report, the Government of Bahrain has made little meaningful progress in implementing those recommendations, missing a critical opportunity to use the report as a bridge toward necessary political reform. Now, after nearly three years of political stalemate, recently revamped political negotiations between the monarchy and opposition leadership may indicate a new way forward for the country.

What diplomatic options does the United States have in Bahrain? What are the main obstacles to political reform and reconciliation in the country? What role, if any, will the new talks play in resolving Bahrain’s deepening divides?

With

Dwight Bashir
Deputy Director,
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

Maryam al-Khawaja
Acting President,
Bahrain Center for Human Rights

Sarah Margon
Acting Washington Director,
Human Rights Watch

Sayed Radhi al-Moosawi
Acting Secretary-General,
National Democratic Action Society (Waad)

Moderator: Husain Abdulla
Executive Director,
Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB)

For a summary of this event, continue reading below or click here for a pdf.

Husain Abdulla opened the event by describing the current situation in Bahrain. He said, “rather than see a move toward reform, the situation is in many ways regressed.” For example, Abdulla said that Bahraini officials have not been held accountable for human rights abuses committed since 2011. Abdulla then enumerated some “steps the United States can take to support meaningful dialogue,” which included the establishment of an international monitoring mechanism, a commitment to human rights, and the existence of military funding only as it is compliant with the intent of the Leahy Law. After Abdulla finished his introduction, he introduced the rest of the panel members—Dwight Bashir, Maryam al-Khawaja, Sayed Radhi al-Moosawi, and Sarah Margon.

Dwight Bashir spoke next, and he opened with a statement that the events surrounding the 2011 uprising “changed Bahrain forever.” Then, he said that even though the Royal Court made a commitment to implement the reforms suggested in the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report, there has “not been significant progress.” For example, Bashir said that 30 mosques were expected to be rebuilt for the Bahraini Shi’a community at the government’s expense. While the government claims to have rebuilt 10 of these mosques already, 6 of them were actually completed by the Shi’a community without reimbursement. On a more positive note, the target completion date for the rebuilding of the mosques was expedited from 2018 to 2014. Regarding government officials’ accountability for past abuses, Bashir said that there has been “clearly insufficient effort and even progress.” Instead of progress on the human rights front, he said that there “continue to be arbitrary arrests and long-term detentions.” If there is to be progress in 2014, Bashir believes that it can come through the following actions: U.S. emphasis on the implementation of BICI reform efforts, cessation of media incitement, public statements from members of Congress on prisoners of conscience, alignment of the State Department and the Pentagon’s reform goals, the establishment of an international monitoring entity subscribed to by all sides.

Then, Maryam al-Khawaja outlined some of the human rights abuse cases that have surfaced since January 2014. She underscored the lack of due process in all of her examples—specifically because of enforced disappearances, the use of torture to obtain confessions, and the purposeful misapplication of Bahraini law. Al-Khawaja also cited deplorable prison conditions, the continuation of systemic torture, and extrajudicial killings as causes of grave concern. She warned that political reform will not happen in Bahrain until the government is willing to acknowledge the problems related to human rights. She also called for U.S. politicians to release solidarity statements and referenced a list of 58 Bahraini officials who she believes should be banned from traveling to the U.S. and should have their assets frozen, in addition to being tried in a court held to international standards. Finally, al-Khawaja discussed the presence of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. She said that even though Bahrain has not exhibited any real reforms, the U.S. government is planning on expanding the Fifth Fleet. She warned that the U.S. emphasis on Bahrain as a strategic ally and willingness to maintain a relationship with the Bahraini government even with mounting human rights concerns is detrimental to U.S. interests in the region.

Next, Sayed Radhi al-Moosawi said that the Royal Family has tried to label the crisis in Bahrain as a sectarian conflict, but it is actually a “political, constitutional crisis” and has been since 1923. Al-Moosawi called for bilateral negotiations between the royal family and the opposition, stressing the importance of releasing prisoners of conscience to partake in what would then be a dialogue representative of Bahraini aspirations. He criticized the regime for purposefully wasting time and not trying to resolve the political crisis. Then, al-Moosawi explained that the National Democratic Action Society’s agenda is to establish fair, transparent elections in which each person would have one vote. He called for an elected parliament with full legislative and monetary authority, judicial reforms, and a civil democracy state. He also said that for the past 43 years, the Prime Minister has been responsible for “a high level of chaos,” including a housing crisis, high unemployment, and a disappearing middle class.

The last speaker was Sarah Margon, who presented an overview of U.S. policy on Bahrain. Referring to the U.S. government, Margon said that “they prioritize stability over anything else in the region.” She added, however, that they have the, “wrong analysis on what stability really is.” She said that it is “probably better for the administration to support the aspirations of all Bahrainis” to avoid, “vengeful violence.” She continued, “The U.S. is squandering its leverage with the Bahraini people.” Then, Margon’s tone became more hopeful. She said that the new Omnibus bill includes $3 million for democracy and governance, representing more thoughtful and aggressive policy. In addition, she said that pushing for human rights now is an opportunity for the U.S. administration to “regain their momentum.”

Abdulla then turned to the audience for questions. One question from a staff member in the office of Representative Jim McGovern (D-MA) was about how to pursue or achieve stability. Margon said that stability is no longer about government actors. Other actors, including civil society organizations, are becoming increasingly important. She advised that civil rights, governance, and the rule of law should be considered equally important to U.S. national security interests in the region. Margon added that the presence of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain has become an excuse for human rights policy in the country. Bashir then said that the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees—those committees connected to the Fifth Fleet—could be instrumental in asking for Bahraini officials to be placed on visa ban lists. Al-Khawaja answered last, offering a story about increasing displays of anti-U.S. sentiment on the streets in Bahrain. She explained that in 2011, protestors would go to the U.S. embassy for support in their demonstrations, sharing donuts in the street with embassy personnel. Today, however, protestors carry signs equating President Obama to King Hamad.