“He was erratic, conspiratorial in nature and harbored a lot of anti-American suspicions. He believes that the 2011 uprising was the result of an external conspiracy rather than internal upheaval.”
“The public remarks in which the US government expresses concern are a necessary precondition. It serves as a signal of how much we care about the status of those individuals. It also helps to create a sense within Egypt that this is a real problem.”
“I don’t think that there’s any question that jailing Kilicdaroglu would be a bad move for Erdogan. [The CHP] gives the [AKP] a clear domestic foil… CHP leadership would be much more dangerous to the AKP in prison than it is in parliament.”
“To me it boils down to this: Erdoğan would certainly prefer to win the elections without outright ballot rigging. But is he willing to lose? I don’t think so. The next election is existential for him. He will win it by hook or by crook.”
“A lot of [Mohammed bin Salman’s] ideas in the region, including in Yemen, have failed, but he has very much enjoyed support in the White House. I think Trump likely overestimates the influence that [MBS] and the Saudi regime have in the region.”
“Egypt and its lobbyists go to huge lengths to put forth the narrative that the country deserves special treatment because of its terrorism threat and its alleged irreplaceable regional role. But no amount of PR can change the reality inside Egypt.”
“The Egyptians have failed to acknowledge that ISIS is not just a terrorism threat. Killing terrorists is not sufficient. They need to deprive ISIS of local support, which is rooted in Cairo’s historical neglect of the Sinai.”
“The internal purge seems to be compounding the AKP’s problems… The party has become too centered on Erdogan’s own personality, his concerns, his whims. It has lost the diversity and, with it, the capacity to connect to the grass roots.”