PANELIST REMARKS

Stephen McInerney: Each year, we write this report analyzing the annual budget request and appropriations process, but this year that process was more challenging than usual for several reasons. First, the budget request that was submitted to Congress contains much less detail than usual – this year the Congressional Budget Justification narrative that for international affairs is about half as long as in previous years. Many sections are omitted, including a narrative section for each country that is a recipient of bilateral foreign aid from the United States.

In our discussions with administration officials, there is also less clarity in terms of strategic vision for assistance than there was in the past. This is partly because of the transition to a new administration this year, resulting in many empty positions at the State Department and USAID. In addition, the State Department is currently undertaking a comprehensive review that should result in recommendations for reorganizing the State Department and USAID. Until this process is completed, it leaves a vacuum in terms of strategy.

The administration’s budget proposes a cut of about 30 percent for all foreign affairs, including foreign assistance. The international affairs budget globally for FY18 is $40.2 billion, down from $57.5 billion currently in FY17. Many people we spoke with were frustrated, feeling that the internal review should be completed before such large budget cuts are proposed. If enacted by Congress, the proposed budget cuts could dramatically influence the U.S. foreign policy apparatus before the comprehensive review is even complete.

Spending is cut by 12 percent in the top line budget for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Government officials have said MENA is a top priority for this administration and that the budget reflects this. MENA does have a larger budget than any other region, and its budget is cut less than that of any other region. But the topline number is misleading. The overwhelming majority of aid is to the 3 largest recipients of aid- Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. They are essentially exempt from cuts. However, bilateral aid to Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and West Bank/Gaza is cut significantly. For each of these countries, the cut is between 20 percent and 67 percent.

The budget request also proposes large cuts to democracy and governance accounts and initiatives. The State Department Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor’s current budget is $145 million, but the FY18 budget requests only $50 million. For the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) the budget is only $25 million, a 58 percent cut from the current level of $60 million. Only $15 million is requested for the Near East Regional Democracy program, half of its current budget of $30 million.

This budget also appears to to accelerate a trend of increasing militarization of the U.S. relationships with the MENA region, including foreign aid to the region. A year ago we noted in this report a consistent trend throughout the Obama administration – that a gradually higher percentage of the MENA budget is allocated to military and security assistance. In this year’s budget, that trend is accelerated, with 80 percent of the aid for the MENA region allocated for military and security assistance – if passed by Congress, this would be the highest percentage to date. And this growing percentage is of the aid allocated through the State Department in the Function 150 account, in addition to a growing level of security assistance allocated through the Department of Defense budget.

There is also a proposal to convert FMF from grants to loans for all but 4 countries in the world – Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan. This would eliminate FMF grants to many foreign allies, including numerous MENA countries. This would likely result in many countries turning to DOD-administered security assistance rather than relying on loans, which could further accelerate this trend of militarization.

One other note – we wrote this report prior to last week’s committee markup in the House, so the report does not include analysis of the House bill, although we’ll be glad to include some of the House numbers in our discussion today.

Cole Bockenfeld: One striking part of the budget proposal is that it aims to maintain Egypt’s aid package more or less “as is,” despite the fact that Egypt’s aid package is widely regarded as outdated and in need of change and modernization. Egypt is one of the very few countries for which a significant cut in aid is not proposed, and it’s also one of only four countries globally exempted from the proposed change of FMF from grants to loans. The administration does propose to reduce economic aid down to $75 million – down from the current level of $112.5 million. Part of the reason for this proposed cut is the existing backlog of approximately $400 million in unspent economic assistance from previous years.

President al-Sisi ratified a repressive, draconian NGO law just over a month ago, which could make implementation of U.S. economic aid programs impossible.  This law has drawn lots of criticism, including from many key members of Congress, and has prompted calls for full review of economic assistance to Egypt, one of the longest running U.S. aid programs in the world.  In response to the law there are many options under consideration:

1. Close USAID mission in Cairo – one of the oldest, largest USAID missions in the world
2. Only focus on education and scholarship programs in Egypt
3. Reprogram parts of Egypt’s backlogged economic aid to other countries

USAID can’t expect to have a widespread development impact in the absence of cooperation from the Egyptian government.

When Obama resumed aid to Egypt in 2015 he implemented a few reforms to the FMF package. The administration introduced four categories that Egypt’s new purchases would have to fall under: maritime security, border security, counterterrorism, and the Sinai. He also announced the phasing out by FY18 of cash flow financing, which has allowed Egypt to sign large, multi-year defense contracts, committing much of their FMF allowance years in advance, which has impeded any efforts to change or modernize the aid package.

Now that cash flow financing has been discontinued, the administration has paid down those outstanding balances. For the first time in history, there is enough money in Egypt’s military account to pay out all outstanding payments. For the first time, Congress is not obligated to pay FMF at or above the previous year’s levels to meet payment schedules. This should allows appropriator to begin a long-overdue comprehensive overhaul of Egypt’s FMF.

We propose 5 ways to change the military aid package to Egypt:

1. Congress should reduce the level of FMF from $1.3 billion
2. Congress should preemptively prohibit the reinstatement of cash flow financing
3. Congress should strengthen democracy and human rights conditions in the law, including by requiring Egypt to drop its newly ratified repressive NGO law and drop case 173 targeting civil society.  
4. Congress should increase the percentage of FMF tied to these conditions..
5. Congress should not provide a national security waiver, which has been routinely used by successive Secretaries of State to essentially render the conditions meaningless.

The Hill has a real opportunity to overhaul the FMF package in a way that’s been needed for many years. The same could also be done with economic aid – modernize the ESF package in line with the current realities, including what is possible and what is not under the new NGO law.

One of the new sections in this year’s report is coverage of humanitarian aid. There are more than 32 million refugees and IDPs that depend on humanitarian aid. The account for Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) has been cut by 18%. There is a proposal to merge Food for Peace with International Disaster Assistance (IDA), and to cut that cumulatively by 30 percent. Congress needs to protect these accounts – humanitarian needs aren’t going away.

There’s been a trend of increasing support to Tunisia since the revolution. This year, the budget requests only $54.6 million for Tunisia – a 67% cut from the current level of $165.4 million, and  the deepest cut proposed for any MENA country. Tunisia is the Arab world’s sole emerging democracy. The budget zeroes out Tunisia’s FMF grant, halves its economic assistance. U.S. investment in Tunisia has had strong returns over the last two years, and modest levels of aid can have a real impact at a key moment in this small yet critically important country. We need to double down on Tunisia, not back off.

The Senate should follow the House’s lead, as it renewed aid to Tunisia at $165 million in its bill last week. Senator McCain recently gave a speech at the Heritage Foundation and eloquently noted that if the administration is committed to counterterrorism, there is no greater response to the cycle of violence and radicalization in the region than to support Tunisia’s continued democratization. We feel like Tunisia deserves support and needs continued assistance.

Paige Alexander: The deep skepticism that this budget shows toward foreign aid is felt not only here in DC, but also abroad. I’m now based in Europe, and there is much discussion among our European allies on the impact of such budget cuts. I will highlight three main impacts:

1. Political impact
   Our “America First” agenda allows figures like al-Sisi to “put Egypt first” – to justify actions like the ratification of the new NGO law or targeting dissent in the name of national security.

2. 

   Funding impact
   Congress has had a swift reaction to the budget, with bipartisan support for the importance of civilian tools in foreign aid. But there’s concern that despite Congressional voices in favor of maintaining funding, the administration could erode institutions through reorganization, even over the objections of Congress, and that budget fights could result in a government shutdown.

3. Adaptation
   When support for NGOs is closely tied to national security interests, this can push NGOs to adapt their work to fit a national security framework to satisfy the donors rather than focusing on the genuine democracy rights and governance work that is needed locally.

FY16 funds expire September 30th and no congressional notification has been sent on FY16 expenditures for Egypt. This time last year the government $100 million of FY15 funds were reprogrammed to Syria and other countries because we couldn’t reach an agreement with the Egyptian Government on how to use ESF funds. Currently, there is $140 million sitting on Egypt that has not been notified. If we skip two years of economic assistance funding to Egypt this will  beg the question as to whether the AID mission should remain in Cairo. Two years without funding for Egypt sends a strong message. It tells the Egyptian government that we’re ok with giving you FMF, but we won’t put on the democracy or decentralization programs that you don’t want and that you obstruct. It tells them we’re not interested in supporting civil society.

Jim Kolbe: The budget is curious in its willingness to overlook repression and lack of democracy in countries like Egypt. Of course, this was also never really a priority in the Obama administration, and the Trump administration appears to be accelerating that trend. It’s troubling when countries that turn away from democracy continue to receive so much military and security aid.

Tunisia is the one country doing relatively well in moving toward democracy. But with a  67 percent cut in proposed aid  to Tunisia, what is the signal we are sending to countries around the world?  In general, democracy has been sliding backwards globally over the past 8 years. Cutting aid to a country who is struggling to be a democracy and rewarding countries going in the opposite direction sends exactly the wrong signal.

Increasing militarization is another disturbing trend.  Security assistance grants are supplemented with even more FMS, and more programs are being run through the Department of Defense.

Secretary Tillerson said before Congress that the State Department and USAID have not evolved to meet challenges in world today. There should be concern with tying short term policy imperatives to reorganization. If you fold USAID into the State Department, you would lose ability to take longer term look at how development is taking place in different countries.

Congress has asked for four things to be made clear prior to any reorganization:

1. Impact on personnel
2. What is the process used to determine the reorganization of operating units
3. Impact on ability to do monitoring and oversight of programs in countries
4. Impact on national security

QUESTION

What can we take away regarding the administration’s approach to Syria from this budget?

Bockenfeld

The most important accounts related to Syria are multi-country humanitarian accounts that address the crisis in Syria. We found frustration with the gap in assistance to Syria  more broadly with the lack of a clear policy, which is not new to the Trump administration.  The dynamics on the ground are rapidly changing, and the assistance and programming have not adapted sufficiently. The administration may be more willing to use force to retake territory, but it remains plagued by the lack of a clear broader strategy, and the assistance reflects that.

Kolbe

Syria is a classic example of a completely failed state – It will be with us for years and will require transfusions of emergency assistance. I don’t see any stable government in the near future.

Alexander

Development is supposed to be linear – you start with humanitarian aid, move to transitional and construction aid, and then move to long term development. Syria is a paradigm of a completely collapsed state. There’s a paucity of Syrian partners – it’s hard to find pockets of opportunity to work to capacity in the country.

QUESTION

Can you clarify whether in security and counterterrorism cooperation there are other activities that would skew activity even more in the military vs. civilian direction?

McInerney

In each individual country section of our report, we focus primarily on the bilateral assistance for each country, but we do also try to touch on which other, multi-country accounts might be drawn on. Our report does not get into Department of Defense funds except in a few places, as DOD funds are not specified by country or in the same level of detail, and those funds do include some funds specifically designated for counterterrorism.

Bockenfeld

The Department of Defense-managed security assistance accounts have increased from $8.5 billion in FY14 to $11.2 billion in FY18, while State Department accounts have decreased from $8.6 billion to $7.1 billion.

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expanded the scope of activities that the Department of Defense could cover under Section 333. These activities are training for countering WMDs, illicit drug operations, organized crime, maritime and border security, military intelligence.  Maritime and border security are two of Egypt’s four categories. Who’s to say the Department of Defense might not take those over? If the Department of Defense takes on those accounts how might that further militarize our relationship with Egypt?

Alexander

There’s much more cross-fertilization between Department of Defense and the State Department than in the past, which is a good thing. I agree that militarization has been underway for many years. It’s important that the State Department and USAID be able to speak the Department of Defense’s language, so we don’t work at cross purposes like we did in Balkans and other places in the 1990s.

QUESTION

Can you talk about what messages are being sent to other donors – are they stepping in to fill the breach left by this budget?

Alexander

Europeans are trying to fill the U.S. funding gap.  The question is whether other private funders can support Tunisia, in Europe’s backyard? They need to be there in a larger way. It’s difficult because the Middle East is seen as a big drain on potential funding streams. There were only 9 countries with over $100,000 dedicated to creating space for civil society in last year’s budget. If missions with USAID get closed, a private funder can come in and fill gaps and give more than U.S. Keeping the Europeans on board is very important.

McInerney

We’ve often found that when U.S. is willing to press countries on human rights, European countries do the same. The U.S. has more leverage with these countries because of our close security cooperation and large military aid and weapons sales. If this administration shows skepticism toward the U.S. role for democratic values, it will be more difficult for Europeans.

QUESTION

When AUSAID rolled into the region, it initially brought tremendous amounts of money in democracy development and human rights work, but then it dried up overnight with political changes in Australia. Has Australian reform been considered in what’s being proposed here?

Alexander

I’m not close to AUSAID and I don’t know what will happen. But that’s why it’s important to reach out beyond America and talk to other funders. I can’t answer on AUSAID in particular.

McInerney

The cuts we see proposed here may be similar to what you describe as happening in Australia. We have to see how Congress will respond. We could see some U.S. government-funded programs come to a screeching halt as soon as next year. And uncertainty about cuts has already had a huge effect in the way programming is carried out now. Fear of oncoming cuts has made agencies more conservative with existing funds. There’s fear to spend down funds too quickly out of fear of enormous cuts to come in the following year.

Bockenfeld

Personnel and policy are also affected. There are still many senior level vacancies in the State Department. That has limited things and created uncertainty. And all of this is before the results of the assessment on reorganization.

QUESTION

To what extent can Congress play a role in the State Department’s reorganization?

Kolbe

They can play a role – they can tell them no – but I don’t know how much of that they’ll do. The administration can take some steps alone but they should be wary of pushback from congress.

Bockenfeld

There was a hearing yesterday at 5 in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the State Department reorganization process.  Chairman Corker spoke about special envoys to the State Department.  There are 68 special envoys – seven were created by congress with permissive language, eleven were congressionally mandated, and the rest are under purview of State Department. Corker said that the State Department should eliminate them. The DRL was created and authorized by Congress.  Any attempt to change it would require that you’d have to go back to Congress and amend the authorities.  Other places don’t have the same level of protection.  Congress can block changes in some areas but in most places changes can be made unilaterally.

McInerney

Many in Congress feel they have less leverage when the State Department effectively wants to shrink itself and reduce its own budget. Congress is used exerting influence and oversight over the State Department and USAID by potentially threatening budget cuts, but now those cuts are coming from the Secretary of State, so Congress is unsure how to get answers from him.

Alexander

The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is not legislatively mandated or approved. MEPI was created as an alternative to the USAID Middle East bureau 9 years ago. Congress can’t get involved in MEPI or other, similar coordinating bodies. Some parts of the reorganization can largely be done without Congress’s approval, which is somewhat worrisome.

QUESTION

It seems like reconstruction efforts in Iraq could be one of the easiest and fastest ways to curry favor, and future projects won’t be successful if people don’t have homes and roads to use. Can you elaborate on grand strategy for the next 1-5 years in northern Iraq?

Alexander

Easiest and fastest often isn’t the best development paradigm. If there’s not decentralization coming from the Iraqi government, and no power and budgeting authority in hands of people getting aid, there’s a mismatch. There’s also a security issue – AID can’t put implementers in harm’s way. This limits the ability to get outside the green zone. Some money goes through the United Nations Development Programme. We have to pool our funds because we can’t keep our eyes on everything. It is going to have to be recovery and stabilization but not reconstruction because it’s simply too costly. There are good civil society groups in Iraq who can pick up where we leave off once given the power. We have to ask: where are we putting our money and how will we be most effective?

QUESTION

What does this budget tell you about the Trump administration’s big ideas for the Middle East and North Africa? What does it tell you about Tunisia? Do you think Youssef Chahed, Head of the Government in Tunisia, was well received here in Washington last week? Did he convince them to change their mind on the budget?

McInerney

What do the budget and lack of narrative description tell us? It tells us that a strategy is not in place yet – and many officials acknowledge that. At the same time there’s a desire to cut budgets. Many people believe that the administration should figure out its strategy before proposing massive budget cuts – it could end up that congress forces something like that to happen. I don’t think the administration cut Tunisia consciously because they don’t want to support them. The budget is coming from the White House to satisfy big top line cuts they want to make. There are some countries with political influence whose aid is protected. The budget started with the big picture and topline cuts, which results in cuts in unprotected places like Tunisia. The longer an aid package has existed, the harder it is to cut for a variety of reasons. It’s the most longstanding recipients of foreign aid that have been exempted from cuts.

Bockenfeld

The PM’s visit did garner attention and support that was much needed for Tunisia.  In general, bipartisan support for Tunisia on the Hill has grown steadily for several years.  This is reflected in the Senate resolution and in comments from senior members in Congress saying Tunisia is a priority. We should be encouraged by the House bill that’s come out. The House rejected proposed changes and fulfilled the full FY17 number. Then there’s Senator McCain’s speech at Heritage, where he said the cuts will not happen. He cannot guarantee that of course, but he is very close to Senator Graham, who’s as close to a guarantee as you can get.

QUESTION

One of the things we’re excited about is the Senate vote to block sale of PGMs (Precision-Guided Munitions) to Saudi Arabia. How much of an indicator do you think that might be of this Congress’s willingness to say “No, human rights will be a priority. No, we are not solely going to base our relationship with the middle East on military expenditures.”

Bockenfeld

This PGM vote was a big deal. It’s not covered in this report because the arms are purchased through FMS, and therefore are not in the U.S. budget. The level of opposition has substantially grown, as a result of discomfort with the  war in Yemen and attacks on civilian targets. I think the Senate is trying to signal a desire to see the war in Yemen come to an end. This should be a top priority for Secretary Tillerson, and we should see real diplomatic attention from him.

Alexander

Stuart Jones, the acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East Bureau, said in testimony “this administration has de-linked human rights and security issues.” He was answering a question on Bahrain, but if this is actually the administration’s position, that’s very unfortunate.

McInerney

We see a lot of bipartisan interest on the Hill to see the U.S. continue to support democratic values. It takes more than expressed opinions of course. Congress’s role will be very important. As we’ve outlined in this report, the administration is skeptical of connections between human rights and democracy and U.S. national security interests.

THE EVENT

POMED is proud to honor an outstanding group of award recipients who exemplify the democratic principles that inspire our work. At POMED’s November 30 dinner, we will recognize five distinguished individuals who have made exceptional efforts to challenge the authoritarian status quo in North Africa and the Middle East and stand up for democratic values through human rights promotion and civic engagement, advancing the rule of law, leadership in government, and literature and the arts. With their courage, perseverance, and creativity, our 2017 awardees are advancing the goal of a more democratic region and inspiring others to support this important cause.

THE SCHEDULE

7:00 PM – 8:00 PM – Cocktails and Silent Auction

8:00 PM – 9:00 PM – Dinner / Awards Ceremony

9:00 PM – 10:00 PM – Silent Auction Last Call

THE AWARD RECIPIENTS

Amna Guellali is a Tunisian researcher and human rights advocate. She is currently a Senior Tunisia and Algeria researcher at Human Rights Watch, where she investigates human rights abuses in both countries. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Guellali worked as an analyst at the office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in the Hague, and as Senior Researcher at the department of international law at the Asser Institute. She has also served as legal officer at the regional delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Tunis. Guellali holds a PhD from the European University Institute in Florence. She is a native speaker of Arabic and also fluent in French, English, and Italian.

Aya Hijazi is an Egyptian-American social justice advocate. Following the 2011 Tahrir uprising, Hijazi and her husband Mohamed Hassanein started a nongovernmental organization in Cairo, The Belady Foundation, to address the plight of street children in Egypt and advocate for child rights. In May 2014, the Egyptian police raided the foundation and detained Hijazi, Hassanein, and several colleagues. They were charged with outrageous crimes in a process lacking evidence and due process. In April 2017, after three years in prison, the defendants were acquitted of all charges. Upon their release, Hijazi and Hassanein relocated to the United States, where they are working to establish the Belady Foundation.

Hisham Matar is a Pulitzer Prize-winning author who writes powerfully about the human effects of dictatorship, repression, and injustice. As a child, Matar and his family relocated from Libya to Cairo in 1979 due to his father’s political persecution under the Gaddafi regime. In 1990, while Matar was studying in London, his father was kidnapped in Cairo and disappeared by Gaddafi’s agents. Matar’s most recent book, the 2016 memoir The Return, recounts his journey to Libya from exile after Gaddafi’s toppling to try to learn the fate of his father. The Return received the 2017 Pulitzer Prize for autobiography, the PEN/Jean Stein Award, numerous other prizes, and was named one of the New York Times’ top 10 books of the year. Matar’s work has been translated into thirty languages. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature.

Representative Don Beyer is a United States Congressman from the 8th district of Virginia. Previously he served as Lieutenant Governor of Virginia from 1990 to 1998 and as the U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland and Lichtenstein from 2009 to 2013. As the Representative of Aya Hijazi’s district, Congressman Beyer was very involved in her case, calling on the U.S. administration to press for her release; drawing public attention to the plight of Hijazi, Hassanein, and their colleagues; and speaking on behalf of human rights in Egypt.

PHOTOS

Wednesday, June 21, 2017
2:00 – 3:30 p.m.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Featuring:

Howard Eissenstat
Associate Professor, St. Lawrence University;
POMED Nonresident Senior Fellow and author of
the POMED report “Erdogan as Autocrat: A Very Turkish Tragedy”

Nicholas Danforth
Senior Policy Analyst, Bipartisan Policy Center

Amanda Sloat
Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School;
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Southern Europe and Eastern Mediterranean Affairs, 2013-2016

Amberin Zaman
Columnist, Al-Monitor

Moderator:

Amy Hawthorne
Deputy Director for Research, POMED

On June 21, 2017, the Project on Middle East Democracy and the Bipartisan Policy Center hosted an event entitled “What’s Left of Turkish Democracy?” The following is a summary of the discussion.

Panelist Remarks

Amanda Sloat described her impressions from a recent visit to Turkey. A year after the attempted coup, many in the United States and Europe do not fully appreciate how traumatizing the event was. There remains a “pervasive climate of anxiety and uncertainty,” a vulnerable state apparatus, and a feeling of vulnerability and paranoia in Turkish society. The indefinite state of emergency and the crackdown on dissent has had a distinct “chilling effect” on civil society. The purges of state institutions carried out under the guise of targeting those alleged to have been involved in the coup attempt have created uncertainty among the populace. The Turkish government is changing the boundary of what is permissible politically, which has led to a narrowing political space for dissent, shrinking press freedom, and a lack of public confidence in institutions. Despite these serious challenges, however, Turkish civil society is showing some resilience, Sloat argued. Amidst an unfree and potentially unfair voting environment, it is notable that 48 percent of the Turkish electorate voted against the April constitutional referendum to give sweeping new powers to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. As another example, in June 2017, the government withdrew a proposal to allow developers to build industrial facilities in olive groves due to popular opposition. Head of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Kemal Kiliçdaroğlu’s current “march for justice” from Ankara to Istanbul is another sign of active opposition. The “silver lining,” Sloat said, is that “civil society is not dead—people are still willing to stand up and engage.”

Howard Eissenstat discussed the impact of the constitutional referendum, which creates an executive presidency system. “We know the referendum was played on an uneven terrain,” Eissenstat argued, citing widespread reports of institutional bias against the “No” campaign and of ballot rigging. Hopes that Erdoğan would end the state of emergency after his referendum victory and take other steps to normalize the political situations were wishful thinking. Eissenstat does not believe that “now, or in the foreseeable future, we will see a fundamental shift” in the President’s behavior—“Erdoğan will be Erdoğan.”  Instead, the purge “will expand” as the government is continuing to expropriate property of real and alleged opponents, to bring legal action against journalists, and to fight a costly conflict against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

The results of the referendum were not ideal for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) despite its structural advantages, Eissenstat said. The vote was extraordinarily tight as the AKP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) did not receive the strong support they expected for a “yes” vote – the official tally was 51.41 percent for “Yes” and 48.59 percent for “No”. The close result indicates that political instability will continue, especially as some members of the AKP break from Erdoğan and the “tentacles of the purge” extend further and even start to start to touch elements of the AKP itself. Erdoğan will “take the changes he won to the bank, but the narrowness of the victory points to some real weaknesses,” Eissenstat argued. The referendum made things more complicated for the President—“no one was happy with the results” due to the slim margin of victory. The results demonstrated the limitations of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), the pro-Kurdish opposition party, in opposing Erdoğan, although it is difficult to determine the HDP vote accurately owing to the widespread displacement and disenfranchisement of Kurdish voters. It appears that the HDP lost some support, and with most of its leadership imprisoned, the party is no longer a serious force in Turkish politics. The MHP also underperformed in the referendum, despite the strong support of party leaders for the “Yes” campaign, indicating lack of unity in the party on the issue. The other opposition party, the CHP, recognizes that it must change tactics in order to survive in this new environment. Kiliçdaroğlu’s “march for justice” is a sign that it is resorting to new tactics to mobilize popular support against Erdoğan.

Amberin Zaman discussed the effects of the coup attempt on the peace process with the Kurdish armed opposition, as well as on policies toward Kurds outside the country. Zaman disagreed with Eissenstat’s statement about HDP underperformance in the referendum, arguing that the results do not directly translate into support for the AKP and that southern Turkey was the “least level playing ground in the country” due to vote rigging and other tactics. She argued that the peace process was already dead by last summer, due to Erdoğan’s decision to walk away from promising peace negotiations in February 2015. Erdoğan was unwilling to negotiate seriously due to the growing influence of Kurdish militias in Syria and because the Kurds were not supportive of his project to expand presidential powers. The collapse of the negotiations was followed by the collapse of the ceasefire last summer, which Zaman described as one of the saddest moments in Turkish history. The popularity of the HDP in the 2015 legislative elections, when the party crossed the electoral threshold and entered parliament, created a “great opportunity for Turkey to move forward” on resolving the Kurdish conflict through politics. But this progress was soon erased as war between Turkey and the PKK reignited. The coup attempt gave Erdoğan new ammunition against the Kurds, especially as he is “determined to defeat them on the battlefield” instead of pursing a political solution. Erdoğan is interested in creating his own Kurdish movement through the groups like Huda-Par and Kurds who are supportive of the President of Iraqi Kurdistan, Masoud Barzani. There is “no room for the peace process as we knew it,” at least before the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections.

Zaman posited that the coup attempt and its aftermath did not have a major impact on Turkey’s relationship with the Iraqi Kurds, but Barzani was very quick to express his support for Erdoğan in the wake of the events, and Erdoğan will rely on Barzani’s support to mobilize anti-PKK Kurds in Turkey. The U.S. decision to provide arms to the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria was a “big slap in the face” for Erdoğan. (The YPG is the military wing of the Democratic Union Party, PYD, a Syrian Kurdish nationalist group with close ties to the PKK. The Turkish government makes no official distinction between the YPG and PKK, and considers both to be parts of the same terrorist group.) The collapse of central authority in the Kurdish areas of Syria and the military partnership between the Syrian Kurds and the United States are comparable to the situation with the U.S.-enforced no-fly zone in Iraq in 1991 that led to the solidification of Iraqi Kurdistan, Zaman observed.

Nicholas Danforth argued that despite the current dominant narrative that it doesn’t matter if Turkey is autocratic as long as it continues strategic cooperation with the United States, ignoring the authoritarian slide is short-sighted and dangerous. The decline of Turkish democracy could have serious consequences for the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Rising authoritarianism would ensure ongoing and intensified anti-Americanism and would make cooperation on key regional issues even more difficult.  Danforth noted that Erdoğan had tempered criticism of the United States since President Trump’s inauguration, in order to try to build relations with the new administration, but Erdoğan may quickly return to harsh rhetoric if tensions increase.

The United States has a history of working with authoritarian regimes, but Turkey is demonstrably different than autocratic countries like Saudi Arabia that do not make a pretense of being democratic, while Erdoğan and those around him are very invested in portraying a façade of democracy. Whereas other authoritarian allies can discuss security or stability with the United States, Erdoğan’s rhetoric keeps the focus on Turkey’s democratic deficit, ensuring continued criticism from the United States and Europe. As a result, Erdoğan will “have to come up with some way to explain to his public why the United States, Europe, and other democratic countries don’t accept Turkey as a democracy,” and anti-Americanism will likely bridge that gap.

The United States counts on authoritarian allies to provide stability, but authoritarian Turkey does not seem destined to be stable due to numerous internal and external conflicts and an economy close to crisis. ISIS’s terrorist campaign inside Turkey, threats from Kurdish militant groups like the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), and the arrival of new militants in Turkey could inflame the situation after the Syrian regime retakes the city of Idlib, which is currently controlled by the al-Qaeda affiliated rebel group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The country is already intensely divided, with a populace that has little trust in institutions and widespread rumors of armed militias loyal to Erdoğan, which could quickly destabilize the situation in the event of another crisis. Politically motivated arrests could quickly extend to members of all four major political parties, which would take the country into dangerous territory. Danforth argued that “in the best-case scenario, it’s a very rocky road for U.S.-Turkish relations ahead in the near term, and in the long term, Turkey may face a steep precipice at the end of the road it is on.”

Finally, Danforth noted that he found it difficult to be positive about prospects for democratic resilience, especially as the leadership of the HDP is already imprisoned, and all other opposition is facing threats. The United States may choose to double down on Erdoğan as the only figure who can maintain stability, but this is unwise. Erdoğan has consolidated his power to the point that if there were a serious challenge to his rule and “if he was going to go down, he could take the country down with him.”

Audience Q & A

Q:  What should the United States do to help Turkish democracy?

The most helpful step, Danforth said, would be to pursue a political solution to the conflict between the government and the PKK. This will be very difficult, however, so realistically the United States should focus on trying to keep the current situation from getting worse. The terrorist threat is intensifying, and further attacks will destabilize the country. The United States maintains some leverage over the PKK, Danforth stated, and if there is a PKK campaign against civilian targets in Turkey, there should be consequences for the U.S.-YPG relationship.

Sloat observed that it is always a challenge in U.S. policy to find the correct balance between pursuing interests and advancing values. Turkey’s NATO membership requires the United States to be concerned about Turkish democracy. If the United States and Europe turn away from Turkey, it will likely seek partners elsewhere (such as Russia). There is a risk that intense public criticism likely would “trigger further anti-Americanism.” But the Trump administration must find ways to strategically raise specific concerns both publicly and privately about democracy and human rights instead of taking a purely “transactional approach” to the relationship with Ankara.

Zaman argued that American leverage over Turkey is often overstated, and the United States is likely to soften its stance on the PKK as long as it needs the YPG as a military partner against ISIS in Syria.  Despite these limitations, the United States “should continue to raise its voice and continue to treat Turkey like a democracy because it is a useful fiction to maintain.”

She pointed out the European Union has a substantial economic and political relationship with Turkey, more so than the United States, and thus is a key actor. But Europe is in a state of flux and the EU’s relationship with Turkey is complex, in part because of European efforts to work with Turkey to host Syrian refugees who might otherwise seek to enter Europe.

Eissenstat said that the international community must speak up about Turkey’s deteriorating democracy, and take “the long view” that includes the possibility of unexpected developments that could alter the situation inside the country. Policymakers should not assume that the current status quo will last indefinitely, he argued: “One can envision certain circumstances where the Turkish government shifts,” and “the possibility exists of a coalition that could viably challenge Erdoğan in 2019.” The audience for U.S. diplomacy promoting human rights and democratic values is not only Erdoğan, but also the wider Turkish public, including the AKP base, most of which believes in the basic values of rule of law and personal freedoms.

Q:  What is the economic impact of the mass purge of state employees?

More than 100,000 people have lost their jobs in the purges, and they have struggled to find other jobs, while the seizure of their passports renders them unable to leave the country, Sloat mentioned. Within the overall population of Turkey (around 80 million), the purge probably won’t have a sustained long-term effect on the national economy, Sloat said, but it will create a not-insignificant pool of people who will be unemployed for the foreseeable future. Their long-term prospects are uncertain. The government is creating a commission to review cases of termination, but the structure will be slow, bureaucratic, and likely politicized.

Eissenstat described how the AKP has capitalized on the purges to place loyalists in positions of power and to appropriate the businesses of accused Gülenists. The purge is “part of a longer story of the AKP wresting control of the public sector,” he explained.  It is not clear that under these circumstances Turkey can have a successful and stable economy and attract foreign investors–the country cannot have “a market economy and a regime that engages in purges.”

Q:  Is it true that there was an uptick in PKK activities around the time of the attempted coup?

Zaman stated that the PKK was reacting to the government’s increasingly offensive posture. This problem cannot be solved through military means, Zaman contended: the PKK largely exists due to the failure of Turkish state to address the Kurds’ long-running grievances. “I do not expect the PKK to fix the Kurdish problem. I expect my government, the government to which I pay taxes, to fix the problem,” she added

Q: Will the Turkish government give citizenship to Syrian refugees in the country?

Giving citizenship to the three million Syrian refugees in Turkey would be the humane thing to do, Zaman argued, and from Erdoğan’s perspective would also likely create new votes for the AKP. A mass offer of citizenship, however, would be politically impossible due to opposition from many Turks. The Turkish people have displayed immense grace in their handling of huge Syrian refugee population, but the idea of granting citizenship is controversial.

Q: Why is Turkey siding with Qatar in the current GCC crisis?

Sloat said that Turkey is acting in part due to its close financial relationship with Qatar, but she does not believe that Turkey is looking to become deeply embroiled in the conflict. The recent decision to move a limited number of Turkish troops to Qatar was a symbolic move, and the result of a basing agreement in the works since 2014. Turkey had wanted to present itself to the new Trump administration as an appealing potential partner against Iran, Danforth said, in the hope that this would strengthen Turkey’s position regionally. However, Turkey’s pro-Qatar stance, which is similar to Iran’s, shows that aligning with the United States unconditionally against Iran doesn’t actually fit with Turkey’s own foreign policy preferences. Zaman noted that a pro-Qatar position is in line with popular sentiment among many Turks. She mentioned a recent column in the Daily Sabah by Erdoğan’s spokesperson İbrahim Kalın defending Qatar and the Qatari and Turkish backing of the Muslim Brotherhood as an example of the government’s justification for its position.

Q:  What could lead to a decline in support for Erdoğan?

Eissenstat stated that Erdoğan can’t afford for the Turkish economy to tank, or for Turkey to “look like a dictatorship.” Erdoğan needs an opposition that will “sit in Parliament yelling at him and contesting elections,” but not a viable-enough opposition to challenge his authority. The march for justice from Ankara to Istanbul poses a discomforting choice for Erdoğan, as he will have to either choose to forcibly stop the march or allow Kiliçdaroğlu to walk into the suburbs of Istanbul and possibly gather thousands of people in the streets. Danforth added that pro-government media has criticized the march, but has begrudgingly admitted that Kiliçdaroğlu has the democratic right to take this action. Zaman mentioned that it is important to recognize the double-standard of Turkish politics—if the HDP mounted a similar effort, the leaders would face serious consequences.

Q:  Can Turkish foreign policy be seen as an extension of domestic policy?

According to Eissenstat, Turkish foreign policy is linked intrinsically with an attempt to gain domestic support through nationalism, but Erdoğan’s nationalist foreign policy decisions also are often heartfelt. Zaman questioned the extent of the United States’ willingness to put up with this type of Turkish foreign policy. Sloat added that there is a perception in Turkey that anti-American campaign rhetoric is permissible and that “no one can hear it outside of Turkey.” But given the global communications of the modern world, there are legitimate consequences to aggressive rhetoric, as evidenced by the fallout from Erdoğan accusing German Chancellor Angela Merkel of employing “Nazi measures” during a diplomatic spat earlier this year. Zaman pointed out that the investigation of former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and scrutiny of his lobbying for Turkey, and the violent clashes in front of the Turkish Embassy in Washington during Erdoğan’s visit in May, have increased the focus on Turkey in American politics. Danforth said that there is a perception of Erdoğan as dichotomous: a supremely clever and skilled politician who deals with national issues in a very personal and emotional manner. Domestically, though, Erdoğan’s emotional instincts and willingness to personalize politics and punish his enemies have proved to be quite practical and effective. But these traits clash more in foreign policy when Erdoğan doesn’t always have the ability to follow through on his threats and posturing, as seen for example in his failed push to topple the Assad regime in Syria.

Q:  Do the referendum results indicate a rural-urban divide in the AKP?

Eissenstat urged caution in reading too much into the regional breakdown of the referendum vote, noting that local patronage systems and familial relations may have had more of an impact on voting patterns than geographic location. A strong urban-rural split is possible, but it is hard to know conclusively from the information available to date about election results. Sloat said that the AKP is actively concerned about such a split, with Erdoğan’s party looking to replace city mayors with politicians who could promote AKP policies more effectively. Zaman added that there is apathy at the grassroots level of the AKP because of a lack of enthusiasm for the executive presidency plans.

Q:  What is the future of the Gülen movement?

Danforth said that it is possible that the government could eventually choose to show leniency to some of the tens of thousands of purged Gülenists, making their social rehabilitation dependent on begging forgiveness and expressing their newfound loyalty for Erdoğan. Zaman said this was unlikely. Gülenists are trying to separate themselves from the alleged perpetrators of the failed coup in order to continue the global movement. Eissenstat noted the complexity and secrecy of the Gülenist movement: it can be understood as a sub-state structure in Turkey, as an international political organization, and as a religious movement. Sloat concluded by stating that she did not see much of a short-term future for the movement inside Turkey, especially as it has been deemed a terrorist organization, but international Gülenist networks may survive.