This event was sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED).

With the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed upon, the international community has begun to focus on the implementation of the nuclear deal. During the course of negotiations, the human rights situation inside Iran failed to improve, and it remains unclear how such issues may be affected by the signing of the nuclear agreement. It also remains to be seen whether the nuclear agreement will now create any additional space for the international community to address its human rights concerns.

What changes can we expect to see in Iran’s domestic politics as sanctions are relieved and attention moves beyond nuclear negotiations? What role can the international community play in addressing human rights concerns in Iran? What changes might we expect in U.S. policy toward Iran post-nuclear deal, and how—if at all—can the United States play a constructive role in helping open space for domestic activists?

A discussion with:

Nazila Fathi
Author, The Lonely War: One Woman’s Account of the Struggle for Modern Iran
Former New York Times Correspondent, Tehran

Dokhi Fassihian
Senior Program Manager, Freedom House

Suzanne Maloney
Deputy Director, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution
Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution

Moderated by:

Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

On October 14, POMED hosted a public panel discussion titled “Human Rights in Iran After the Nuclear Deal.” Panelists included Nazila Fathi, author of The Lonely War: One Woman’s Account of the Struggle for Modern Iran; Dokhi Fassihian, Senior Program Manager for the Middle East and North Africa at Freedom House; and Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director of the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution and Senior Fellow in the Brookings Center for Middle East Policy. Moderating was Stephen McInerney, Executive Director of POMED.

In her opening remarks, Nazila Fathi stated that her prior expectation that the human rights situation in Iran would deteriorate has come to pass. She distinguished that it is not the government writ large leading the crackdowns, but instead the judiciary. However, President Hassan Rouhani is incapable of stopping these crackdowns on the whole. While he was able to curtail the “modesty police” last year when they were targeting primarily women (and even some men) who were deemed to be immodestly dressed, he is unable to put an end to the targeted arrests and detentions. Meanwhile, the judiciary has continued its systematic repression of various sections of society, including those of the Baha’i faith and unions. The hardliners are clearly feeling vulnerable, evident in all of their harsh repressive moves. Fathi believes that the most pressing situation, however, is that of women. It was primarily lower class women who supported the Revolution and were therefore able to climb up the socioeconomic ladder due to regime support. These “Islamist feminists” have been rewarded with quotas for women in employment and university acceptance. If the regime tries to backtrack, the number of women employed and in school will decrease, thus reversing the gains in female empowerment.

Following Ms. Fathi, Dokhi Fassihian shared in her opening remarks that there was a hope that if the nuclear negotiations were resolved and diplomatic discussion occurred, there would be an “opening.” Through economic re-engagement and cultural exchanges, Iran would come out of the extreme isolation it has put itself in and repression would therefore be more difficult. Fassihian gives three main reasons why the human rights situation has instead deteriorated since President Rouhani came into office. First, during the nuclear negotiations and engagement with the international community, the government has actually taken the opportunity to crack down. As the government consolidated a crackdown, there was no reaction from the international community due to the emphasis on nuclear negotiations, essentially giving the regime a green light. Second, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has been working to weaken opponents ahead of the 2016 parliamentary elections. It is in his interest not to see an opening on human rights, and repression of those who would bring human rights into the discussion is therefore in his interests. Finally, the international community as a whole has weakened its stance on human rights in Iran over the past few years, again emphasizing nuclear negotiations over the issue of human rights abuses.

In addition, Fassihian argues that another obstacle to democracy and human rights promotion in Iran is the “narrative Iranians are force fed from a young age,” which emphasizes that Iran is always a victim of bigger powers and the United States in particular. Therefore, there is a belief among Iranians that trusting the international community will lead to the weakening and breakdown of the country, so Iran remains isolated for fear of state collapse. While Iranians are ready to “counter that narrative”, they are not necessarily empowered to do so, and the international community is not clear on how to do so. While Iranians have tried to improve their situation themselves through voting and peaceful protest, the structure of the government makes it extremely hard for citizens to have any actual influence. The powers of Supreme Leader Khamenei and the Guardian Council are simply too strong and with these powers they are “micromanaging” domestic policy.

To conclude, Fassihian gave a few recommendations for what the international community can do to help improve the human rights situation in Iran. While various resolutions related to human rights in Iran have been passed at the United Nations since the 1980s, with monitoring missions occurring in the 1980s, the monitoring discontinued in the 1990s with the election of former president Mohammad Khatami, whose platform promised reforms that never came to pass. In 2011, the U.S., along with Brazil, Sweden, and the European Union worked to establish a stronger monitoring mechanism, which reported the deterioration of human rights in the country. However, nothing was done because, again, the international community was more focused on nuclear negotiations, which sent the signal that human rights were of secondary importance. Therefore, Fassihian proposed three steps the international community must take. First, the consensus from 2011 needs to be rebuilt, with a coalition strengthened by and organized around a “real human rights agenda that charts a path for progress.” Second, the international community needs to sanction human rights violators, particularly those high level members of the judiciary and Guardian Council who are directly responsible for human rights violations. Finally, a Commission of Inquiry needs to be launched, following the models of the successful Commissions on North Korea and Eritrea.

Finally, in Suzanne Maloney’s opening remarks she expounded upon U.S. policy towards Iran, highlighting that regardless of the will of members of the policy community to improve the human rights situation in Iran, they have relatively few tools with which to do so. With the beginning of nuclear discussions over a decade ago, Washington realized it had almost no leverage with Iran, so the administrations of former President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama worked for years to build this leverage. While former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did work to unite the international community in their views on Iran, there is still no multilateral consensus on human rights being on the agenda in discussions about Iran, as Russia and China are unwilling to entertain discussions related to human rights. Therefore, Maloney suggests that the U.S. must work to rebuild and sustain a common position with its European allies. While the U.S. and Europe once had opposing views on Iran, the decade of nuclear negotiations has brought them to the same side. Finally, the U.S. needs to do more to talk about political prisoners, because it is international attention that ultimately changes their status. For example, the international community has ignored that opposition candidates from the last election who have now been under house arrest for four and a half years, and bringing international attention to these matters is what can possibly work to change such predicaments.

Next, Stephen McInerney asked the panelists what could be expected in the upcoming 2016 elections. Ms. Fathi said she expects some surprises, and that what she believes is more important than the elections themselves is whom the Guardian Council announces as eligible to run. In the past, anyone who posed any sort of threat to the regime was barred from running, and because of this, the current parliament is ineffective at bringing about change; the only people who are in power are those who are willing to comply with government orders. However, she was surprised by the last presidential elections. She expected that the votes would not even be counted and Rouhani’s victory was a shock. She believes he won because the government elites sensed that a prospect for change was required. Therefore, she believes that in the upcoming election there is a possibility for more independent candidates due to this sense among elites that a small space needs to be opened for liberalization. She also notes that as people move up socioeconomically, their political affiliation tends to change; people who started out in the lower classes and supported the regime have moved up to the middle classes and no longer support it. Also noteworthy is that the younger generations’ views do not always align with that of their parents. For example, Ali Jannati, Minister of Culture, is considered to have more moderate views than his father, Ahmad Jannati, Chairman of the Guardian Council, considered to be a hardliner.

By contrast, Fassihian argued that she expects no surprises in the upcoming elections. While the sophistication of the factions and coalition building in the last election improved, elections continue not to be free and fair, and the Supreme Leader has made it clear that the Guardian Council will look extremely closely at the candidates. Maloney meanwhile emphasized that repression is likely to decrease in the run-up to the elections. Historically with international press attention comes less repression, followed by serious crackdowns once the international attention wanes.

Subsequently, audience members were given the opportunity to ask the panelists questions. First among these was whether there were openings for international assistance to Iranian civil society groups, whether this assistance was wanted, and also what overall role international attention can play. First, the panelists noted the importance of “naming and shaming,” which works to publicly shame those who are directly involved in human rights crackdowns and makes more people in Iran reluctant to join groups enforcing harsh repressive policies. Second, international attention does generally work to improve the conditions for civil society activists in prison. It has been found that when international attention is brought to their case, their prison conditions improve. For example, they are moved from solitary confinement to a larger cell with other people, whereas those prisoners whose cases are not public knowledge always end up staying in prison longer. Finally, while there is a desire for international attention and aid for the civil society organizations, this is a double-edged sword. Receiving international help automatically sets them as being allied with the Western “enemy.” Not providing assistance, however, feeds into the Iranian victimhood narrative.

Next, a question was posed about how the U.S.’s ability to bring international attention to human rights abuses in Iran is hindered by its inconsistent record on human rights worldwide. The consensus among all panelists was that this does hurt U.S. efforts. The U.S. has bundled the myriad concerns it has about Iran, including the nuclear issue, regional designs supporting terrorism, and human rights, into one blanket issue. However, these must all be tackled separately. Historically, it looks as though the U.S. drops human rights concerns in favor of other issues and politicizes human rights as a whole. Furthermore, there is the problem of feeding into Iran’s victimhood narrative. By calling attention to Iran’s human rights abuses and not Saudi Arabia’s, for example, Iran can manipulate this to be a narrative of the West playing favorites and marginalizing Iran.

Another question was if there was any way positive inducements could be more effective than pressuring the government into human rights improvements. The panelists believed that the Iranian government was afraid of its own people, as evidenced by the harsh repressive moves. For the Supreme Leader and those who support him, they view the end of Iran’s isolation as the end of the regime, so they are afraid of any opening that could change the isolation. Also, animosity towards the U.S. is one of the remaining principles from the Islamic Revolution, therefore leaving no opportunity for positive inducements.

A final question posed was why dissent from Ali Motahari has been tolerated by the regime. Generally, the panelists believe he has been tolerated because he can be used as the “token politician” the government can look to in order to be able to say that dissent is tolerated. He also happens to come from a prominent family tied to the Revolution and is generally unpopular due to his very conservative social notions. He lacks a real support base and is unpopular among the youth and women, as he wants to go back to radical societal restrictions on women.

This event was co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).

Date: November 3, 2015
Time: 2:30 – 3:45 pm
Location: Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 562

As Tunisia has democratized since its 2011 Jasmine Revolution, its frail economy remains a danger to social peace, with unemployment even higher than when the country’s mass protests began in late 2010. Terrorist attacks this year killed more than 50 foreigners, undercutting tourism, the country’s third-largest industry. On November 3, Houcine Abassi, Tunisia’s most prominent labor leader, and leading U.S. analysts will discuss these economic challenges and their implications for the country’s evolution. Abassi heads the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), part of the National Dialogue Quartet that was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October.

What should the priorities for spurring economic recovery in Tunisia be? What policies should the Tunisian government adopt to improve employment, especially for youth? What role can Tunisia’s labor unions play in the country’s political and economic environment? And how can the United States and the international community help Tunisia make difficult reforms and recover economically?

Abassi will discuss Tunisia’s situation with U.S. experts in a forum co-hosted by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, and the United States Institute of Peace.

A conversation with:

Houcine Abassi
Secretary General, Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT)

Brad Cunningham
Economist, Millennium Challenge Corporation
Research Fellow, Center for International Development, Harvard University

Amy Hawthorne
Deputy Director for Research, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

Moderated by:

Ambassador William Taylor
Executive Vice President, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

This event was co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and the Legatum Institute.

Monday, November 16, 2015
12:00 pm – 1:30 pm
Open Society Foundations
1730 Pennsylvania Ave NW, #700
Washington, DC 20006

Despite the immense progress Tunisia has made in its transition since the Jasmine Revolution, significant challenges—both internal and external—threaten the future of Tunisia’s democracy. As major terrorist attacks have negatively affected the country’s security and economic stability, Tunisia’s government has struggled to find an appropriate and effective response to counter the threat of terrorism.

The Legatum Institute’s upcoming publication Tunisia at Risk: Will counter-terrorism undermine the revolution? analyzes successive Tunisian governments’ responses to terrorism and considers the relation between these responses and the future of the country’s democratic transition.

How can governments effectively counter terrorism without threatening civil liberties? What reforms are needed to make Tunisia’s security sector effective, accountable, and in line with international human rights standards? And how can the United States and the international community play a productive role in encouraging and facilitating these reform efforts?

A discussion with:

Fadil Aliriza
Visiting Senior Fellow, Legatum Institute

Daniel Brumberg
Co-director, Democracy & Governance Studies, Georgetown University

Querine Hanlon
President, Strategic Capacity Group

Moderated by:

Cole Bockenfeld
Deputy Director for Policy, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

With opening remarks by:

Anne Applebaum
Director of the Transitions Forum, Legatum Institute

On November 16, POMED co-hosted an event with the Legatum Institute titled “Countering Terrorism in Tunisia: Prospects for Security Sector Reform.” Panelists included Fadil Aliriza, Visiting Senior Fellow at the Legatum Institute and author of “Tunisia at Risk: Will Counterterrorism Undermine the Revolution?”; Daniel Brumberg, co-director of Democracy and Governance Studies at Georgetown University; and Querine Hanlon, President of the Strategic Capacity Group. The discussion was moderated by Cole Bockenfeld, Deputy Director for Policy at POMED, and opening remarks were provided by Anne Applebaum, Director of the Transitions Forum at the Legatum Institute.

In his opening remarks, Fadil Aliriza explained that in writing his report on Tunisia, he sought to answer the question of what the response to terrorism has been in Tunisia. This includes the two terrorist attacks this year, the assassinations in 2013, and the insurgency beginning in spring 2013. Aliriza contends that Tunisia’s response has been politicized. The security sector, he argues, and in particular the Ministry of Interior (MOI), views security through the lens of how it can best serve its own interests. While the revolution itself was against a police state, the MOI has set about a counter-revolutionary project to re-image itself, using the media to change the discourse from one of revolution to one of counterterrorism. Furthermore, Aliriza noted that there has been some lobbying by the security forces to counter some of the gains of the revolution. For example, the anti-terrorism law has increased pre-trial detention from six days to fifteen days. Within this counter-terrorist discourse, there are groups of politicians who see all opponents of the state, not just violent ones, as terrorists, painting all critics with a terrorist brush. In addition, as the MOI is not entirely under civilian control, civil society members are concerned about its lack of checks and procedural protocols.

The result of these factors, argues Aliriza, is that counterterrorism actions counterintuitively might be creating an environment conducive to terrorism. Employees of the MOI, for example, are letting arms into the country, and employees have intelligence on terrorist attacks that never makes it to civilian chiefs. Additionally, between January and July of this year, 100,000 arrests were made, according to the MOI. The problem with these arrests, however, is that they seem to be arbitrary, with many people arrested based on appearing to be Salafists. Furthermore, torture still occurs. Working together, these factors can lead to threats of radicalization. The solution to this, Aliriza contends, is to change the way people think. The problem goes beyond a problem of lack of training and equipment for the police, and the situation is so dire that Tunisians are starting to see the national military as a potential solution.

Following Aliriza’s opening remarks, Querine Hanlon laid out some challenges to the security sector and potential reforms. According to Hanlon, the central challenge is that the security apparatus in Tunisia was created for regime protection and preservation, and this security sector design remains largely intact today. Reforming the internal security sector, not the military, needs to be a priority, and reform faces four main challenges. First, the security apparatus, Hanlon argues, is “Byzantine in its complexity.” The MOI is the “black box” of the security sector, where there is excessive duplication of duties and departments. The structure is so complex that most Tunisians do not know how all the sector and divisions work, and more importantly, the information is not publicly available. Second, there is limited to no coordination among and between institutions. Serious tensions exist between the military and police. The police were the most resistant to the revolution, as they had the most to lose when Ben Ali lost power, and are now generally reviled by the populace. With these significant tensions, the police and military do not coordinate, cooperate, or share information. Furthermore, for any serious decision-making, all decisions must go through the capital of Tunis, giving forces at the border and in the interior limited capabilities and no real autonomy. Third, there is the fundamental problem of the mission. The security sector in Tunisia does not operate on the idea of civilian protection. There is no understanding, particularly in the police force, of what it means to serve the population. Fourth, there is a culture of secrecy and distrust. There is no real and practical way for civil society organizations to request a meeting with anyone from the MOI. Furthermore, when it comes to information-sharing with the police, citizens are unwilling to share their intelligence due to a lack of trust and not wanting to be perceived as informants, and the police do not have a mechanism in place to change this perspective. Moving from the perception of serving as informants to a trusting partnership with the security apparatus is a significant challenge. Since the revolution, the regular police have been ignored more and more in favor of specialized forces, which has security implications in and of itself. While they are better trained and better equipped, these forces are militarized units, not the equivalent of a police force. The overarching solution to these challenges, argues Hanlon, is to generate an “ethos of service.” While it is true that the forces need better training and equipment, changing the overall perspective of the security sector is essential to creating any sort of real and long-lasting change.

Finally, Daniel Brumberg highlighted the importance of democratization in countering security threats. He argues that there is a race occurring in Tunisia between two dynamics: securitization versus democratization, and the race for securitization is escalating more quickly. However, there is a necessary connection between fighting terrorism and democratization, and democracy and security must go hand in hand. The deep state in Tunisia is expanding; the businessmen, members of the old regime, and smugglers are all merging into one block. Furthermore, the failure to establish advanced democratic institutions and processes has led to the exploitation of laws to support the security sector. This lack of democratic institutions and processes, the failure of the establishment of the Supreme Constitutional Court, for example, has led to the security sector employing outdated laws to justify its actions. In addition, reflecting Aliriza’s previous points, there is no active, effective opposition. Opposition members who questioned the anti-terrorism law were themselves accused of terrorism. There is a paradox developing where the middle class who supported the revolution are now shifting back to supporting authoritarianism. Brumberg’s central question is how to reform the state when the state itself is the problem. He believes the solution requires finding allies within state institutions who want to reform, and he argues that demonizing the MOI will not be productive. He also believes that mobilizing regional networks of reformers is essential. Finally, in the global fight against the Islamic State (ISIS), the United States needs to support Tunisia and its democratization and stop supporting authoritarianism.

Following the opening remarks from the panelists, Cole Bockenfeld asked them how the U.S. and international actors can aid the security sector and ministries to reform. He also asked if the previous efforts to establish a Fusion Center, an initiative to bring together the Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Justice to better coordinate their actions, had helped at all. The panelists distinguished between assistance and reform, noting that reform needs to come from within. While it can be encouraged by outside actors, reform cannot be imposed, and the solution needs to involve finding areas where the government has the political will to change. The agents of this change will likely not be found at the senior level within the ministries. However, lower-level staff are trying to determine what operational changes can be made, so the political will to change might be encouraged through them. Regarding the Fusion Center, while it was an attempt to tackle the problem of information sharing that plagues Tunisian institutions, progress has been stalled because the MOI has not come to an agreement on who to name to work at the Center. The panelists argue that the U.S. needs to get involved in encouraging political will, perhaps through conditionality-based aid.

Subsequently, audience members were invited to ask the panelists questions. First among those, a member of the audience argued that the problems in Tunisia are not particularly unique and asked what solutions to these problems have worked in other countries. Qualifying that security sector reform is a relatively new field with few potential areas for success, Hanlon contended that the most obvious cases of success are in Eastern Europe. However, she argued that these cases are not comparable to Tunisia because those countries in Eastern Europe had the political will to reform in order to gain membership to NATO and the European Union. Tunisians themselves, she said, look to the cases of reform in Taiwan, Chile, and South Africa. One of the central issues they must address, though, is what the security sector is, which will require a public dialogue and sharing of information, and civil society organizations need to work to keep these issues in the public space.

Further questions broadly asked whether there were other actors in the MOI and security sector who would be interested in pushing forward reforms. Hanlon’s answer highlighted that the MOI contains both those who were uninterested in reform and information sharing and those who wanted to work towards reform but may not necessarily know how. First she emphasized that everyone within the MOI has their own private archive of information, and this information moves with him or her – there isn’t a culture of information sharing. So divided is the MOI that people who work in the same hallway or have worked in the same space for years may not know each other. Further, the police force views themselves as being above the politicians, which creates problems itself. However, there are those members of the police force who do genuinely want to change but do not know how. For example, Hanlon shared a story of talking to a police chief who asked with genuine curiosity how he could make someone confess without the use of torture. Part of the problem rests with Tunisia operating on a confession-based system of justice. While there are individuals who see that the system does not work, they do not know how to fix it.

Subsequent questions focused on what kind of incentives the U.S. can offer Tunisia to encourage reform. Is there any sort of leverage comparable to NATO or EU membership that can be offered? Can economic incentives be attached to security sector reform? The panelists noted that to join NATO, there is an exhaustive list of requirements a state accedes to, which inherently creates security sector reform, and there are no comparable incentives in Tunisia. Offering conditionality-based aid is an option, but there is no guarantee that the aid is put to effective use. Furthermore, economics are likely not enough of an incentive when asking institutions to give up some power, which the MOI would have to do in order to implement meaningful security sector reform.

This event was co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI).

Date: Thursday, February 25, 2016
Time: 2:00 – 3:30 pm
Location: National Democratic Institute
455 Massachusetts Ave, NW, 8th Floor
Washington, DC 20001

The National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) invite you to a discussion with members of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People (ARP) of the Republic of Tunisia. This event will provide an opportunity for the representatives to share their perspectives on the evolving nature of Tunisian politics, as well as the challenges and opportunities they face in trying to meet citizen expectations and address issues of youth employment and engagement. Les Campbell, Senior Associate and Regional Director of MENA Programs, NDI, will join as a discussant, and the panel will be moderated by Stephen McInerney, Executive Director, POMED. This event is made possible through a grant from the Institute for Representative Government to NDI and with the support of the Bureau for Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Department of State.

Join us for a discussion with:

The Hon. Nozha Beyaoui
Representative, Assembly of the Representatives of the People of Tunisia

The Hon. Haikel Ben Belkassem
Representative, Assembly of the Representatives of the People of Tunisia

Les Campbell
Senior Associate and Regional Director, MENA Programs, National Democratic Institute (NDI)

Moderated by:

Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

Event Summary

On February 26th, POMED co-hosted an event with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) titled: “Delivering on Democracy: A Discussion with Members of the Tunisian Assembly of the Representatives of the People.” Panelists included the Honorable Haigel Belgacem from the Popular Front and the Honorable Nozha Beyaoui from Front du Salut, both members of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People, and Les Campbell, Senior Associate and Regional Director of MENA Programs at NDI. The discussion was moderated by Steve McInerney, Executive Director at POMED.

In his opening remarks, Steve McInerney commented on the origins of the Tunisian’s revolution in 2011 and its evolution. He lauded the formation of the Constituent Assembly, which drafted a constitution in 2014, and the elections of 2014, which made the Assembly of the Representatives of the People the most democratically elected parliament in the Middle East. Mr. McInerney added that Tunisia still required economic development in addition to positive political reform.

Steve McInerney asked each of the panelists to offer their own opening remarks. Popular Front Representative Haigel Belgacem talked about the success of the revolution against Ben Ali which led to democratic elections and he discussed the successes and failures of the Constituent Assembly and the Troika. He then praised recent legal reforms, the creation of the Ministry of Civil Service, Governance and Fight Against Corruption, and the fight against corruption. He emphasized three key challenges of the revolution: freedom, work, and dignity. Belgacem explained that freedom had been achieved and increasing employment was underway, but dignity still needed work.

Front du Salut Representative Nozha Beyaoui talked about how the dream of a new democracy in the Arab World had been fulfilled. She stated that Tunisia still needed support in all fields, particularly the economy. She added that economic investments would create opportunity in all sectors and stressed the need for economic partnerships inside and outside the country. She spoke about security issues, noting that terrorism concerned not only Tunisia but also the rest of the world.

Finally, Les Campbell praised the Tunisia expertise of Steve McInerney and POMED and thanked them for their support for NDI’s Tunisian election commission. Campbell characterized Tunisia as the ray of hope in an otherwise depressing region in terms of democracy promotion. He explained that Tunisia needs guidance for its legislative branch, particularly how the parliament should operate. Campbell stressed the importance of relations between representatives and the people who elected them. He noted that the Representatives are aware that Tunisia has done admirably so far but the international community should wonder what they can do to continue this progress and keep the Tunisian dream alive.

Steve McInerney then addressed questions to all of the panelists, starting with Belgacem’s discussion of freedom, work, and dignity and new economic reforms underway. Ennahdha representative the Hon. Zouhayer Rajbi explained that Tunisia was ready to export the ideas of the revolution after defeating Ben Ali’s dictatorship. He added that legislative reforms should be coupled with economic reforms, particularly the establishment of public-private partnerships involving foreign and local investors. He also highlighted growing corruption in Tunisia, hoping that the new Ministry of Civil Service, Governance and Fight Against Corruption, would remedy some of the problems posed by corruption. Belgacem talked about specific laws on finance, particularly a clause regulating taxation and investments, as well as the ongoing fight against corruption.

Steve McInerney asked Beyaoui about the local elections and the processes of decentralization. She responded that without security you cannot talk about decentralization and growth because of the importance of security to the stability of the country. However, she gave details about the local election processes, stating that the minimum age to run for local elections was now 20. She also explained her proposal of a new system in which the president of the local council would be elected directly by the people rather than assume the role by virtue of being the leader of the majority party in the local council. Rajbi also added his thoughts about the creation of a ministry of local affairs which should oversee the move from centralization to decentralization.

Audience members were then invited to ask the panelists questions. The first round of questions was about the causes for radicalization and the influence of marijuana criminalization, about job opportunities for youth, and about reforming the local courts. Belgacem explained that radicalization did not result from any Tunisian values or Tunisian culture. He noted that extremist groups took advantage of new freedoms to radicalize individuals but in no way draw on Tunisian values. Furthermore, Belgacem stressed the need to fight violent extremism while successfully rebuilding the country. On marijuana laws, Belgacem explained that the Assembly was reviewing the text and wanted to avoid condemning first time offenders. He instead proposed going after drug traffickers. Beyaoui reaffirmed the absence of extremism in Tunisian culture and lamented the absence of awareness against terrorism and radicalization in the country. She then talked about court reform, explaining that the Ben Ali regime used the courts as a weapon but the current legislature revised Ben Ali’s practices. She explained that the constitution enshrines a separation of powers, which brings more credibility to the justice system while putting together a legal framework; judges are not subject to executive power over them. For Beyaoui, the reforms need to make the legal codes consistent with the constitution, including first instance tribunals and appeal courts.

Further questions focused on the upcoming free trade agreement with the European Union and about the relationships between different parties. Belgacem voiced his concern with the proposed free trade agreement explaining that his background as a left wing politician and his experience did not make him sympathetic to such an agreement. He claimed that while the Popular Front did not fear partnerships, several sectors of the Tunisian economy were particularly vulnerable, noting for example that agriculture needs protection and cannot afford to compete with European products. He concluded that Tunisian economic sectors first should be up to par with the EU before opening its borders to trade. He gave the example of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which the EU agreed to sign only if they could protect various sectors of its economy from American competition. Rajbi, as a member of the ruling coalition, agreed with the free trade agreement but acknowledged the importance of protecting vulnerable sectors. Regarding the importance of good relationships between parties, Rajbi explained that coalitions were crucial for ruling Tunisia properly and illustrated the importance of the commissions in which party allegiances were set aside for the good of the country. Belgacem explained that while he and Rajbi were good friends they still had their differences, particularly on the mixed results of the Troika. He also explained that his party did not have a similar political agenda to that of the coalition. However, he corroborated his counterpart’s analysis on the importance of coalitions in Tunisia.

Subsequent questions asked about the impact of the Nidaa Tounes break up on the stability of the Assembly and about the overall stability of Tunisia. This round of questions also allowed for brief closing statements at Steve McInerney’s discretion. The representative from Nidaa Tounes, the Hon. Sana Salhi, spoke for the first time regarding the question about her party. She explained that Nidaa did not actually break up and that Al-Horra and Nidaa were still voting very similarly. Furthermore, she classified Nidaa as the party of all Tunisians which best incorporated Tunisian values. Belgacem concluded by saying that despite their differences, all Tunisians want social justice and a democratic future together. Beyaoui called for the American Congress to support them and the democratic process in Tunisia.

On Thursday, March 30, 2017, POMED and the Arab Center Washington D.C. hosted an event entitled, “Egypt and the United States under the Trump Administration.” The following is a summary of the discussion.

Moderator Joyce Karam of Al Hayat newspaper noted that April 3, the date of Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi’s meeting with U.S. President Donald J. Trump, is almost exactly 40 years after President Jimmy Carter welcomed President Anwar al-Sadat to the White House to promote Egypt-Israel peace negotiations (April 4, 1977).  Clearly much has changed in U.S.-Egypt relations since then.

The first speaker, Bahey Eldin Hassan (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies) offered five main reasons why the al-Sisi regime is less stable than it may appear:

• Human rights violations are occurring with impunity on a scale unparalleled in modern Egyptian history. The lack of accountability is dangerous. It motivates some victims of the state’s abuse to take matters into their own hands to seek justice and revenge.
• The public sphere is being closed off systematically to all kinds of peaceful citizen activism. This especially hurts youth:  all-Sisi’s regime has shut down coffee shops and football fan clubs.
• There is a huge gap between al-Sisi and Egyptian youth, who make up more than 60 percent of the population. This is not just an age gap, but also one of values.
• Major state institutions, such as the judiciary and Parliament, are eroding. They were semi-independent and semi-functional under the Mubarak regime but now are controlled directly by security agencies and being hollowed out.  Weak institutions undermine state resilience and cannot absorb instability.
• The salafi-jihadi insurgency is causing deteriorating conditions in the Sinai Peninsula. The insurgency threatens to turn the city of el-Arish into Egypt’s Mosul.

Egyptians will watch the Trump-al-Sisi meeting carefully, Hassan said.  If Trump offers al-Sisi unqualified support, the United States will pay a price sooner or later.

Next, Moataz El Fegiery (Front Line Defenders) described al-Sisi’s crackdown and other challenges in grim detail. Under this regime, young Egyptians who carried out the Tahrir revolution have become “Generation Jail,” as a recent New York Times Magazine article put it.  Human rights defenders are under constant threat.  Grievances among most sectors of society are accumulating rapidly, including among minority groups like Copts and Nubians.  Human rights violations are fueling resentments that the regime cannot easily control.  Popular trust in state institutions such as the judiciary, once highly respected, is collapsing and these institutions are becoming platforms for repression.  Crushing independent civil society and moderate voices risks creating a void that extremists will fill—as has been the case in Syria and Libya.

Egypt is facing its worst security and socio-economic conditions in modern times. Economic discontent is mostly beneath the surface, but it is very real.  Recent small-scale protests such as those over the rising price of bread haven’t grown bigger mainly because Egypt has become a republic of fear. As it confronts these problems, al-Sisi’s regime needs every measure of support it can get, and the White House visit and stamp of U.S. approval is a crucial prize. But unqualified backing from Trump would be simply a green light for al-Sisi to continue his program of repression.

Michele Dunne (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) pointed out that Washington visits by Egyptian presidents used to be an annual affair, but this has not been the case for some time. Many people believe that the U.S.-Egypt relationship soured under President Obama, but in fact ties between Washington and Cairo have been cooling since at least the George W. Bush administration. Bush and Obama both began their presidencies optimistic about U.S.-Egypt ties—and both grew disillusioned and ended their time in office distancing themselves from Cairo. The relationship has deteriorated largely due to Egypt’s repression and unwillingness to democratize. Human rights abuses under al-Sisi are driving despair, radicalization, and terrorism—making them a direct U.S. concern.

Although some in the United States praise al-Sisi’s economic policies, in reality his approach is limited to undertaking certain macroeconomic reforms and launching hugely expensive mega-projects that enrich the military but do nothing to help Egypt’s unemployed youth.  Al-Sisi is not investing in human capital development and job creation—what is urgently needed to put Egypt on a more stable footing.

Trump will learn, just as his predecessors did, that Egypt’s internal problems constrain its ability to be a U.S. ally. Thus it is time to ask, what is the United States really getting out of this relationship? Since the late 1970s, the United States has given Egypt $77 billion dollars in aid for two reasons: to cement Egyptian-Israeli peace, and to assist Egypt’s development. The first objective has been met a long time ago, but the second one has not.  Continued aid and unquestioned support for whoever is running Egypt will not help the United States achieve the outcomes it seeks.

Tom Malinowski (former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the Obama administration) argued that Egypt has not lived up to its potential and the level of U.S. support doesn’t advance our interests or values. The United States tries to work with Egypt on counterterrorism, but Egypt is a difficult partner. Al-Sisi is contributing nothing to the campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria–there are no Egyptians flying F-16s in the sky above Mosul. Moreover, Egypt’s role in Libya and its brutal counterinsurgency campaign in the Sinai have been counterproductive. As for Egyptian-Israeli peace, Egypt upholds this because it sees peace as being in its own interest, not because of U.S. aid. U.S. officials were “besieged by reports of disgusting cruelty by Egypt’s security agencies,” Malinowski stated. Perhaps most worrying is al-Sisi’s conflation of his domestic opposition and terrorists. Prison radicalization—in packed, dingy cells where ISIS members have a captive audience to spread radical messages to vulnerable Egyptian youth—is a huge concern. President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry tried to get through to al-Sisi on these issues, but found the conversations very frustrating and eventually gave up.

Trump is unlikely to have much more success, and indeed is unlikely to try. The burden of promoting democracy and human rights will fall instead on Congress and U.S. civil society. If Trump wants to achieve a transactional relationship with al-Sisi, at a minimum he could use his leverage to get Americans imprisoned in Egypt released.

The question-and-answer period covered several themes:

• What does al-Sisi want from Trump? And what should Trump offer?

Dunne argued that al-Sisi has already achieved a primary goal: the visit itself. After the strains under Obama’s presidency, a high-profile visit to Washington is a boost to al-Sisi’s flagging legitimacy and he will try to use it to enhance his prestige within the regime. Another Egyptian goal, an increase in U.S. aid, is unlikely considering Trump’s economic nationalism, and there are hints that his administration may even want to change Egypt’s military grants to loans. Instead, Trump could offer al-Sisi political concessions such the restoration of cash-flow financing privileges to purchase U.S. weapons, a designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, or extradition of certain Egyptians in the United States, a troubling request that al-Sisi may put forward to the White House. Regarding what the United States should do, Dunne said, “we cannot control Egypt—it is about taking a clear stance on what we are for, and what we are against. Sometimes withholding aid can influence Egypt’s actions.” Malinowski stated that a Brotherhood designation may be unlikely.  Not only would it cause pushback from many of our Arab allies, but the Brotherhood doesn’t meet the legal criteria for designation.  He recommended watching closely the Oval Office body language between Trump and al-Sisi, which may be warmer than what we saw during Trump’s meeting with German leader Angela Merkel.  El Fegiery asserted that al-Sisi has exploited the problem of terrorism to attract and maintain support from the West, and he will do the same with Trump.

• Will al-Sisi continue to get close to Putin?

Dunne contended that it would be hard for al-Sisi to get closer to Russia than he already is, noting their shared worldview and al-Sisi’s admiration for Putin’s autocratic governing style. But Russia cannot replace the United States as Egypt’s key strategic partner. For one thing, Putin simply does not have the cash to finance Egypt’s military purchases as the United States does or to offer favorable economic deals. It’s important to see Egypt’s relationship both with Russia and the United States in context, Dunne explained. Al-Sisi uses his great-power partnerships to increase his prestige within the Egyptian military and society at large and plays great powers off one another. Malinowski reminded the audience that most of the Egyptian military is U.S.-supplied, and “you can’t service F-16s with MiG parts.”

• What role does repression play in radicalization and jihadist recruitment in Egypt?

According to El Fegiery, radical ideology is a very important ingredient, but recruitment also requires personal grievances on which to feed. A recent study profiling Egyptian youth involved in radical movements revealed a strong desire for revenge among those who had been abused and humiliated by security officials in prison.

• Do Egypt’s Copts still strongly support al-Sisi?

As security and economic conditions worsen, support is declining, said Hassan.  It was quite striking to see angry Copts gathering outside Botroseya Church in Cairo—the scene of December’s horrific ISIS terrorist attack against worshippers—chanting against al-Sisi’s regime and attacking famous pro-regime media figures in the crowd.

Amine Ghali
Program Director,
Al Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center, Tunis

Leila Hilal
Senior Fellow, International Security Program
New America

Chawki Tabib
President,
Tunisia’s National Authority for the Fight Against Corruption

Sarah Yerkes
Fellow, Middle East Program,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Background

Tunisa, the birthplace of the “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2011, stands today as the only country undertaking a democratic transition. But despite the historic progress, daunting challenges remain, including confronting corruption, bolstering the economy, and reforming the justice sector.

What are the most important steps in confronting these challenges? And what role can international actors, including the United States, play in supporting Tunisia’s fragile democracy?

Thank you for joining us at the Project on Middle East Democracy offices:

Wednesday, March 21, 2018
11:30 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, Suite 617
Washington, DC 20036