Presented by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), the American Tunisian Association, the Middle East Institute, and the SAIS Conflict Management Program

Monday, February 10, 2014
11:00 am – 12:30 pm
Rome Auditorium, Johns Hopkins SAIS
1619 Massachusetts Ave, NW

Three years after the actions of a 26-year-old Tunisian helped bring about the overthrow of a 23-year-old dictatorship and usher in free elections, the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly has ratified a historic constitution guaranteeing various rights, including equality between men and women and freedom of conscience. Three leading experts will explore how diverse political parties succeeded in building consensus around the constitution; key debates about executive power and women’s rights; and Tunisia’s prospects for maintaining a democratic constitutional order.

With:

Duncan Pickard
Nonresident Fellow,
Atlantic Council Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East

Dr. Nathan Brown
Professor of Political Science
George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs

Dr. William Zartman
Professor Emeritus
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

For a summary of the event, continue reading below or click here for a pdf.

Bill Lawrence, POMED Nonresident Senior Fellow and President of the American Tunisian Association, gave opening remarks and introduced the panelists. William Zartman then gave an introductory statement, prompting the featured speaker, Duncan Pickard to begin. Pickard began by giving a recent history of the events in Tunisia leading up to the finalization of the constitution last week. He highlighted four main points that were unique to Tunisian’s newly established Constitution saying that the constitution is the “birth of the second Republic of Tunisia.” He highlighted that this is the first “tangible fruit,” of the revolution, the constitution is the first sustainable constitution in the Arab Spring, the constitution was consensual and agreed upon by all parties, including the Ennahda (Muslim wing of the Tunisian government), and that success came after a series of immense roadblocks. Pickard then zoomed in on two main points of the success of the Constitution, those being a genuine commitment to consensus and a commitment to the rule of law. Pickard then explained the progression and transition of the Tunisian government beginning with the explanation of the Ben-Al Shur commission that initially strove to amend the constitution with the help of the constituent assembly and the Ennahada coalition that formed late in 2011. He explained the early debates about the constitution, those being the division of executive powers and the role of religion in society and the constitution. Pickard explained that the Ennahda party wanted a strong parliament and a weak executive where the secularists wanted a strong executive and weaker parliament.

Additionally, Pickard mentioned two other roadblocks caused by the assassinations of two prominent Tunisians in 2013 that marked the lowest point in the Tunisian transition. Following this low point, Pickard explained the rise of the National Dialogue that sought to resolve the appointment of the members of the elections commission, an agreement on the constitution, a date for elections, and who would take over the government if the Prime Minister was to step down. Pickard concluded his in depth history and analysis by looking forward in Tunisia’s transition with the new Prime Minister, Mehdi Jomaa, and the success of a finalized constitution that established a new constitutional court, included “progressive language” on women’s rights, healthcare, climate change etc., and was not based on Islamic law. Pickard said he is optimistic and happy about Tunisia’s accomplishments but stressed that the implementation process remains to be seen.

Nathan Brown then began his analysis by making some comparisons and contrasts to Egypt, highlighting that the process and structure in Tunisia was far more successful than in Egypt. Brown touched upon a comparison between the Ennahda party in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, stating that he believed The Brotherhood was more experienced at “enacting state power,” but that Tunisia successfully came to a consensus. He also highlighted the strong military presence in Egypt but weak presence of the military in Tunisia. He then pointed to the fact that Tunisians made enormous changes to their system and began a difficult process of inclusionary politics but that the “real democracy” and “real politics” are ugly, and Tunisia has yet to see these “real processes.” He described the greatest challenge will be when social issues are not codified into the constitution but fall into the hands of politicians during the political process and this will be the start of “ugly politics in Tunisia.”

William Zartman then made a few brief comments stating that the “constitution is something to be proud of,” but that the liberal side thinks there are things in the constitution that Islamists will take advantage of if they come into power in the next election cycle, and Islamists think liberals are trying to keep them out of elections. Zartman also predicted that Ennahda will be less popular in the parliamentary elections and that there will be enormous difficulties if the Prime Minister and President are of different parties.

Tunisian Ambassador to the U.S. M’hamed Ezzine Chelaifa then gave a brief statement, saying that the constitution in Tunisia is a historic breakthrough but the success remains “fragile and unfinished.” He highlighted two problems, one being that despite democratic and secular elements, the constitution is not valuable if not accepted by the people and, additionally, that the “emerging democracy” needs to be consolidated and protected and it cannot rely solely on “western allies.” He concluded by saying that Tunisia hopes to build a mutual strategic agenda with the U.S. through security, economics, trade, and investment, which would help Tunisia’s democratic transition.

The floor was then opened for questions and New York Times journalist Thomas Friedmanasked if it was a coincidence that the country with the least U.S. involvement had the greatest success out of the Arab Spring. Pickard responded saying, “correlation doesn’t equal causation,” and that Tunisia was out of the spotlight for a number of reasons, which gave them more space to make internal, independent decisions. He added that now there is a greater call for U.S. involvement in Tunisia for mutual economic benefits. Brown added, in response to Ambassador Chelaifa’s ambition to form a greater relationship with the U.S., “It’s not too late for U.S. involvement and investment.”

Tunisia has recently completed the historic milestone of approving a new constitution, representing a remarkable achievement of consensus-building in a difficult climate of political polarization. This important step has also been accompanied by an unprecedented peaceful transfer of power from the Ennahda-led government to a caretaker government. Despite this momentous progress, however, enormous challenges remain – both on the economic and political sides.

At this critical juncture in Tunisia’s transition, what obstacles lie ahead in implementing and solidifying democratic rule? What role can the United States play in aiding Tunisia economically and politically? And what opportunities exist for the international community to cooperate with Tunisia to help it serve as a model for the rest of the Arab world?

With

William Roebuck
Deputy Assistant Secretary,
U.S. Department of State

His Excellency M’hamed Ezzine Chelaifa
Ambassador of the Tunisian Republic
to the United States

Emna Jeblaoui
Former Advisor to the President of the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly
for Civil Society and Democratic Dialogue

Stephen McInerney
Executive Director,
Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

Moderator: Reuf Bajrovic
President,
Emerging Democracies Institute (EDI)

Wednesday, February 26, 2014
3:00 pm – 4:30 pm
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW

For a summary of the event, continue reading below or click here for a pdf. 

Reuf Bajrovic opened the event by describing the current situation in Tunisia. Bajrovic said that Tunisia is undergoing dramatic changes and that it’s “landmark” constitution gives hope to people in other countries affected by the Arab Spring. After Bajrovic finished his introduction, he introduced the rest of the panel members— M’hamed Ezzine Chelaifa,William Roebuck, Emna Jeblaoui, and Stephen McInerney.

M’hamed Ezzine Chelaifa started by saying, “It’s good to be a Tunisian ambassador these days in Washington.” He spoke about Tunisia’s “historic breakthrough” in establishing a democratic, non-partisan government with an electoral board and a liberal, secular constitution. Chelaifa cautioned that Tunisia’s democratic transition “remains unfinished and fragile and needs to be protected.” He acknowledged that the way forward will have risks and challenges. On the political level, Chelaifa suggested that the people work to keep the “spirit of dialogue alive.” He also mentioned the necessity of having free and fair general elections. In terms of security challenges, Chelaifa spoke about terrorism and the proliferation of weapons from neighboring countries. Lastly, Chelaifa spoke about Tunisia’s economic and social challenges, saying that the real challenge for the next government is going to be balancing long-term reforms with the immediate social demands of the people. Chelaifa then discussed the U.S. role in Tunisia, saying that Americans have a stake in Tunisia’s success and that the two countries should work together to foster a strategic partnership that is “program based” and “results-oriented.”

William Roebuck spoke next and began by saying that “Tunisia remains the best hope for a democratic transition in the region.” Roebuck said that youth empowerment remains a top priority for the U.S. government. He also spoke about Kerry’s recent visit to Tunisia, stressing that the U.S. will stand with Tunisia throughout its democratic transition. Roebuck agreed with Rached Ghannouchi that there is a young, fragile democracy in Tunisia in need of a series of elections and consensus building efforts. Roebuck then spoke about Tunisia’s strengths including its inclusive national dialogue, liberal constitution, vibrant governmental and non-governmental institutions, and independent government. Roebuck also said the U.S. and Tunisia signed an agreement to build operational capacities, create a more transparent system, and work with the Tunisian armed forces to help them address Tunisia’s threat environment. Roebuck concluded by briefly talking about economic issues, saying that one of the underlying causes of unrest in the Middle East is a lack of economic opportunity and jobs. Roebuck asserted that the U.S. will continue to support Tunisia’s commitment to economic reform and its promotion of private sector development. He also mentioned that bilateral trade between the two countries has grown steadily.

Emna Jeblaoui spoke next about her experiences working with the constituent assembly throughout the national dialogue process. Jeblaoui discussed the achievements of the new constitution as well as the challenges that it faces in the long-term. She mentioned the need for both independent election monitoring and press freedom. Jeblaoui also said that political parties need to be able to organize in a secure environment, which includes strengthening Tunisia’s borders and security forces. She concluded by saying, “we still have a lot of work to do, but we are very happy to have the support of our American friends.”

Steve McInerney opened by pointing out how rare it is that countries in the Middle East and North Africa enjoy positive international attention. McInerney called for more of a focus on Tunisia from the U.S. administration. While he welcomed Kerry’s visit to Tunisia, McInerney pointed out that it was the Secretary’s first visit to the country and that it only lasted for a few hours. McInerney then said, “By the end of this year I hope that Tunisians and everyone across the Arab world will see that the U.S. is committed to supporting Tunisia’s democratic transition on par with our support for other goals or agendas in the region.”

McInerney continued by presenting his policy recommendations. He spoke about the State Department’s travel warning on Tunisia, acknowledging that the attacks in Tunisia were certainly frightening, but saying, “I feel that the reaction has been somewhat disproportionate to the events themselves.” McInerney believes the State Department should reevaluate the threat status of Tunisia because removing the travel warning could expand tourism, trade, and investment. McInerney suggested that the U.S. use its leverage and provide economic assistance in a way that encourages Tunisia’s leaders to make difficult decisions on security sector reform and the restructuring of old institutions.

Reuf Bajrovic then opened the floor for Q&A. In response to a question about whether or not Tunisia can serve as a model in the region, McInerney said that the establishment of the Troika in Tunisia is indicative of a willingness to compromise that other actors in the region lack. He also said the Tunisians benefitted from higher levels of education and the military’s choice to let political forces emerge and handle the transition. Mr. Roebuck added that, from the beginning, Tunisia had a more diverse and successful economy than other countries in the region.

In response to a question about the Tunisian government’s tolerance for U.S. engagement on the issues of transitional justice and security sector reform, Ambassador Chelaifa acknowledged that Tunisia needs “big and deep reforms” related to decentralization and job creation. Roebuck added that the U.S. will be very engaged, particularly regarding security sector reform.

This event is co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB). 

Thursday, June 5, 2014
10:00 am – 11:30 am
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington DC

At the beginning of 2014, a new phase of political negotiations was launched by Bahrain’s Crown Prince. With the reported full backing of the King, the formal opposition parties in Bahrain and international community were encouraged by the potential to break a nearly two-year stalemate in negotiations to seek a political compromise to the national crisis. But the fanfare of the announcement has since faded, with many observers fearing that a window of opportunity may soon be missed.

Parliamentary elections in Bahrain are tentatively planned for the coming months, and Bahraini political elites and voters must soon decide whether to participate in the polls. Without a breakthrough in the country’s long-standing political stalemate, the alternative – the election of a parliament devoid of opposition voices for another four-year term – will only contribute to Bahrain’s negative trajectory.

What are the main obstacles to political reform and reconciliation in the country? What steps need to be taken by political actors in Bahrain to make these elections credible and meaningful? And what diplomatic options does the United States have to encourage genuine reform and address deepening divides in Bahrain?

Please join POMED and ADHRB for a discussion of the political dynamics in the country, including the state of political negotiations in Bahrain and the role of the international community in spurring long-delayed reform.

Les Campbell
Senior Associate and Regional Director, MENA Programs
National Democratic Institute

Matar Ibrahim Matar
Former Member of Parliament,
National Assembly of Bahrain

Dr. Dafna H. Rand
Deputy Director of Studies & Leon E. Panetta Fellow,
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)

Moderator: Stephen McInerney
Executive Director,
Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

For a summary of the event, continue reading below or click here for a pdf.

Matar Ibrahim Matar began by providing background on Bahrain and its government, speaking first about an al-Wefaq human rights report that described crimes against humanity, such as the torture of detainees. There are more than 7,000 detainees in Bahrain, noting that in targeted areas of the country, one in ten Bahrainis have experienced detention. The abundance of these abuses, Matar says, place Bahrain as the third worst country in the Middle East in terms of human rights abuses, a fact demonstrated in the country’s rapidly declining democratic status, according to the Index of Democracy. Bahrain’s prime minister, who has been in power since the early 1970s, appoints the Upper House as well as the Council of Supreme Judiciary. The PM can also assign citizenship and grant land without constraint, allowing him to manage the demography of Bahrain. Furthermore, the Crown Prince has not compromised for political representation of Bahrainis. Matar went on to say that all leaders of the opposition party al-Wefaq are currently under trial, showing that the government is “shutting all doors.” However, al-Wefaq says they are ready for the transition, and that there is an agreement in place on a roadmap to reform. Next, Matar spoke on potential policy recommendations for the U.S. government to take to move forward. He suggested that if the U.S. can push reforms, Bahrain could serve as a regional model for democracy promotion. As it is time for the ruling family to call on the prime minister to step down, Matar believes the U.S. must cease recognizing him in an attempt to isolate the regime. He suggests that if the U.S. can confront the likes of Russia, then it can confront Bahrain. Matar stressed the urgency of action in Bahrain in light of problems such as sectarian tensions, growing national debt, increasing violence, and terrorism.

Dr. Dafna H. Rand spoke next, first making the case for U.S. involvement in Bahrain and then describing two different “forks” which U.S. foreign policy towards Bahrain could follow. She explained that “there are many reasons why it makes strategic sense” for the U.S. to invest in diplomacy in Bahrain. The first ‘fork’ thinks in the short term. She outlined a number of reasons short term involvement would be beneficial. First, terrorism showed the Bahraini government that time “was not on their side.” Second, modest reconciliation would have positive repercussions for resolving other partially sectarian conflicts. She described how “a lot of sectarianism in the Arab Spring has been manufactured from the top,” and depicted reconciliation in Bahrain as a possibility to show that sectarianism is “not embedded in the DNA of the Middle East.” Third, al-Wefaq should participate even if their needs are not all met, as it would empower Shi’a members in the Bahraini government. Rand said that if al-Wefaq earns even just a few seats in parliament, they will become “the people the U.S. government looks to work with.” The second ‘fork’ thinks in the long term and ponders how much long-term leverage the U.S. government actually has beyond arm sales, to influence transition internally. In this respect, there has been some degree of success by the U.S. government with bureaucratic reforms.

Les Campbell spoke last, emphasizing that “this has been done before,” as the same things were said in 2002 about accepting undemocratic constituencies. He believes that compromise should be advocated. He suggests that it is better to accept limited powers, like when land reform was examined during the limited opening by parliament, but was then shut down by the government when the government realized that it was giving parliamentary members independence to interact with foreigners. A law was then passed prohibiting international actors to come in and interact with parliament without approval of the government. However, fair action should be pushed, as events of the Arab Spring gave every country the motivation to have election observers. Although elections are still “farcical,” like in Egypt, the rigging of elections is more obvious. In conclusion, Campbell says the National Democracy Institute is “extremely skeptical and probably cynical” towards prospects for reform because the Bahraini government has always closed openings.

Stephen McInerney began the Q&A section by asking each panelist a question. First he asked Matar what the opposition needs in order to make progress. Matar suggests they want to be part of the negotiation process, which currently is nonexistent. Next he asked Dr. Rand who exactly in the current administration would make the decision to get involved in Bahrain, and how would they do it. She first reiterated the debate of how invested should the U.S. be in brokering agreements. She then recommends that someone from the State Department should be paired with someone from the Defense Department, and with White House support they should travel to Bahrain and speak on Bahrain policy, while not dictating policy. However, she stresses that scrutiny towards potential human rights violations should continue. McInerney asked Campbell what the international community could have done differently. Campbell suggests that it is and was counterproductive to make recommendations of governance to other countries. He also noted, near the close of the event, that he has “skepticism” towards the potential for possible change because “all of the same leaders are still in place.” Answering a question on the influence of opposition participation changing the power dynamics, Matar noted that the government always chooses Sunni representatives that do not necessarily represent the Sunni community in Bahrain; the majority of Sunnis are looking for an opening to act upon. Addressing a question on opposition participation, Campbell says that the involvement of the opposition would serve to marginalize the real centers of power like the president and PM, and thus have a positive short-term effect.

On the question of potential U.S. policies towards Bahrain, panelists discussed the role of the U.S. 5^th Naval Fleet as well as past actions on the part of the embassy. While McInerney said the implications of the Fleet as being mixed, Matar described the Fleet as decidedly “negative” for Bahrain’s potential reforms. Citing Sarah Chayes of the Carnegie Endowment, he said that the 5^th Fleet is a “shield for Kleptocracy” in Bahrain. He also emphasized the importance of the U.S. having a clear, widely known policy on Bahrain. Rand said the U.S. Embassy has been doing a good job “being in the room” with different actors in the political process. Les Campbell said the U.S. government has failed the Bahraini people by not condemning laws which violate human rights.

This event is co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy and the Heinrich Böll Foundation of North America.

Tuesday, June 10, 2014
12:00 pm – 2:00 pm
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 562

POMED and the Heinrich Böll Foundation of North America are pleased to invite you to attend a public panel discussion to release an annual publication, The Federal Budget and Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2015: Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East. This report, authored by POMED’s Executive Director Stephen McInerney and Advocacy Director Cole Bockenfeld, offers a detailed look at U.S. funding and assistance for democracy and governance in the Middle East, the congressional appropriations process, and implications for U.S. policy in the Middle East during a turbulent time. With political transitions – of varying degrees of success – in some states and political stalemate in others, it is important to examine U.S. funding for the Middle East and its impact on relations with nations in the region.

This publication focuses on several key questions: What does U.S. funding tell us about the priorities of the Obama administration and its policy response to the events in the Middle East? How are transitions in some states – and troubling trends in many – affecting U.S. assistance to the Middle East and North Africa? What are the most significant elements of U.S. funding and appropriations this year, particularly when compared to previous years? What has been the impact of ongoing budget cuts and sequestration on funding for the Middle East? And what might we expect from Congress during its ongoing appropriations process?

Please join us for a discussion of these issues with:

Lorne Craner
Former President, International Republican Institute

Cole Bockenfeld
Advocacy Director, Project on Middle East Democracy

Amy Hawthorne
Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council

Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy

For a summary of the event’s proceedings, click here (pdf) or continue to read below.

Stephen McInerney began by introducing the report as an effort to “paint a picture” of what the budget request says about supporting democracy, governance, and human rights in the MENA region. He noted that this seventh consecutive budget report, is the “grimmest” yet. Where the budget report tries to balance the positives with the negatives concerning implications of the requests, this year’s report had the fewest positive aspects to note. With so much excitement coming from the 2011 uprisings, McInerney said that many would have expected it to spur changes in U.S. policy. However, he showed how shockingly little change has occurred between now and pre-2011 by discussing a pair of pie charts in the report that show nearly identical budget request numbers for FY2010 and FY2015. The “remarkably similar” charts actually show a slight increase in military requests, and a slight decrease in requests for Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) funds. The decrease in GJD funds is strange, McInerney notes, considering the rhetoric espoused from the administration that seems to stress the need to support these democratic transitions. He then highlighted another pair of bar graphs in the report that displays U.S. foreign assistance to countries in the region by most to least spent in FY2010 and FY2015. In both of the graphs, the same order and nearly the same amount of money is allocated to the first six countries, highlighting the dramatically unchanged policies between the two time periods. The unchanged requests are “realistic descriptor[s]” of the priorities concerning these countries, McInerney suggests. He then spoke about the administration’s rhetoric in supporting transitions in Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia, and how the budget request instead reflects a desire to continue the “status quo.” McInerney specified the Tunisian budget as being “extremely disappointing,” as Tunisia remains the most progressive Arab Spring country in implementing democratic reform. Again though, the administration’s rhetoric in supporting Tunisia’s transition is not reflected in the budget request, thus McInerney thinks the administration is missing out on an “historic opportunity.” McInerney mentioned Yemen as one of the few positive takeaways from the report, as the administration has “admirably shifted attention to supporting democracy” in the country and now should be a model to replicate with other countries.

Cole Bockenfeld spoke next, focusing on broader findings in the report. He first spoke on a key response to the 2011 uprisings, which was the Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund (MENA IF). The fund was designed to respond to transitions in the region, but failed to garner congressional support in 2012 and 2013 largely due to a lack of administrative will to press it. This year however, the MENA IF was replaced by a smaller MENA Initiative Fund, that more closely resembles other government programs. Additionally, the new fund would be administered by a new office called the Near East Affairs Office of Assistance Coordination (NEA/AC). Bockenfeld noted how there is a lot of confusion and suspicion over how the office operates, as same the people who are in charge of coordinating assistance are also administering it. Furthermore, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) within the NEA/AC has witnessed a change in its type of leadership. While  political appointees would assume leadership in the past recent patterns have shown career diplomats taking charge who may be less independent and more reluctant to take risks. Bockenfeld also noted a decrease within the administration in support for civil society policies, perhaps due to the crackdown on NGOs within Egypt in 2012. Speaking further on specific funding to Egypt, Bockenfeld suggests that although the relationship with Egypt is complicated, there has developed a broad recognition of a need to reform the assistance package. Despite this, the relationship has not seen any changes and remains consistent. The “big question” now is will there be enough political will to begin reforming the assistance relationship; the administration will have to take the difficult steps in order to reform Egypt aid.

Lorne Craner then spoke more generally about the opportunity presented to the current administration to influence proper democratic transitions in the region. He noted that the administration has lacked a “durable strategy” and thus has missed a key opportunity. He talked about when he worked at the State Department during the collapse of the Soviet Union, and how it was a similar situation. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the U.S. has maintained steady funding of satellite states and has thus made a huge difference in former Soviet countries. Craner suggests a similar approach should be taken with respect to MENA transitions. However he insists that the administration still has time left to make the necessary changes in policy, but a coherent strategy must be outlined and then reforms must be implemented that reflect the principles in the strategy.

Amy Hawthorne spoke last specifically on the aid relationship with Egypt which she called a “very troubled” one. Hawthorne  believes the fallout from the NGO episode in 2012 was disastrous for U.S.-Egyptian relations; the administration began to see the trouble of funding civil society organizations as not worth the risk, as there was such intense pushback from the Egyptian government. Speaking about specific Economic Support Funds (ESF), she argues the funds are unclear in their purpose; there is a lot of rhetoric espousing support for the Egyptian people, but few Egyptians know what ESF assistance actually does. She also explained how the Egyptian government is a difficult partner to work with as there are “sensitivities” within the Egyptian government about receiving U.S. aid. On a positive note, she says there was a decision within the administration to suspend military aid, but nevertheless, the restructuring of military aid to more support counterterrorism efforts has serious risks as the U.S. and Egyptian government may have discrepancies over who they consider terrorists.

Addressing a question on women in the region during the Q&A session, Lorne Craner noted that while there is a lot of talk about empowering women in the region, there is not a lot of money to back it up. Meanwhile in response to a question on the impact of assistance to Israel, Stephen McInerney noted that the exclusively military assistance to package to Israel does impact relations with other states in the region, but that impact should not be overstated. On a specific question concerning Lebanon, Cole Bockenfeld mentioned John Kerry’s recent visit to Beirut and noted that his support for Lebanon seems to “stop at the rhetoric.” Answering a question on global health programs in the Middle East, Amy Hawthorne commented that this is important as Egypt has “slid backwards” with public health and may be ignoring the return of potentially deadly diseases.

Co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy and the Congressional Tunisia Caucus

Friday, October 17, 2014
10:00 am – 11:30 am
Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2325

Due to security procedures at Rayburn House Office Building, guests are asked to add additional time to their travel plans to enter the premises.

POMED and the Congressional Tunisia Caucus are pleased to host a public panel discussion in conjunction with the release of a new POMED publication, “Previewing Tunisia’s Parliamentary and Presidential Elections.” This report offers a detailed look at the context for the upcoming elections, the parties running for parliament, notable presidential candidates, and potential concerns facing the elections. With few success stories coming out of the Arab Spring, Tunisia stands as an example of the power of the democratic will of its people, and its elections represent the potential for peaceful, consensus-based transfers of power in the region.

This discussion will focus on several key questions: What steps has Tunisia taken in its transition to arrive at these elections, and in what political and economic context are the elections occurring? Who is running for parliament and president, and how are they expected to perform in the elections? What should we expect to see from political actors should they be elected to office? And why should these elections matter to U.S. policymakers?

His Excellency M’hamed Ezzine Chelaifa

Alexis Arieff

Jeff England

Stephen McInerney

Cole Bockenfeld

For a full summary of the event, continue reading below or click here for a pdf.

In his opening remarks, Ambassador Chelaifa underscored how admiration for the Tunisian democratic transition experience should not overshadow the complexity of the process, and he called on the U.S. to continue supporting the transition. Chelaifa then identified several dimensions that might affect the election: voter turnout; the proliferation of electoral lists that might spread out votes; the attitude of Tunisian voters; the polarization of the political landscape; the presence of Ben Ali regime members; and the role of civil society, media and lobbying in the electoral process. Chelaifa underlined that, following the elections, politicians will face serious challenges and will also have to decide whether they want to build a coalition, share power between parties and form a national unity government. In terms of policy, the new government will need to elaborate a national security strategy, tackle economic reforms, and most importantly, resolve the issues that drove the revolution in the first place in 2011. The Ambassador emphasized that Tunisia is a promise for democracy in the Arab World as it can provide a “proof of concept.” However, Tunisia’s transition is vulnerable and therefore needs international and U.S. support. Finally, he argued that support for Tunisian democracy will give the U.S. an effective public argument that the U.S. does genuinely support democracy in the region.

Alexis Arieff highlighted key aspects of the United States’ role in supporting Tunisia’s democratic transition, such as the decision by Congress to authorize the appropriation of $500 million to Tunisia since 2011 and the creation of the Tunisian American Enterprise Fund. She noted, however, that most funds appropriated specifically for Tunisia have been focused on military sales and equipment. Arieff pointed to the threat of extremism both in Tunisia and on its borders, although she noted that most groups in North Africa have domestic agendas and only a few seem to have targeted Western interests. Arieff also mentioned that Tunisian security forces have engaged in a recent campaign to arrest potential suspects in order to secure the elections, focusing in particular on designed terrorist groups AQIM and Ansar al-Shariah and the spillover from neighboring Libya.

Jeffrey England spoke next, highlighting Tunisia’s relatively smooth path to democracy. While he reiterated that this is not the end of transition, the elections will present an opportunity to build off the 2011 experience and formalize the legitimacy of the constitution. Observation is a key element to the success of the upcoming elections, and Tunisia has done well to maintain a transparent framework, England noted. The challenges Tunisia will face in this election season have nothing to do with transparency, but rather with ensuring that political contestants will have the professionalism to accept outcomes that are not in their favor and that accusations against the integrity of the elections will only come with sufficient evidence. Another challenge England foresees for Tunisia is overcoming voter apathy. Beyond a lack of basic voting education, many Tunisians appear to have unreasonable expectations for what will happen after the elections. The critical question is whether a coalition approach to governance will take place and involve a constructive opposition. Healthy competition is a good thing, England argues, and must be used to build up institutions rather than tear them down. `

Stephen McInerney noted that though the political system today was more established compared to 2011, there remains much uncertainty surrounding the electoral process. As of today, upwards of 50 percent of Tunisian voters appear to be undecided. The new POMED publication, “Previewing Tunisia’s Parliamentary and Presidential Elections,” focuses on the seven highest polling parties and presidential candidates, though McInerney emphasized that there is a strong possibility that others will perform well at the elections. He also expressed his personal thoughts based on his recent trip to Tunisia, where he met with several actors involved in the democratic transition. The outlook in Tunisia is mixed, and more Tunisians are disillusioned with their political elite and pessimistic than they were in 2011. The country’s economic outlook is also a particular area of concern. He emphasized the need for the next government to undertake serious reforms rapidly after the elections in order to turn around Tunisia’s economic decline. McInerney is hopeful that the upcoming elections will be a high point in Tunisia’s transition, though the main challenge will be for parties to fight disillusionment and regain the public’s confidence. He noted that the populous appears to be more focused on presidential rather than the parliamentary elections. The likely result of the elections is that a coalition government will have to be formed. He mentioned that in Tunisia, there has been talk of forming a “national unity” government that will see Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes sharing power; however, it remains clear that both parties would rather be leader of their own coalition.

During the Q&A, Cole Bockenfeld started the discussion by asking where Tunisia stood with regards to security threats and what the chances were of an attack during the elections season. Arieff responded by explaining that, unlike in many countries where electoral violence is a concern, the threat of an attack in Tunisia does not come from the state or those running in the elections. Tunisia’s primary concern is non-state actors involved in terrorism along the Algerian border, as well as the increasing numbers of Tunisians going to fight abroad who could return home and carry out attacks. While the size and role of the security apparatus in relation to civil society in Tunisia remains a topic of ongoing debate, the fact that the military is under-resourced could lead to problems in the long term as well as the short term.

Bockenfeld then fielded a question concerning feelings of disillusionment on the part of youth with Islamist leanings and potential support for Moncef Marzouki. McInerney responded by describing how Tunisian youth feel as though they made change happen during the revolution, but now they have little political representation. Because Marzouki is seen as outside of the traditional political elite, he may be appealing to youth who feel disenfranchised. England added to the dialogue by questioning how the term “youth” is even defined. He emphasized that it is not that the youth in Tunisia lack political interests, but rather they are not represented in government. England suggested prioritizing how to take the energy of this population and make it a part of the political discussion.

With respect to concerns over the impact of the economy on elections, McInerney responded by saying that there is real danger for the destabilization of democratic gains unless economic reform happens soon. The international community needs to be more engaged and grant more economic aid, he continued. England concurred with McInerney, adding that while the economy will not improve quickly, the next leader will have to “swallow the poison pill” and undertake politically unpopular but serious reforms in order to bolster the economy in the long term. Because Tunisia’s political parties generally lack platforms with a clear and in-depth agenda for how to reform the economy, England suggests the new leader start by aiming for “low-hanging fruit” that will satisfy the Tunisian masses with some small reforms for the time being. Also concerned with the disconnect between short-term and long-term needs, Arieff highlighted that what analysts want and what any elected government official will be able to achieve are very different.

This event is co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).

Thursday, November 6, 2014
12:00 pm – 2:00 pm
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Floor 2
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW,
Washington, DC 20036

Under Threat: Egyptian Press in Peril (Full Version) from Committee to Protect Journalists on Vimeo.

Since the Egyptian military took power in July 2013, Egypt has become one of the most dangerous countries for journalists. At least six journalists have been killed and dozens of others have been detained, including three affiliated with Al Jazeera, despite a continued international campaign for their release.

In his September speech at the United Nations General Assembly, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said his “new Egypt” would “guarantee freedom of speech.” Although there have been other similar promises made to protect the basic rights of Egyptian citizens, unprecedented arbitrary detentions of activists and journalists—and an expanding crackdown on civil society organizations—permeate the country. As Egypt prepares for parliamentary elections later in the year, many of its citizens remain uncertain about their country’s future as they face an increasingly repressive environment.

What threats currently exist for the press and civil society in Egypt? To what extent can the U.S. push back on the Egyptian government’s abuses against its citizens’ basic freedoms? And what should be the priority issues that could help facilitate a free and open press and allow necessary debate ahead of the elections?

Please join POMED and CPJ for a screening of the short documentary “Under Threat,” a joint production of CPJ and Egyptian See Media Productions. The screening will be followed by a panel discussion with the following guests:

Michele Dunne

Senior Associate, Middle East Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Muhammed Mansour

Freelance Journalist,
Egypt Independent

Sherif Mansour

MENA Program Coordinator,
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)

Stephen McInerney

Executive Director,
Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

After the screening of “Under Threat,” Stephen McInerney introduced the panelists and presented opening remarks on the state of journalism and press freedom in recent years. He highlighted a trend of instability for space in Egypt reserved for free expression over the past decades. But since the uprisings in 2011 that led to the ouster of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, journalists and media figures in Egypt have come under intense scrutiny in a number of ways. As the space for freedom of expression wanes, the panel will discuss the threats that to open press and civil society in Egypt, the contradiction between President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s promises of a “new Egypt” and guarantees of free speech and the recent crackdowns on the press, and the actions the United States can pressure the Egyptian government to open more space for free association and discussion.

Muhammed Mansour discussed his own background and experiences as a journalist in Egypt. He provided a background from his perspective of the events leading to the current state of press affairs. In 2002 it was completely taboo to speak against the Mubarak regime. The situation in Egypt now has regressed back to the way it was under Mubarak nearly 15 years ago. In his own work, Mansour focused on human rights issues, and by the 2011 revolution, journalistic circles were experiencing a kind of euphoria from the space the uprisings provided them to express themselves freely. However, these advances were quickly reversed, either in name or in practice. SCAF, the ruling military council after the ouster of Mubarak, oversaw a culture that was suspicious of journalists. The Egyptian population began to see journalists as spies or agitators, and the military viewed critical publications as acts of chaos. In this way, journalists adopted the practice of self-censorship to protect themselves. Further, under Morsi’s rule, critical press flourished, but after the military coup that ousted him and eventually led to the Sisi presidency, the media has been restrained by both a self-imposed censorship in support of the military, and government policies enacted by the military regime that seek to root out all challenges to their narrative of Egypt.

Sherif Mansour followed Muhammad’s remarks with an account of Egypt’s current state of press freedom. Egypt’s recent crackdown on, harassment, and detention of journalists critical of the regime is set today against the backdrop of upcoming elections. Mansour recounted that in every election, and with every new president, there are promises that the government will stop interfering in media and that it will make the privatization of the media a priority. Yet, in reality, the result has been the opposite. Each new president who assumes office appoints bureaucrats and ministers to oversee media activities and installs allies in state-run media outlets. Even if the private media sphere is not legally restrained, it is marginalized by the state-run media’s access to a near-unlimited budget. Despite promises of fewer police powers to arrest, detain, or search journalists, the repeal of such laws in practice translates into journalists being arrested or detained under different charges, such as trespassing or protesting. Unfortunately, Mansour added, the lack of journalistic freedoms is particularly prominent in election periods when voters need information to decide between what often looks like a very polarized spectrum of possible decisions. To the ruling regime, critical journalists represent a challenge to the narrative that Egypt’s only choice is between military rule and Islamist terrorists.

Michele Dunne provided the panel with a series of policy implications and recommendations. After the removal of Morsi, she said, the only media operating were voicing pro-military perspectives. Although there have been efforts to activate journalistic voices, the government is also making concerted efforts to control the narrative of what is happening in the country and how it got there, both for domestic and foreign audiences. The Sinai, a particularly volatile region in Egypt where a terrorist attack recently claimed the lives of 31 people, used to be a site of particular interest to journalists. However, the Sinai is now “a black hole.” The Egyptian government is either driving away or jailing dissident voices with detentions, torture, or harassment. The important question for policymakers is, “What are the consequences of this?” Dunne argued that not only is the closing of media space toxic to U.S.-Egypt relations, as conspiracy and anti-American stories surface time and again, but the grand narrative of an Egypt engaged in an existential struggle against terrorists is beginning to solidify in the minds of everyday Egyptians. The aforementioned terrorist attack that killed 31 people shook up the media status quo, as the government silenced even the discussion or reporting of the story by some of its greatest supporters. The United States needs to understand that it cannot be silent while the ruling regime allows the demonization of America and flaunts its ability to threaten and drive away American civil society workers and foreign journalists. Journalists not only provide Egypt with important news, but their work informs the policymakers who directly engage Egypt on a regular basis.

This event is co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch, Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB), the Gulf Center for Human Rights, and Civicus.

November 14, 2014
10:30 am to 12:00 pm
Human Rights First
805 15th Street NW, suite 900

For a full summary, keep reading or click here for the PDF.

On Friday, November 14, POMED co-sponsored a discussion on the repression of pro-democracy and human rights activists in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The panel included Maryam Al-Khawaja, Co-director of the Gulf Center for Human Rights (GCHR); Brian Dooley, Director of the Human Rights Defenders program at Human Rights First (HRF); Melanie Gingell, human rights lawyer; Khalid Ibrahim, Co-Director of the Gulf Center for Human Rights (GCHR); and Nabeel Rajab, President of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR), via Skype. The discussion was moderated by Joe Stork, MENA Division Deputy Director at Human Rights Watch (HRF). Participants offered their thoughts on how to promote a U.S. policy that can address the threat ISIS presents to the region while also countering the criminalization of peaceful dissent.

This event is co-sponsored by POMED and the Heinrich Boell Stiftung (HBS).

Wednesday, February 4, 2015
12:30 pm – 2:30 pm
Stanhope Hotel,
Brussels, Belgium

A sandwich lunch will be available between 12:30 and 1:00 pm. The discussion will start at 1:00 pm and will be held under Chatham House Rule.

The ongoing political turmoil in much of the Arab World–coupled with the simmering budget and debt crises in the West–have posed great challenges for foreign aid and democracy support across the region. While the hot button issues of the Middle East have grabbed much attention, the transitions in the Maghreb countries have received far less interest in the U.S. and Europe. The political trajectory of the Maghreb countries of course varies significantly, ranging from Libya on the verge of becoming a failed state, to Tunisia which has embarked on a relatively successful trajectory of democratic consolidation and reforms. While Tunisians just completed their second orderly electoral process since their 2011 revolution, significant challenges remain including a weak economy, high levels of unemployment, and an increasingly divided political climate. Meanwhile, Morocco has averted significant upheaval by quelling reform movements through small concessions approved in a constitutional referendum held in July of 2011. While this referendum granted nominal changes to the division of power between the executive and the legislative bodies, these reforms have done little to protect and expand civil liberties.

Within this context, the discussion will take a closer look at U.S. and European democracy promotion and human rights in the Maghreb region, focused primarily on Tunisia and Morocco. The discussions will be framed around the joint POMED/ hbs report on the U.S. foreign assistance budget in the fiscal year 2015 for the Middle East and North Africa. This report closely examines how far the Obama administration has adjusted its engagement and policy toward greater democracy in the Middle East as a result of the Arab Spring. By means of comparison, the panel will analyse the EU’s tools for democracy support in the Maghreb. The panelists will discuss the tools’ main focus and funding levels, and if they actually reflect a change in strategy towards the region. Furthermore, local perceptions of U.S./ EU democracy support and its impact on the ground will be highlighted from a Moroccan perspective.

A discussion with:

Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, POMED

Lora Borissova
Deputy Head of Division, EEAS, Democracy and Election Observation

Nicolas Rougy
Executive Director, European Partnership for Democracy

Aboubakr Jamai
Moroccan journalist and publisher

Moderator
Klaus Linsenmeier
Director, Heinrich Böll Stiftung European Union

This event is co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), the Institute for International Law and Human Rights, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, No Peace Without Justice, and Minority Rights Group International.

Despite the repressive environment that existed for Egyptian civil society and NGOs in the Mubarak era, pre-2011 Egypt nonetheless had one of the most vibrant civil societies in the region, which included a variety of professional and respected human rights organizations.  Following Egypt’s 2011 revolution, many hoped to see a more democratic Egypt emerge, with greater political openness and space for civil society to operate.  Unfortunately, the reverse has been true, and Egypt’s civil society in particular has faced an increasingly repressive and hostile environment since 2011.

POMED is pleased to invite you to attend a public panel discussion in conjunction with the release of a new publication, Under Threat: Egypt’s Systematic Campaign against NGOs. This discussion will focus on several key questions: What threats does Egyptian civil society currently face? What are the options for Egypt’s embattled NGO community? What forces have led this ongoing campaign against NGOs? What impact does the ongoing campaign against civil society have on Egypt’s broader political trajectory? And what role may the international community be able to play in supporting Egypt’s threatened civil society?

A discussion with:

Michele Dunne
Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Bahey Eldin Hassan
General Director, Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

Kristen McGeeney
Senior Legal Advisor, Middle East and North Africa, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL)

Todd Ruffner
Advocacy Associate, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

For full notes of the event’s proceedings, continue reading or click here for a PDF.

Mr. McInerney introduced the panel and explained that the Egyptian government’s ongoing campaign against non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should be a major concern for Western observers. While repression of civil society in Egypt is not a new phenomenon, McInerney explained, certain developments undertaken by the regime of President Abdelfattah al-Sisi in the past year, combined with lessening pressure on human rights issues from Washington, pose a very dangerous threat to the future of NGOs in Egypt. McInerney cited previous successes that international pressure on the Egyptian government regarding the treatment of NGOs has had in the prevention of a large public crackdown in Fall 2014, much like the one that occurred in late 2011. At the same time, he noted that the Sisi government has now switched to quieter and more subversive tactics to suppress civil society, posing an equal if not more dire threat to Egyptian NGOs. McInerney detailed some of the results of these subversive tactics; NGOs have had to significantly reduce their staff and activities, move their operations outside of Egypt, or even suspend their operations entirely in fear of a government crackdown. NGO partners in Egypt are extremely appreciative of the international attention and support they receive, McInerney reported, but many on the ground fear that the focus of Western attention has drifted over the past year and that the Egyptian government no longer feels restrained in its tactics. The goal of POMED’s report, McInernery concluded, is to draw attention back to these tactics undertaken by the Sisi government and to spur the conversation about what can be done by the regional and international community.

Mr. Ruffner, the author of the new publication, began his remarks by mentioning that the findings of his research on the current climate for civil society were much darker than he expected. He outlined five different tactical styles the government has employed to undermine NGO work since President Sisi came to power in June 2014. He mentioned that many of these tactics are not unique to the Sisi regime, but they have been undertaken by previous Egyptian administrations and other governments across the region. The first tactic undertaken by the government is the hindering of the NGO registration and government authorization process. Ruffner mentioned a July 2014 announcement by the Ministry of Social Solidarity in al-Ahram newspaper, which mandated that NGOs had to register under new guidelines within 45 days or face severe legal consequences. One of the ways in which the government derails NGO activities is by not responding to NGO application requests. Civil society groups are automatically registered if the government does not provide a response within 60 days, but they do not receive a registration number which limits the scope of their organizational activities, such as opening bank accounts. Ruffner mentioned a women’s economic rights group who tried to register with the word “empowerment” in their mission statement; their application was not accepted until that word was removed from their mission statement. A second tactic used by the Sisi regime is making issue of foreign funding received by NGOs – specifically, how private funding of NGOs has been targeted. Ruffner asserted that NGOs are afraid to take action on any project with even a “hint” of a rights component for fear of government investigation into their finances. A third tactic is direct intervention into daily operations; this includes mandating meeting agendas, shutting down meetings entirely, and sending undercover informants disguised as civil society partners to investigate organizational activities. The fourth tactic is an ongoing defamation campaign against NGOs and their employees. Civil society has long been the target of a pro-state and pro-government campaign which labels NGOs as instruments of United States and Zionist infiltration into Egyptian domestic affairs. Even POMED has been targeted in an Egyptian media campaign, Ruffner explained. The fifth tactic is coercion, including death threats issued by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry against groups who refused to speak positively about their experience in civil society at the United Nations Periodical Review in Geneva last fall. Police raids on NGO offices have been very graphic and brutal. These threats do not just affect Egypt’s NGO community, Ruffner said, but they have a broader impact on the marginalized communities that NGO tries to defend as well as civil society writ large.

Mr. Hassan analyzed the conclusions of POMED’s report on civil society in the context of what daily life is like for civil society employees in Egypt. Hassan asserted that in his long tenure in civil society work, the oppression that the sector faces has been by far the worst under President Sisi. Most of the laws issued under Sisi have further institutionalized the repression of human rights. More than 3,000 Egyptian citizens have been killed since the 2011 revolution. 40,000 Egyptians are currently in prison with rare access to due process trial – this is compared to 20,000 prisoners under the Mubarak regime, when legal rights were more accessible. Hassan noted a massive deterioration of the performance of the judiciary; during the Mubarak era, NGOs and the judiciary were allied in maintaining independence from the government, but now, the “front line” of defending civil society from government has collapsed. The oppression of civil society, Hassan said, reflects the oppression of the greater Egyptian populace. The new Terrorist Entities Law is a prime example. This law has much less to do with fighting domestic terrorism, Hassan argued, than the suppression of civil society, independent journalists, critical political parties, and related actors. Many of the human rights defenders that Hassan has worked with are suffering in Egyptian detention due to repressive laws and politically motivated trials. While ongoing repressive tactics are justified by a fight against terrorism, Hassan believes that these actions create an environment that is dangerously more welcoming to the recruitment of terrorism in the Sinai.

Ms. McGeeney placed the current situation that NGOs in Egypt face into a larger global context. She explained that while the laws governing civil society activity in Egypt have not changed since 2002, different approaches to implementation of the laws have resulted in a more hostile civil society climate. Since 2012, 150 draft laws to replace the current legislation governing civil society activity in Egypt have been proposed since 2012. Seventy-five percent of those laws have been negative in terms of their intended impact on NGO activity. An additional 46 percent of those negative laws have been focused directly on limiting civil society organizations’ operational capacities – including registration processes and funding restrictions. 34 percent of the negative laws called for further government oversight in funding, and 17 percent dealt with the right to public assembly. McGeeney said that while the crackdown against civil society in Egypt was intensifying, other countries in the Middle East and North Africa have taken important steps towards preserving the integrity of their NGO sectors. There is a rising global fear of foreign interference and terrorist infiltration that has served as justification for the curtailment of civil society. McGeeney said the legal community is worried that penalties against NGO workers will only increase in severity, a threat which will detour groups from working. Unfortunately, McGeeney concluded, Egypt has served as a model for a growing global trend to curtail civil society work. She asserted that the international community must stay engaged on the issue to increase the visibility of rights encroachments, as well as to advocate for societal and legal reforms.

Ms. Dunne explained the scope of US policy towards Egypt’s treatment of civil society.  She highlighted two misconceptions in the American policy debate. The first is the idea that the US has to strike a balance between promoting stability in the Middle East and North Africa and promoting democracy or freedom, both of which are destabilizing. The second misconception is widespread confusion about the size and nature of US influence in Egypt. Some think that President Sisi will do whatever the US wills him to, while others think the United States no longer has any influence in Egypt. Dunne believes these conversations are not binary. She cited President Obama’s remarks at the recent Countering Violent Extremism summit in Washington, D.C. as the signaling of a realization that the United States’ is struggling to address terrorism concerns. She said it has not recognized that the larger problem of radicalization cannot be suppressed with military and financial action. The United States is used to working bilaterally with governments to fight terrorism, but this will not work in the Middle East because many of those governments, with Egypt being a prime example, are implementing policies in their countries which exacerbate the threats of extremism – such as the crackdown on civil society. Many would think that civil society organizations would be a natural government ally in the fight against terrorism because they have similar social agendas, but this is not the position of the Sisi regime. Dunne asserted that the United States needs to distance itself from the either/or question of fighting terrorism or upholding human rights and instead focus on ways to fight radicalization by promoting freedom, pluralism, and diversity, which will eradicate the issues that draw Middle Eastern populations to radicalism. On the second point of United States’ influence in Egypt, Dunne pointed out that public opinion has shifted from believing the idea that the United States can accomplish anything it wants in Egypt to the idea that the country can have no influence or impact on Egyptian policies. She claimed the reality is somewhere in the middle.

There has been tension between the US and Egypt in the last few years, especially since the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, which has been exacerbated by the partial withholding of U.S. military aid. Secretary of State John Kerry recently remarked that a decision on whether to resume military aid to Egypt will be made “soon,” but nothing is for certain. The United States has sent a lot of mixed signals to Egypt regarding civil society in the past few years. In the case of the raids on U.S. organizations and the detention of American NGO workers in late 2011, the reaction of the United States was much weaker and ambivalent than it should been. Dunne noted that a similar crackdown on civil society in the Arab Gulf states has begun, modeled off of Egypt’s tactics, and encouraged the United States to respond more vocally. She stated that the United States has recently tried to bring up the issue of civil society in Egypt more consistently, which is a move in a positive direction. For example, in November 2014, around the time the Egyptian government threatened to close NGOs for a second time, the United States made a statement at the Geneva Periodical Review of Egypt by the United Nations Human Rights Council Review calling for the repealment of the controversial civil society and assembly laws–much to the surprise of the Egyptian government. Dunne praised the trend imposing more conditions related to democratic reform on American aid to Egypt in the last few fiscal years. She reiterated the severity of the current threat against civil society organizations; while the Mubarak government did not want NGOs to engage in “edgy” or controversial work, the Sisi government does not want NGOs to engage in any work at all, and is hoping to eliminate them quickly and quietly. The United States needs to seriously consider what the impact of the disappearance of civil society would have on Egypt’s dynamic, young, and restive population.