Beyond Morocco’s Elections: Prospects for Genuine Reform?

03/27/2018 |
Friday, November 18, 2011
2:00pm-3:30pm
SEIU Conference Center

Video footage of this event is available here.

Overshadowed by the dramatic political transitions underway in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, political events in Morocco – including parliamentary elections scheduled for November 25th – have received very little attention in Western media. This belies the fact that the Moroccan political arena has been quite active in recent months.  In July, Moroccans approved in a referendum constitutional reforms put forward by King Mohammed VI in an effort to respond to demands of protesters.  Nonetheless, the youth-led February 20 Movement views these efforts as insufficient, calling for a boycott of the upcoming elections and resuming weekly protests to revive popular demand for further reform.

POMED is excited to host an event examining the Moroccan political landscape, including expectations for the upcoming parliamentary elections. Who are the main parties competing, and who is likely to perform well? What political forces are supporting the calls for boycott, and how might this affect results and the voter turnout?  How are these elections likely to impact the opportunities for substantive political reform including shifts in the balance of power between elected institutions and the monarchy?  And what steps can the U.S. and other international actors take to encourage meaningful reform in Morocco rather than merely superficial changes?

Featuring:

Ahmed Benchemsi
Visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
Anouar Boukhars
Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies, McDaniel College
Marina Ottaway
Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Moderator: Charles Dunne
Director for Middle East and North Africa Programs, Freedom House

For full event notes, continue reading. Or, click here for the PDF.

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Dunne offered introductory remarks in which he noted that although Morocco does not receive ample attention, it is an important “test case.” Morocco can demonstrate whether “any authoritarian government can respond effectively to the upheavals of the Arab Spring through a process of managed, top-down change.” Dunne added that the monarchy faces many challenges, including continuing protests from the February 20 movement among others, as well as the persistence of the economic problems that sparked the unrest. He also mentioned that many Moroccans are wary of sweeping change, and are “cautious” about “embracing it.” Lastly, Dunne stated that the fate of Morocco’s internal stability holds implications for the region and the U.S.

Boukhars analyzed the challenges facing political parties, arguing that voter confidence in existing political parties to effectively utilize the “greater mobility” allowed by Morocco’s new constitution is scarce. “Pluralities are still skeptical,” he said, and enthusiasm is lacking among the populace. Boukhars also mentioned several possible outcomes of Morocco’s parliamentary elections, asserting that concern that the PJD will win a vast majority is “overblown.” One reason the PJD will not fare as well as some analysts predict, he said, is that the Islamist vote is divided. Furthermore, “districting laws disadvantage Islamists.” If the PJD were to win, it would likely experience great difficulty in forming a coalition to govern, effectively lending credence to the claims that voting will fail to change the political landscape in Morocco. Boukhars added that given the new constitutional reforms, political parties have an “unprecedented opportunity” to push for democratic reform. He concluded by posing the question of whether Morocco’s political parties would take advantage of this opportunity.

Then, Ottoway addressed the question of whether top-down reform could work, asserting that “it always depends on the push from the bottom.” “Is there going to be enough push from the society within the political system” to push for change “that would allow the most democratic provisions of the constitution to actually be put into practice,” she said. Ottoway stressed that the constitution is “an extremely ambiguous document at this point,” which “could be implemented in an array of different fashions.” The constitution, she added, does not clearly provide for a constitutional monarchy; rather, it allows to king to govern. Ottoway noted that Moroccan political parties have not been utilizing the political space allowed by the new constitution. She stated that regardless of the election results, the parties will not put much pressure against the monarchy.

Ottoway then discussed the February 20 movement, noting that it is a loose group without a clear leadership hierarchy: “It’s almost too democratic for its own good in the sense that it really doesn’t have a strong leadership structure,” which makes it “very difficult to have a coherent direction.” She stated that the leftist parties in Morocco are “leftovers” from the past, “more of a marginal factor.” The Justice and Charity party, while more likely to be a significant force, is not likely to participate in the elections.

Benchemsi disagreed with Boukhars’ argument that the upcoming elections would reveal whether or not parties could effectively utilize their newfound mobility. Benchemsi asserted that these elections are “not that important,” as “the main factor in Morocco is the balance of strength between the monarchy and all other forces.” He also stated that the king’s introduction of constitutional reforms was a “skillful play” intended to crush momentum on the street rather than a genuine promise of change. Benchemsi added that the official statistic of 98.5% of voters in favor of July’s constitutional referendum revealed egregious fraud. He called the new constitution “perverse,” and enumerated the ways in which a “smokescreen” created the illusion of change while protecting the king’s hegemony.

During the question and answer session, Boukhars stated that among the trends indicating positive change in Morocco is that youth within political parties are beginning to challenge political veterans in their organizations. An attendee asked whether continuing economic woes would “be a push for another major uprising.” Benchamsi affirmed the power of economic problems to fuel unrest, adding that the “regional spirit of the Arab spring” could be reinvigorated in Bashar al-Assad were to fall.

Ottoway said that “Morocco is ahead of any other monarchy” in the region in terms of responding to calls for reform. “This is the one Arab monarchy that has at least taken small steps,” she added. An attendee inquired about Moroccans who oppose the constitution as well as the monarchy. Benchemsi and Ottoway agreed that those who “want the fall of the Monarchy in Morocco,” also known as republicans, are “marginal.”

After the BICI Report: What Next for Bahrain?

03/27/2018 |
Monday, December 5, 2011
12:30-2:00pm
Kenney Auditorium, SAIS

The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report, released on November 23, described “the use of excessive force by police officers,” as well as “a systematic practice of physical and psychological mistreatment, which in many cases amounted to torture” and sometimes death. Secretary Clinton expressed “deep concern” over the report’s findings and stressed the need for the Bahraini government to address the reported abuses “in a prompt and systematic manner.” In his response to the report, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa said that his government is “determined…to ensure that the painful events our beloved nation has just experienced are not repeated, but that we learn from them.”

In the wake of the report’s release, a number of questions remain. In addition to the numerous findings of the report, what if anything was missing? What has been the reaction of the Bahraini government and on the Bahraini street? What has been the Obama administration’s reaction, and what can we expect to see of the proposed arms sale that was delayed pending the outcome of the investigation? Lastly, if this report is to lead to much-needed political reform and substantive progress toward resolving the continuing crisis in Bahrain, what should the next steps be: for the government of Bahrain, for the Bahraini opposition, and for the U.S. administration?

Featuring:

Senator Ron Wyden
(D-OR)

(click here for Senator Wyden’s full statement)

Brian Dooley
Director, Human Rights Defenders Program, Human Rights First

Andrew Exum
Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security

Toby Jones
Assistant Professor of History, Rutgers University

Moderator: Matt Duss
Director, Middle East Progress, Center for American Progress

For notes on this event please continue reading below.

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On Monday, the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) hosted an event entitled “After the BICI Report: What Next for Bahrain?” Matthew Duss, director of Middle East Progress at the Center for American Progress, moderated the discussion. The panel featured Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR); Brian Dooley, director of Human Rights First; Andrew Exum, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security; andToby Jones, assistant professor of history at Rutgers University.

For full event notes, continue reading. Or, click here for the PDF.

After a brief introduction from Duss, Senator Wyden discussed the report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), asserting that “the Commission has confirmed what others have been reporting about the human rights violations that took place during the protests that began earlier this year […] the repression was systemic and widespread.” He added that the BICI report has “shown the wisdom of stopping” the proposed $53 million arms sale to Bahrain: “America should not be rewarding brutal regimes with arms. It’s that simple.” Wyden urged the Bahraini government’s swift implementation of the report’s recommended reforms, while noting that the BICI’s recommendations are “not sufficient,” and that “progress must also be made in areas not covered by the Commission’s Report.” Wyden also argued that while some may claim that Bahrain’s status as a U.S. ally constrains the U.S.’s ability to coerce the Bahraini regime, “being friends with Bahrain should make it easier for us to point out when they go astray, not harder.” He concluded by stating that the report provides a good starting point for progress and a transition towards a more democratic, inclusive society, and that he is hopeful that Bahrain will move forward and “the alliance between our two countries will endure.”

Then, Dooley echoed Wyden’s sentiment that the BICI report confirmed what many already knew: the Bahraini crackdown was characterized by a systemic practice of acts that amounted to torture. He noted that the report does not list the names or ranks of any responsible individuals. Dooley added that the Government of Bahrain must implement all of the report’s recommendations, release all political detainees, and grant access to non-governmental observers and international journalists.

Jones argued that “Bahrain desperately needs a game changer,” as “the situation is dire.” Bahrain, he said, needs a set of political tools that provide for reconciliation. Jones added that he sees nothing in the BICI report that provides for this set of tools. Furthermore, Jones noted that the report does not include a “set of mechanisms for making clear what the responsibilities of the government are.” The report, he asserted, has accomplished one thing: it has produced a “damning narrative of the excessive use of force,” implicating the regime as the responsible party. Meanwhile, the report has been a political failure thus far, as it has failed to achieve its implicit political goals, or to even discuss political steps. Duss interjected, highlighting the apparent tension in U.S. policy between values and national interests, a false dichotomy that is apparent in the case of Bahrain.

Exum addressed this tension between ideals and interests, stating that the U.S. is in a “difficult position” in terms of its policy in the Gulf: whereas popular protests call for democratization in the Gulf, the U.S. is most invested in the nations that are not democratic and that, furthermore, are actively obstructing democratic reforms. He posed the question of whether reducing U.S. involvement with a given regime will help or hurt the cause of advancing U.S. interests. Exum posited that there exists a middle ground that will allow the U.S. to affect a regime’s behavior and disposition without harming U.S. interests.

During the question and answer session, the speakers agreed that the uprisings of the Arab Spring have proven that ideals and interests are compatible, and that the U.S. advances its interests in the region by advocating its ideals. While this compatibility has been proven in theory, U.S. policy has not yet caught up. Jones noted that it will be interesting to see how the U.S. will define its interests in the era after the Arab Spring. For now, however, the American response remains trapped: U.S. support for democracy may advance its interests in the long term, but concerns remain for policy makers in the short term. Jones was sure that the benefits outweigh the risks in the short term. Panelists also warned that the Government of Bahrain will surely find ways to talk about reform while doing something else; in other words, the regime will use new strategies in an attempt to out-maneuver calls for reform. Jones concluded by stating, “It’s not 2010 anymore. This is a totally new era in Arab politics.” Dooley warned that the tone of Bahraini protests is changing, and that if the regime fails to reform or offer a space for expression, unrest is likely to escalate toward extremism.

The Unfinished February 14 Uprising: What Next for Bahrain?

03/27/2018 |
Thursday, February 9, 2012
9:30am-11:00am
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 106

As the February 14th anniversary of the start of mass protests in Bahrain approaches, now is a critical time to analyze events over the past few months and discuss expectations for the coming weeks. With the release of the BICI report in late November, which detailed systematic human rights abuses and a government crackdown against peaceful protesters, the Government of Bahrain was tasked with a long list of reforms and recommendations. At this juncture, nearly two months after the release of the report, it is essential for the United States to debate the Kingdom’s reforms and how to move Bahrain forward on a path of democratic progress. Human rights groups continue to raise significant human rights concerns with respect to the situation on the ground. What are some of these concerns? What are the current realities on the ground in Bahrain? What are the strategies of the country’s political opposition parties and revolutionary youth movement, and how is the monarchy reacting? What are some expectations and challenges regarding the palace-led reform process? And, importantly, what constructive roles can the U.S. play in encouraging meaningful reform at this time?

Featuring:

Senator Ron Wyden
(D-OR)
Elliott Abrams
Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Joost Hiltermann
Deputy Program Director, Middle East and North Africa, International Crisis Group
Colin Kahl
Associate Professor, Georgetown University; Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security
Moderator: Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy

For full event notes, continue reading below. Or click here for a full text of the PDF

Full text of Senator Wyden’s speech can also be found here

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Ron Wyden reminded the audience that despite some reports that the situation is improving, January 2012 saw the highest death toll since March of 2011, which was shortly after the uprising started. He commended the King of Bahrain for the creation of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, describing it as a show of willingness to reform and change. However, Wyden said the changes have been cosmetic, and when NGOs are not let into the country or when protestors are still dying from government crackdowns, more needs to be done. Therefore, Wyden stated he is not in support of the arms sales to Bahrain that the Obama administration is pushing forward because “an arms sale of any kind sends the wrong message at the wrong time … not just to Bahrain but to the world.” He said the U.S. should not reward the government with any support until sincere and more integral changes are made. Wyden ended on a positive note, saying he sees the Bahraini government as having an opportunity to initiate honest dialogue to choose peace and reform instead of violence. He also vowed to work toward the U.S. federal government being a partner in human rights promotion. During a brief Q&A session with the Senator, it was asked how the Obama administration could balance its short- and long-term interests when it came to Bahrain. Wyden responded that he would let the administration speak for itself on that, but emphasized that the facts cannot be disputed, and the situation on the ground must be addressed. “At the end of the day, [an arms sale] is still a big important message, and it happens to be the wrong one,” he said.

Joost Hiltermann began by speaking about the observation and report that Cherif Bassiouniconducted in Bahrain, saying the report was filled with documentation about oppression, destruction, and repression of free speech and media. He also mentioned the website the Bahraini government has setup to illustrate all the BICI recommendations it has implemented. However, Hiltermann echoed Senator Wyden’s sentiments that the changes have been relatively small in comparison to what really needs to be done, and described the Bahraini government as playing a “game of charm” targeted at the international community to mold foreign policy. For example, the website is in English, not Arabic, which means it is meant for the international audience, not the internal Bahraini one. Hiltermann concluded by saying that the problems go beyond human rights violations. Bahrain needs dialogue, accountability, and judicial reform – especially electoral law reform.

Elliott Abrams said he believes that greater pressure from the U.S. could have lessened the extent of the crackdown from the Bahraini government. He expressed his disappointed in the Obama administration’s “almost complete inability to ameliorate the violence in Bahrain.”Abrams also said that Bahrain risks being the only monarchy in the region that will not have the majority of its people’s support, and unless major reforms are implemented, the situation will only deteriorate further. He mentioned the need for a level of power sharing between the government and the people as one positive step toward change. With regard the arms sale, Abrams said he may be more supportive of it had the U.S. government been more candid about the reasoning and content of the sale, but as the situation stands, he has high levels of concern for the anniversary of the uprising approaching, and reminded the audience that time is running out for the U.S. to apply pressure on the regime.

Colin Kahl said he sees the Obama administration as having two goals for Bahrain: reform and partnership. Reform in many sectors (security, electoral law, human rights, etc) may sound idealistic, but that is necessary for the nation’s long-term stability. Partnership refers especially to security. Bahrain is a key ally for the U.S. in an area of the world where there is economic interest and a high level of terrorism threats. Kahl said the U.S. must learn to navigate these two goals by “deploying its values pragmatically.” Regarding the possibility of cutting off aid to Bahrain to push reform, Kahl said it could never work because the stakes of losing the ally relationship are bigger for the U.S. than for Bahrain. Asymmetrical stakes make a threat such as cutting off aid impractical and ineffective. He concluded by saying the U.S. must emphasize that Bahrain’s stability is in everyone’s long-term interest, and in the absence of reform, the future will hold “deep turmoil.”

During Q&A, many questions surrounded concerns about the arms sale and about how U.S.-Iran tensions would influence U.S. policy toward Bahrain. Regarding the arms sale, Kahl said cancelling the sale of arms would not make a difference – it would not trigger the Bahraini government to make grandiose reforms overnight. Sending these arms, provided they are truly used for Bahrain’s external defenses, could be in the interest of the U.S. because it could mean better security and stability for Bahrain. Showing some support now could increase the leverage the U.S. has to apply pressure for reform. Regarding the U.S.-Iran tensions, Kahl said that he did not feel it would make much of a difference in shaping U.S. policy toward Bahrain, but did say that it raises concerns about the prevalent sectarian tensions in the region.

Turkish Democracy: A Model Abroad, Troubled at Home?

03/27/2018 |

Wednesday, February 22, 2012
10:00am-11:30am
 Stimson Center

In the past few years, Turkey has played an increasingly important role on the world stage and in particular, the Arab world, where it has supported democratic uprisings in the region and become an attractive model for Muslim countries undergoing transitions. With increasing repression at home, however, there seems to be a widening gap between Turkey’s international image and its domestic record. The ruling Justice and Development party (AKP) won its third straight parliamentary elections this past June, but has veered away from the reforms that made the party so popular ten years ago. Indeed, the imprisonment of journalists, Kurdish activists, and other government critics threatens to undermine the tremendous strides Turkey has made on its path toward democracy. Now as Turkey strives to become a regional power, it is important to take stock of Turkey’s own democratic credentials. What is the state of Turkey’s democratization process? After ten years of single party rule, what are the dynamics between the AKP and other centers of power? How can the U.S. capitalize on its improved relations with the AKP government to play a constructive role in Turkey’s democratic development?

Featuring:

Sinan Ciddi
Executive Director, Institute of Turkish Studies

Howard Eissenstat
Assistant Professor, St. Lawrence University;
Turkey Country Specialist, Amnesty International

Ambassador Ross Wilson
Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council

Moderator: Daphne McCurdy
Senior Research Associate, POMED

For full event notes, continue reading below or click here for the PDF

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Daphne Mccurdy introduced the topic to the panel, summarizing the current state of Turkish politics. Turkey’s role in the region is expanding and Turkey has recently received a lot of positive attention do to its “dynamic” foreign policy. However, “we should not lose site of the developments of their [Turkey’s] own democracy,” said McCurdy. A series of arrests and subsequent detentions have called into question the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) commitment to democratization.

Dr. Sinan Ciddi delivered a series of criticisms concerning the AKP’s behavior with regards to the promised development of a new constitution, the state of judiciary, and the National Intelligence Organizations’ recent wave of arrests. He stated that the AKP’s dominance of Turkish politics has “shocked even the most speculative of analysts.” The same analysts have begun to project Turkey as a model for the transitioning Arab countries to follow due to its ability to develop a strong, secular national government that is built on economic strength. However, Ciddi is skeptical of the idea that Turkey can and should be used as a model to be exported internationally. “Three quarters of the constitution implemented in 1982 has been amended,” according to Ciddi who referred to the process as a “sham.” Cidi said he was “skeptical” that the AKP promise of a more open society, increased civil liberties, and minority freedoms will ever come into fruition due to suspicion surrounding the intentions of the party and the general feelings of the public that the government is attempting to expand its own power by transforming the political body from a parliamentary to a presidential system. Ciddi stated that the real opposition to the AKP is the judiciary, which he said has challenged the authority and has even threatened to “shut it down.” In response, the AKP party has attempted to change policies on the appointment of judges and prosecution figures. In doing so, Ciddi believes that the government has corrupted and politicized the judiciary “in order to get its own way.” Ciddi briefly discussed the “Ergenekon” controversy in which the AKP has arrested multitudes of high profile leaders, academics, students, and journalists for unsubstantiated charges of attempting to “bring down the government.” Unwarranted arrests, Ciddi said, are “deteriorating credibility” of the AKP in the electorate. The AKP, said Ciddi, is focused on “bringing down the opposition” instead of focusing on democratization.  Other controversies such as the alleged split between the AKP and the Gulen movement have been discussed in the press but nonetheless remain unsubstantiated.

Howard Eissenstat credited the AKP party with making huge strides in political and economic development. “Close to 100% of the Turkish people believe that free elections are the only way to have a government,” said Eissenstat. Over the last 20 years, the AKP party members have proven that they are not Islamists and Putin-style cronyism does not permeate their bureaucracy. According to Eissenstat, much of the problems the AKP faces are “intrinsic of Turkish political power.” He believes that the AKP’s turn to nationalistic/militaristic rhetoric is historically characteristic of Turkish politics. Eissenstat alleged three parts to the latest crackdown on political dissidents. First, he contended that the initial arrests did prosecute actual criminal activity, but he sees the latest crackdown as a result of hysteric investigation that “has gone badly off the rails.”Secondly, he noted that thousands had been arrested for affiliation with violent movements or individuals, but have not plotted or perpetrated a violent crime. The arrests are wide-ranging, people are detained without trial or access to evidence, and more and more are being held for being critical of the government. Finally, he concluded by saying that the AKP party is creating a “culture of censorship” as media outlets become increasingly hesitant to criticize the government.

Ross Wilson discussed Turkey on two fronts: Turkey as a model in the region and internal issues of democracy and human rights. Wilson said Turkey’s history is “much too troubled to wish that model on anybody.” However, the model is nonetheless successful and thus makes it an attractive aspiration of the people in the Arab world currently undergoing political transitions. Turkey has achieved an “astounding” amount of economic success and developed a representative government. However, Wilson stated that Turkey still is “not a liberal democracy” and reminded the audience “not to lose sight of Turkish politics as being ‘a contact sport.’” Wilson voiced serious concerns with respect to human rights abuses. The attacks on the freedom of the press, with hundreds of journalists sitting in jail, stretch the credibility of the party. “The most effective driver of democracy in Turkey are the Turks,” said Wilson. The “vibrant debate” that exists on all issues in Turkish society is an encouraging sign, according to Wilson. Wilson concluded saying that the U.S. role, although complicated, needs to be aware of “becoming partisan” in Turkish political battles. He clarified this position responding to a question about how the U.S. could capitalize on AKP dominance. He stated that the U.S. should speak with a “high degree of generality” concerning issues like freedom of the press, and should refrain involving itself in micro-level issues, which Wilson said could be construed as “U.S. meddling.”

The panel answered questions from the audience concerning the rights of women and minorities in Turkey, allegations concerning the dispute between the AKP and Gulen movements, and prospects for intervention in Syria. Eissenstat stated that while women’s rights have improved, women still face an increase in violence and prejudice with respect to equality in society and the judicial system.Wilson responded to a question concerning the prospect of military intervention in Syria. He said that while “military-led regime change” is not an option, Turkey may be looking at setting up humanitarian corridors in the periphery. Ciddi concurred and said that any intervention would involve the use of Turkey as a “credible source” and said that through support of the international community, Turkey’s apprehension of intervening would be alleviated. Eissenstat “does not see the Turkish military going across the border,” but noted the extent to which the intervention movement was supported by some constituencies in the AKP base.

The Success Story of the Arab Spring? An Update on Tunisia’s Transition

03/27/2018 |
Wednesday, February 29, 2012
12:30-2:00pm
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Following Tunisia’s widely applauded elections for a National Constituent Assembly last October, the country has made considerable progress towards writing a constitution and has initiated much-needed reforms of some state institutions. A number of challenges remain, however, as ongoing economic difficulties and high unemployment continue to bring frustrated demonstrators to the street, media freedom remains a source of concern, and essential reforms to the security sector have yet to take place. What have been the most significant political and economic developments in Tunisia since its elections? What achievements have Tunisians made, and what challenges remain? What are the main priorities of the country’s National Constituent Assembly and of local civil society? And what role can international actors continue to play in supporting the transition?

We are especially excited to welcome Tunisian activist and former candidate for the National Constituent Assembly Omezzine Khelifa to speak on these and other issues. Ms. Khelifa is also one of three recipients of POMED’s 2012 Leaders for Democracy Award.

Featuring:

Omezzine Khelifa
Tunisian civil society activist and former candidate for Tunisia’s National Constituent Assembly (Ettakatol Party)
 Mohamed Malouche
President, Tunisian American Young Professionals
 Alexis Arieff
Africa Analyst, Congressional Research Service
 Moderator: Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, POMED
For notes on this event, continue reading below.
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On Wednesday, the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) hosted a panel at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to address the progress that Tunisia has made thus far in its democratic transition, and to discuss the challenges that lie ahead. Panelists were Omezzine Khelifa, Tunisian civil society activist and former candidate for Tunisia’s National Constituent Assembly (Ettakatol Party), Mohamed Malouche, president of Tunisian American Young Professionals, and Alexis Arieff, Africa Analyst at the Congressional Research Service. The moderator was Stephen McInerney, executive director of POMED.

To read the full text of the event notes, continue reading below or click here for the PDF

Omezzine Khelifa described the current situation as very delicate, and discussed both the accomplishments of Tunisia’s transitional government to this point and the challenges it must address to successfully move forward. In talking about the latest electoral dynamics and the constitutional drafting process, Khelifa said 27 percent of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) seats were allotted for women, which is a significant step toward democracy. Furthermore, a positive relationship has been established between the transitional President Moncef Marzouki and the NCA, similar to that of the U.S. President and parliament. Marzouki was elected by members of the NCA to lead the country in holding future elections and drafting a new constitution. Khelifa said there are three challenges facing the transitional government: security reform, unemployment, and transitional justice. “Tunisia’s youth are very educated,” she said, but employment opportunities are scarce and the youth are losing hope in their government. In addition, Tunisians are unaccustomed to trusting their judicial system; therefore the government must implement the rule of law and alleviate their fears. Lastly, Khelifa said freedom of expression is still limited and the media should be free to criticize the government without concern of threats or being shut down.

Mohamed Malouche spoke mainly about the dire need for economic growth in Tunisia. Foreign investment has decreased by 30 percent, which is expected he said, “but now investors are in a ‘wait and see’ mode.” Malouche described a negative “feedback loop” where sit-ins and protests about high levels of unemployment are not conducive to economic growth and in fact are counterproductive for achieving those desired outcomes. While importantly noting that there is no single panacea to Tunisia’s economic woes, Malouche offered some possible solutions to the crisis, including a recommendation that the government clearly outline  goals to provide employment opportunities and immediately begin  its planned infrastructure projects (which provide tangible and visible evidence of progress), and that it encourage an environment that fosters entrepreneurship, particularly among the youth. He also recommended that the government utilize its electoral legitimacy more to reassure local and foreign investors that Tunisia is “predictably stable” (meaning that it may not always have stability in the short-term, but that its highly educated and pacifistic population grants Tunisia stability over the long term). Finally, Malouche emphasized the support system that the Tunisian diaspora in the U.S. has developed, actively backing investment and economic growth to encourage long-term sustainability.

Alexis Arieff discussed the U.S. and international community’s policies toward Tunisia as they relate to supporting its democratic transition. She began by statingprior to 2011, bilateral aid to Tunisia was very modest by regional standards, but the Obama administration has been supportive of democracy in Tunisia and is hopeful that its transition will continue to serve as a leading model for its neighbors and will grant opportunities to deepen the U.S-Tunisia bilateral relationship. As Tunisia’s regional role grows (the Friends of Syria meeting held in Tunis being one example), the challenge will continue to be anticipating new events and being able to support them financially when necessary. Some ways the administration has creatively developed more support for Tunisia (without needing Congress to make new appropriations- a great challenge given the strict budget climate) is by re-establishing the Peace Corps program there, making Tunisia eligible for support from the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and expanding educational and cultural exchange programs. In addition, the U.S. has continued to back the efforts of multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund. The E.U. is also reworking its outreach framework toward the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries to create stronger partnerships than it had in the past. The biggest challenge facing the international community, Arieff argued, is coordination, but she believes it is a challenge that will be overcome.

During the Q&A session, the moderator first asked about the perception of international actors from Tunisians’ points of view. Malouche said the reputation of the U.S. is improving even post-revolution, as it has been regarded as a fair and supportive external actor. Both Malouche and Khelifa emphasized the need for technical and training support as well as civil society empowerment and civic education. Khelifa said there is a lack of cultural discussion and would like to see more cultural exchange both within the different regions of Tunisia and internationally. On a related note, a question was raised about the fine line between international support and international interference. Khelifa said transparency in foreign aid both from the U.S. government and the Tunisian government would help ameliorate skepticism that there are hidden agendas or personal motives involved.

Another audience member asked the panel to elaborate on security sector reform and transitional justice. Khelifa said that to some degree, Tunisians want to see some level of accountability for their actions, especially for high-level authorities who worked for former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.. Arieff agreed with Khelifa that security sector reform is one of the most difficult challenges ahead, particularly because of the extensive network throughout the country Interior Ministry had established over the years. Another audience remark was made about the importance of praising the army for indirectly causing Ben Ali’s ouster by refusing to attack protesters, and for subsequently not seizing political power when an opportunity presented itself during the revolution.

There was a question raised about the role of women in the Tunisian revolutions and how those roles will remain the same or change with post-revolution rebuilding. Khelifa agreed with Malouche’s assessment that Tunisian women are carefully scrutinizing every action of the government, and would never sacrifice their rights or freedoms. She also explained that women’s rights are very progressive relative to the rest of the region. Polygamy is outlawed, and women have had the right to vote and have abortions, just to name a few long-standing freedoms, she said. Although there are undoubtedly challenges that face women, 62 percent of Tunisians with degrees are women, and in terms of gender, it is a very united and integrated society. 

Egypt’s Transition: Military Rule, Human Rights Challenges, and U.S. Policy Choices

03/27/2018 |
Wednesday, March 28, 2012
12:30-2:00pm
Stimson Center

The Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East co-hosted a panel discussion about Egypt’s ongoing transition and U.S. policy options. Under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), thousands of civilians have been tried in military courts, bloggers and activists have been imprisoned for criticizing state policies, detainees have been tortured, tensions between Muslim and Christian communities have risen, and nongovermental organizations have been harassed and prosecuted. Tensions between Egypt’s military and the U.S. have also been exacerbated recently by attacks on international and Egyptian civil society organizations. There will be a new Egyptian president elected in May and the military will formally relinquish control, but the U.S. must decide now whether to continue aid to the military.

What are the military interests that have shaped the first year of Egypt’s transition from authoritarianism? How will they change once Egypt has an elected president and new cabinet and the military formally returns to the barracks? What are the U.S. interests that guide the longstanding relationship with the Egyptian military? And how should the U.S. look at the relationship with Egypt once there is a new civilian government?

We were particularly excited to welcome Egyptian blogger and activist Maikel Nabil to the panel. Maikel has been outspoken about human rights violations committed under the SCAF’s rule and about corruption inside the military, and he founded the ‘No Compulsory Military Service’ movement in 2009. After being arrested in March 2011 and undergoing a form of hunger strike for over 5 months, Maikel was finally pardoned and released in January 2012.

Featuring:

Maikel Nabil
Egyptian Blogger and Activist
Shana Marshall
Research Fellow, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University
Michele Dunne
Director, Hariri Middle East Center, Atlantic Council
 Moderator: Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, POMED
For notes on this event, continue reading below.
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On Wednesday, The Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East co-hosted a panel discussion focused on Egypt’s ongoing transition and U.S. policy options. The panel featured Shana Marshall, research fellow at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Maikel Nabil, an Egyptian blogger and activist, and Michele Dunne, Director of the Hariri Middle East Center at the Atlantic Council.

For the full text of notes, continue reading below or click here for the PDF

Shana Marshall discussed the role of the military in both the domestic and international economy of Egypt. Marshall focused on incentive contracts (also known as offset agreements), which is a component of international defense trade that requires a portion of the defense contract sale value to be reinvested in the domestic civilian economy of that country. The issue with Egypt, however, is that “arms contracts are providing complementary incentives to the Egyptian military over and above what the arms contract transfers.” She also said Egypt’s military has a strategic method of diversifying its economic portfolio, and that as a result, it has a significant amount of control and influence over the economy. The question then, she said, is “to what extent can the military steer politics in Egypt when it has so much influence in different markets?”

Maikel Nabil discussed three points: Egypt is not adhering to the peace treaty with Israel, or the Camp David Accords; Egypt is not undergoing a real democratic transition; there is no foundation for a long-term U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship. Nabil argued that there is still significant anti-Israel propaganda in schools and state-run media, which is in violation of the peace treaty, and the continued crackdown on freedom of speech is a violation of the Camp David Accords. He said, “Democracy is more than a polling booth,” and using his own arrest as an example, he insisted that divergent opinions are considered a crime. Lastly, he described the continued relationship between the U.S. and Egypt as “strange,” particularly given the deterioration of the NGO situation as the crisis continued. Nabil argued that U.S. citizens are not safe in Egypt, U.S. organizations cannot operate peacefully, Egyptian state media runs propaganda campaigns defaming the U.S., and there are few shared values between the two countries. While wanting to enhance the relationship between the U.S. and Egypt, Nabil said that in order to solve the problem one must recognize that there is one.

Michele Dunne spoke about the uncertainty of Egypt’s future, especially politically. The U.S.-Egypt relationship is off-balance and too dependent on the security sector, and Dunne believes that relationship may get worse before it gets better. Dunne argued that the U.S. is missing the moment of getting involved in Egypt’s transition in a meaningful way by not voicing its willingness to revitalize the bilateral relationship and work toward long-term transition goals. By failing in this regard, “The U.S. is clinging to old assumptions about its relationship with Egypt, and is reluctant to rethink it.” Drawing on recent polls, Egyptians are frustrated with the lack of U.S. support, and not just concerning military aid.

During Q&A, an audience member asked about the steps that can be taken to move the economy away from being militarily dominated, and panelists were asked to comment on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’ (SCAF) pardon of Ayman Nour. Marshall said there is nothing “inherently wrong” with a military dominated economy, rather, the problem arises when that influence is used as political leverage.  Dunne said Nour’s pardon is positive, because it restored his political rights; however, Dunne does not see Nour as being a front-runner in the upcoming Presidential Elections.

Another question was raised about the. Dunne addressed the U.S.’ ability to use its military aid as leverage that aid could definitely have been used as leverage to push along democratic reform, but Secretary of State Hillary Clinton chose to not use that leverage when she waived the conditions.“What is the point of having leverage of we’re never going to use it?” asked Dunne. 

Bahrain at the Boiling Point? Failed Reforms, Mounting Frustration

03/27/2018 |
Thursday, May 3, 2012
3:00-4:30pm
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

Despite claims by the Government of Bahrain that it is implementing the recommendations of last year’s Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report, ”reforms have only scratched the surface,” according to Amnesty International, and the situation on the ground in Bahrain has clearly continued to worsen. Prominent human rights activist Abdulhadi Alkhawaja remains in detention and has entered his 11th week of hunger strike, having declared: “dying with dignity is better than living in humiliation.” His case has helped bring protesters to the streets en masse in Bahrain and around the world calling for his release. Meanwhile, the Government of Bahrain’s insistence on holding the recent Formula One Grand Prix as planned sparked “Three Days of Rage” demonstrations across the country, which were met with violence and involved the killing of at least one person. All of these events have heightened fears that escalating tensions could soon erupt in more widespread violence and more serious internal conflict.

What steps towards reform has the Bahraini regime taken, and how meaningful are those steps? What remains to be done, both to address immediate human rights concerns and and to move towards broader institutional reforms? What are the central demands of activists and protesters in Bahrain today? At this point, what are the prospects for genuine dialogue between the government and the opposition? What are the risks if genuine political progress is not made? And what steps can the U.S. administration take to help encourage the implementation of needed reforms and to support the nonviolent resolution of political conflict in Bahrain?

Featuring:

Joost Hiltermann
Deputy Program Director for the Middle East and North Africa, International Crisis Group
Khalil Al-Marzooq
Former Member of Parliament (Al-Wefaq), Former First Deputy Speaker of Parliamentand Assistant Secretary-General of Al-Wefaq for Political Affairs
Tom Malinowski
Washington Director, Human Rights Watch
 Moderator: Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, POMED

For notes on this event, continue reading below.

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On Thursday, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted an event by the Project on Middle East Democracy titled “Bahrain at the Boiling Point? Failed Reforms, Mounting Frustration.” In light of recent developments in the Gulf Nation, the event was held to address the progress toward reform thus far, the steps that need to be taken next, and the role of the U.S. in moving toward a peaceful political solution. Panelists were Joost Hiltermann, deputy program director for the Middle East and North Africa at the International Crisis Group, Khalil Al-Marzooq, Former Member of Parliament and now a member of Al Wefaq, and Tom Malinowski, the Washington director of Human Rights Watch. The panel was moderated by POMED Executive Director Stephen McInerney.

For the full text of the notes, continue reading below or click here for the PDF

Joost Hiltermann acknowledged that the recommendations set forth in the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report take hard work and extensive effort, but said the government has fallen too far short of implementation. Hiltermann saw three salient issues: there are political prisoners still in jail, there is no level of accountability for security forces (particularly high level), and there is no minority representation in the security forces. Discussing the reforms, he said, “the regime does not seem to have its heart in it, and I assure you, it doesn’t.” He then discussed the opposition, and said the Bahraini government has changed the narrative: last year, Bahrain’s uprising was simply the next chapter of the Arab Spring. Today, the government has pushed a sectarian narrative that portrays the opposition as a Shia movement that is Iranian-backed. “The notion that Iran is involved is without evidence,” he said. In closing, Hiltermann emphasized that the regime must seriously consider implementing the BICI recommendations and make solid strides toward political dialogue. Regarding the opposition, he urged clear and public condemnations of any violence from protesters to maintain credibility of a peaceful movement.

Khalil Al-Marzooq stressed the sincerity of the opposition in wanting a democracy. He said Bahrainis are living in a state that does not provide security for its citizens, and oppresses anyone that opposes it. He stated that every element of the government and society are formed in a way that serves the ruling family, not the people. He blamed this institutionalized flaw for the failure of John Yates and John Timoney to truly reform the security system; “the system doesn’t allow for that,” he said. Al-Marzooq asked the international community: what do you want to see? You can wait and see how this “match” plays out, or you can support the calls for democracy. He concluded by emphasizing that the opposition is very open to dialogue as long as it is credible – such as the one the international community is calling for.

Tom Malinowski recounted his arrest during his most recent trip to Bahrain, in which he believes the foreign presence deterred any mistreatment. Based on interviews he did with Bahrainis during his visit, he can confirm the ongoing mistreatment of protesters and detainees. One positive result of the BICI report, he said, is that there has been a significant reduction in abuse and torture within police stations. However, that abuse has now been pushed out into the streets, and protesters continue to be mistreated after being arrested. Malinowski said reform implementation has “hit a brick wall,” citing Abdulhadi al-Khawaja and other political prisoners still detained as an example. He reminded the audience: when demonstrators are met with violence, they do not run away; they become more desperate and more determined. He concluded with four recommendations: the King must begin by releasing all political prisoners in order to pave the way for further reforms; the U.S. must unwaveringly call for all BICI recommendations to be implemented to the fullest; the U.S. should, at least in private, explain that time is running out for the Bahraini government to reform; the Fifth Fleet gives the U.S. leverage to say that the navy presence is not sustainable if a peaceful political solution is not attained.

Libya on the Eve of Elections: Examining the Challenges of Political and Economic Development

03/27/2018 |
Tuesday, June 12, 2012
10:00-11:30am
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

With Libya’s first nationwide democratic election quickly approaching, serious progress on political and institutional development is essential as the country proceeds with its transition. While re-establishing security remains vital in the short term, many long-term development challenges also require immediate attention, including building effective, accountable institutions at the national and local levels; developing an independent and diverse civil society; establishing and protecting a free, professional press; and reforming the military, police, and other security forces. Meanwhile, Libyans must engage in a national dialogue on how to ensure adequate representation in government for women, youth, and and various tribal and ethnic groups. By smartly leveraging domestic resources and international assistance, the Libyan people could be well-positioned to build a prosperous and free country.

What will the assembly elections – originally slated for June 19th but now expected to be delayed until July – look like?  What are the major political forces emerging in the country and how are they preparing for the elections?  How will the election of a national assembly affect the role of the National Transitional Council (NTC)? What are the top priorities for the Libyan government, particularly regarding institutional reform? How can Libyans develop a robust civil society and ensure freedom of opinion, press, and assembly?  Which best practices from other state-building efforts would be most appropriate for the Libyan case?  In particular, how might various models of federalism and decentralization be useful? And what is the most constructive role for international actors to play in supporting capacity-building, among other needs?

Featuring:

Manal Omar
Director of Iraq, Iran, and North Africa Programs, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of Peace

Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, POMED

Fadel Lamen
President, American-Libyan Council

Moderator: Sarah Margon
Associate Director, Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding Initiative, Center for American Progress

For full event notes, continue reading below or click here for the PDF version. Read more…

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Stephen McInerney, having just returned from an eight day trip to Libya, began by saying he was more optimistic, albeit cautiously, after the visit than before and contrasted the enthusiasm on the eve of elections in Libya with similar visits to Tunisia and Egypt. McInerney cited the general assumption that the results will be accepted as cause for the excitement, saying Libya has benefited from Tunisia and Egypt’s example in that regard. Based on first hand encounters, McInerney said Libyans were still uncertain about who they will vote for, but are generally looking to the new government to address the problems that the National Transition Council (NTC) has not. McInerney said, however, that the electoral system is one of the most complicated he has ever seen, comprising both proportional representation lists and majoritarian seats that overlap in some districts but not in others.

McInerney went on to discuss the nascent political parties, whose inexperience and confusion he found greater than those in Egypt and Tunisia, but are still committed to playing by the rules. Without reliable public polling, however, McInerney expressed concern that unexpected results could trigger violence in the heavily armed country. In terms of civil society, McInerney said he was impressed by the professionalism and the success of the many young organizations he encountered. He went on to say funding for these mostly volunteer groups is still limited, and that many are suspicious of foreign investment due to Egypt’s crackdown on foreign NGO’s. McInerney questioned the future of many of these groups if their leaders are drawn into politics or their previous professions before the revolution. He also detailed a generational divide in both civil society and political parties, as many youth are frustrated with those who say they lack experience when the country as a whole has no experience with democracy.

Sarah Margon underscored the importance of Tunisia and Egypt’s example to Libyans, who she said have watched their elections closely and do not want to end up like Egypt. She went on to say this fear has contributed to the high level of engagement in Libya.

Manal Omar prefaced her discussion of Libya’s challenges by recalling its successes, saying the Libyan spirit of volunteerism personally reenergized her after the cynicism of Iraq and Afghanistan. Omar then listed her ten biggest challenges going forward.  First among these was the need for foreign assistance partnerships with Libyans to overcome suspicion and to address Libya’s many serious challenges. Also among her list was the threat of violent saboteurs hijacking the revolution, the risk of armed groups with detainees, whom she says have sincere concerns about the legitimacy of the national justice system, destabilizing national security, and the need for a national reconciliation dialogue to “unpack” the past. Margon reiterated the importance of legitimacy for national security, and expressed concern that the government thus far has not created a plan to address it.

Fadel Lamen then discussed the high expectations among Libyans for the future, and the need to manage those aspirations and bring them to reality. Lamen said that Libyans now want everything they have been denied for 40 years, and that no government will be able to match these high expectations. Lamen went on to discuss the failures of the NTC that are now carrying over to the new elected body, namely weak ties to local governments and poor separation of powers.Lamen then discussed the major players in the upcoming election. According to Lamen, the much-hyped Muslim Brotherhood is strong, but not as strong as many think due to infighting and concern for Islamist domination by secularists. Then he named the National Democratic Coalition, comprised of multiple parties, civil society groups, and individuals, who present themselves as democrats without an Islamic agenda. Lastly, he discussed the Islamist jihadists who may not be interested in participating in the election, but still want to be engaged in the political scene.

In a question about the perception of foreign oil companies in Libya, Lamen said their image was mixed, but that Libyans are eager to use oil revenues to develop the state. Manal added that many want civil society groups to monitor revenues and prevent corruption.

Then, in a question about national reconciliation, Manal said that it is easy to skip important steps, especially given the short timeline of transition in Libya, but that strong concerns remain that must be addressed about the integration of Gaddafi-era loyalists into the new state. She went on to say that the state needs a system of transitional justice that all recognize in order to tackle this. Margon added that she was struck by the debate around the citizen status of Sub-Saharan migrants in Libya, whom many Libyans resent for the role some played in countering the revolution but are still living in Libya.

Addressing a question about federalism, McInerney discussed regional resentment, specifically in Benghazi towards Tripoli which received most of the development money during Gaddafi’s reign. Lamen then discussed Muslim identity in Libya, which he said goes unquestioned. He added, however, that there is less interest in political Islam and that most people are nationalists.Lamen then addressed a question about the impact of the diaspora, which he called critical to injecting democratic traditions into Libya. Manal warned however that nationals may come to resent the returning international Libyans if they displace nationals in government.

When asked about what the international community can do, McInerney recalled that many Libyans perceived the U.S. as too focused on Egypt. Lamen added that Libyans don’t want to be used as contractors and underscored the need for partnerships. Margon echoed Lamen’s sentiment, adding that the U.S. need not spend a lot to see a big impact if they contribute much needed technical expertise. 

Is Egypt’s Transition On or Off the Rails?

03/27/2018 |

Presented by the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and POMED

Thursday, June 21, 2012
Atlantic Council
3:30-5:00pm


Audio footage is available here.

The Supreme Constitutional Court decision invalidating the law under which parliament was elected has thrown the Egyptian political scene into even greater confusion ahead of the second round of the presidential election. Egyptians face a critical moment in a sixteen-month-old political transition that has been shaky at best. Will the presidential election proceed peacefully and will the results be accepted by most Egyptians? How will various forces deal with the prospect of new parliamentary elections? What will the respective powers of the new president and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) be? How will these developments affect Egypt’s vulnerable economy?

Featuring:

Bahey eldin Hassan
General Director, Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies
 Mohsin Khan
Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council
Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, POMED
 Moderator: Michele Dunne
Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council

For full event notes, continue reading below or click here for the PDF version

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Bahey Hassan opened the panel, strongly asserting that Egypt is no longer in a transition at all “unless we are talking about the growth of the army’s power.” Hassan was particularly critical of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) for sitting idly by while the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) repeatedly repressed Egyptian protesters with excessive use of force. The result of the MB and SCAF “cooperation against the revolutionary youth” is that the SCAF now has unprecedented powers, the worst being SCAF’s control over the constitution. Hassan claimed, “If the Islamists had been open to working with other actors, the SCAF wouldn’t have taken over.” Now, “it makes little difference who wins, Mohamed Morsi or Ahmed Shafik, because neither will be granted any power,” Hassan said.

Michele Dunne asked for Hassan’s opinion on the Brotherhood’s ability to garner support from opposition parties. Hassan replied that most political leaders (including the Salafists) had no trust for the MB and that whoever becomes president will have trouble with both SCAF and the Egyptian people.

Mohsin Khan talked about the state of Egypt’s economy, which is “clearly in recession.” Egyptian growth has dropped and unemployment has risen since the revolution 16 months ago. Foreign direct investment is virtually nonexistent (compared to $6 billion in 2010) and the deficit is set to exceed $11 billion. Khan described Egypt’s budget, which now has to be approved by SCAF, as “extremely optimistic” in terms of growth and revenue. With regard to the presidential candidates, Khan asserted that there was very little difference between the two as both candidates have “ambitious expenditure plans” with no ideas for increasing revenue. Both Morsi and Shafik also believe Gulf countries will help Egypt to make ends meet, as Qatar has previously promised $10 billion in assistance. Khan pointed out however, that Qatar is currently “being pretty hardnosed;” they expect Egypt to join an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program before sending any aid. Ultimately, Khan concluded, Egypt is going to have to turn to the IMF within the next year or face economic collapse.

Finally, Stephen McInerney wrapped up the panel with a review of United States foreign policy toward Egypt. McInerney was critical of US policy, describing it as a “failure” and “humiliating.” “There seems to be a disconnect” between the administration and SCAF, McInerney argued, citing Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s statement affirming that “SCAF is committed to a transition to civilian rule.” McInerny added, “There’s no excuse for [SCAF’s actions] taking the U.S. by surprise.” The United States hasn’t changed its policy from the Mubarak era, according to McInerney, and has also failed to reach out to civil society or political entities other than SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood. McInerney urged the administration to start applying real leverage on the Egyptian government and said “it can do that through the $1.3 billion in military aid, but also through the IMF.”

In the question and answer session, Bahey Hassan was asked if Egypt’s revolutionary fervor was waning. He replied that the Egyptian youth will continue their struggle and that the last 16 months have absolutely proven that the young generation has strength and determination and is ready to sacrifice for its cause. Hassan added that beyond the youth, average Egyptians attitude toward their government has fundamentally changed as well.

Road Bumps in Tunisia: Understanding Emerging Tensions

03/27/2018 |

Presented by The Project on Middle East Democracy and the New America Foundation

Friday, June 29, 2012
New America Foundation
3:00-4:30pm

As Tunisians focus on the urgent priorities of constitution-writing, economic development, and civil society growth, the country’s political and social arenas have become increasingly polarized in recent weeks. Controversies over public art displays have led to localized violence, the in absentia sentencing of former president Ben Ali has sparked criticism, and persistent economic difficulties continue to cause frustrations in the street. Tunisia, often hailed as the “success story” of the Arab world following last year’s uprisings, is now hitting bumps in the road.

What is causing rifts between political, religious, and social factions in Tunisia? How is the constitution-writing process proceeding, and what effect are new tensions having in the National Constituent Assembly and elsewhere? How are average citizens responding to recent troubling developments, and in what ways are Tunisians participating in public arenas? What has been the nature of civil society growth, and what role can international actors play in supporting its ongoing development? In what additional areas can the U.S. and others provide assistance?

Featuring:

Amine Ghali
Program Director, Al Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center

Alexis Arieff
Africa Analyst, Congressional Research Service

Tamara Wittes
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution

Moderator: Leila Hilal
Co-Director, Middle East Task Force, New America Foundation

For notes on this event, continue reading below.

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In her opening remarks, Leila Hilal observed that Tunisia is much less visible in Western media, reflecting the common thinking that the country is a “success story” in the Arab world today. But the real question, in her view, is whether Tunisia is really a model for revolutions across the region. While the conventional wisdom presumes that it is, it has become clear in recent months that Tunisia’s transition is fragile and may even be in peril.

Alexis Arieff spoke first, noting that Tunisians are at a point in their transition where they are taking stock of their progress. There have been a host of achievements, of course, while other steps are partially complete. She mentioned that the Constituent Assembly is still finding its way, balancing its specific task of writing the new constitution with broader legislative assignments. Judging by preliminary drafts of the new constitution released to the public, Arieff observed that the process appears to be an inclusive, good-faith effort at building a consensus document. Many questions remain, however, such as uncertainties related to the country’s electoral system and associated institutions, for example. On the topic of institutional reform, she noted that ongoing investigations have shed light the former regime’s modus operandi, but it remains to be seen how the new government will handle real questions of reforms, including the of trials of former regime officials.

Arieff added that the economy presents major challenges in the short run, and that the solutions must be more structural and long-term in nature. Regarding the security situation, Arieff mentioned problems related to transnational smuggling and the possible threat of terrorist activity, as well as “gaping problems” having to do with the operation of internal security services. Moreover, clashes between Salafi groups and security forces highlight, for some, the state’s failures in maintaining security and integrating marginalized groups into the political process. While much of the international press attention has focused on recent Salafi clashes, Arieff contended that the more important issues are longer-term, more complicated issues.

Next, Amine Ghali pointed out that since Tunisia is going through a transition process, many of the phenomena in the Tunisian landscape today are unique – not necessarily because there is something particularly unique about Tunisia, but because every transition process is different. He outlined that Tunisia is currently in the second phase of its transition: the first being the time from the revolution to elections, and the second being from the elections to the delivery of a constitution. The first phase was largely a success, in his view, in that it delivered free and fair elections; Ghali attributed that success to the fact that it was managed by neutral actors. The second phase, in contrast, is being administered by partisan actors. Unexpected political allies, in his view, are not leading an inclusive process, and Ghali stressed that the new Tunisia must not be built by the winners, but rather by everyone. He outlined several points of confrontation in Tunisia today, largely related to efforts by one group to monopolize a part of the transition process.

In response to a question about how Tunisians are working to build consensus around contested issues, Ghali stated that many actors are mobilizing to ensure that their voices are heard – labor unions, lawyers, and a host of other civil society actors, for example. He also noted that various commissions have been formed to investigate cases of corruption and human rights abuses, among other things, which are conducted via consultative and technical processes, rather than partisan ones. Through these types of projects, political actors are pushed to be more open to dialogue with others. On security sector reform, Ghali stressed that lessons from other transitions show that police reform is a key to broader institutional reform efforts.

Next, Tamara Wittes contended that Tunisia’s challenges are not any worse than challenges elsewhere. She also noted that while it is natural for the winners of elections to seek to design a system that is favorable to them, parties must create laws that will benefit them even if they lose in future elections. Such a strategy is not altruistic, but rather practical and self-interested in the long term. Wittes continued that one feature of Tunisia’s transition that bodes well for its future is that the military quickly removed itself from the political sphere. In addition, a number of Tunisia’s current political factions existed in exile under Ben Ali’s rule and engaged in dialogue with each other while in exile. Through this process, many forged agreement on basic principles related to democracy and the role of religion in politics. When those parties became active after the revolution, they shared some basis of understanding. However, since new parties were not part of the pre-revolution exile community dialogue, there is now a challenge of engaging those emerging actors so that everyone can agree on the rules of the game.

On the economy, Wittes observed that there were some early assumptions about how quickly the Tunisian economy could recover, based largely on how quickly it was expected that political stability would be achieved. However, the developmental disparities in Tunisia were greater than many people thought. Furthermore, the conflict next door in Libya also slowed Tunisian growth. And, while Europe would have had a central role to play in supporting Tunisia economically, it is of course struggling with its own economic difficulties.

When asked about U.S. strategy towards Tunisia, Wittes pointed out that U.S. assistance to the country has risen substantially since pre-revolution levels. Before the revolution, the U.S. embassy was severely constrained in its contacts and activities in Tunisia. Almost overnight, however, U.S. policy required a fundamental shift: major economic assistance needed to be quickly dispersed, for example, and election support needed to be administered. Now, the overall U.S. assistance package to Tunisia is about $190 million.

Following each speaker’s prepared remarks, Arieff asked Wittes about the future of U.S. assistance to Tunisia. She responded that one challenge for donors is that it is not possible to provide apolitical economic assistance. Assistance is a sensitive issue, and donors want to be responsive to consensus on the ground (unfortunately, Wittes added, there is not always consensus). Another challenge has to do with domestic American politics, related to Washington’s willingness and ability to commit substantial funds to assist new democracies during their transitions. She mentioned the Obama administration’s proposal for a Middle East Incentive Fund, which is a step in the right direction towards committing meaningful resources to transitioning countries. Ghali also pointed out that that although Tunisia is doing relatively well, compared to its neighbors, it still needs resources from the international community. He stressed that foreign assistance must be anchored to standards of human rights and democracy, including media freedoms, women’s rights, and other issues.

During the question-and-answer period, it was asked whether Tunisia will receive the amount of private investment that it requires. Wittes responded that it is difficult for Tunisia to attract private investment because it is a small market; thus, it must integrate itself into a wider Maghreb market. Western governments can play a role in facilitating that broader market development, she contended. Another economic development opportunity for Tunisia may also be as a transshipment point for companies that want to do business in Libya. For that to be feasible, however, Libya-Tunisia relations must improve.

Another audience member asked about the decline in optimism among Tunisian youth and former revolutionaries. Ghali addressed the issue of fatigue, noting that it is common in a post-revolution environment for youth to lose energy and even feel deceived as the transition process proceeds. While optimism and high youth involvement characterize the first stage of transitions, politicians generally take over during the second phase. Arieff pointed out that some degree of frustration can actually be constructive if channeled properly.

The problem of defining success in Tunisia was also mentioned, to which Wittes responded that a successful transition ends with an election that transfers power to another party. Responding to a question about Tunisia’s informal sector, Wittes emphasized that the Tunisian bureaucracy needs to be reformed to incentivize people to participate in the formal sector, adding that there is a problem with regulatory frameworks. Decentralization can help give people a greater sense of ownership over their efforts, but it can also have the opposite effect of empowering local power brokers.

Finally, on a question about civic education, Ghali said that while small civil society organizations are holding workshops and engaging in other projects aimed at educating Tunisians, the government has not made civic education a priority. He indicated that a wider civic education effort will be crucial moving forward.