Presented by the Carnegie Endowment and the Project on Middle East Democracy

When Egyptian opposition groups called for a “Day of Rage” on January 25, few predicted that the protests would escalate into a full-fledged uprising that threatens to unravel Egypt’s existing political order.  As hundreds of thousands of Egyptians call for an end to President Mubarak’s 30-year rule, the crisis unfolding in Egypt has the potential to fundamentally transform Egypt’s political landscape and the balance of power in the Middle East.  Will these protests ultimately lead to a more transparent and democratic political processes in Egypt?  What impact may we expect across the  Middle East?  And what do these events mean for U.S. relations with Egypt and the region?

Featuring:

To read full notes, continue below or click here for pdf.

Michele Dunne opened by mentioning the clashes in recent days between pro-regime and anti-regime demonstrators and the arrest and detainment of human rights activists by the security forces. She noted the growing uncertainty of the role of the military in these clashes. Given the strong statements issued by Vice President Omar Suleiman and Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq condemning the attacks and vowing to investigate the attacks, Dunne questioned whether there was a rift forming in the regime or if they were seeking to manipulate the populace with a “good cop-bad cop” tactic. Dunne also noted the conflicting reports surrounding negotiations between Suleiman and the opposition parties and ambiguity surrounding the U.S. government’s definition of “transition” in the Egypt context.

Amr Hamzawy, speaking from Cairo, spoke about the concessions made by the government, such Suleiman saying that they are open to constitutional amendments beyond Article 76 and 77. Furthermore, Hamzawy optimistically discussed the road map for the transitional period stating the Suleiman was entering into dialogue with all opposition groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood. He made mention of Suleiman’s speech in which he promised to investigate and punish the organizers of the attacks and release all detained protesters and activists not involved in violence on Wednesday.

Hamzawy stated that Suleiman’s unwillingness to dissolve the parliament, out of the interest of having enough time to make constitutional amendments before the transition period ends, will likely be a point of contestation among the different opposition groups, which had demanded dissolution of parliament after the blatant election violations by the regime last November. He also states that going into this transition period constitutional and political safeguards need to be put in place to ensure that the regime does not violate its commitment to reform and that the army will play a key role in ensuring stability during this period as well.

When asked about Mubarak’s role, Hamzawy states that many of the opposition groups, not including the Muslim Brotherhood or Mohamed ElBaradei, have agreed to have Mubarak continue on as an “honorary president,” with all essential powers delegated to Suleiman. He calls this a “face-saving” method that reaches out to the sentimentalities of Egyptians and will help manage a safe transition. It is clear, however, that some people will be upset, but others are willing to make the compromise for stability and in hopes of returning to normality.

Responding to a question on amendments to Article 88 on judicial supervision of elections, Hamzawy said that the new amendment will lead to the formation of an independent election commission made after consultations with independent judges, legal experts, and scholars.

When asked how a parliament full of members of the dying NDP can be expected to make full constitutional amendments demanded by the people, Hamzawy states that Suleiman has offered to re-run elections into those areas where the Constitution Court found to have suffered from voting fraud; this means over 250 seats will be contested. Until these elections are run the parliament has been suspended.

Hamzawy states that while debates still continue, many protesters are moving towards no protests tomorrow and supporting the road map. He states that the transition period will be tough as some try to backslide into the old regime, but he believes the protesters are resilient and will ensure demands are met credibly.

Bahey al-Din Hassan began by stating is respect and pride for Egyptians who continue to struggle in face of the violence which has killed at least 500 and injured thousands more. He went on to discuss the arrests of journalists and human rights activists that occurred on Thursday, noting that this the first time the military police has participated. Not only did the military police arrest activists with the thugs, they also closed all outlets in Tahrir Square leading Hassan to believe that in coming days we may see a humanitarian crisis take place on the streets.

The opposition Hassan said is divided and weak as they have been under severe and continuous repression under Mubarak, and really, in his opinion, since July 1952 when the “Free Officers” coup took place. Currently, he states, Egyptians have a minimum consensus over who the leader of the opposition should be and that is ElBaradei. He states that the opposition groups really need to stick behind him instead of engaging in independent consultations with Suleiman. He also argues that while ElBaradei refused to negotiate until Mubarak had departed, he should shift his position given the realities on the ground.

Neil Hicks began by discussing past opposition movements in Egypt, stating that in the 1980s the groups were smaller and tended to include lawyers and members of the middle class, who had limited objectives. In recent years, he says, there has been a change in the ambition of the people. The youth have constructed their own networks and outreach tactics, which older generations did not support or see as useful. But demonstrations on the 25th showed the value of the youth networks, especially those put in place to monitor the November elections; they were able to mobilize the masses effectively. Hicks credits this transformation with the maturation of human rights groups and NGOs in Egypt and labels ElBaradei as the father of this change, which is indigenous and authentic to the people, not imposed by the U.S. or the West.

Addressing U.S. policy in the region, Hicks said that the administration and congress are behind the curve. Mubarak’s early comment that the Egyptian people can choose between stability and chaos was misinterpreted in the West, Hicks said; the statement was meant as a threat, saying that if things don’t go his way there will be chaos. And as protesters failed to give into his demands chaos ensued as he shut down the internet and sent tourists home, costing the country billions of dollars. The regime, Hicks says, was fraying; it was beginning to lose its ability to maintain stability and control as demonstrated by the beating of Khalid Said and the blatant rigging of elections; they were scared they would lose. The blatant violations during the elections should have garnered a stronger response from the Obama administration, Hicks said.

If Mubarak stays in power, he will do so as the Mugabe of Egypt. Hicks called on the administration to make clear that it does not see Mubarak as having an effective or useful role in the transition and have him step down. While appreciative of Hamzawy’s optimistic assessment of Suleiman, Hicks cautions against quickly embracing him as a leader. The U.S. also needs to ensure the army protects demonstrators and make it abundantly clear to the military leaders that the army must  not be involved in violence as it will lead to cutting aid and a deterioration of their relationship, which the Egyptian army values highly. He also calls on the administration to push for the release of activists arrested today.

Answering a question on the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan stated that while they are the most organized there is a great deal of exaggeration on their actual weight and influence. This protest movement was organized by the youth with a labor background, not an Islamist one. The Brotherhood, he says, lacks any real influence on what’s happening in the streets much like the Islamic group Ennahda does in Tunisia. The state, Hassan claims, has issued exaggerated claims in the hopes of shifting international opinion in their favor instead of in the favor of protesters who are demanding political reform. He goes on to say that if the protest movements fail to bring real reform to the country, the tides will turn in the favor of the Islamists.

Addressing questions over the military, Hicks stated that the U.S. and Egyptian military officials have been communicating and that the U.S. should continue to encourage the army to protect protesters and live up to the ethos of professionalism. When it comes to cutting off aid, Hicks says the U.S. should draw clear red lines that if crossed would lead to cuts in aid. Hicks also addressed the possibility of a military coup in Egypt, stating that essentially that is what took place in Tunisia as protests grew though the possibility remains unclear in Egypt.

Dunne answered a question over the lack of democratic terms in Suleiman’s speech by stating that she is skeptic of what Suleiman said. While he has offered some change and reform it is unclear whether he will allow free and fair elections to take place or if he is attempting to pass limited reform aimed at quelling the unrest. Hassan states that in Egypt it is better to have a quick transition towards democracy as true democracy will decades to build in the country and that movements need to start sooner rather than later. Hassan believes that demonstrations will continue tomorrow as people push for transition knowing that this is the best way to have their demands realized.

When asked about rifts between the NDP and the military, Hicks stated that we had seen a fracturing between the two groups as Mubarak became aligned with the economic elite members of the NDP. In recent weeks he has attempted to make a shift back towards the military as seen by his selection of Vice President and Prime Minister. Hicks also questions whether Mubarak’s abandonment of the business elite could lead to the formation of new party.

Addressing questions regarding skepticism that the U.S. will cut aid, Hicks stated that he too was skeptical but given that the events on the ground are changing so rapidly, U.S policy will have to adapt. What is clear is that the reluctance of the U.S. to call out violations of close allies will no longer be accepted.

Finally, answering a question on whether a new party will be able to survive if they cannot address the domestic economic issues facing the country, Hassan stated it is unlikely. However, he said that the people recognize that economic reform cannot take place without political reform; it is a key first step.

On Thursday, the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) hosted a discussion on recent and ongoing events in Tunisia and Egypt and their influence on U.S. relations with the region’s governments and people and what steps the U.S. government can take to support democratic transitions in Egypt and Tunisia. POMED Executive Director Stephen McInerney made opening remarks and introduced panelists: Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at Hoover Institution at Stanford University and founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy; Tom Malinowski, Washington Director at Human Rights Watch; and Mona Yacoubian, Special Adviser at the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, United States Institute of Peace. 

(A video of the event is available here.)

On January 25, Egypt’s youth activists, using new media technology, succeeded in launching a protest movement that eventually forced Hosni Mubarak to resign the presidency. Since that time, these activists have retained an important role during the transition period and continue to pressure the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to undertake reforms. Many key questions remain, however, surrounding Egypt’s ongoing transition to a civilian government. How are Egypt’s youth movements adapting themselves to the evolving political dynamics during this transition period? How do they view the actions of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces? What new political forces are emerging in Egypt? What are the most important steps that must be taken in the months ahead? And what role can the United States play during this period to support Egypt’s transition to democracy?

Featuring:

Esraa Abdel Fattah
Leading Egyptian democracy and human rights activist

Commentator:

Jason Brownlee
Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center and Associate Professor, Department of Government,
University of Texas at Austin

Moderator:

Stephen McInerney
Executive Director,
Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

For full notes, continue below.  For pdf version, click here.

Stephen McInerney began by stating that this was a historic and exciting time for observers and democracy activists and stated that the policy community had underestimated the chance for change in the region and underestimated the abilities of the youth movement spurred by online activism.  Egypt’s revolution has proven that Washington’s previous dismissal of the potential of youth movements was mistaken, he said.  McInerney also stated that he saw a generational divide in Egypt as a response to the Tunisian revolution.  Whereas elder established human rights activists were unsure of how to handle a possible response, youth activists immediately set forth trying to replicate Tunisian success in Egypt.  The youth movements were fully ready to seize the opportunity.  He also said that what happened in Egypt would not have happened without the years of groundwork of activism in Egypt including Fattah’s work.  McInerney called her, “one of the best possible spokespeople for the youth movement,” in Egypt and mentioned that her April 6^th protests were a direct precursor to the January 25^th revolution.

Esraa Abdel Fattah mentioned she was speaking at the panel on the third anniversary of the April 6^th protests and her subsequent arrest and imprisonment by Egyptian authorities.  She described the protests as a general strike entirely organizes through Facebook and social media; which she said was the only way to campaign and get the message out to others.  Fattah called the campaign a success and said that it taught other activists and people who to successfully organize protests using social media.  She also outlined the buildup of the Egyptian protest movement starting in 2004 with the Kefaya movement that continued to the 2008 protests and ultimately the 2011 revolution.  The 2011 campaign drew inspiration directly from the Tunisian revolution.  Fattah said that she did not originally expect for the movement to crystallize so quickly nor did she expect Hosni Mubarak to step down 18 days after the protests began.  She continued by stating that organizers and activists have been adamant about holding continuous Friday rallies at Tahrir Square to ensure that protester demands are being met by the transitional military council.  She also outlined the main priorities of the youth movement which are to ensure free and fair elections with equal opportunity for all candidates.  Fattah also expressed some concern about the very short five month run-up to new parliamentary elections.

Jason Brownlee mentioned that the recent constitutional referendum vote, which many of the youth activists campaigning against the proposed reforms, was passed with an overwhelming 77% majority vote.  Brownless stated that had there been more polling stations, the voter turnout would have been much higher than 41% and still would have turned out overwhelmingly in favor.  He said this was due to the desire of many Egyptians for a return to normalcy and stability.  Given this setback, Brownlee posed the question of how the youth protest movement would reach out to new groups and do a better job in getting their message across in the upcoming parliamentary elections.  Fattah responded that she and other organizers and activists were trying to quickly set up a new political party and establish a social-liberal coalition to run an effective list for the upcoming elections.  She stated that it would be difficult to unify disparate groups together in such a coalition but said it was necessary for the groups to succeed in parliament.  She also reiterated the need to encompass old parties, like al-Ghad, as well.  Fattah stated that the announcement about the new party would be released in about two weeks and that there would be a meeting on May 1^st to select a unified list.  She also discussed the importance of reaching more people through civil society education and training.

In response to a question posed by McInerney on what steps the U.S. and international community could take, Fattah stated the need for a new balancing of the relationship between the U.S., the Egyptian government, and Egyptian civil society.  She reiterated the need for more support for civil society NGOs and criticized the U.S. for its “late statements” during the protests.  Fattah said that the U.S. and international community should not wait to see “who will win” before deciding to support democratic principles.  She also said that the U.S. could help with its technical expertise in election organizing in addition to monetary aid programs.  Help retraining the police force to protect instead of harm people, was also welcome.  The international community must also ensure that frozen assets of the Mubarak family are returned to the Egyptian people as it was an issue of dignity for Egyptians.

In response to audience questions, Fattah stated that she was not asking the U.S. or the international community to get involved but merely providing them guidance if they wished to help.  She said she believed that the Egyptian could move forward on their “own power.”  Brownlee stated that Egypt needed help from international partners because the protests and revolution in Egypt had cut GDP in half.  He stated that for this reason the U.S. should forgive Egypt’s debt that was incurred under Mubarak.

Fattah also spoke about the Muslim Brotherhood stating that she did not see the group as a threat or a problem.  She speculated that organizational infighting and fault lines that have been emerging within the group would hamper its performance at election time.  She also stated that she is worried about whether the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF) will live up to its promises but does not actively distrust the military council.  She reiterated her belief that Egypt needs a civil authority to ensure democracy.  She also said that the country needed a new communications law to secure privacy, particularly with internet/e-mail accounts, and prevent a future internet shutdown.  Fattah also said that Egyptians and activists were not focused on foreign policy issues like the peace treaty with Israel, but solely focused on internal issues.

McInerney, speaking about U.S. foreign policy post-revolution, said that American policy toward the Middle East would not instantly change overnight.  However, the events in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere would have lasting impacts for the long term.  One immediate effect, he said, would be a re-evaluation of the type of “casual relationships” the U.S. maintains with authoritarian regimes.  Brownlee commented that despite the events on the ground, the U.S. still maintains the same interests for much of the region and that it will take time to truly assess any substantive changes in U.S. foreign policy.

Fattah closed by commenting that the protest movement was working more strenuously on political issues but that economic issues were still very important for activists and organizers.  She also declared her optimism on the role of the judiciary in the transition citing the former regime officials who are already on trial for corruption and other regime related offenses.

Muslim-Christian clashes in a poor Cairo neighborhood on May 7 left twelve dead and provoked allegations of inadequate protection and intervention by security forces.  After protestors stormed the State Security building in Cairo in March, seizing documents that revealed alarming surveillance tactics as well as grave human rights abuses, the government formally dissolved the notorious State Security Investigations apparatus and replaced it with a new “National Security” apparatus.

How different will the new security apparatus be from the old one in terms of personnel, mission, and methods? Should former security officials accused of human rights abuses be brought to account individually, or should Egypt undertake a comprehensive transitional justice process? What should a new security agency look like and how can further human rights abuses be prevented?

 

Featuring:

Mohamed Kadry Said
Military and Technology adviser and head of military studies unit,
Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo

Omar Afifi
Former Egyptian police officer and Supreme Court lawyer

Speakers:

Mohamed Kadry Said, Ph.D., Maj.Gen.(ret.) is the military and technology adviser and head of military studies unit at Al- Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. He also serves as the center’s coordinator at the Consortium of Research Institutes’ Project for Regional Security in the Middle East and North Africa. Dr. Said is a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, various Euro-Mediterranean Security and Cooperation working groups, and numerous scientific organizations.

Omar Afifi Soliman, is a former police officer and Supreme Court lawyer in Egypt. He is the author of an extremely popular book about how to avoid police torture in Egypt, So You Don’t Get Hit on the Back of Your Neck, that was banned by the Mubarak regime. He was also recently a Reagan-Fascell Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy. More recently, Afifi was active on the Internet and elsewhere in helping organize the January 25 protest movement that led to the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak.

Robert Perito directs USIP’s Security Sector Governance Center under the Centers of Innovation. He also directs the Haiti and the Peacekeeping Lessons Learned Projects. Before joining the Institute, he was a Foreign Service officer with the U.S. Department of State, retiring with the rank of minister-counselor. He was deputy executive secretary of the National Security Council (1988-1989).

Michele Dunne is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and editor of the online journal, the Arab Reform Bulletin. A former specialist at the U.S. Department of State and White House on Middle East affairs, she served in assignments including the National Security Council staff, the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, the U.S. embassy in Cairo, the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem, and the department of state’s bureau of intelligence and research.

For for a summary of this event please continue reading below, or click here for the pdf.

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On Thursday, the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), in partnership with Libya Outreach, the Libyan Council for North America, and the Libyan Emergency Task Force hosted an event entitled “Supporting a Democratic Transition in a Post-Gadhafi Libya: What Can the U.S. Do?” Stephen McInerney, POMED’s Executive Director moderated the event. The panelists were: Manal Omar, Director of Iraq, Iran, and North Africa Programs, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace; Hafed Al-Ghwell, Libya Outreach Group; Amira Maaty, Program Officer, Middle East and North Africa, National Endowment for Democracy; and Christopher Blanchard, Middle East Policy Analyst, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service.

Notes on the event are located below or can be accessed in PDF form here.

Christopher Blanchard, speaking in his official capacity, began his remarks discussing the halting transitions within Libya that had begun under Moammar Gadhafi. He noted that significant opportunities remain in Libya for social and economic development. He stressed that the vital decisions about security, cease fire, terms of justice, etc will be made by Libyans, not outside powers, but the U.S. and other international partners can assist in the decision making process. Blanchard specifically cited items that Congress can do to help including:

• Encourage the Obama Administration to show results in their aid packages
• Allocate humanitarian and security assistance
• Assist in funding international peace keeping missions and other international operations
• Lay the ground work and follow through on longer term economic and trade partnerships

Blanchard also cited human resource development as a critical challenge facing Libya. He noted other serious complications that will need addressing, including: damage to key infrastructure, the exodus of skilled foreign oil workers, immediate conflict resolution needs regarding participation during the conflict, the need to build experience living in an open society, the need to define terms of representation in Libya (i.e. rural vs. urban, poor vs. wealthy), and the need to determine terms of participation and accountability for former regime officials.

The discussion turned to Manal Omar, who spoke in a personal capacity, but who has recently returned from Benghazi. She noted the strong discussion about the role of civil society in post-conflict Libya, including the establishment within the Transitional National Council (TNC) of a Public Engagement Committee. She also noted the Islamic character of Libya and the importance of incorporating religion into the new government in a manner that is in line with democratic best practices.

Omar described four ‘lessons learned’ from the Iraq experience that must be implemented to prevent similar problems in Libya. These lessons include:

• Avoiding early elections because early elections fueled divisions within Iraq
• Including former regime elements to prevent divisive witch hunts, she cited South Africa’s truth and reconciliation process as a model, but good leadership and a good, trusted transitional justice system are critical
• A focus on women is required and necessary, but not one focused on women’s ‘liberation’
• A need for basic services across the country, in addition to the political needs

Omar noted hopeful differences between Iraq and Libya relating to territory and the indigenous TNC.

Hafed al-Ghwell spoke of specific items that the U.S. is capable of doing to help the Libyan transition including:

• Providing the right set of technical help and expertise in institution building
• Make human rights an issue that is publically addressed with any future government
• Encourage the development of a robust private sector

He also noted a lack of international understanding about the depth of social, political, and security fragmentation within Libya caused by Gadhafi. Al-Ghwell specifically cited the issue of personal property as being a critical issue in the reconciliation and compensation process. This stems from a 1970/80’s directive from Gadhafi for all people to move into vacant or empty homes nearby as part of his political ideology. Al-Ghwell also noted the need for any future political system to be anchored in the culture of Libya; however, international partners can assist by insisting on transparency, inclusion, and systemic accountability.

The final panelist was Amira Maaty. Maaty discussed positive reports of civic and political engagement in Libya. She noted a need for international technical assistance in several areas including: political and good governance, constitutional assistance, legal and regulatory reforms, independent and professional media, and monitoring and defending journalist’s rights. She noted that an accountable transitional justice system, with “public buy-in,” is critical, as well as the need for security sector reform.

Matty closed her remarks discussing the need for dialogue about the proper sequence and the establishment of priorities for change in Libya. She noted the need to build institutions with a solid foundation and the need for independent think tanks.

The event concluded with a Q&A session. Christopher Blanchard noted that the degree of unity within Libya is still unknown and will ultimately be determined by how the conflict ends. Amira Maaty and Hafed al-Ghwell noted the critical role that youth play in the revolution and that they will play a critical role in strengthening civil society. Al-Ghwell also noted the need to incorporate newly armed and battle hardened groups into the post-conflict Libya. Many of the panelists described the post-Gadhafi situation as being entirely dependent on how the violence ends.

Manal Omar noted a widespread awareness of the need to avoid tribalism. She is encouraged by discussions currently taking place within Libya to this effect. The panelists also discussed the lack of legitimacy that the African Union holds in the eyes of many Libyan people and the need for any economic development assistance to be tied to job creation and growth.

On October 23, Tunisia will hold the first open elections in the Arab world since historic uprisings swept the region this year.  Tunisians will elect a 218-seat National Constituent Assembly (NCA) that will write the country’s new constitution and play a leading role in the next stage of Tunisia’s transition.  With Tunisians exercising their rights in competitive elections for the first time, there are many key questions to be addressed:

Who are the major parties competing in the elections and how are they likely to perform?  What are the differences between those parties in terms of ideologies, campaign strategies, political positions, and constituencies? What are the major concerns regarding the elections? What is needed in order for the elections to be regarded as a success? How might we expect independent candidates to perform? What might be expected after the elections, in terms of the make-up of the constituent assembly, and any coalitions that are likely to formed within it? What will be the role of the NCA in guiding Tunisia’s transition, and what are the major challenges that it will face following the elections?

Featuring:

Chiheb Ghazouani

Attorney at Law and Vice President of the Tunisian nongovernmental organization Afkar

Mongi Boughzala

Professor of Economics, University of Tunis El-Manar, and Research Fellow at the Economic Research Forum

J. Scott Carpenter

Principal, Google Ideas

Stephen McInerney

Executive Director, POMED

Speakers:

Chiheb Ghazouani, an attorney at law, is the Vice President of the Tunisian nongovernmental organization Afkar (“ideas”), which analyzes the political and economic programs of the main political parties and provides recommendations. He is also the Vice President of the Tunisian Association of Governance and the President of Atlas Leaders, a charity organization in Tunis. Ghazouani holds a PhD in e-commerce law and has taught at the Sorbonne University in Paris, where he also worked as a lawyer.

Mongi Boughzala is a professor of economics at the University of Tunis El-Manar and holds a PhD from the University of Minnesota. He focuses on monetary economics, macroeconomic policy and labour economics. Boughzala’s work has been published in the International Labour Review, Saving and Development Quarterly Review, and the Annales d’Economie et de Gestion. He is also a research fellow at the Economic Research Forum and a board member of the Forum Euroméditerranéen des Instituts de Sciences Économiques (FEMISE).

J. Scott Carpenter is a Principal with Google Ideas in New York. He was formerly the Keston Family fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and director of its Project Fikra. Previously, Mr. Carpenter served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, was coordinator for the State Department’s Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiatives, and served in Baghdad as director of the governance group for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

Stephen McInerney is POMED’s Executive Director. Previously, he was Director of Advocacy at POMED. He has more than six years experience in the Middle East, including graduate studies in Middle Eastern politics, history, and the Arabic language at the American University of Beirut and the American University in Cairo.  His work has been published in the Arab Reform Bulletin, The Daily Star, Foreign Policy, The New Republic, and The Washington Post, among other outlets.

For full event notes, continue reading. Or, click here for the PDF.

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J. Scott Carpenter began with opening remarks by praising the Tunisian electoral system, characterizing it as a politically inclusive system with impressive gender parity. Mr. Carpenter cited the electoral system, the transparency of the elections, and recent explosion of civil society as reasons to label Tunisia as the “best opportunity for success” in the Arab Spring.

Egypt’s parliamentary elections will be a critical test for Egypt’s fragile transition and will be watched closely throughout the region and the world. On November 28th, the electoral process will begin with elections for one-third of the seats in the lower house of parliament, the People’s Assembly.

In the pre-election environment, incidents of media censorship, politically-motivated arrests, restrictions on civil society activity and ongoing military trials of civilians have all been cause for serious concern. The field of political contenders has been unclear amid frequently-shifting alliances and the rapid formation of new parties. Moreover, some uncertainties remain about the voting process itself, due to complicated election laws, restrictions on election monitoring, and suspicions regarding the aims of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces during the ongoing transition.

What might we expect to see on election day? Which parties are expected to perform well, and which parties may be disappointed? What steps have been taken to ensure that the voting process is free and fair, and what remains to be done? How are civil society organizations in Egypt involved in the pre-election environment, whether through voter education, candidate trainings, or other efforts? Who are the “actors to watch” in Egypt in the run-up to the elections, and what challenges do they face? What actors or events may jeopardize the process? What can the U.S. do to help ensure that the elections go smoothly?  What is the  role of Egypt’s new parliament likely to be, and what key challenges will remain after these elections?

Featuring:

For full event notes, continue reading. Or, click here for the PDF.

An audio recording of this event is available here.

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Speaking from Cairo via Skype, Houdaiby expressed several aspects of the upcoming elections on which to focus. He relayed that the elections are significant because they are the “first step” to transfer power to the Egyptian people, but he also enumerated a number of challenges including security concerns, an undemocratic media, and a suspect judiciary. There is currently a leadership vacuum, according to Houdaiby, in Egypt’s political landscape which has resulted in a fragmented population. He stressed that the threat Islamic parties pose to democratic development is over publicized, and that Egyptians are seeking coherent approaches to security and economic issues while they formulate a new identity. Houdaiby also said his optimistic estimate for election turnout is approximately 40 percent, which he concluded would be a vast improvement from previous elections. Additionally, he asserted that there is a noticeable lack of media objectivity which has stunted some of the election measures.

Next, Magdy Samaan spoke about the restraints placed on freedom of expression since the SCAF took over for Mubarak. He asserted that freedom of expression has shrunk immensely since the revolution, directly referring to several of the activist bloggers who have been detained and arrested in recent months.Egyptian television has reverted back to Mubarak-style coverage by promoting sectarianism, particularly during the protests at Maspero, according to Samaan. He believes that the SCAF is “playing with Mubarak’s cards” when it comes to freedom of expression. Samaan added that the upcoming elections represent a “dress rehearsal” for the subsequent steps toward democracy, though he warned that the value should remain reasonable because the results will illustrate the political weight of many parties and individuals, though they will not rule the country. Samaan also said there is an opportunity for Egypt to follow and learn from Tunisia’s positive democratic elections.

Michele Dunne addressed the topic next, agreeing that the elections will illuminate Egypt’s political layout but will not guarantee political transition. We “must watch the larger story,” Dunne said, noting that violence during and after the proceedings is a legitimate concern. She also expressed that the SCAF’s actions indicate that it intends to “shape” the constitution, and she said that the role of both the parliament and the cabinet remain unclear. Additionally, Dunne was concerned that the developing institutions will in fact be powerless once they are formed, but she stressed that it was far too early to “give up” on Egypt’s transition.

Stephen McInerney added several remarks as well, stating that the complexities of the election proceedings may cause immense confusion among the population, particularly because some of the results will be delayed which may arouse suspicion. He also detailed many of the coalitions that have been formed in the run-up to the elections, including the Democratic Alliance, the Egyptian Bloc, and the Alliance to Continue the Revolution, among others.

During a question and answer session, Houdaiby and Samaan agreed that the SCAF has shown a willingness to negotiate many aspects of Egypt’s transition, though altering the military budget may prove difficult. Houdaiby also stated that most Egyptians are paying close attention to the upcoming elections, though many feel betrayed by the SCAF and pessimism has started to cloud Egypt’s initial confidence in the proceedings. Regarding the logistics once the votes are tallied, McInerney expressed that there is a “lack of clarity” regarding how parliamentary seats will be portioned to election winners, and Dunne added that this characteristic may have a negative impact on the public’s perception of balloting procedures.

Regarding the attachment of conditionality to financial support based on the success of Egypt’s democratic transition, Dunne stated that it may in fact be a positive idea, even though she objected to it in the past. However, McInerney stressed that U.S. Congress and the Obama Administration need to agree on how to institute conditionality since each entity has shown disparate strategies in the past. Both domestic and international non-governmental organizations will also play an important role at Egypt’s polls, the panel agreed. However, it remains unclear the amount of access that will be granted to these actors since Egypt has not officially approved many of the requests to observe the elections. Houdaiby added that thus far campaigns have been focused on individuals rather than specific ideologies, and that many parties should address the role of Islam in Egyptian democracy.