Scholars debated the definition of democracy and discussed the implications of the controversy for democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East during a panel at Georgetown University on April 24, 2006.

Although many discussions of democracy focus on the political developments occurring in particular countries, the panel addressed a more fundamental question: What does the term democracy mean? Does it entail a strict definition of what a government must look like to be called democratic? Or does it represent a more fluid concept that can be adapted to different local circumstances?

Gerard Alexander, a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and associate professor at the University of Virginia, expressed skepticism about the more flexible view of democracy. He traced the history of this idea back to the 1960s, when there were regimes that called themselves democratic despite their obvious lack of adherence to democracy. In the following decades, political scientists proposed proceduralist definitions of democracy that required countries to meet certain criteria to be understood as democratic. However, Alexander pointed to several recent examples of democracy promotion practitioners and policymakers who are departing from this trend and reviving the imagery of heavy adaptation to local conditions.

According to Alexander, democracies can vary in the institutional forms and processes used in a particular country. Democracies can also vary enormously in the types of policies that result from these processes, he said, but all of these adaptations are peripheral to the core definition of democracy. He argued that a regime is not democratic unless it effectively makes officeholders accountable to the citizenry. The mechanisms that deliver accountability include competitive elections, freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of leaders to compete for political support, freedom to access alternative sources of information, and the capability of the government to enforce these freedoms. These mechanisms happen to be the core features of Western democracy, Alexander said, but this is because there is no effective democratic alternative to the Western model.

According to Alexander, democracies can vary in the institutional forms and processes used in a particular country. Democracies can also vary enormously in the types of policies that result from these processes, he said, but all of these adaptations are peripheral to the core definition of democracy. He argued that a regime is not democratic unless it effectively makes officeholders accountable to the citizenry. The mechanisms that deliver accountability include competitive elections, freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of leaders to compete for political support, freedom to access alternative sources of information, and the capability of the government to enforce these freedoms. These mechanisms happen to be the core features of Western democracy, Alexander said, but this is because there is no effective democratic alternative to the Western model.

While some scholars have argued that these mechanisms can be sustained in virtually all social contexts, Alexander called this idea “deeply naïve” and instead proposed that these mechanisms rely on certain conditions that are not present in every country. He identified three cases in which democracies can fail: polarized societies in which groups would rather fight than lose an election, overpowered states such as rentier states in the Middle East, and underpowered states such as weak or failed states.

For the democracy promotion community, this means that continuing to press for democracy even when conditions are lacking will be ineffective, Alexander said. Their work will be more successful if it aims to promote the underlying conditions required for democratization, he argued.

In contrast, Abdeslam Maghraoui, director of the Muslim World Initiative at the United States Institute of Peace, sharply disagreed with Alexander. Trying to duplicate a precise definition of democracy shows a “lack of imagination,” he said. Instead of attempting to implement a universalist model, it is important to imagine the possibility of diverse patterns of change, different political outcomes, and different forms of accountability, he argued.

The most striking feature of democracy promotion efforts is their lack of sociological imagination, Maghraoui said. For example, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership’s Barcelona Process “produced very limited results” in the area of political reforms because it was based on a flawed assumption that economic growth will lead to political change, and because it was driven by immediate concerns like immigration instead of a long-term commitment to democracy.

U.S. government efforts also suffered from a lack of imagination, he said. U.S. democracy initiatives have been “marred with contradictions” because of their linkage with security concerns. The war on terror requires cooperation with security services that are the backbone of authoritarian regimes, Maghraoui noted, and this assistance undermines political reform. The U.S. should “disassociate democracy from issues of security and stability” because they are contradictory goals, he said.

Several democracy initiatives that have emerged in the Arab world are promising, Maghraoui said, but they do not adequately address important questions such as the role of religion in public life and the process by which these issues will be negotiated. Statements such as the Doha Declaration and the Alexandria Charter discuss the procedural requirement of democracy advocated by Alexander, but they do not go far enough in exploring different processes of democratic change, according to Maghraoui.

Maghraoui suggested that one possible alternative is to “engage Islam, not just Islamists,” to “renew Islamic humanistic values” and encourage reforms in the religious sphere. He cited recent Moroccan reforms in women’s rights, revision of school textbooks, and the formalization of religious authority as successful examples of this approach. While these reforms might not fit the strict definition of democracy, they are substantive measures that can lead to an open, tolerant, and diverse society, he argued. Furthermore, the U.S. government “cannot remain neutral or indifferent” to these types of reforms, Maghraoui said. Moroccans do not want the U.S. to fund these efforts, but U.S. policymakers should support and encourage the reforms, he argued.

The broad, flexible nature of both democracy and Islam present opportunities for alternative interpretations, according to John Voll, the Associate Director of the Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University. Democracy and Islam both have a vast repertoire of concepts and symbols which can be adapted to different circumstances depending upon the mode of operation that you use, he said. The terms and symbols of Islam are “sufficiently broad [so as] to articulate a thoroughly authentically Quranic political philosophy of either authoritarian rule or democracy,” depending on the speaker, he said.

Voll said that his experience of participating in New Hampshire town meetings, where political party identification is rejected, shows that there are many different formats and modes of democratic action. Alexander presented a model of adversary democracy, Voll argued, but there are alternative models such as unitary democracy or Athenian-style democracy. The real challenge is to create governing systems that are democratic in the way they tolerate and manage diversity, he said.

The panel was co-sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), Americans for Informed Democracy (AID) and Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS). It was moderated by Jamie Arnett, a M.A. in Arab Studies candidate and Associate in the Project on Middle East Democracy.

“Defining Democracy: Contested Visions of Governance in the Middle East” was the sixth event for POMED, an organization dedicated to examining the impact of U.S. policy on political reform and democratization in the Middle East.

Event Details

Date and Time: September 27, 2007 12:00-2:00pm

Panelists
Geneive Abdo, Century Foundation Fellow and author
Anthony Chang, Deputy Director for the Europe Division of the International Republican Insititute (IRI)
Matthew Frumin, Senior Advisor at the National Democratic Institute

Moderator
Shadi Hamid, POMED Director of Research

Downloads

Right-click or control-click here to download a full MP3 audio transcript file. Or use the controller below to listen to a streaming version:

Click here to read POMED’s full notes from the event.

At a panel event entitled “The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Regime: Toward Confrontation?” on Monday March 19th, POMED founding member and Associate Shadi Hamid and Dr. Amr Hamzawy, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, discussed recent issues facing the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Topics discussed included its plans to form a political party, the recent state repression of the group, and the upcoming constitutional referendum in the country.

Shadi Hamid began the discussion with a summary of the current situation for the Brotherhood within Egypt. He stated that situation in the country was getting worse for the Brotherhood as the Mubarak regime was putting on one of the worst crackdowns in the group’s history. Hamid mentioned that severe financial sanctions were being applied to Brotherhood financiers and that the regime may even dissolve Parliament in order to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from acquiring seats. The upcoming constitutional referendum will try to ban religious political parties and would be seen as a huge blow to the Brotherhood and their political aspirations.

Discussing the Brotherhood specifically, he mentioned that the group announced in January of 2007 that it would form a political party. Hamid stated that, as a political party, the group would have to become more transparent, normalized, and allow for more public accountability. He discussed the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood has tried to modernize its organization. It began a process of democratizing its internal structure, but this was put on hold because of the severe repression from the state. The Brotherhood is currently in survival mode because of the recent crackdown and this has hurt its modernization efforts. Hamid concluded by saying that the Muslim Brotherhood wants to moderate by forming a political party, but the Mubarak regime’s oppression will lead them to radicalize as a group. He mentioned that the current Brotherhood members in Parliament may resign in protest and that the international community has dropped the ball on democracy promotion, leading opposition groups to move away from the mainstream.

Dr. Hamzawy began his discussion with the current regime oppression of the Brotherhood, focusing on the economic crackdown on the group, including the jailing of 29 of the major financiers of the Muslim Brotherhood. He states that this will severely hamper the ability of the group to run election campaigns against the Mubarak administration and it will deal a huge blow to the social services network that Brotherhood operates. Dr. Hamzawy also discussed the different trends within the Muslim Brotherhood leadership. He predicted that those who had been pushing hard for reform and inclusion into political life would be pushed aside by elements that are suspicious of political participation in the midst of the current crackdown.

Dr. Hamzawy also stated that the Mubarak regime wanted to divide up the opposition movements in order to isolate the Brotherhood, its only serious challenger. He said that this was being accomplished by giving opposition parties alternative stakes in the process from the group, thus turning secular parties against the Muslim Brotherhood. The goal would be to prevent a serious opposition movement by prevent cohesion among the different parties. He also mentioned that the Mubarak regime has done a masterful job of questioning the Brotherhood’s dedication to peaceful political participation and forcing them to defend their internal machinations as a political party. This campaign has reignited suspicion of the Muslim Brotherhood in the general populous and the media.

The event was co-sponsored by The Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding and was held on the campus of Georgetown University.

Event Details

Date: March 19, 2007

Panelists

Shadi Hamid

Amr Hamzawy

Downloads

Click here to read POMED’s full notes from the event.

The Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) hosted a panel discussion on President Bush’s fiscal year 2009 budget request and the funding increase in democracy and governance programs across the Middle East. The speakers discussed the budget request’s potential impact on U.S. efforts to support democracy in the region; the changes in the international affairs budget request as compared to past fiscal years; and how the request might affect President Bush’s “freedom agenda” legacy. Ambassador Edward Gabriel, President and CEO of The Gabriel Company, LLC, Stephen McInerney, Director of Advocacy for POMED, and Jennifer Windsor, Executive Director of Freedom House, spoke to these issues. POMED’s Executive Director, Andrew Albertson, moderated the event.

Panelists:

Amb. Edward Gabriel, President and CEO of The Gabriel Company, LLC, where he advises multinational corporations on international affairs and domestic policy, and former U.S. Ambassador to Morocco.

Stephen McInerney, Director of Advocacy for the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and author of the April 2008 article “The Bush Administration’s Budget and Democracy in the Arab World” in the Carnegie Endowment’s Arab Reform Bulletin.

Jennifer Windsor, Executive Director of Freedom House and former Deputy Assistant Administrator and Director of the Center for Democracy and Governance (now the Office of Democracy and Governance) at the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Moderated by Andrew Albertson, Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy

For POMED’s full notes on the discussion, click here.

Thursday, July 24, 2008
2:00 – 3:30 pm
Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2212

In Turkey, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) stands accused of undermining Turkish secularism and is currently embroiled in a legal case that could see the party closed down and its leading figures, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül, banned from party politics for five years. In what some are calling a “judicial coup d’état,” the legal case against the party is widely expected to succeed. Such an outcome would likely have far-reaching consequences not only for Turkey’s fragile democracy, but also for a variety of other countries and political actors across the Middle East.

Just how likely is it that the AKP will be shut down? What might the domestic consequences be for Turkey to see its ruling party closed down and the country’s democratically elected leaders removed from office? What impact could this have on the ongoing Israel-Syria negotiations facilitated by the AKP-led Turkish government? How might Turkey’s bid to join the European Union be affected? How would the banning of the AKP be viewed by other political actors across the region? How has the United States reacted to the closure case, and what effects could this issue have on both U.S.-Turkish relations and on the credibility of American efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East?

Please join us for a panel discussion with:

Abdullah Akyuz, President of TUSIAD-US, the United States office of the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. He was previously the Executive Vice-Chairman of the Istanbul Stock Exchange.

Bulent Aliriza, Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Director of CSIS’s Turkey project. He was previously a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and also served as a diplomat in New York and Washington.

Ömer Taşpınar, Professor of National Security Strategy at the U.S. National War College and Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, where he directs Brookings’ Turkey Project. He is also the author of the 2005 book, Political Islam and Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey.

Moderated by Stephen McInerney, Director of Advocacy, Project on Middle East Democracy

As the most populous Arab country, Egypt has long played a unique role in the Middle East and has been an important U.S. ally in the region. Egypt was also seen as a key focal point of the Bush administration’s “freedom agenda,” with U.S. pressure to reform hailed as leading to political openings by 2005. However, more recently, the Egyptian government has taken a series of regressive steps with regard to respect for human rights and the rule of law.  Numerous political activists and dissidents remain in Egyptian prisons on dubious charges, including former presidential candidate Ayman Nour and members of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Most recently, leading political reform activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim was sentenced in absentia to two years in prison on charges of “tarnishing Egypt’s reputation.”

What is the extent of Egypt’s regression on human rights and rule of law? What actions has the Egyptian government taken in this regard? Against what political backdrop are such steps being taken? What has been the role of the Egyptian judiciary in this regard? What are the consequences of such steps on the Egyptian political scene and the prospect for stability in Egypt? How has the U.S. government reacted to the deterioration of the rule of law in Egypt? What policy options are available for addressing these issues?  And what may we expect in the months and years ahead in Egypt?

Panelists:

Michele Dunne, Senior Associate and Editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of the September/October 2008 article “A Post-Pharaonic Egypt” in the American Interest

Neil Hicks, International Policy Advisor for Human Rights First and former Director of the Human Rights Defenders Program

Marc Lynch, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where he teaches courses on Middle Eastern politics and international relations

Ambassador Nicholas Veliotes, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt and Jordan

Moderated by Stephen McInerney, Director of Advocacy, Project on Middle East Democracy

Event Details:

Wednesday, September 10, 2008
2:00 – 3:30 pm
Cannon House Office Building, Room 210

Click here to read a summary of the event

Click here to view a video recording of the event

On July 28th, POMED and the Heinrich Böll Foundation released a new publication, The Federal Budget and Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010: Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East, written by POMED’s Director of Advocacy Stephen McInerney.  McInerney presented the report’s findings, launching a discussion with Thomas Melia of Freedom House and Marina Ottaway of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Andrew Albertson, Executive Director of POMED, moderated.

McInerney highlighted the report’s key conclusions, that the Obama administration’s first annual budget requests significant increases for overall foreign assistance to the Broader Middle East and North Africa, including large increases for democracy and governance assistance.  These increases are especially focused in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, but the remaining countries and programs in the region also receive increased democracy and goverance funding, with the notable exceptions of Egypt and Jordan.

Tom Melia warned against drawing conclusions too broadly based on budget numbers alone, and he asked whether this budget can truly be seen to represent the approach of the new administration, which has yet to fill many key positions, including the administrator of USAID.  Marina Ottaway questioned the effectiveness of spending large sums of money on democracy and goverance programs in the region if they are unaccompanied by diplomatic pressure and other policy support.

Click here for POMED’s notes on the event, or continue reading below:

Stephen McInerney began by arguing that the numbers in the FY2010 foreign operations budget indicate the priorities of the Obama administration. This assuaged prior fears that the administration would distance it self from democracy promotion to avoid any policy echoing the parlance of President Bush. McInerney highlighted the report’s main conclusions:

• The budget request contains large increases for democracy and governance across the broader Middle East and North Africa. The proposed funding for the region ($1.54 billion) is more than double the FY2009 request.

• Democracy and governance funding comprise 14 percent of total assistance for the region, the highest percentage yet.

• The most dramatic increases in funding for democracy and governance will be to Afghanistan and Pakistan, which includes a tenfold increase in aid to civil society groups. This signals that the administration’s priorities in these countries are not limited to military operations, but will also focus on building government institutions and supporting independent civil society actors.

• Increases for civil society are seen in the Arab world, where funding for civil society is cut by 29 percent, and is cut most severely in Egypt and Jordan. This demonstrates that the administration, while committed to funding for democracy across the region as a whole, is shifting toward working directly with governments.

• The budget contains robust funds for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), both signature initiatives of the Bush Administration that have shown success after initial difficulties.

• In recent years, Congress has granted less than requested for MCC and MEPI. The appropriations process shows that this Congressional outlook has changed and that Congress is more amenable to granting funding under the Obama Administration.

• McInerney also examined the Near East Regional Democracy Fund (NERD), introduced in March. At the outset, NERD funds will be directly particularly toward Iran, but the program will enjoy a great deal of flexibility, allowing it to adapt readily to conditions on the ground and shift funds elsewhere as necessary.

Tom Melia reviewed his observations about the budget request, noting his hesitation in drawing large conclusions about policy from budget numbers. Nevertheless, he conceded that the request conveys to domestic and international audiences U.S. public diplomacy and foreign policy priorities.

Given the twin crises in Honduras and Iran, Melia asserted that President Obama’s appreciation for democracy has “crystallized” a conclusion that elections by citizens matter, even if the victor is a party with a platform unaligned with U.S. interests. But he warned that well-intentioned civil society aid in the Middle East that is traced back to Washington can undermine the credibility of civil society actors the U.S. is trying to help.

Melia focused on the budget request’s major funding for USAID initiatives, asking who at USAID—where there are many vacant political appointments—wrote the budget request. He questioned whether the request actually signals a shift in policy or if it is political inertia continuing from the previous administration.

In reference to the request’s Governing Justly and Democratically category, Melia commented that major increases in the war zones in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq amount to 47 percent of all global GJD spending. While this demonstrates a focus on democracy in important post-conflict countries, it also draws funding away from successful democracy promotion programs in other countries. The policies are counterintuitive, claimed Melia, as aid is going to war zones with bad democratic records rather than to key allies such as Jordan and Egypt.

Marina Ottaway questioned how effective the funds for democracy and governance allocated to the Middle East are, in light of the closing of political space across the region in recent years. Doubting whether outside funding could successfully trigger domestic reform, she emphasized the “closure” of any sort of the “Arab Spring” that was heralded five years ago.

Attempting to gauge U.S. policy in the Middle East under the Obama Administration, she argued, is much like “reading tea leaves.” Ottaway nevertheless agreed with McInerney’s description of an emphasis in state-to-state relations. When it comes to democracy promotion, however, the relationship of society to the state must also be taken into account. When we ask governments to make “confidence building” steps toward accountability and reform, which requires massive concessions from their perspective, the U.S. cannot then pressure them to simultaneously cooperate with the U.S. For example, in Egypt, the U.S. has dropped democracy promotion efforts to enhance its relations with the regime, she claimed.

“Closure” in the Middle East political landscape, in conjunction with a U.S. diplomatic track focusing on state-to-state relations, means that funding for democracy programs are unlikely to have much impact, she argued. Optimists will endorse democratic aid nonetheless, continuing to “wave the flag of democracy” in all weather, but pessimists, she said, think it is a waste of time.

Andrew Albertson asked the panelists what they hoped to see in the budget request for next year. Melia expressed hopes that the FY2010 funds will be praised as having been “spent well,” while Ottaway insisted that a clearer statement of U.S. policy priorities for democracy beyond the request will be necessary. McInerney noted that he hopes to see further increases in democracy and governance spending accompanied by diplomatic and policy tools, as well as a reversal in cuts to democracy and governance funding in Egypt and Jordan and to independent civil society actors.

The Project on Middle East Democracy and the Safadi Foundation USA hosted an event to discuss the implications of “connection technologies” for U.S. foreign policy. The year 2009 witnessed an explosion of Internet-based activism in the political cultures of the Middle East. The Use of information and communication technology (ICT) has been a transformative tool in strengthening civil society and expanding the outreach of independent voices. What types of U.S. assistance are needed to empower young reformers committed to non-sectarian politics? What is the role of ICT in promoting inter-faith dialogue and peace building? To answer things questions, Mona Yacoubian, Director of the Lebanon Working Group at USIP, moderated a discussion featuring Jared Cohen, a member of Secretary Clinton’s Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State. Elias Muhanna, the other expected panelist and publisher of the widely read blog www.qifanabki.com, was unable to attend due to the recent birth of his daughter.

For full notes in PDF, click here. Otherwise, continue reading below.

Jared Cohen opened by chronicling the massive proliferation of ICT in the Middle East over the last seven years. “The Middle East has the second fastest growing internet market in the world,” he reported, “and one of the fastest growing cell phone markets.” Noting the significant generation gap between demographic usages of technology, Cohen stressed that young people in Lebanon and elsewhere “will learn to use [these technologies] more innovatively than others” – a dynamic which may present new opportunities for U.S. policymakers.

Although he conceded that “technology doesn’t itself choose sides and can be used for good or bad,” Cohen suggested that it would be unwise for the U.S. to withdraw from this emerging space out of fear that ICT can be used for nefarious purposes. “Technology is impacting civil society,” he said. “It’s not changing how big it is, but rather how visible, expansive, and inclusive it is.” For that reason, and with the understanding that young people increasingly share a universal ICT language, he urged a much more serious engagement in this area in order to influence and perhaps even control the orientation of these forces. Groups like Hamas and Hezbollah aren’t shy about using these tools to recruit and disseminate propaganda, and Cohen sees the need for a counterweight to push back and provide similar tools to those who strongly disavow extremism.

“Where does this leave us in the context of U.S. policy?” he asked. “It used to be that when we talked about new media, it meant using technology to connect people with information, which is great for things like government advocacy and messaging. The second stage was social media – connecting individuals with each other – and that started to impact how the U.S. thought about civil society. It impacted the sort of democracy assistance we gave to grassroots organizations; connecting traditional grants with non-traditional civil society entities that wouldn’t even exist without technology. The third phase of this development was connection technologies – the larger universe of technologies — which provided a way to connect to people, resources, and other forms of information simultaneously. There’s not a single part of U.S. policy toward Lebanon that should not have a connection technology element.”

Cohen also insisted that both traditional and non-traditional civil society entities can learn from each other’s expertise – “I’ve always said that the 20th century could use a swift kick in the butt from the 21st century, and the 21st century could use a swift kick in the butt from the 20th century.”

With that said, he does see some challenges in how the U.S. can integrate technology vis-à-vis Lebanon. But he thinks that if the U.S. truly wants to provide better access to various social services to defuse the power of extremist groups, it needs to work with NGOs to make ICT more accessible.

Perhaps most importantly, Cohen contends that emerging technologies and social media facilitate a free exchange of ideas, empowering individuals in ways they wouldn’t be otherwise and allowing them to hold officials accountable for their actions. And as it relates to violent extremism, “If connection technology is an increasingly used tool by Hamas and Hezbollah, there’s no reason not to try to influence this space.”

Following Cohen’s presentation, Mona Yacoubian shared what she believes are three crucial points:

1. We need to understand this as a value-neutral tool, not a transformative force – in order for them to facilitate an agenda or ideology, there need to be the following preexisting conditions: a vibrant civil society; an engaged public; and a government that, even if not pro-reform, is not capable of quashing reform.
2. Emerging media can also be a force for ill, helping to accelerate authoritarianism and religious extremism.
3. With respect to Lebanon and sectarianism, it’s important to be aware of the power of emerging media to entrench sectarianism as well.

In a response to a question about the wisdom of U.S. officials continuing to use radio and television even though those mediums are increasingly competitive, Cohen insisted that policy-makers need to focus upon dissemination – “if no one sees it, it doesn’t matter,” meaning that if emerging technologies are more easily accessible to large swaths of the population, those tools need to be prioritized. He also addressed a question on technology in the Palestinian territories by proposing a plan for “micro-engineering loans,” which would encourage people and companies in the U.S. to request coding services from anyone around the world, particularly in the W. Bank and Gaza where there’s an abundance of talented software engineers looking for work.

Cohen also addressed the issue of online chat rooms serving as forums for radicalization, saying that while it’s certainly a concern, at least it’s happening in the public domain “where people can monitor and stop it.” He pointed to an organization in Great Britain that enters these forums to provide a counterbalance and pitch moderate views, but conceded that there’s no perfect solution. Nonetheless, he maintained that the prerequisite for U.S. ICT support “should not be whether individuals like our policies or not – it should be whether they are pro- or anti-extremism.” Sometimes the most credible people are adamantly opposed to our policies, he said, but we need to empower them as voices of moderation to provide counter-narratives.

The Project on Middle East Democracy and the Heinrich Böll Foundation co-hosted an event on Capitol Hill to mark the release of a new publication, The Federal Budget and Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2011: Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East. What are the most significant changes in these portions of the budget request, as compared with the appropriations made in previous years? How does the budget impact U.S. efforts to support democracy in the Middle East and North Africa?

Featuring:

Click here for POMED’s notes in PDF, or continue reading below.

Michele Dunne opened by praising Stephen McInerney for his work in producing a “very satisfying document,” one which reflects the true understanding that democracy promotion is not only about the money, but about how these programs interact and whether they reinforce or contradict each other. The report, Dunne said, does a tremendous job interpreting “the signal that the U.S. is sending to people in the Middle East – to reformers, oppositionists, young people – about where the U.S. stands in terms of democracy and human rights.”

Dunne then handed off to McInerney, who detailed particular points interest or significance within the report, and delineated a few conclusions derived from the administration’s FY11 budget request. A thorough summary of these findings can be found here.

Next, Geneive Abdo spoke about the broader issue of civil society programming through the lens of funding directed toward Iran. She observed that the “tension in the Obama administration is to not destroy relationships with regimes while also supporting democracy – this tension is most acute as it regards Iran.” Obama’s early overtures toward Iran created a lot of confusion internally. The government didn’t know how to respond to the way that the U.S. attempted to reconfigure the relationship: downplaying the commitment toward civil society, and thereby downplaying the democracy promotion component of U.S. policy that was so prominent under President Bush.

More specifically, Abdo referenced the Near East Regional Democracy (NERD) program, which addresses the issue of Internet freedom in Iran, among other countries. She highlighted one particularly poignant line in the report – which emphasizes that the decision by the Obama administration not to specifically earmark funding for Iran has some advantages, as it allows the administration flexibility to adapt to changes on the ground in Iran – to argue that the NERD program has enabled the administration to fund what it deems to be more effective. Because the regime invests vast amounts of money to severely limit online access, NERD is a very smart effort by the administration to address very specific civil society issues without bringing on the “same sort of baggage” as democracy promotion policies. Abdo believes that there is a real practical application about how the NERD funding can be used.

Shifting the discussion to the relationship between budget and policy priorities, Scott Carpenter contended that it’s still unclear to determine how strongly the administration prioritizes democracy funding relative to other forms of aid. Like the other panelists, he was rather concerned with the drastic reductions in democracy assistance funding to Egypt from FY 2006 to FY 2011 (specifically between FY08 and FY09). And even for countries with increased assistance, Carpenter worried that the nature of the bilateral assistance – specifically that it must be coordinated with internal ministries of social cooperation – might dilute some of the power of civil society and democracy programming. “It’s important to consider how those relationships are being structured,” he said, “to make sure that how the money is being used isn’t working against either our interest or their interest.”

Programs matter, Carpenter said, only to the extent that they are in support of policy – and policy needs to be directed toward expanding/enabling those programs to have an impact. “So they need to work hand in hand. Simply saying that you’re going to spend money on something, and are therefore making it a priority… I disagree with that assessment to some extent.”

He then highlighted five points that either pleased or startled him:

1. He was pleased with the administration’s decision to consolidate its support for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). “They’ve appointed real leadership to it (in the form of Tamara Wittes), they’ve increased the budget for it. So MEPI is here to stay.” However, he noted that the budget increases for MEPI are still very small, and he expected to see much larger funding given the president’s rhetoric on strong Muslim-world engagement.
2. An area of concern, he said, is that aid is “increasingly going out of business in the democracy area,” meaning that democracy promotion funding is being slowly removed from bilateral channels (USAID) under the argument that MEPI is more equipped to handle such responsibilities. However, Carpenter believes that MEPI simply isn’t being given the resources necessary to accomplish those goals – he insisted that it’s important to continue having programming through USAID since it’s still the biggest administer of aid in our foreign policy apparatus.
3. Peace and security funding makes up over three-fourths of the total Near East request. With regard to Iraq, the fact that we are significantly increasing military funding while cutting the Governing Justly and Democratically objective by half is rather concerning.
4. Although support for Internet freedom is way up – which is great – it should not cause us to ignore the “real world.” For example, Carpenter feels that the U.S. should be heavily engaged in the draft NGO law under discussion in Egypt.
5. Continuing on Egypt, Carpenter argued that the orientation of the Obama administration’s relationship with Egypt is fairly instructive for the broader Middle East. Because a transition is likely, sooner rather than later, cuts in civil society programming are problematic, as is the notion of ceasing support for “non-registered” NGOs. The “genuflection to this idea of a Mubarak endowment” may be problematic as well, since it would largely remove congressional oversight on massive amounts of funding designated for Egypt.

Next Dunne asked McInerney about the Obama administration’s shift toward giving governance assistance as opposed to civil society or political competition assistance. McInerney responded that this shift has somewhat been reversed in FY11, but not enough to nullify the larger reallocation one year ago. He thinks that it’s not entirely a conscious effort by the administration to prioritize governance aid over other programs, but this FY11 request “doesn’t do enough to dispel some of those concerns.” He also acknowledged a comment from a USAID representative who defended the cuts in civil society funding for Egypt as simply the result of much broad cuts in all economic aid to Egypt from FY08 to FY09. McInerney explained that, while accurate, this assessment doesn’t account for the Bush administration’s programmatic plan in 2009 that sought to preserve democracy and civil society funding disproportionately over other programs that were to be cut. The Obama administration changed this plan, he said, which meant that civil society and democracy promotion funding was cut alongside other elements of the budget.

In response to a question regarding the role of the U.S. and the National Endowment for Democracy in monitoring the upcoming Egyptian elections, McInerney argued that the NED has fairly strong support, but it’s unclear how actively involved it will be in the upcoming elections. If the draft NGO law is passed, that will tremendously increase Egypt’s restrictions on an already heavily restricted NGO community.

One audience member asked if military spending for Egypt is a “sacred cow,” to which McInerney replied that military aid to Egypt has been constant at $1.3 billion every year since 1987, and it’s now part of a 10-year agreement that began in 2008. With regard to restrictions on NGOs in Egypt, Carpenter maintained that the U.S. government shouldn’t be focused as much on programs, but rather on policy – “saying clearly to Egyptian officials that this is something the president is very concerned about.”

McInerney responded to a question about the West Bank and Gaza by reporting that democracy programming has increased overall, particularly for institutions within the Palestinian Authority. “Generally speaking,” he said, “there’s a perception there’s been in some senses progress on rule of law in the two territories, but maybe a deterioration with regard to human rights.” This reflects the notion that the administration has focused more on rule of law and less on human rights and political expression.

Finally, a representative from the Egyptian embassy challenged earlier assertions about Egypt’s Emergency Law and draft NGO legislation, saying that there is little evidence that the 6 April Youth protesters were arrested under the Emergency Law or that the government is making the NGO law a priority. Carpenter responded that “from political perception point of view, whenever such arrests take place, emergency law issues always come up. So in the context of Mubarak’s own campaign pledge, we’d think that maybe he’d want to have a deliverable for the Egyptian people [of a new anti-terrorist law].” On the NGO law issue, Carpenter noted that no one from the ruling NDP has publically stated opposition to the legislation. And when we see these kinds of leaks, it’s natural to see a huge reaction from the human rights community because it fits with a pattern of behavior.

Over the last several months, Washington has voiced growing concerns that Turkey, under the leadership of its AKP government, may be turning away from the West.  The country’s foreign policy moves in 2010 – partnering with Brazil to co-sponsor an alternate nuclear deal with Iran and threatening to cut ties with Israel after the Gaza flotilla raid – have prompted heated discussions about its regional alignments.  At the same time, domestic developments, including the ongoing “Ergenekon” trial of retired military officers and the recent lawsuit against the Dogan media group, have raised questions about the country’s political trajectory.  The government’s proposed constitutional amendments, to be voted on next week, have only added fuel to the fire of this debate.  Critics have gone so far as to claim that after years of positive democratic development, Turkey’s current leadership is making the country less democratic.

The purpose of this event is to focus on Turkey’s political development.  Do the government’s domestic moves represent efforts to further entrench rule of law or a new quest to undermine it?  What is the state of civil and political liberties in the country today? And how would the proposed constitutional amendments impact Turkey’s political development?

Featuring:

POMED’s full notes continue below or read them as a pdf.

The panel focused on recent political developments in Turkey and explored recent concerns in Washington that Turkey, under the leadership of its AKP government, may be turning away from the West. The passage of a series of constitutional amendments on September 12th has added fire to a host of debates about the future of Turkey’s government and policy, both domestic and foreign. Panelists were asked to address the state of civil and political liberties in the country, as well as how the new constitutional amendments might affect Turkey’s political future.

In her prepared remarks, Gonul Tol contended that recent claims that Turkey is turning eastwards are simplistic and cliché. She asserted that Turkey is in many ways closer to the West than ever before, and pointed out that while considerable attention is paid to Turkey’s improved relations with Iran, little is said about Turkey’s improved relations with Serbia or other European states. She cautioned against assuming that Turkish leaders make decisions based merely on ideology, rather than national interests.

Tol said that it is important to look at the changing internal dynamics in Turkey. Although strained relations with some of its neighbors historically meant that the security establishment was the most influential actor in Turkish government, new regional dynamics have changed Turkey’s security perception. She asserted that Turkey now stresses the civil side of the civil-military balance and has prioritized the use of soft power in foreign policy. This has meant the de-militarization and de-securitization of Turkey’s relations with other states.

In addition, Tol recommended that observers not put too much stock in superficial debates about Turkish ideology. Turkey-Israel relations, for example, are based on Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, and Tol pointed out that any Turkish government would oppose attacks on Palestinians or, in another example, a military strike on Iran. She stressed that Turkey’s foreign policy reflects changes in the region, not changes in ideology. She seemed optimistic that the current leadership wants to build a more democratic Turkey – although there are still shortcomings in areas such as minority rights, Turkey is more democratic than it was 10 years ago. Tol concluded that “Turkish democracy is on the right track,” and that Turkish leaders have the same goals as Western ones, including seeing a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and arriving at a just peace of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Daniel Brumberg spoke next, and he also expressed the sense that Turkey is better off today than in the past, but that there are still some worrisome trends taking place in the country. He asked whether Turkey is more liberal today, as well as whether the recent constitutional amendments contribute to or undermine the liberalization of Turkey. Brumberg noted that democracy flourishes best when there is a clear and unified conception of national identity, and that governance becomes difficult when political winners and losers are defined along cultural or ethnic lines. In the Middle East, Brumberg asserted, societies are “profoundly divided,” and debates about the role of religion in government pervade the region. He outlined three models of how states manage difference: 1) through autocracy or totalitarianism, by which one group completely represses the other; 2) through liberalized autocracies, in which there are surface-level political processes, channels for self-expression, and elections, but in which the ruling party is always guaranteed to win; and 3) through the liberal democratic model. In the Middle East, Dr. Brumberg asserted, the dominant model is the liberal autocracy model.

He asked whether the new constitutional amendments will undermine the balance of power in Turkey, as well as whether they will have an overall liberalizing effect. Although the answer is yet to be seen, Brumberg indicated that recent events point to reasons to be concerned: for instance, the Turkish government has been aggressive in prosecuting and repressing dissent.

Next, Ambassador Pearson expressed confidence that the Turks can and will solve any domestic disagreements that they might have. He argued that recent developments in Turkey represent fundamental changes in Turkish politics, and that Islam has been a growing force in the domestic sphere for decades. The Kemalist revolution was, Pearson stressed, truly revolutionary in that it created a totally new national identity and narrative. Although the original spirit was deeply democratic, however, he noted that Kemalists began acting as a more elite cadre over time. The September 12th vote on a series of constitutional amendments, in Pearson’s view, represented a genuinely democratic move because they were generally free and fair, and there were no charges of fraud.

Pearson also reminded the audience that the U.S. understanding of internal dynamics in Turkey comes largely through the military establishment, since that is the group with which the U.S. government speaks. Pearson outlined four factors that he thinks will affect the future of Turkish politics: 1) The Kurds will try to broaden their base; 2) Institutions will need to adapt – specifically, Pearson asked what will happen in schools and the courts; 3) The anti-Americanism and even some anti-Semitism that exists in Turkey is harmful for democracy and may reveal broader trends that will hinder Turkey’s liberalization; and 4) Turkish leaders will continue to strive for EU membership.

Looking forward, Pearson predicted that Prime Minister Erdogan wishes to lead the government and will seek to become president in the 2012 elections or beyond. He also indicated that the AKP might propose a completely new constitution and use that constitution as a platform for the next elections. Pearson ended with a recommendation for U.S. policymakers: to support “a good opposition” in Turkish politics, so that alternative voices can be empowered to offer better ideas to Turkish voters.

In the question-and-answer session, Schneider asked whether any part of the referendum vote was undemocratic. Pearson responded that one shortcoming was that there was no thorough explanation of each of the 26 amendments to voters, and Tol stated that some of the amendments may be detrimental for separation of powers in the Turkish government (for example, the granting of additional executive control over the judiciary). She added that judicial impartiality is essential in Turkey, especially since Turkish courts have shut down political parties in the past. Brumberg, similarly, suggested that the courts may merely become an apparatus of the executive branch. Later in the question-and-answer session, an audience member brought up that although there was no evidence of fraud during the vote, the government has increased control over the media – to this, Pearson responded that media control was also a source of concern, both in general and in the run-up to the referendum.

Schneider also asked whether Turkey can be considered a model for democracy in the region, or an exception. Brumberg responded that Turkey is unique and should not necessarily be held up as the model of a liberal, democratic model in the Middle East. He argued that every state’s political system is path-dependent, and that Turkey should be analyzed in light of its unique history and development. Tol and Pearson responded, similarly, that Turkey is a unique case, and Pearson added that calling Turkey a model for democracy in the region would distort the role that Turks actually seek to play in the Middle East.

Schneider also asked whether the U.S. should be concerned about the referendum in terms of the implications it might have for the role of religion in Turkish politics. Tol noted that religiosity is on the rise globally and that Turkey is no exception. However, the emergence of a new identity that involves religion should not be perceived as threatening to the U.S. Brumberg said that the exact role of religion in the Turkish government will be determined by the ruling party – as such, we will have to wait and see what factions win out, and how internal decisions about the party’s identity and platform play out in policy.

One audience member asked whether the new constitutional amendments strengthened civilian control of the military, as well as minority rights. Tol responded that it is a shortcoming of the constitutional reforms that they do not address minority rights; the amendments do, however, empower civilian courts, and hold military courts more accountable.

Overall, the panelists’ remarks provoked thoughtful discussion and provided a fruitful launching point for understanding the current political dynamics in Turkey, as well as how Turkish domestic and foreign policy might develop in the near future.

For POMED’s full notes, continue below or click here for the pdf.

Nawara opened his prepared remarks by providing basic context for the current parliamentary elections. Over previous decades, while much has changed on the surface the “same people and same mechanism” have remained in place, Nawara said.  The Egyptian political process is a carefully scripted play in which the outcome is predetermined. Since the 2005 election, there has been an increase in social activism in Egypt. The judges, labor, and youth movements have all grown and the involvement ofMohammed ElBaradei has invigorated the liberal opposition. During the same period, however, the government has become more sophisticated in its ability to crackdown on the activists. According to Nawara, the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) shrewdly crushed the liberal opposition while allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to participate. This has allowed the Mubarak regime to argue in the West that “it is either us or them.”

Nawara then turned to the argument about the proposed election boycott. Those against the boycott say that participation is the only possible “positive action,” will expose electoral fraud, and will allow opposition parties to engage the population and train activists. Also, in their view, the boycott is unlikely to work and will simply make the government’s job easier. Proponents of the boycott, which Nawara said he is, argue that opposition parties should not participate in what they know will be a flawed process. Abstention will delegitimize the outcome and regardless of how many seats the opposition wins, the parliament itself is basically just a rubber stamp for the Mubarak regime. To be clear, Nawara said, the boycotting parties are not advocating for complete inaction and plan to engage in acts of civil disobedience, e.g. the formation of a parallel parliament.

Both sides face one significant question: what should they do the day after the election? For those that boycott, two key issues will be restoring trust among the opposition parties and making sure that social activism translates into campaigns that actually have the power to change political institutions. The parties that participate, on the other hand, face other challenges. Corruption and vote buying are normal, oppression by state security is widespread, and opposition parties generally face a host of “independent” challenger who are actually back by NDP.

At the end of the day, Nawara said, even if the elections are technically perfect, it would mean very little in the Egyptian context. NDP has designed a system where even if the opposition wins seats in parliament, any attempts to play a real role in the political process will be stymied. Nawara feels that the Obama administration has yet to settle on a strong strategy for how to deal with Egypt. “We have to be confident that there are alternatives,” to NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood he said, adding that U.S. can uses positive incentives to motivated Egypt to open its political process. Seeking stability through the Mubarak regime is not in the U.S.’s long-term interest.

In his remarks, Mohamed described the challenges facing domestic electoral monitors in Egypt. Election monitoring is not new to Egypt, he said. During the 2005 election, local monitors played an active role in the election. Since then, civil society organizations have exerted pressure on the government to expand election monitoring efforts and ostensibly the government has obliged; the process surrounding domestic monitoring efforts has improved significantly. The issue, however, will be implementation. For example, it is unlikely that more than 10% of the election monitors who apply for government credentials will receive them. According to Mohamed, the Egyptian government must also amend the law to codify the rights of electoral monitors to enter and inspect polling places.

Egyptian election monitors face two significant challenges, Mohamed said. First, there is very little information about the registration process, where the polling places will be located, and a host of other important issues. Second, cooperation between the high electoral commission and civil society remains problematic. According to the law, election officials must cooperate with local election monitors, but thus far they have not been forthcoming. For example, it is very likely that of the thousands of electoral monitoring permits civil society organizations have applied for, only a few hundred will be filled and those that are will probably only be approved hours prior to the election.  Moreover, police oppression is still a huge issue. This year, registration will take place in police stations and it is highly likely that those election monitors attempting to observe the process will be rebuffed, have their equipment confiscated, or worse.

In his response, Albertson made two points: First, we must look at the Egyptian parliamentary election in the regional context. This fall, Jordan and Bahrain are also holding elections. What we see when we look at these three countries is that authoritarian regimes are using an ever evolving arsenal of weapons to clamp down on freedom of association and information before elections. Interestingly, we also see that some countries in the region have been more open to international election monitors than others. Lebanon, Jordan, and Sudan for example, have opened their doors to international monitors, while Egypt and Bahrain have refused.

Second, Albertson said that “we need to crush the myth about Egyptian non-participation.” If we put ourselves in the Egyptians shoes, we begin to see how hard participation is. Alternative voices have largely been eliminated, there is little information about candidates or their platforms and voters must go police stations to register, a highly unpleasant experience by any measure. Far too often U.S. officials excuse the behavior of the Mubarak regime by saying that the Egyptian population has some sort of innate aversion to political participation.

Dunne then opened the floor for questions. The first questioner asked how Mohamed felt about international election monitors and if he ever consults with international organizations. Mohamed responded that he believes international monitors could play an important role in the election, first by providing the world with a clear picture of the political environment in Egypt, second by giving support to domestic monitors, and finally by making it harder for the Egyptian government to rig the elections. There has been some discussion in the government about allowing some sort of low level election monitoring like in 2005 when representatives from embassies and international NGOs were allowed to visit polling places briefly. Mohamed added that international monitoring organizations have provided excellent training for Egyptians monitoring NGOs. Today Mohamed’s election monitoring alliance has over 12,000 monitors prepared to observe the election.

Another questioner asked Nawara what he thought the Obama administration should do to motivate Egypt to change. Nawara responded that the U.S. must develop a package of positive incentives for the Egyptian government including partnerships and special trade agreements that are predicated on political reforms. According to Nawara, this deal would be similar to Turkey’s EU accession process.

Next, an audience member asked where the line was between helpful international assistance and meddling in Egypt’s internal politics. Mohamed responded that while he clearly supports Egypt’s sovereignty, free and fair elections are an international norm and thus when the international community works to promote them in Egypt, it does not constitute meddling, as some in the Egyptian government argue.

In closing, Albertson said that it is important to remember that elections are fundamentally about accountability and the Egyptian government has failed to be accountable to its citizens. The Mubarak regime has not brought about development and Egyptians want real change. The question for the international community is how to play a role in this process. “We can’t stand on the sidelines,” Albertson said, adding that we must stand up and declare what we care about and what we stand for. Dunne added that how the U.S. handles the parliamentary election will almost certainly have implications for next year’s presidential election and ultimately the transfer of presidential power, however that occurs.