When Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) became Saudi Arabia’s crown prince in 2017, he pledged that the kingdom would no longer “waste another 30 years of our lives dealing with extremist ideas.” He vowed to move Saudi Arabia toward a more “moderate” Islam that would empower women, modernize society, and loosen the grip of the ultra-conservative Saudi religious establishment. Western policymakers and media have embraced the narrative. Yet nearly a decade later, that promise rings hollow. The recent appointment of Saleh al-Fawzan as Saudi Arabia’s new Grand Mufti—a hardline Salafist cleric notorious for his sectarian and violent rhetoric—exposes the illusion of the crown prince’s reform narrative. Far from curbing extremism, MBS has simply reengineered the religious establishment to serve his rule. 

A Rebranded Alliance, Not a Reformed One

Saudi Arabia’s political structure remains deeply intertwined with Wahhabism—a puritanical, literalist, state-sponsored interpretation of Sunni Islam that has shaped the kingdom’s identity since its founding. The alliance between the ruling Al Saud family and the Wahhabi religious establishment was built on mutual legitimacy: state clerics provide the monarchy with religious authority, while the monarchy safeguards the clerics’ dominance over social and religious life.

Despite MBS’s claims, that alliance has not been dismantled; but instead, it has been redesigned. The religious establishment no longer operates as a semi-independent moral authority, but as a political tool to suppress dissent, manufacture religious consent, and validate royal decrees. Clerics who demonstrate loyalty to MBS are promoted, while those who call for reform or pluralism are silenced. 

In this reconfigured system, “moderation” is defined not by tolerance or reform, but by obedience to MBS. What MBS has created is an authoritarian theology that sanctifies his political dominance under the veneer of combating extremism.

Who is Saleh al-Fawzan?

The elevation of Saleh al-Fawzan to Grand Mufti exemplifies this transformation. Al-Fawzan, a long-time member of the kingdom’s highest religious bodies and someone who MBS has described as a father figure, has declared publicly that Saudi Shia are non-Muslims and has endorsed violence against dissenters. In 2018, just weeks before the murder of Saudi journalist and U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi—an operation the then-U.S. Director of National Intelligence concluded was ordered by MBS—al-Fawzan issued a fatwa calling for the killing of dissidents. Al-Fawzan’s predecessor, Abdelaziz al-Sheikh, was similarly notorious, once justifying violence against the Shia minority and calling for churches in the Arabian Peninsula to be destroyed.

Together, the two men represent the continuity—not the dismantling—of an ultra-conservative religious establishment that remains deeply intolerant, misogynistic, violently sectarian, and politically subservient. 

By rewarding figures like al-Fawzan, MBS has made clear his campaign against extremism is selective. Hardline Salafist scholars who affirm his power thrive while moderates who challenge it and call for political openness are crushed. 

Reformist Scholars Under Threat

Among those silenced is my father, Dr. Salman al-Odah, one of Saudi Arabia’s most respected reformist scholars. He was arrested in 2017 for a tweet calling for reconciliation with Qatar during Saudi Arabia’s blockade of the country. One of the charges against him is that he deviated from “traditions of the country’s recognized scholars”—in other words, that he disagreed with the official clerical line. My father also spearheaded a group that supported a 2011 petition demanding Saudi authorities fight corruption, support democracy and civil liberties, and release political prisoners.

Another prominent reformist, historian Hassan Farhan al-Maliki, was also detained in 2017 for his outspoken criticisms of Wahhabism and his support for freedom of religion. One of the charges against him is insulting the official religious establishment that MBS claims he is curtailing. Both men, my father and al-Malki, face the possibility of the death penalty for their outspoken views.  

Their persecution reveals the real nature of MBS’s so-called war on extremism: it’s not about religious ideology, but political control. Reformist scholars who advocate for democratic principles represent an independent moral authority and therefore a threat to MBS’s absolute rule. 

Authoritarian Theology in Modern Garb

The appointment of Saleh al-Fawzan as Grand Mufti is not an isolated clerical reshuffle; it is the culmination of MBS’s authoritarian theology. By empowering ultra-conservative clerics who legitimize state violence and suppress reformists, MBS has entrenched a model of governance that fuses absolute political control with selective religious legitimacy.

MBS’s modernization project thus represents not a rupture with Wahhabi conservatism, but its evolution into a new form: one that trades independent religious authority for obedience to power. The result is a dystopian reality with the allure of social progress, where women can drive, concerts can flourish, and cinemas can reopen—but public thought, religious debate, and political conscience remain under siege.

As long as figures like Saleh al-Fawzan define Saudi Arabia’s religious establishment, MBS’s moderation will remain a myth, and Saudi Arabia’s deepening authoritarianism will continue to be concealed beneath a glittering facade of reform.

Photo credits: Saudi Press Agency and Youtube