

President Trump's Third Foreign Affairs Budget

Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights
In the Middle East and North Africa in FY20

— JUNE 2019 —



Andrew Miller
Seth Binder
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The Project on Middle East Democracy is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to examining how genuine democracies can develop in the Middle East and how the United States can best support that process. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, we aim to strengthen the constituency for U.S. policies that peacefully support democratic reform in the Middle East.

CONTENTS

Acronyms	1
Executive Summary	2
Introduction	4
The Big Picture: U.S. Assistance for the Middle East and North Africa	6
<i>Economic Support and Development Fund</i>	7
<i>Foreign Military Financing Loans vs. Grants</i>	8
<i>Department of Defense</i>	9
Major Initiatives: Multi-Country Accounts and Programs	10
<i>Office of NEA Assistance Coordination and the Middle East Partnership Initiative</i> . .	10
<i>Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor</i>	11
<i>Near East Regional Democracy Program</i>	13
<i>National Endowment for Democracy</i>	14
A Closer Look: Assistance by Country	15
<i>Egypt</i>	16
<i>Iraq</i>	21
<i>Jordan</i>	25
<i>Lebanon</i>	29
<i>Libya</i>	32
<i>Morocco</i>	35
<i>Syria</i>	38
<i>Tunisia</i>	42
<i>West Bank and Gaza</i>	46
<i>Yemen</i>	50
Appendix: Data Tables	54

ACRONYMS

CBJ	Congressional Budget Justification
DRL	Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State
ESDF	Economic Support and Development Fund
ESF	Economic Support Funds
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
GJD	Governing Justly, Democratically
HACFO	House Appropriations Committee on Foreign Operations
HFAC	House Foreign Affairs Committee
IMET	International Military Education and Training
INCLE	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MEPI	Middle East Partnership Initiative, U.S. Department of State
MRA	Migration and Refugee Assistance
NADR	Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
NEA	Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State
NEA/AC	Office of Near East Affairs Assistance Coordination, U.S. Department of State
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NERD	Near East Regional Democracy
RRF	Relief and Recovery Fund
SACFO	Senate Appropriations Committee on Foreign Operations
SFRC	Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SFOPS	State and Foreign Operations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

President Donald Trump's third international affairs budget request reminds one of the movie "Groundhog Day." His administration's Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 request, as with the previous two iterations, calls for significant cuts in the assistance funded by the State and Foreign Operations appropriations bill. The top-line request of \$42.8 billion is a startling 21.3 percent lower than what Congress authorized for the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in the FY19 Consolidated Appropriations Act.¹ Particularly concerning are the proposed cuts of more than 50 percent to democracy and governance programs and 34 percent to humanitarian assistance worldwide.²

As in the last two years, Democrats and Republicans in both the House of Representatives and the Senate have resoundingly rejected the administration's FY20 request, pledging to pass a bill that funds the international affairs budget at close to prior-year levels. Capturing the reaction from key members of Congress on both sides of the aisle, Representative Hal Rogers (R-KY), the ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee on Foreign Operations (HACFO) and normally a staunch supporter of President Trump, called the request "detached from reality."³

Yet, it seems clear that the Trump administration will continue to lowball the international affairs budget, irrespective of the inevitable congressional reaction. At one level, this is not surprising, in light of Trump's deep skepticism about U.S. foreign aid and the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad. On another level, however, it is not obvious what the administration is trying to accomplish by continuing to propose budget cuts that Congress will quickly reject. Perhaps these budgets are mainly a political gesture designed to appeal to the president's base, which also tends to be deeply skeptical about foreign aid. Another possibility is that Trump is using inadequate budget proposals to lower expectations about the budget of the State Department and USAID, hoping to shift the political discourse around foreign aid to pave the way for major cuts down the road.

KEY FINDINGS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (MENA):

Trump's FY20 budget request continues the longtime trend of devoting more U.S. foreign aid—\$6.6 billion—to MENA than to any other region of the world. Of the total assistance sought for MENA, the requests for Israel and Egypt alone account for 71 percent of that amount.⁴

1. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Fiscal Year 2020," U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/FY-2020-CBJ-FINAL.pdf>

2. "Review of the FY 2020 USAID Budget Request," House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 8, 2019, <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy-2020-usaid-budget-request>; "STRIKE THREE: Once Again International Affairs Programs Slashed, Out of Step with Today's Global Realities," U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, March 11, 2019, <https://www.usglc.org/media/2019/03/USGLC-FY20-Budget-Analysis.pdf>

3. "Hearing on the Fiscal 2020 Budget Request for the State Department," House Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations, March 27, 2019, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?459006-1/secretary-state-pompeo-testifies-house-appropriations-sub-committee>

4. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020."

However, the FY20 request for MENA is a 6 percent reduction from the FY19 request, and an 11.5 percent reduction from the FY18 enacted level of \$7.4 billion.⁵ By contrast, President Barack Obama's last two annual budget requests for MENA assistance were \$7.6 billion for FY16 and \$8.6 billion for FY17.⁶

The FY20 budget request continues the trend of militarizing U.S. foreign assistance, proposing \$5.3 billion in security assistance for MENA, which is 80.9 percent of the total request for the region, and up from 77.7 percent in the FY19 budget request. By contrast, the FY20 request for democracy assistance, at \$196 million, is 30.3 percent lower than in FY19.⁷

The FY20 request seeks the full \$1.3 billion in FMF funds for Egypt, the same level it has received since FY87. Moreover, in July 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo released the \$195 million in FY16 FMF funds for Egypt that Secretary Rex Tillerson had withheld due to human rights and other concerns.⁸

The administration once again has proposed a substantial cut for Tunisia, even though Congress preserved robust assistance levels for the democratizing country in the FY19 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Trump's \$86.4 million FY20 request for Tunisia is 64.2 percent lower than the \$241.4 million Congress appropriated in FY19.⁹

Trump's FY20 budget zeros out all assistance to the West Bank and Gaza, except for \$35 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding, as part of his administration's effort to force the Palestinian Authority to re-engage with the "deal of the century." The administration had requested \$251 million in total aid for the Palestinians in FY19.¹⁰

Trump's FY20 budget request envisions major assistance cuts for Syria and Iraq. The administration calls for zeroing out all non-humanitarian aid to Syria, consistent with Trump's stated preference that other countries should be responsible for reconstruction in the war-torn country. The FY20 request would cut total aid to Iraq by 59.2 percent, as compared to the FY19 congressional appropriation of \$406.6 million.¹¹

5. *Ibid.*

6. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix Three: Fiscal Year 2016," U.S. Department of State, February 27, 2015, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/238222.pdf>; "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix Three: Fiscal Year 2017," U.S. Department of State, February 9, 2016, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/252734.pdf>

7. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020."

8. "Fact Sheet - Human Rights Conditions on U.S. Military Aid to Egypt," Project on Middle East Democracy, August 17, 2018, <https://pomed.org/fact-sheet-human-rights-conditions-on-u-s-military-aid-to-egypt/>

9. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020."

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*

INTRODUCTION

Pledging to restore the “swagger” of the U.S. diplomatic corps after Rex Tillerson’s disastrous management of the U.S. Department of State, Mike Pompeo was initially greeted with optimism as Donald Trump’s second secretary of state. Defenders of a more robust international role for the State Department hoped that Pompeo, who took office in April 2018, would use his close relationship with Trump to advocate for the department and its interests. Pompeo has succeeded in lifting the department’s hiring freeze, in engaging with staff at Foggy Bottom and embassies around the world, and in improving morale, at least to some degree.

But with regard to the State Department’s budget, Pompeo has been a disappointment. President Trump’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 request for the international affairs budget, the first fully developed budget proposal under Pompeo’s leadership (at the time he took up the post, the FY19 request had already been prepared), continues the pattern of proposing reckless cuts to U.S. foreign aid and diplomacy that began under Tillerson.¹² For the third consecutive year, the administration has asked Congress to make major reductions in the international affairs budget.

Although Pompeo’s FY20 request of \$42.8 billion is slightly more than the FY19 request of \$41.8 billion, it is nevertheless a full 21.3 percent lower than the \$54.4 billion Congress appropriated in the FY19 Consolidated Appropriations Act. To put it into perspective, the proposed cut to the State Department’s FY20 budget is the largest of all cabinet-level agencies, and about 15 percent

less than the Barack Obama administration’s last two annual budget requests. As will be described at greater length in the following section, Trump has also decreased his request for foreign assistance for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region by 6 percent from last year and for MENA democracy aid in particular, which his budget slashes by 30.3 percent.

The good news is that, just as with the administration’s first two budget requests, Congress is expected to reject the FY20 request on a bipartisan basis. In the Senate, Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations (SACFO), bluntly told Pompeo that “we’re not going to approve this budget,” which he called “insane.”¹³ Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), the ranking member on SACFO, noted that Pompeo would not have been able to “lift that hiring freeze if we had accepted the president’s FY19 proposal.”¹⁴ For his part, Pompeo insisted to Congress that “this budget will achieve our key diplomatic goals.”¹⁵ Although Pompeo has claimed to support a robust State Department, there is no evidence that he worked behind the scenes to lobby the White House for more funding for his agency.

Congress should be commended for defending the international affairs budget from the Trump administration’s continued assaults. Were it not for the efforts of Democrats and Republicans in both chambers, the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) would not have anything close to the resources they need to promote U.S. interests abroad. Unfortunately, however, President Trump’s proposed budget cuts, even

12. The international affairs budget in appropriations parlance is called the Function 150 account. As a House of Representatives document explains, Function 150 “covers U.S. international activities, including: operating U.S. embassies and consulates throughout the world; providing military assistance to allies; aiding developing nations; dispensing economic assistance to fledgling democracies; promoting U.S. exports abroad; making U.S. payments to international organizations; and contributing to international peace-keeping efforts. Agencies in this function include the Departments of State, Agriculture and Treasury; the United States Agency for International Development; the Broadcasting Board of Governors; the Peace Corps; and the Millennium Challenge Corporation.” The Secretary of State submits the annual budget request for all these agencies.” <https://budget.house.gov/sites/democrats.budget.house.gov/files/documents/Focus%20on%20Function%20150%20FINAL.pdf>

13. “Hearing on USAID Fiscal 2020 Budget Request,” Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations, April 9, 2019, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?459622-1/secretary-state-pompeo-testifies-fiscal-year-2020-budget-request>

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*

though they have been dismissed out of hand, are still causing damage to U.S. foreign policy in at least two ways.

First, the administration's refusal to provide meaningful information about its request to lawmakers has led to a breakdown in communications between the Executive Branch and Congress. The State Department provided less country- and program-specific budget information in its Congressional Budget Justification (CJ), a supplementary document from each agency that is supposed to explain and make a more detailed case for the President's overall federal budget request, than it has in past years. This shortcoming makes it hard to divine exactly what the department is trying to achieve with the money it wants from Congress. Indeed, one congressional staffer interviewed for this report described the president's request as "meaningless." By presenting funding requests with little information, the administration is forfeiting the opportunity to convey important information about its plans and needs that could—and should—shape congressional deliberations. These actions or, more accurately, inactions complicate legislative oversight for foreign assistance while impairing long-range planning.

The second problem, as Congressman Eliot Engel (D-NY) observed, is that the administration's budget "tells our diplomatic . . . workforce that their efforts are not valued."¹⁶ Proposing to further slash the budget of the State Department and USAID not only damages morale in those agencies, but also has direct implications for implementation of U.S. foreign aid. President Trump's obvious skepticism about foreign aid, particularly about democracy assistance, sends a signal to the State Department bureaucracy about his administration's priorities. The proposed slashing of many foreign assistance accounts empowers those within the system who are hostile to such programs to obstruct certain new projects or initiatives. For example, one State Department official interviewed for this report explained that it had become virtually impossible to get U.S. embassies in his region to

sign off on programs that could create friction with host governments. What this means is that, even if Congress continues to appropriate higher levels of assistance, there is no guarantee that funds will be spent in the way appropriators intended, if at all.

In spite of the seemingly arbitrary nature of President Trump's approach to the foreign assistance budget, there is still value in analyzing his requests. The administration's request reveals its priorities. Comparing requests year-on-year can help to elucidate changes in the administration's priorities over time. Comparisons between the President's request and Congress's appropriations, moreover, highlight important policy differences between the executive and legislative branches.

This report describes the portion of Trump's FY20 international affairs budget request that pertains to security and economic assistance for the MENA region. Regarding security assistance, the report focuses on Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR). For economic assistance, we discuss the Economic Support Fund for MENA (which includes aid both for economic development and for governance, human rights, and democracy building), and to a lesser degree, international disaster and migration and refugee assistance.

The information and analysis presented here is drawn from a variety of sources, including analysis of all relevant budget documents and legislation; interviews with current and former executive branch officials and congressional staff; and discussions with a wide range of other relevant actors, such as regional experts and representatives of development and democracy promotion organizations involved with U.S. aid to the region. The following sections provide an in-depth analysis of the trajectory of U.S. foreign assistance in MENA in recent years, with an emphasis on U.S. aid to support human rights and democracy.

16. *Ibid.*

THE BIG PICTURE: U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

The MENA region made out relatively well in President Trump's first two foreign affairs budget requests, as this region was spared the most dramatic cuts that were requested for Europe, Eurasia, and the Western Hemisphere. Unfortunately, Trump's FY20 budget request breaks this pattern by proposing a more significant reduction in aid to MENA. The president's \$6.6 billion request for the region is \$423 million less than in FY19, a 6 percent proposed cut year-over-year. When the FY20 request is compared to what Congress actually allocated in FY18, the last year for which full data is available, the proposed FY20 cut would amount to a full 11.5 percent reduction.

Yet, the president's top-line request for MENA obscures the depths of the cuts he is proposing. The \$6.6 billion request is inflated by the requests for Israel and Egypt, which are two of the three largest recipients of U.S. assistance globally. When these two countries are excluded from the totals, the FY20 request for all other MENA countries is actually 18.2 percent lower than the FY19 request and *a whopping 35.1 percent lower* than what Congress appropriated in FY18. From this perspective, it is clear that Trump is proposing sweeping aid cuts to most of MENA, bringing the region into line with the major reductions contemplated for other parts of the world.

The FY20 request also seeks to intensify the dominance of security assistance—at the expense of economic aid—in the MENA foreign aid budget. Such securitization is a longstanding problem that predates President Trump's election, but his administration has accelerated this trend by consistently proposing MENA aid budgets that are even more lopsided in favor of military- and security-related funding. While the administration's request for the Peace and Security objective—the category for military

and security aid—of \$5.3 billion is slightly smaller than in FY19, the percentage of regional aid dedicated to security climbed from 77.7 to 80.9 percent.


Conversely, the FY20 request slashes funding for the Governing Justly, Democratically (GJD) objective for MENA—the category for democracy-related aid—by 30.3 percent, from \$281.6 million to \$196.2 million.¹⁷ Overall, funding for the GJD objective takes up only 3 percent of the administration's total MENA request (in FY19, it was 4 percent). The administration's cuts to democracy aid in the FY20 request are not limited to the Middle East and North Africa: Trump's budget proposes slashing global democracy aid by more than 50 percent, underscoring the low priority his administration has attached to the support of democracy abroad.

The administration's proposed cuts to aid would not only reduce the level of non-military U.S. involvement in the MENA region, but also limit its own flexibility to address unanticipated developments. In Algeria, for instance, the country's ongoing political transition following the resignation of autocratic President Abdelaziz Bouteflika could afford new opportunities for U.S. engagement. The bare-bones nature of Trump's budget, both for MENA and the wider world, however, leaves little room for surging resources in response to breaking developments. In such an environment, the administration would have to go back to Congress for additional funding, a time-consuming exercise that works against a rapid U.S. response.


The following sections describe a number of changes proposed in the Trump administration's FY20 request for MENA that could have a significant effect on U.S. assistance, including military aid and democracy assistance, to the region.

17. For FY20, the administration has renamed GJD to Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DR); for this report, however, we have retained the traditional nomenclature.

MENA REQUEST BY OBJECTIVE in millions of dollars



MENA TOTAL ASSISTANCE BY OBJECTIVE in millions of dollars




ECONOMIC SUPPORT AND DEVELOPMENT FUND (ESDF)

For the third year in a row, the Trump administration has requested to consolidate the Economic Support Fund (ESF); Development Assistance (DA); Democracy Fund (DF); and Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and

Central Asia (AEECA) accounts into a single Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF). According to the CBJ, the proposed consolidation would help “[streamline] accounts and [prioritize] foreign assistance to better advance U.S. interests, target the challenges of a new era of great power competition, and support reliable strategic

SECURITY VS. NON-SECURITY BILATERAL ASSISTANCE, FY20 REQUEST



and diplomatic partners.”¹⁸ But, as in the two previous years, the effort to consolidate these accounts will almost certainly be rejected by appropriators. Members of Congress fear that, by combining distinct accounts into a single fund, they will be granting the administration more discretion to de-fund areas it deems less important but that Congress continues to prioritize, such as democracy and governance programming. This concern is only heightened by the fact that the president’s total request for ESDF in FY20—\$5.2 billion—is \$2.7 billion less than the \$7.9 billion Congress appropriated for its constituent accounts in FY19.

FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING LOANS VS. GRANTS

Last year, the administration dropped its request to replace nearly all Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants with loans after it was resoundingly rejected by Congress for FY18. For FY20, the administration is once again seeking a substantial FMF loan program, but, in contrast to FY18, is presenting the loans as

a complement to, rather than a replacement of, the FMF grant program. Administration officials interviewed for this report explained that they see a need for a third option between grants and arms sales, particularly for middle-income countries who may be considered “too wealthy” for grant assistance but not wealthy enough to afford purchasing expensive weapons systems outright. The administration has requested \$8 billion in loan and loan guarantee authority in FY20, which would allow the State Department to negotiate loans backed by the U.S. government up to that amount.¹⁹ The CBJ notes that “while the full range of partners that may be interested in FMF loans in FY 2020 is not yet known,” Tunisia has explicitly requested a \$500 million loan to purchase U.S. manufactured light attack aircraft.²⁰

From the perspective of Congress, however, the administration’s claim that it views FMF loans as a complement to grants is belied by the fact that its FY20 FMF grant request (\$5.4 billion) is significantly less than the \$6.1 billion Congress appropriated in FY19. President Trump’s FY20 request, moreover, includes only

18. “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Fiscal Year 2020,” U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/FY-2020-CBJ-FINAL.pdf>

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*

14 countries, as compared to the 53 countries that Congress identified as recipients for FMF grants in its FY19 appropriation. In addition, the administration has not explained why a new FMF loan program would be more successful than the previous iteration in the 1980s, which ended with \$26.4 billion in outstanding loans, leaving appropriators who remember those failures highly skeptical.²¹ Congressional staffers interviewed for the report also expressed concern that the administration, which has sought to increase U.S. arms sales, would abuse the loan program to “sell more” weapons at the expense of other vital U.S. national security interests.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Although the focus of this report is on foreign assistance administered by the State Department and USAID, the Department of Defense (DOD) increasingly plays an important role in the funding and implementation of foreign aid. While the administration continues to request dramatic cuts to Function 150 foreign assistance—the international affairs budget—it has sustained large requests for the Department of Defense’s “security cooperation” budget. For example, the \$9.2 billion FY20 request is only 2 percent below the FY19 request. Ninety-four percent of the FY20 security cooperation request is for building the capacity of foreign partners through the “provision of defense articles and services” and support for counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq,

and Syria.²² The request also includes \$123 million for humanitarian assistance and \$115 million in education and training activities for foreign militaries.²³

While the request does indicate that three-quarters (\$7 billion) of the total security cooperation request is intended for the U.S. Central Command theater of operations—69 percent of which is for the Afghan security forces (\$4.8 billion)—DOD does not provide a complete accounting for where the remaining funds will be allocated.²⁴ Based on the available information, it appears that the bulk of assistance for the MENA region would go to the Levant. The department has requested \$745 million for the Iraqi security forces and \$300 million for the Vetted Syrian Opposition (VSO) through the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund.²⁵ According to officials interviewed for this report, Lebanon and Jordan are expected to receive most of the assistance for the region in the Section 333 global train and equip account, the \$1.2 billion funding request of which is a 14 percent reduction from FY19. Government officials noted in interviews for this report that efforts are underway to “think longer-term” and to develop a “more fulsome planning process” both to better align DOD programs with State Department accounts such as FMF—which also provides equipment and training to partner militaries—and to better incorporate the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation program required under the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

21. “Security Assistance: Foreign Military Sales Debt Refinancing,” NSIAD-89-175. U. S. Government Accountability Office, August 16, 1989, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/220/211598.pdf>

22. “Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 President’s Budget Justification for Security Cooperation Program and Activity Funding: March 2019,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2019, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/FY2020_Security_Cooperation_Book_FINAL.pdf

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*

25. “Justification for FY 2020 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO): Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund (CTEF),” U.S. Department of Defense, March 2019, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/FY2020_CTEF_J-Book.pdf

MAJOR INITIATIVES: MULTI-COUNTRY ACCOUNTS AND PROGRAMS

OFFICE OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS ASSISTANCE COORDINATION (NEA/AC) AND THE MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE (MEPI)

The State Department's Office of Assistance Coordination in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA/AC) was established in 2014 to improve coordination of all State and USAID-managed foreign assistance for the MENA region provided through the Function 150 account of the international affairs budget. NEA/AC's origins lie in the State Department's Office of the Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions, which the Obama administration created in 2011 to coordinate the U.S. assistance response to the Arab uprisings. As described in previous editions of this report, during the tenure of former Assistant Secretary of State for NEA Anne Patterson, NEA/AC absorbed the Office of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), a State Department assistance program established during the George W. Bush administration to promote political and economic reform. MEPI's website currently describes its mission as supporting "governments and their citizens to achieve shared political, economic and stability objectives."²⁶

NEA/AC's coordinating function remains important in light of the array of State and USAID offices involved in implementing assistance projects in the MENA region and the value of prioritization and deconfliction of possible overlapping or duplicative efforts. The office's collaborators in and outside of government, however, give its performance in this area mixed reviews. One USAID official interviewed for this report praised NEA/AC's coordination function over the past year, calling the relationship between USAID and NEA/AC "vastly improved." A representative of a democracy-promotion organization receiving U.S. funding, however, expressed frustration with NEA/AC, saying that it seems as if its "job is to say no" to project ideas proposed by grantees and others. Moreover, as

reported in last year's report, NEA/AC's role in administering MEPI, one of the programs funding and overseeing assistance projects in the region, undermines NEA/AC's role as a neutral arbiter.

MEPI continues to operate in a very challenging environment in the MENA region and in Washington, with diminishing support from the administration. Trump's FY20 request of \$14.5 million is both a 24.4 percent reduction from his FY19 request of \$19.2 million, and the lowest request for MEPI since its establishment more than 15 years ago.²⁷ When compared to the FY19 congressional appropriation for MEPI of \$50 million, the Trump administration's FY20 request, if enacted, would constitute a 71 percent decline in MEPI's annual budget. While U.S. government support for MEPI began to decline during the Obama administration due to the difficult regional climate, this trend has accelerated sharply since President Trump took office. The Trump administration has made no secret of its skepticism toward democracy promotion, and MEPI, which was created to support indigenous political development in the MENA region, faces many obstacles in justifying its existence with the current leadership.

As discussed in last year's report, MEPI has sought to rebrand itself to appeal more to President Trump's interests, in particular by focusing more on economic projects. The administration's FY20 request envisions directing 58.6 percent of MEPI's annual budget, or \$8.5 million, to economic growth programs, leaving less than half of the request for the type of democracy and governance programs that were once the initiative's staple.²⁸ Indeed, from its founding until a recent refocusing, the main mission of MEPI was to promote economic, educational, and especially political reforms through supporting MENA citizen and civil society-led initiatives, even at times when such reform efforts were not welcomed by incumbent authoritarian regimes. Today, MEPI

26. "About MEPI," Middle East Partnership Initiative, <https://mepi.state.gov/about-mepi/>

27. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020," <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/State-and-USAID-Appendix-2.pdf>

28. *Ibid.*

MEPI FUNDS: REQUESTED VS. ACTUAL, FY11–20



* FY19 actual number indicates the appropriated amount rather than the actual allocated amount.

generally has moved away from funding explicit democracy and human rights-focused projects in most MENA countries, focusing instead on less controversial activities, and often shies away from supporting initiatives that host country regimes do not want or that are not carried out with local government counterparts. The FY20 Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) language captures this shift, saying that MEPI will “focus on regional initiatives that advance economic opportunities for women and youth in emerging markets and increase transparency in host government actions” and “address core U.S. economic interests by promoting business-enabling environments that increase opportunities for U.S. trade and investment.”²⁹

MEPI’s shift in most MENA countries away from supporting citizen-focused change to top-down, state-led programs that avoid political reform themes has elicited a strongly negative reaction within the U.S. democracy promotion community. (The exception is Tunisia, the Arab world’s only genuinely democratizing country, which offers a far more hospitable environment for a range of MEPI democracy-promotion activities, including those implemented by civil

society partners.) There is a growing sense that MEPI has all but abandoned potentially adversarial projects—especially those carried out with local independent civil society groups—that irk authoritarian host governments. But, as one representative of a democracy NGO told this report’s authors last year, “MEPI only works if it is antagonistic” toward authoritarianism and repression.³⁰ Another representative of a democracy promotion organization summarized the thinking of many in the community by describing MEPI’s current direction as “pretty discouraging.”

BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR (DRL)

The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) leads the State Department’s efforts to advance democratic institutions, human rights, and the rule of law. DRL is probably best known for its annual reports on human rights, child soldiers, labor, and international religious freedom practices. It also plays a critical role in implementing the Leahy Law, which prohibits the U.S. government from providing military

29. *Ibid.*

30. “President Trump’s Second Foreign Affairs Budget,” Project on Middle East Democracy, June 2018, https://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/BudgetReportFY19_Digital.pdf

assistance and training to foreign military and security units that commit gross violations of human rights, by conducting required vetting of potential recipients of U.S. security assistance. Importantly, DRL also funds and manages a variety of aid programs around the world and in MENA focused on democracy and governance, including support for independent civil society and programs designed to protect human rights.

In FY20, the administration's \$70.7 million request for DRL programs represents a 19.4 percent increase from the FY19 request of \$59.2 million, but remains a gaping 55.2 percent below the FY19 appropriation of \$157.7 million.³¹ By appropriating more than double what President Trump requested for DRL in FY19, Congress sent an unmistakable message about the importance it attaches to the bureau's mission. If anything, the Trump administration's low-ball budget requests appear to have provoked Congress into boosting its support for DRL. One State Department official interviewed for this report said that robust congressional support for DRL was critical at a time when the administration seems to be going out of its way to signal that it does not prioritize the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad.

Outside of the budget process, DRL's influence within the State Department remains uneven. Secretary Pompeo has engaged more with the bureau than did his predecessor, and he devoted time to personally reviewing some sections of the annual human rights report. According to a department official interviewed for this report, DRL's cooperation with the NEA Bureau remains fairly good at the working level, and NEA front office officials are open to DRL's recommendations. DRL's exclusion from the vast majority of interagency meetings, however, not only undermines its standing with the White House and other agencies, but within the State Department itself.

In the past year, DRL has inched closer to having a

full front office for the first time since the Obama administration. To handle the MENA region for DRL, Pompeo appointed a former West Point classmate, whose personal relationship with the secretary could afford the bureau greater influence. In June 2018, Trump nominated Robert Destro, a law professor at the Catholic University of America, to be DRL's new assistant secretary, pending Senate confirmation.³² Destro has a long history of advocating for the rights of Christian communities abroad, a key priority of the Trump administration, especially Vice President Mike Pence. Some observers have expressed reservations about Destro's nomination, however, pointing to his views on women's and LGBTQ rights.

The bureau continues to face challenges in implementing programs in the MENA region. Given the Trump administration's general indifference to democracy and human rights, U.S. officials abroad who prioritize improving relations with their host countries above all else have felt more free to kill DRL programs that could upset their interlocutors. One State Department official interviewed for this report said GJD programming is "still a tough sell with [foreign] posts," likening the process to "pulling teeth." The only exceptions to this pattern, this person said, are Iran and Syria, adversaries against whom "we should use human rights as a weapon."³³ According to the State Department official, "any idea is a good one" when it comes to these two countries.

While Congress can once again be expected to appropriate high levels of funding for DRL, the bureau will continue to face obstacles to asserting its views and implementing its programming. The revelation in June 2019 that Pompeo was creating a "Commission on Unalienable Rights" to provide "fresh thinking about human rights," to supplement or possibly supplant DRL's role, underscores the bureau's precarious position in the Trump administration.³⁴ Not only was this "human rights" body established without


31. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020," U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/State-and-USAID-Appendix-2.pdf>

32. "PN119—Robert A. Destro—Department of State," Congress.gov, 1/16/19, <https://www.congress.gov/nomination/116th-congress/119>

33. Nahal Toosi, "Leaked memo schooled Tillerson on human rights" Politico, December 19, 2017, <https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/19/tillerson-state-human-rights-304118>

34. Department of State, Public Notice, "Department of State Commission on Unalienable Rights," *Federal Register*, vol. 84, no. 104 (May 30, 2019): 10777, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-05-30/pdf/2019-11263.pdf>

DRL FUNDS: REQUESTED VS. ACTUAL, FY11–20



* FY19 actual number indicates the appropriated amount rather than the actual allocated amount.

the knowledge of DRL, but its focus on “natural rights,” a code word on the religious right for opposition to core human rights regarding gender and sexuality, seems antithetical to the bureau’s very mission. What is at stake in DRL’s continuing battle for relevance is the future of U.S. human rights policy, not just that of the bureau.

NEAR EAST REGIONAL DEMOCRACY FUND (NERD)

The Near East Regional Democracy (NERD) program provides funds for U.S. democracy and human rights programming directed toward Iran. Established as the Iran Democracy Fund in 2006 by the George W. Bush administration, the fund was rebranded as the NERD program in 2009 to make it appear less hostile to the Iranian government. Though Congress has not legally restricted NERD funding to Iran-related democracy programs, it is broadly understood that funding for the account is provided for that purpose.

NERD-funded assistance primarily goes toward projects and trainings meant to “foster a vibrant civil society, increase the free flow

of information, and promote the exercise of human rights.”³⁵ It places an emphasis on projects that build “the institutional capacity of indigenous civil society organizations” such as developing media content, promoting digital freedom, producing tools to ensure internet access, creating voter education tools, and training investigative journalists.³⁶ NEA and DRL share responsibility for programming NERD funds, with DRL responsible for 20 percent of the money according to one U.S. official’s estimate.

In both FY18 and FY19, the administration requested only \$15 million in funds for NERD, whereas Congress appropriated \$42 million and \$52 million in those respective years. In FY20, the administration request is \$40 million, still short of recent congressional appropriations but nevertheless much more closely aligned with them. The Trump administration’s newfound interest in supporting funding for NERD may be related to its overall Iran strategy, which aims to exert “maximum pressure” on the Islamic Republic to change its domestic and external behavior. As part of this campaign, President Trump has withdrawn the United States

35. “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal year 2020,” U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/State-and-USAID-Appendix-2.pdf>

36. *Ibid.*

from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); created the Iran Action Group at the State Department and the Iran Mission Center at the CIA to coordinate Iran-related activities; implemented an anti-propaganda initiative that funded controversial campaigns against journalists, think-tank analysts, and human rights activists; enacted broad economic sanctions; attempted to build an international coalition against Iran;³⁷ and deployed additional troops to the Persian Gulf.

While some Members of Congress have serious reservations about the administration's Iran strategy, it appears that Congress will likely once again exceed the president's NERD request. The FY20 House markup has again designated \$52 million for the NERD program. Notably, for the first time since FY15, the House of Representatives report accompanying its draft appropriations bill has not included language directing that "a portion of [NERD] funds be used to support programs to increase the participation of women in politics."³⁸

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY (NED)

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is an independent, nongovernmental institution "dedicated to the growth and strengthening of democratic institutions around the world."³⁹ It receives funding through Congress, where it has strong, consistent bipartisan support. The NED sub-grants a significant amount of its funding to four "core grantees," which include the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the Center for International

Private Enterprise, and the American Center for International Labor Solidarity.⁴⁰

For the second consecutive year, President Trump requested \$67.3 million in funding for the NED, which would constitute a cut of more than 60 percent from FY19 actual levels. The FY19 and FY20 requests were also a sharp reduction from previous administration requests, including the Trump administration's FY18 request, that were in the range of \$103-105 million. As reported last year, the State Department has acknowledged that it no longer wishes to fund the four core grantees or other 501(c)(3) organizations through the NED, preferring to fund them through USAID or DRL. Consistent with this view, the administration, in the FY20 CBJ, claims that the reduced funding level will "enable NED to continue to focus on smaller organizations, while providing grants in priority countries and regions."⁴¹

Congress, however, is unlikely to accept the administration's request. The FY19 Consolidated Appropriations Act granted \$180 million for the NED, a 6 percent increase from FY18 levels.⁴² The act, moreover, earmarked \$117.5 million to be "allocated in the traditional and customary manner, including for the core institutes," suggesting that Congress opposed the administration's attempt to eliminate NED support for core grantees, such as NDI and IRI.⁴³ Indeed, at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) hearing on the USAID FY20 budget, Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) said that the NED is "well worth our continuing to support."⁴⁴ And, in the FY20 House markup, the committee once again recommended \$180 million for the NED, demonstrating that congressional support for the NED and its traditional activities remains high.⁴⁵

37. Julian Borger, "US cuts funds for 'anti-propaganda' group that troll activists," *The Guardian*, May 31, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/may/31/us-cuts-funds-for-anti-propaganda-group-that-trolled-activists>

38. For more recent version of this text, see: "President Trump's Second Foreign Affairs Budget," Project on Middle East Democracy, June 2018, p. 57, https://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/BudgetReportFY19_Digital.pdf

39. "About the National Endowment for Democracy," National Endowment for Democracy, <https://www.ned.org/about/>

40. "Frequently Asked Questions," National Endowment for Democracy, <https://www.ned.org/about/faqs/>

41. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Fiscal Year 2020," U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/FY-2020-CBJ-FINAL.pdf>


42. U.S. Congress, House, "Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019" HJ Res 31, 116th Congress, 1st sess., introduced in the House January 22, 2019, <https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hjres31/BILLS-116hjres31enr.pdf>

43. *Ibid.*

44. "Review of the FY 2020 USAID Budget Request," United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 8, 2019, <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy-2020-usaid-budget-request>

45. U.S. Congress, House, "State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2020," HR 116-78 116th Congress, 1st sess., Committed to the House May 20, 2019, <https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt78/CRPT-116hrpt78.pdf>

A CLOSER LOOK: ASSISTANCE BY COUNTRY




EGYPT	16	MOROCCO	35
IRAQ	21	SYRIA	38
JORDAN	25	TUNISIA	42
LEBANON	29	WEST BANK AND GAZA.....	46
LIBYA	32	YEMEN	50

Most U.S. democracy and governance programs in the MENA region are funded through bilateral assistance accounts and are administered by USAID, which also oversees most bilateral aid to support economic development. There are currently six

USAID missions in the region: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and the West Bank and Gaza. The USAID mission in Yemen is closed due to the ongoing conflict. Libya does not have a formal mission, but USAID staff members work on the country from the U.S. embassy in Tunis while the U.S. embassy in Tripoli remains closed. USAID is planning to establish a full-fledged mission in Tunisia.

TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE REQUEST BY COUNTRY, FY20




The forthcoming sections describe U.S. assistance—including for GJD, economic reform and development, security assistance, and humanitarian aid—to these locations, along with assistance for Syria, which does not have a USAID presence. Syria has not traditionally been a recipient of U.S. assistance, but the United States now spends significant resources to address issues arising from the ongoing conflict in the country.




EGYPT snapshot

- Several amendments to the 2014 constitution allow President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to remain in power at least through 2030, strengthen his control over the judiciary, and empower the military to defend al-Sisi against threats to his rule. Despite Egypt's totalitarian turn, the Trump administration has only moved closer to al-Sisi's government.
- The president's budget request for Egypt is the second highest request globally behind Israel, and more than was sought in FY19.

TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE in millions of dollars



GOVERNING JUSTLY & DEMOCRATICALLY in millions of dollars



Figures for FY11–FY18 are actual levels, while those for FY19–FY20 are requested levels. Variance in numbers may occur due to rounding.

The human rights environment and political conditions in Egypt have continued to deteriorate since this report was last published. In the most important development of the past year, several amendments to Egypt's 2014 constitution that codify President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's personalist dictatorship were passed in a rushed April referendum orchestrated by the security services.⁴⁶ These amendments, which eliminate the last remaining democratic achievements of the 2011 popular uprising against Hosni Mubarak, allow al-Sisi to remain in power at least through 2030, strengthen his control over the judiciary, and empower the military to defend al-Sisi against any threats to his rule. Their net effect is to close off the possibility of a legal and peaceful transfer of power in Egypt, raising the risk of prolonged violence in the country.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, chronic human rights abuses persist, including the detention of tens of thousands of political prisoners,⁴⁸ the rampant use of torture, and allegations of extrajudicial killings.⁴⁹ Moreover, there has been a worrying uptick in the number and pace of executions, which is deeply problematic given the parlous state of Egypt's judicial system and the absence of fair trial guarantees.⁵⁰ In May 2019, Human Rights Watch published an extensive report on Egyptian security operations against the Islamic State branch in the Sinai, accusing the military and police of "committing serious and widespread

abuses against civilians" in what may "amount to war crimes."⁵¹ While several leading human rights defenders were released from prison following the completion of their sentences,⁵² the Egyptian government has used an obscure provision in the Criminal Procedure Code to require them to report to jail every evening, significantly abridging their freedom.⁵³

**“ DESPITE EGYPT'S
TOTALITARIAN TURN, THE
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION HAS
ONLY MOVED CLOSER TO
AL-SISI'S GOVERNMENT IN
RECENT MONTHS. ”**

Despite Egypt's totalitarian turn, the Trump administration has only moved closer to al-Sisi's government in recent months.⁵⁴ In the first two years of the Trump administration, the U.S.-Egyptian relationship was dominated by warm symbolism, but President Trump provided Egypt with few concrete deliverables. That appears to be changing, however, following al-Sisi's second visit to the Trump White House, on April 9. By hosting al-Sisi in the Oval Office just weeks before

46. Mohamed El Ansary, Mahmoud Farouk, and Ahmed Rizk, "Q&A - Between a Rock and a Hard Place: How Egypt's Constitutional Amendments Erode Judicial Independence," Project on Middle East Democracy, April 30, 2019, <https://pomed.org/qa-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-how-egypts-constitutional-amendments-erode-judicial-independence/>

47. "Fact Sheet - Egypt Under Pressure: Examining the Dangers of Proposed Constitutional Amendments," Project on Middle East Democracy, April 2019, https://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/190417_EgyptAmendments.pdf

48. "Press Release - Andrew Miller on 60 Minutes: 'This is the Most Repressive Government in Modern Egyptian History,'" Project on Middle East Democracy, January 8, 2019, <https://pomed.org/press-release-andrew-miller-on-60-minutes-this-is-the-most-repressive-government-in-modern-egyptian-history/>

49. "World Report 2019: Egypt," Human Rights Watch, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/egypt>

50. Amr Magdi, "Why Executions in Egypt are Skyrocketing and Why They Should End," Middle East Eye, March 24, 2019, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/why-executions-egypt-are-skyrocketing-and-why-they-should-end>

51. "Egypt: Serious Abuses, War Crimes in North Sinai," Human Rights Watch, May 28, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/28/egypt-serious-abuses-war-crimes-north-sinai>; "If You Are Afraid for Your Lives, Leave Sinai! Egyptian Security Forces and ISIS-Affiliate Abuses in North Sinai," Human Rights Watch, May 28, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/egypt0519_web3_0.pdf

52. Mohamed Abdellah and Mahmoud Mourad, "Eight Years After Uprising, Egyptians Say Freedoms Have Eroded," Reuters, January 24, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-anniversary-uprising/eight-years-after-uprising-egyptians-say-freedoms-have-eroded-idUSKCN1P11ZJ>

53. "Egypt Update - Sisi Announces Support for Palestinians," Project on Middle East Democracy, June 3, 2019, <https://mailchi.mp/pomed/egypt-daily-update-845693?e=8e9e92eefa>

54. "Fact Sheet - Egypt's Totalitarian Turn: Al-Sisi's Crackdown Deepens," Project on Middle East Democracy, May 2018, <https://pomed.org/fact-sheet-egypts-totalitarian-turn/>

the controversial constitutional referendum, and by saying that “he’s doing a great job,” Trump gave his implicit backing for the Egyptian president’s power grab.⁵⁵ Al-Sisi also apparently persuaded Trump to call the Egyptian-backed Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar, signaling a potential shift in U.S. policy toward the country’s conflict.⁵⁶ Multiple press reports, moreover, have suggested that Trump promised al-Sisi during the meeting that he would designate the Muslim Brotherhood, the latter’s mortal enemy, as a foreign terrorist organization, though this step had not happened as of publication.⁵⁷

“BY HOSTING AL-SISI IN THE OVAL OFFICE JUST WEEKS BEFORE THE CONTROVERSIAL CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM, AND BY SAYING THAT ‘HE’S DOING A GREAT JOB,’ TRUMP GAVE HIS IMPLICIT BACKING FOR THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT’S POWER GRAB.”

Regarding assistance, in July 2018 Pompeo decided to release \$195 million in FY16 FMF funds that his predecessor Rex Tillerson had suspended in August 2017, even though Egypt had not met the three conditions attached to the aid (curtailing military cooperation with North Korea, resolving the unjust 2013 convictions of 43 employees of U.S.-and-German-based NGOs, and reforming the draconian 2017 NGO Law).⁵⁸ Egypt’s highest appeals court subsequently exonerated the NGO employees in December

2018, but a new draft NGO law recently approved by al-Sisi’s cabinet would not fully address U.S. concerns regarding civil society freedoms and, if past is prologue, Egypt will escalate cooperation with North Korea as soon as the United States looks the other way. Rumors are circulating that Pompeo is also considering blowing through Senator Leahy’s informal hold on \$105 million in FY17 FMF funds, which is tied to his ongoing human rights concerns in Egypt.

Consistent with the administration’s support for continued U.S. aid to Egypt, the president’s budget request proposes \$1.4 billion, the second-highest request globally behind Israel and slightly more than was sought in FY19.⁵⁹ This figure includes \$1.3 billion in FMF funds, the same level Egypt has received since FY87,⁶⁰ to bolster its “capacity to maintain security and stability,” help it to “significantly degrad[e]” ISIS, to keep “the canal and airspace. . . open,” and to ensure that “Egypt’s borders are substantially reinforced,” among other objectives.⁶¹ While the Trump administration has overturned many of President Obama’s foreign policies, it has continued to implement the changes Obama introduced in how the United States provides military aid to Egypt. These changes include discontinuing Cash Flow Financing (the special financial mechanism through which Egypt was able to purchase defense articles, services, and sustainment in advance on the expectation of future-year FMF appropriations) and limiting Egypt’s purchase of new weapons and equipment to four categories: counterterrorism, border security, maritime security, and Sinai security.

According to the CBJ, the remaining \$82.3 million of the FY20 request, including \$75 million in ESDF funds, would “support a healthy, better-

55. “Egypt Update – Trump Administration Welcomes al-Sisi to Washington, DC,” Project on Middle East Democracy, April 10, 2019, <https://mailchi.mp/pomed/egypt-daily-update-845405?>

56. Samer Al-Atrush, “Trump Has a New Favorite Strongman in Khalifa Haftar,” Bloomberg Businessweek, May 3, 2019, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-03/trump-backed-libyan-strongman-haftar-holds-out-for-regime-change>

57. Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt, and Maggie Haberman, “Trump Pushes to Designate Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Group,” *New York Times*, April 30, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/30/us/politics/trump-muslim-brotherhood.html>

58. “Fact Sheet – Human Rights Conditions on U.S. Military Aid to Egypt,” Project on Middle East Democracy, August 17, 2018, <https://pomed.org/fact-sheet-human-rights-conditions-on-u-s-military-aid-to-egypt/>

59. “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020,” U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/State-and-USAID-Appendix-2.pdf>

60. *Ibid.*

61. “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Supplementary Tables: Fiscal Year 2020,” <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Supplementary-Tables-%E2%80%93-Foreign-Operations.pdf>

educated population,” “improve governance,” and “promote increased employment, economic growth, regional economic security, and U.S. commercial engagement.”⁶² One U.S. official interviewed for this report described assistance priorities for the coming year as economic growth, family planning, tourism, and the Egyptian American Enterprise Fund, the last of which will be supported exclusively with prior-year money. The same official estimated that about one-third of the economic aid will go to programs designed to increase Egyptians’ access to higher education. A former congressional staffer told the authors of this report that Egypt’s pipeline of unspent prior-year funds remains substantial, which reduces congressional willingness to appropriate a higher level of economic aid to Egypt.

As reported last year, Congress has grown increasingly skeptical of Egypt, even as the Trump administration has embraced al-Sisi’s government. Suggesting that this trend is continuing, HACFO has for the first time included conditions on 20 percent of the \$1.3 billion in military aid to Egypt in its FY20 markup.⁶³ This breaks the pattern of the last two years in which HACFO approved bills granting Egypt the full \$1.3 billion condition-free, while SACFO both reduced Egypt’s appropriation to \$1 billion and included robust human rights-related conditions on \$300 million of this funding. The case of April Corley, an American citizen who is seeking restitution for injuries she incurred during an errant 2015 Egyptian military strike on her tourist group, appears to have had a major effect on House members who previously were reluctant to place conditions on aid to Egypt.⁶⁴ The House markup not only ties 5 percent of the total amount of military aid conditioned in the bill (\$13 million) to the secretary of state’s

certification that Egypt has “provide[d] fair and commensurate compensation to American citizen April Corley for injuries suffered by Egyptian armed forces,” but also specifies that this condition—unlike the others—cannot be waived on national security grounds.⁶⁵ In another new development, the HACFO markup includes a condition related to Egypt’s constitutional referendum.⁶⁶

“CONGRESS HAS GROWN INCREASINGLY SKEPTICAL OF EGYPT, EVEN AS THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION HAS EMBRACED AL-SISI’S GOVERNMENT.”

SACFO almost certainly will continue to include conditions in its markup, expected to be released in July, ensuring that military aid to Egypt will remain conditioned in the FY20 budget. Senator Leahy, SACFO’s senior Democrat, remains a staunch critic of the Egyptian government, including its treatment of American citizens, repression of civil society, and potential misuse of U.S.-provided military equipment. The position of Senator Graham, the Republican chairman of SACFO, is somewhat less clear. One congressional staffer interviewed for this report said that while Graham has taken a tough stance on Egypt in recent years, he may feel compelled this year to soften the conditions on aid in recognition of the acquittal of the NGO workers, one of Graham’s central concerns vis-à-vis al-Sisi’s government. It is unclear how this perceived need to reward the Egyptians will manifest itself in SACFO’s markup, but it could mean that the

62. *Ibid.*

63. U.S. Congress, House, “Making Appropriations for Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2020, and for Other Purposes.” H.R. 2839, 116th Cong., 1st sess., May 20, 2019, <https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr2839/BILLS-116hr2839rh.pdf>

64. “American survivor of mistaken Egyptian military attack makes plea to President Trump,” CBS News, April 2, 2019, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/april-corley-american-injured-in-mistaken-egyptian-military-attack-calls-on-trump-to-hold-country-accountable/>

65. U.S. Congress, House, “Making Appropriations for Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2020, and for Other Purposes.” Congress has routinely given the secretary of state the option of waiving human rights conditions by certifying that it is in “the national security interest of the United States” to continue providing the conditioned aid to Egypt.

66. *Ibid.* The House’s markup requires the secretary of state to certify to Congress that the Egyptian government has taken steps to “adhere to the separation of powers and the rule of law, including constitutional limits on elected office and the role of the military in governance.”

Senate will no longer call for a cut to military aid or, alternatively, recommend less stringent conditions. Regardless of where Graham comes down, congressional concerns about Egypt are unlikely to subside and military aid will remain a contested subject for the foreseeable future.

“WHILE POMPEO LIFTED THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S HOLD ON THE \$195 MILLION IN FMF FUNDS TO EGYPT BEFORE IT COULD HAVE ITS FULL EFFECT, THE FACT THAT IT LED TO EGYPTIAN CONCESSIONS, HOWEVER MODEST, DEMONSTRATES THE POTENTIAL OF PLAYING HARDBALL WITH MILITARY AID.”

We continue to believe that military aid remains an important source of leverage over the Egyptian government, and urge Congress to use this tool in an attempt to modify al-Sisi’s policies. The exoneration of the NGO workers was a welcome and long-overdue step, but this does not fundamentally address the threats to U.S. interests posed by al-Sisi’s increasingly repressive

behavior, clumsy and ineffective campaign against the Islamic State in Sinai, or cooperation with problematic actors, whether Kim Jong Un or Khalifa Haftar. While Pompeo lifted the State Department’s hold on the \$195 million in FMF funds to Egypt before it could have its full effect, the fact that it led to Egyptian concessions, however modest, demonstrates the potential of playing hardball with military aid.⁶⁷

Three particular steps are in order. First, Congress should reduce military aid to Egypt in FY20 to no more than \$1 billion; this would both send the message to Egypt that U.S. assistance cannot be taken for granted and conserve American taxpayer money that the Egyptian military has been squandering on unnecessary items. Two, Congress should keep in place robust human rights conditions on at least 30 percent of total military aid to highlight U.S. concerns about Egypt’s domestic political environment. Third, we recommend that Congress refrain from giving the administration a national security waiver to suspend human rights conditions; as we have seen in Egypt and Yemen, President Trump has abused prior waivers, exercising them even when U.S. national security is not at stake. Success is not guaranteed if Congress institutes these measures, but we strongly believe they would give the U.S. government a stronger hand to play in its relations with Egypt.


67. Bryant Harris, “Trump administration releases another \$195 million in Egypt aid,” Al-Monitor, August 9, 2018, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/08/trump-administration-releases-egypt-aid.html>




IRAQ snapshot

- ISIS's territorial caliphate has been defeated, but in order to prevent the group, or a successor, from re-emerging Iraq will both have to rebuild liberated areas and find a way to address the grievances of marginalized populations.
- U.S. policy toward Iraq at this sensitive time is to support a strong, stable, and unified Iraq, including a prosperous and secure KRG. The Trump administration's specific policy steps, however, have at times seemed inconsistent.

TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE in millions of dollars



GOVERNING JUSTLY & DEMOCRATICALLY in millions of dollars



Figures for FY11–FY18 are actual levels, while those for FY19–FY20 are requested levels. Variance in numbers may occur due to rounding.

Iraq, and its people, are at a historic crossroads. ISIS's territorial caliphate has been defeated, but in order to prevent the group—or a successor—from re-emerging, Iraq will both have to rebuild liberated areas and find a way to address the grievances of marginalized populations. The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) that were critical to Iraq's victory against ISIS will have to be integrated into the Iraqi state and subjected to genuine civilian oversight. Persistent tensions between Kurdish national aspirations and Iraqi territorial integrity will have to be reconciled. The Iraqi government will also have to address growing popular frustration with corrupt, abusive, and inefficient governance, particularly in the country's Shi'a south. And all of this is playing out against a background of rising U.S.-Iranian tensions in the MENA region, in which Iraq is simultaneously both victim and culprit.

This would be a tall task for any government, much less the compromise government of Adil Abdul Mahdi that has had difficulty filling posts at the most important and politically sensitive ministries.⁶⁸ In this environment, there is a high risk that human rights issues will receive short shrift. Enforced disappearances, particularly against Sunni Arab males, remain a problem. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has violated freedom of assembly and expression during protests. As ISIS cells continue to perpetrate human rights abuses, the Iraqi judicial system has struggled to ensure free trial guarantees for suspected members of the group.⁶⁹

U.S. policy toward Iraq at this sensitive time is to support a strong, stable, and unified Iraq, including a prosperous and secure KRG. The specific policy steps that the Trump administration has adopted in pursuit of

this policy, however, have at times seemed inconsistent. The United States continues to provide strong support to the Iraqi military and the Peshmerga and, unlike with Syria, President Trump has not publicly threatened to withdraw U.S. forces. At the same time, the administration has closed the U.S. consulate in Basra, and drawn down U.S. personnel from the embassy in Baghdad for reasons that do not appear to be fully tied to the security environment.⁷⁰ President Trump's gaffes, such as suggesting that U.S. forces could conduct military operations in Syria from their base in Iraq and failing to meet with the Iraqi prime minister on a visit to the country, have strained relations.⁷¹

“THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO PROVIDE STRONG SUPPORT TO THE IRAQI MILITARY AND THE PESHMERGA AND, UNLIKE WITH SYRIA, PRESIDENT TRUMP HAS NOT PUBLICLY THREATENED TO WITHDRAW U.S. FORCES.”

This inconsistency reflects divergent views about how the United States can best pursue its interests in Iraq. On one side are officials who believe the U.S. government should go “toe-to-toe with Iran in Iraq” by sustaining high levels of investment there, as one official described it to the authors. Others, however, argue that the United States should be willing to walk away from Iraq, both to demonstrate to Iraqi officials that they cannot take U.S. support for granted and to conserve resources if the U.S. investment there is not paying off. Notwithstanding these differences,

68. Simona Foltyn, “Will Iraq's Old Divisions Undermine Its New Prime Minister?” *Foreign Policy*, February 5, 2019, <https://foreign-policy.com/2019/02/05/iraqs-prime-minister-faces-old-challenges-to-deliver-on-reform/>

69. “World Report 2019: Iraq,” Human Rights Watch, January 17, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/iraq>

70. Edward Wong, “U.S. Orders Partial Evacuation of Embassy in Baghdad,” *New York Times*, May 15, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/us/politics/us-iraq-embassy-evacuation.html>

71. Alissa J. Rubin and Eric Schmitt, “Trump's Plan for U.S. forces in Iraq Met with Unified Rejection in Baghdad,” *New York Times*, February 4, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/world/middleeast/trump-iraq-iran-reaction.html>; Ali Mamouri, “Iraqi Politicians Call to Expel US Troops Following Trump Visit,” *Al-Monitor*, December 28, 2018, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/12/iraq-us-trump-ain-asad-anbar.html>

most officials in the administration appear united in the belief that U.S. support for the Kurds should continue and that minority groups, particularly Christians, deserve American assistance.

Consistent with the administration's ambivalent position toward Iraq, President Trump's FY20 budget request seeks a sum that is substantial—\$165.9 million in total assistance—but still well short of the \$406.6 million that Congress appropriated in FY19.⁷² This request also represents a 17 percent decline from the administration's FY19 request, which can be explained by a \$34 million decline in the request for funding for the Peace and Security objective.⁷³ One Iraq analyst interviewed for this report said the reduction does not reflect flagging confidence in such programs, but instead a desire to get the total international affairs budget below a certain figure for domestic political consumption.

According to the CBJ, the administration's primary objectives for assistance to Iraq are ensuring the lasting defeat of ISIS and aiding in the country's recovery and reconstruction, particularly in minority communities.⁷⁴ One administration official interviewed for this report said that they see northern Iraq, where Kurdish, Christian, and Yazidi communities are concentrated, "as one of the rare cases of foreign assistance really being the answer." An Iraq analyst told the authors that the emphasis on northern Iraq made sense, but that the administration should be able to do more in other parts of the country as well. Speaking more bluntly, a representative of a democracy promotion organization said the focus on Christians, which is strongly supported by Vice President Mike Pence, was "not helpful from a development perspective" because NGOs were

being asked to advocate for groups with specific interests at times incompatible or divergent from national ones.

**“THE ADMINISTRATION'S
PRIMARY OBJECTIVES FOR
ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ ARE
ENSURING THE LASTING
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IN THE COUNTRY'S RECOVERY
AND RECONSTRUCTION,
PARTICULARLY IN MINORITY
COMMUNITIES.”**

In addition to bilateral Function 150 accounts, Iraq continues to receive substantial funding from multilateral funds and from the DOD budget. For instance, Iraq in FY18 received \$499 million in humanitarian aid for the 6.7 million people the UN assesses are in need of assistance.⁷⁵ Iraq is also eligible for support from the Relief and Recover Fund (RRF), a multilateral account dedicated to helping countries recover from ISIS, which has approximately \$750 million in unspent funds from FY17 and FY18, \$500 million of which is about to expire.⁷⁶ Unlike Syria, which is also eligible for RRF funds, Iraq can expect to receive some of this funding. One congressional staffer interviewed for this report said that the administration was not opposed to RRF funding in Iraq, but that internal State Department disagreements about which projects to fund have delayed notification. DOD has requested \$745 million in FY20 funding for

72. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020," U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/State-and-USAID-Appendix-2.pdf>; "Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY 2019 Budget and Appropriations," Congressional Research Service, March 12, 2019, <https://fas.org/srgp/crs/row/R45168.pdf>

73. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020,"

74. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Supplementary Tables: Fiscal Year 2020," U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Supplementary-Tables-%E2%80%93-Foreign-Operations.pdf>

75. "Fact Sheet - Iraq - Complex Emergency," USAID, April 5, 2019, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/iraq_ce_fs02_04-05-2019.pdf

76. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal year 2020,"

Iraq through the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund, including money to continue stipends for the Kurdish Peshmerga, but this is a 12.4 percent reduction compared to the administration's FY19 request.⁷⁷

“CONCERNED WITH THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S ABSENCE OF A CLEAR STRATEGY FOR STABILIZATION IN IRAQ, CONGRESS IS INCREASINGLY TAKING MATTERS INTO ITS OWN HANDS.”

Congress remains strongly supportive of U.S. assistance to Iraq, particularly funding for reconstruction and recovery. Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT), who is the senior Democrat on the SFRC's Middle East and North Africa subcommittee, summed up the views on the Hill by saying, “the failure to re-settle displaced populations and to rebuild the portions of the country that were destroyed. . . will be in fact the ultimate invitation for these Sunni extremist groups to re-emerge.”⁷⁸ Concerned with the

Trump administration's absence of a clear strategy for stabilization in Iraq, Congress is increasingly taking matters into its own hands, earmarking \$50 million for reconstruction in the FY19 appropriations act.⁷⁹ Where Congress and the administration are in closer alignment, the former is taking steps to ensure the administration can promote their shared objectives, such as by clarifying that ESF funds can be used to support ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq and Syria.

We agree on the importance of investing in Iraq's recovery from ISIS, recognizing that failure to do so could be disastrous for U.S. interests, as well as the Iraqi people. Congress can be expected to appropriate higher levels of assistance for Iraq than the administration requested in FY20, and to continue to earmark a portion of this funding for reconstruction efforts. The challenge for Congress, however, is that the Trump administration has been willing to subvert congressional intentions, violating norms of conduct between the two branches of government, and in some cases daring the legislature to check executive power. If Congress is to succeed in enhancing U.S. support for Iraq's stabilization, it will need to reassert its role as a co-equal branch of government in foreign relations.

77. “Justification for FY 2020 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO): Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund (CTEF),” U.S. Department of Defense, March 2019, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/FY2020_CTEF_J-Book.pdf

78. “Hearing on USAID Fiscal 2020 Budget Request,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 10, 2019, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?459495-1/department-state-fiscal-year-2020-budget-request>


79. U.S. Congress, Senate, “Making Appropriations for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year September 30, 2019 and for Other Purposes,” S. 3108, 115th Cong., 1st sess., in the Senate of the U.S. June 21, 2018, <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/115th-congress/senate-report/282/1>




JORDAN snapshot

- Although several of President Trump's decisions in the region have placed increased pressure on Jordan, U.S. financial support for the country remains robust.
- Two-thirds of USAID's Middle East and North Africa budget is dedicated towards Jordan, where according to government officials interviewed for this report, USAID has been successful in reforming some of the systemic challenges that Jordan's economy faces.

TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE in millions of dollars



GOVERNING JUSTLY & DEMOCRATICALLY in millions of dollars



Figures for FY11–FY18 are actual levels, while those for FY19–FY20 are requested levels. Variance in numbers may occur due to rounding.

Over the past year, Jordanians have continued to grapple with declining economic conditions in the country. Jordan's economy continues to sputter. The projected GDP (2.2 percent) for 2019 is inadequate to address the country's high unemployment rate (18.5 percent) and Jordan continues to be reliant on outside support to hold up its economy.⁸⁰ Adding additional pressure to the Jordanian economy are the significant number of refugees Jordan has taken in from neighboring countries. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, there are more than 750,000 registered refugees in Jordan, 88 percent of which are Syrians who have fled that country's civil war and require nearly \$400 million in economic support.⁸¹

Controversy over proposed new taxes have riled the Jordanian public, which is averse to paying more taxes amidst government corruption and poor services. Demonstrations in May 2018 over a proposed tax hike resulted in the removal of Prime Minister Hani Mulki and withdrawal of the proposed bill. The new Prime Minister Omar Razzaz, however, proposed a similar tax bill that fall, which reignited protests.⁸² When the government subsequently approved the new law, the protests grew in frequency and intensity, yielding weekly protests in Amman's Fourth Circle, where the prime minister's compound is located.⁸³ For some Jordanians, the economic protests have been a gateway to calls for more political reform and accountability. At the end of last year, Jordanians succeeded in persuading the government to reconsider a proposed cybercrime bill after activists expressed frustration that the bill threatened

to stifle freedom of expression.⁸⁴ And amid continued discontent, Prime Minister Razzaz appointed eight new ministers to his cabinet in May 2019, the third time Razzaz has reshuffled his cabinet since taking office a year ago.⁸⁵

**PRESIDENT TRUMP'S
“DEAL OF THE CENTURY” COULD,
IN PARTICULAR, HAVE MAJOR
IMPLICATIONS FOR JORDAN,
GIVEN THE KINGDOM'S LARGE
PALESTINIAN POPULATION AND
KING ABDULLAH'S STATUS
AS THE CUSTODIAN OF
JERUSALEM'S MUSLIM AND
CHRISTIAN HOLY SITES.**

U.S.-Jordanian relations remain close, despite growing Jordanian concerns over the direction of the Trump administration's Middle East policy. President Trump's “deal of the century” could, in particular, have major implications for Jordan, given the kingdom's large Palestinian population and King Abdullah's status as the custodian of Jerusalem's Muslim and Christian holy sites. Concerned about reports that the proposal would not grant Palestinians full statehood or a capital in East Jerusalem, the king has stressed that the U.S. plan must “be based on a two-state solution that gives Palestinians a capital in East Jerusalem.”⁸⁶ The administration's decision to withdraw U.S. funding from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees

80. “Jordan,” International Monetary Fund (IMF), <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/JOR#countrydata>; “19.0% Unemployment Rate during the First Quarter of 2019,” Department of Statistics, June 3, 2019, http://dos.gov.jo/dos_home_e/main/archive/Unemp/2019/Emp_Q1_2019.pdf

81. “Fact Sheet - Jordan,” UNHCR, March 2019, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/68925>

82. Aaron Magid, “Jordanians Fed up With More of the Same,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 3, 2018, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77401>

83. Allison Spencer Hartnett and Laith Fakhri Al-Ajlouni, “Making the Economy Political in Jordan's Tax Revolts,” Middle East Report Online, February 24, 2019, <https://merip.org/2019/02/making-the-economy-political-in-jordans-tax-revolts/>

84. Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Jordan to Rethink Controversial Crimes Law,” Reuters, December 9, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jordan-dissent-online/jordan-to-rethink-controversial-cybercrimes-law-idUSKBN1O80IW>

85. Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Jordan Revamps Cabinet in Latest Overhaul of Top Institutions,” Reuters, May 9, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jordan-government/jordan-revamps-cabinet-in-latest-overhaul-of-top-institutions-idUSKCN1SF29K>

86. Nicole Gaouette, “Jordan's King tells Kushner Palestinians Must Have a State,” CNN Politics, May 29, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/29/politics/jordan-abdullah-kushner/index.html>

in the Near East (UNRWA), which not only supports Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza but also in Jordan, was criticized in Jordan.⁸⁷ Similarly, President Trump's announcement that the United States would be withdrawing troops from Syria, presumably including from the al-Tanf garrison on the Jordanian border, set off alarms in Amman.⁸⁸ Even though Trump later reversed the decision, the perception that the U.S. commitment to Syria is tenuous has led to increased concerns about U.S. reliability in the region.⁸⁹

“THE ADMINISTRATION'S
DECISION TO WITHDRAW
U.S. FUNDING FROM UNRWA,
WHICH NOT ONLY SUPPORTS
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN THE
WEST BANK AND GAZA BUT
ALSO IN JORDAN, WAS
CRITICIZED IN JORDAN.”

Although several of President Trump's decisions in the region have placed increased pressure on Jordan, U.S. financial support for Jordan remains robust. The five-year U.S.-Jordanian Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in February 2018 pledges the United States to provide no less than \$1.3 billion in military and economic assistance through 2022.⁹⁰ Consistent

with the MOU, the administration has requested precisely \$1.3 billion for Jordan for FY20, the same as last year. The request includes \$910.8 million for ESDF, \$475 million (or 52.2 percent) of which is for direct budget support, \$63 million for economic growth initiatives, and \$212 million to help improve the country's water and wastewater treatment infrastructure.⁹¹ The rest of the request includes \$350 million in FMF funding to support the Jordanian military's "efforts to modernize and enhance their ability to counter asymmetric threats," and additional smaller security assistance accounts to help the kingdom improve its security sector.⁹² According to interviews conducted for this report, Jordan will also continue to receive military assistance from the Department of Defense, from which it has received more than \$1 billion since FY16, including \$188 million from the Section 333 global train and equip account.⁹³

Two-thirds of USAID's Middle East and North Africa budget is dedicated towards Jordan, where according to government officials interviewed for this report, USAID has been successful in reforming some of the systemic challenges that Jordan's economy faces.⁹⁴ These officials also noted that the conditions placed on the budget support funds have successfully influenced the government to reform. According to one assistance implementer interviewed for this report, however, there have been delays in obligating democracy and governance funds and U.S. government infighting over the assistance package because of sensitivities with the Jordanian government.

87. Suleiman Al-Khalidi, "Jordan says U.S. Move to Halt U.N. Refugee Agency Funding Fuels Radicalism," Reuters, September 1, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-palestinians-unrwa-jordan/jordan-says-u-s-move-to-halt-u-n-refugee-agency-funding-fuels-radicalism-idUSKCN1LH3RA>

88. Mohammad Gazal, "Jordan 'capable of deterring threats' after US Withdrawal from Syria," *The Jordan Times*, December 20, 2018, <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-%E2%80%98capable-deterring-threats%E2%80%99-after-us-withdrawal-syria>

89. Mark Landler and Helen Cooper, "In Latest Shift, Trump Agrees to Leave 400 Troops in Syria," *New York Times*, February 22, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/22/world/middleeast/trump-troops-syria-.html>

90. "New U.S.-Jordan Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Jordan," U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, February 14, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/new-u-s-jordan-memorandum-of-understanding-on-bilateral-foreign-assistance-to-jordan-2/>

91. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020," U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/State-and-USAID-Appendix-2.pdf>

92. *Ibid.*

93. "Security Aid Pivot Table: Jordan from 2016 to 2020," Security Assistance Monitor, accessed June 14, 2019, <http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Jordan/2016/2020/all/Global/>

94. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020," <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/State-and-USAID-Appendix-2.pdf>

In a sign of Jordan's strong support on the Hill, Congress continues to appropriate even more funding than the MOU pledges and the administration is requesting. In FY18, Congress appropriated more than \$1.5 billion in State Department accounts, including \$1 billion in ESF and \$425 million FMF funds, and up to \$500 million in Defense Department funds for border security.⁹⁵ The FY19 appropriations act mirrored the FY18 appropriation, including \$745 million in direct budget support for the government.⁹⁶ And the House FY20 SFOPS markup includes the same figures as the previous two years, which would once again make Jordan the second largest recipient of Function 150 foreign assistance worldwide.⁹⁷

Last year's protests show a Jordanian population that continues to want the same rights, freedoms, and opportunities other Arab citizens have demanded in their own streets since 2011. While strong U.S. support for Jordan is justifiable, the administration and Congress should continue

“IN A SIGN OF JORDAN'S STRONG SUPPORT ON THE HILL, CONGRESS CONTINUES TO APPROPRIATE EVEN MORE FUNDING THAN THE MOU PLEDGES AND THE ADMINISTRATION IS REQUESTING.”

to press the government—and condition its assistance where necessary—to become more responsive to popular demands for economic security, better governance, and individual freedoms. A stable Jordan is manifestly in U.S. interests, but concerted action by King Abdullah will be required if the country is to avoid the turbulence that has beset its neighbors over the past decade.

95. U.S. Congress, House, “Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018” 115th Cong., 2nd sess., H. R. 1625, March 2018, <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr1625/BILLS-115hr1625enr.pdf>

96. U.S. Congress, House, “Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for Fiscal Year 2019, and for Other Purposes: Conference Report,” (to accompany H.J. Res. 31), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2019, <https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt9/CRPT-116hrpt9.pdf>


97. “U.S. Congress, Committee on Appropriations, State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2020: Report,” (to Accompany H.R. 2839), 116th Cong., 1st sess., May 20, 2019, <https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt78/CRPT-116hrpt78.pdf>




LEBANON snapshot

- U.S. strategy is predicated on supporting the development of independent Lebanese institutions, in particular the Lebanese Armed Forces, as a bulwark against Hezbollah and Iranian influence.
- While the overall requested funding level for FY20 does not represent a major shift from FY19, the past year has seen growing tensions over Hezbollah between the Trump administration and those in the Lebanese government deemed too close to the Iran-backed militia.

TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE in millions of dollars



GOVERNING JUSTLY & DEMOCRATICALLY in millions of dollars



Figures for FY11–FY18 are actual levels, while those for FY19–FY20 are requested levels. Variance in numbers may occur due to rounding.

Lebanon formed a new government under Prime Minister Saad Hariri in January 2019, following nine months of deadlock after elections in May 2018. Hezbollah, a U.S. designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO), performed well in the elections and now holds the Ministry of Health, which controls the state's fourth-largest budget.⁹⁸ Early promises by the new leadership to address grievances regarding the economy and government services—both pressing issues for the small, multi-confessional country—have not borne fruit, and squabbling continues over how best to implement reforms to address massive public debt. Lebanon has also absorbed about 1.5 million Syrian refugees, in addition to its own population of 6 million;⁹⁹ while it claims that refugees who began returning to Syria in July 2018 have done so voluntarily, human rights organizations say that the Lebanese government has made conditions for refugees “intolerable.”¹⁰⁰

U.S. policy in Lebanon is driven by Lebanon's complicated but close relationship with Iran and its close proximity to Israel. Successive U.S. administrations have viewed Lebanon as an important partner “at the forefront of U.S. efforts to defeat ISIS and counter Iran's malign influence in the Middle East.”¹⁰¹ U.S. strategy is predicated on supporting the development of independent Lebanese institutions, in particular the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), as a bulwark against Hezbollah and Iranian influence. The challenge for the United States is finding ways to strengthen the central government and the LAF without inadvertently providing support to Hezbollah. The latter's performance in the 2018 elections and subsequent control over the health ministry thus presents a challenge for U.S. policy. The Lebanese government, too, tries to walk a fine line between taking advantage of U.S. support without violating sanctions against Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah.

U.S. POLICY IN LEBANON IS DRIVEN BY LEBANON'S COMPLICATED BUT CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN AND ITS CLOSE PROXIMITY TO ISRAEL.

For FY20, the administration has requested a total of \$133.2 million in aid for Lebanon, down only slightly from the FY19 request of \$152.8 million. Nearly \$70 million is requested for Peace and Security funding, including \$50 million in FMF funding that the administration says will go toward supporting the LAF as “the sole legitimate defender of Lebanon's security and sovereignty” and for its efforts to “repel terrorist groups' efforts to destabilize Lebanon,” both thinly veiled references to Hezbollah's influence in the country.¹⁰² The overall request for Peace and Security funding, however, is a sharp decline from the \$126.9 million allocated for that objective in FY18. For FY20, the administration has also requested \$11.8 million in NADR funding for demining and counter-terrorism efforts, including to “prevent terrorist activity across Lebanese borders,” and \$6.2 million in INCLE funding to support the Internal Security Forces (ISF), Lebanon's national police and security service. The administration's request includes only \$9 million in GJD programming for FY20, designed primarily to support decentralization efforts, which is a 40 percent decrease from the FY19 request. This includes \$4 million for civil society programming to “strengthen local organizations' institutional capacities by improving financial management and governance structures.”¹⁰³

The educational sector remains a priority area for USAID—the Ministry of Education is the

98. “Lebanon Announces Government after Months of Deadlock,” Al Jazeera, January 31, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2019/01/lebanon-announces-government-months-deadlock-190131172502369.html>

99. “Lebanon,” International Rescue Committee, 2019, <https://www.rescue.org/country/lebanon>

100. “Lebanon: Wave of Hostility Exposes Hollowness of Claims that Syrian Refugee Returns are Voluntary,” Amnesty International, June 12, 2019, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/lebanon-wave-of-hostility-exposes-hollowness-of-claims-that-syrian-refugee-returns-are-voluntary/>

101. Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020,” U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/State-and-USAID-Appendix-2.pdf>

102. “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020”; “Fact Sheet – U.S. Relations with Lebanon,” U.S. Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, July 30, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-lebanon/>

103. Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020.”

only civilian government ministry USAID works with in Lebanon because it is viewed as free of Hezbollah influence—and the administration has requested \$29 million in assistance for programs ranging from higher education scholarships to educational equipment; the administration's higher education program request doubled from \$6 million in FY19 to \$12 million in FY20.¹⁰⁴ An additional \$54.2 million in economic assistance is requested to support private sector growth and health services, including solid waste management, an issue that has plagued Lebanon since 2015. The CBJ also directs funding to deliver water and power services to “vulnerable communities. . . in Lebanon's north, south, and the Bekaa.”¹⁰⁵ As a result of the restrictions on implementation in Lebanon, which severely limit with whom aid implementers can work with, some government officials noted that assistance ends up going more directly to “non-elite” and municipal actors.

While the overall requested funding level for FY20 does not represent a major shift from FY19, the past year has seen growing tensions over Hezbollah between the Trump administration and those in the Lebanese government deemed too close to the Iran-backed militia. In March, Secretary Pompeo reportedly threatened President Michel Aoun and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri with personal sanctions if they did not “pull the reins” on Hezbollah.¹⁰⁶ During a trip to Israel, Pompeo said that “Lebanon's success depends on the Lebanese people demanding that a terrorist organization not be in control of their government and not drive policies and create risk for their country.”¹⁰⁷ One administration official said that they are currently looking into ways to support the Lebanese Shia community with foreign assistance without helping Hezbollah.

Another potential area of tension between the United States and Lebanon is the latter's desire to

participate in Syrian reconstruction efforts, which could expose them to secondary sanctions on the Assad regime. Multiple experts and government officials consulted for this report noted the immense strain the Lebanese government feels as a result of the Syrian refugee population, and one assistance implementer noted that it has been challenging to ensure that assistance designed to help with refugees is a win-win for both the refugee population and the host country.

As with the broader foreign assistance budget, Congress has been more generous than the administration with what it provides to Lebanon, appropriating \$233.5 million for Lebanon in FY19, plus an additional \$25 million in Relief and Recovery funding.¹⁰⁸ Congress, however, places strict conditions on how such funding can be used to ensure it does not benefit Hezbollah. For instance, the FY19 Consolidated Appropriations Act notes that FMF and INCLE funding must be cleared by the appropriate congressional committees, and the State Department must submit a spending plan to the Appropriations Committee in order to obligate assistance to the LAF. Congress also includes language limiting assistance to the LAF and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) if either are “controlled” by an FTO; the degree of Hezbollah's influence in Lebanon's government and security forces is a frequently debated topic in Washington.¹⁰⁹

Congress, to a greater extent than the administration, appears to recognize that enhanced economic opportunities and stronger government services are the most effective answer to Hezbollah's narrative of resistance. Looking ahead, it would be prudent for Congress to continue that approach so that USAID can continue its work supporting smaller communities on the ground. For an administration fixated on checking Iranian influence in the region, it does not have the luxury of ignoring what happens in Lebanon.

104. “Lebanon: Education,” USAID, October 25, 2018, <https://www.usaid.gov/lebanon/education>

105. Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020.”

106. Anchal Vohra, “Threat of US Sanctions Looms Over Lebanon's Hezbollah Allies,” Al Jazeera, April 7, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/threat-sanctions-looms-lebanon-hezbollah-allies-190407065855195.html>

107. Dan Williams, “Pompeo, in Israel, Says Hezbollah Putting Lebanon at Risk,” Reuters, March 21, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pompeo-israel/pompeo-in-israel-says-hezbollah-putting-lebanon-at-risk-idUSKCN1R217V>


108. U.S. Congress, Senate, “Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2019,” (to accompany S. 3108), 115th Cong., 2d sess., June 21, 2018, <https://www.congress.gov/115/crpt/srpt282/CRPT-115srpt282.pdf>

109. U.S. Congress, “Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019: Joint Resolution,” 116th Cong., 1st sess., 2019, H.J.R. 31, <https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hjres31/BILLS-116hjres31enr.pdf>


LIBYA snapshot

- The administration needs to clarify its policy toward Libya, and it must make a firm commitment to supporting the UN-backed political process toward brokering a power-sharing agreement that establishes a path for scheduling elections and creating an inclusive transitional government.
- While there is support for Libya on the Hill, there are concerns about the U.S. government's ability to spend funding wisely in the unstable country.

TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE in millions of dollars



GOVERNING JUSTLY & DEMOCRATICALLY in millions of dollars



Figures for FY11–FY18 are actual levels, while those for FY19–FY20 are requested levels. Variance in numbers may occur due to rounding.

Since the 2011 Libyan revolution that ousted the government of Muammar Gaddafi, a succession of transitional governments and interim leaders have been unable to gain enough widespread support to establish stability in Libya. The country remains split between the UN-backed and internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj and a parallel administration allied with the Libyan National Army (LNA), the militia group controlled by Khalifa Haftar, a former general in Gaddafi's army. Although a ceasefire agreement was signed between the GNA, military commanders, security apparatuses, and other armed groups in September 2018, renewed violence prompted the postponement of elections originally scheduled for December of that year. In early 2019, UN Special Representative for Libya Ghassan Salamé briefed the UN Security Council on the fragility of the ceasefire agreement and warned that "conditions [were] deteriorating at an alarming rate."¹¹⁰ Then, in early April, Haftar suddenly launched his first offensive against Tripoli, targeting civilian infrastructure.¹¹¹ Attempts to halt hostilities have so far failed and armed clashes have intensified, resulting in 125 wounded civilians, 42 civilian fatalities, and nearly 94,000 forced to flee their homes.¹¹² External support for various actors on the ground has only fueled the fighting, hindering a return to negotiations. Haftar has the backing of France, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, while the GNA is supported by Qatar

and Turkey.¹¹³ While GNA forces have repelled Haftar's attacks, Haftar has explicitly ruled out the possibility of ceasefire, leaving Libya on the verge of an intensified and wider civil war.¹¹⁴

The Trump administration's approach toward Libya is deeply unclear. Officially, the United States recognizes the GNA in Tripoli as Libya's legitimate government and supports political negotiations as the only viable path for bringing stability to the country.¹¹⁵ During a March 2019 meeting with GNA officials in Tripoli, then-U.S. Ambassador to Libya Peter Bodde asserted that the United States "will not tolerate spoilers to the political process."¹¹⁶ In the immediate aftermath of Haftar's attack on Tripoli, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a statement urging "the immediate halt to these military operations against the Libyan capital" and reaffirmed U.S. support for the peace process envisaged by the United Nations.¹¹⁷ Following the intervention of Egypt's President al-Sisi and Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed, however, President Trump conducted a phone call with Haftar, in which he "recognized Field Marshal Haftar's significant role in fighting terrorism and securing Libya's oil resources."¹¹⁸ The administration subsequently joined Russia in blocking a UN Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire in the country.¹¹⁹ While administration officials claimed that its policy had not shifted, many were left with the impression that President Trump's outreach to Haftar represented a shift away from the GNA.

110. "The Situation in Libya: Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya," United Nations, January 18, 2019, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_8448.pdf

111. "Libya crisis: Air strike at Tripoli airport as thousands flee clashes," BBC News, April 8, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47853478>

112. "Tripoli: Humanitarian Key Figures and Responses as of 10 June 2019 (since 4 April 2019)," OCHA Libya, June 11, 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Response_Infographic-10JUNE2019_3.pdf

113. "Khalifa Haftar: Libya's military strongman," BBC News, April 8, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27492354>

114. Marine Pennetier, "Libyan commander Haftar told Macron no ceasefire for now: French presidency," Reuters, May 22, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-haftar-france/libyan-commander-haftar-told-macron-no-ceasefire-for-now-french-presidency-idUSKCN1SS23F>

115. "Review of the FY2020 Budget Request for the State Department," Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, April 9, 2019, <https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy2020-budget-request-for-the-state-department>

116. U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, "Amb. Peter Bodde and AFRICOM Gen. Thomas Waldhauser Visit Libyan Prime Minister in Tripoli, Libya," March 19, 2019, <https://ly.usembassy.gov/amb-peter-bodde-and-africom-gen-thomas-waldhauser-visit-libyan-prime-minister-in-tripoli-libya/>

117. Michael R. Pompeo, "Situation in Libya," Department of State, April 7, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/situation-in-libya/>

118. Steve Holland, "White House says Trump spoke to Libyan commander Haftar on Monday," Reuters, April 19, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-trump/white-house-says-trump-spoke-to-libyan-commander-haftar-on-monday-idUSKCN1RV0WW>

119. Michelle Nichols, "U.S., Russia say cannot support a UN call for Libya truce: diplomats," Reuters, April 18, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-un/us-russia-say-cannot-support-a-un-call-for-libya-truce-diplomats-idUSKCN1RU2ML>

The administration's FY20 request seeks \$21.8 million in aid for Libya, which is a 36.8 percent decrease from its FY19 request of \$34.5 million.¹²⁰ Funding requested for Libya would support "efforts to build a unified, inclusive, and accountable government while defeating terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qa'ida."¹²¹ The FY20 request for the GJD objective ticked down slightly to \$10.7 million from the FY19 request of \$12.6 million. This would be used to "improve Libyan capacity to continue its political transition and build legitimate, accountable, and effective institutions," as well as to "promote inclusion, human rights, and government accountability, and focus on marginalized groups, such as women, youth, and religious and ethnic minorities."¹²² The FY20 budget request also seeks \$7 million in Peace and Security funding, nearly halving the FY19 request of \$13.7 million. Within that, the administration requested \$3 million in funding for NADR programs, prioritizing those that fortify border security, combat weapons trafficking and proliferation, build law enforcement capacity to counter ISIS and other terrorist threats, and support demining activities. An additional \$1 million is requested for INCLE programming related to enhancing the criminal justice system and law enforcement, including programs that "address the role of prisons in minimizing opportunities for the radicalization of vulnerable groups."¹²³

Congressional appropriations for Libya in the past decade have tracked relatively close to administration requests, with the exception of FY17 when Congress ultimately appropriated substantially more funding than requested, including funding from that year's Islamic State supplemental package. For FY19, Congress appropriated \$38.5 million, an 11.6 percent increase over the administration's request. For

FY20, it remains unclear what Congress will do. While there is support for Libya on the Hill, there are concerns about the U.S. government's ability to spend funding wisely in an unstable country. As one former congressional staffer explained, DRL has asked for less funding because the money is difficult to spend.

“**CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR LIBYA IN THE PAST DECADE HAVE TRACKED RELATIVELY CLOSE TO ADMINISTRATION REQUESTS.**”

Outside of assistance decisions, there appears to be opposition on the Hill to Trump's flirtation with Haftar. HFAC's Middle East and North Africa subcommittee convened a hearing of experts to analyze renewed violence in Tripoli, offering a critical appraisal of Haftar's suitability as a U.S. partner. Bipartisan letters from both the House and Senate this spring called on President Trump to reaffirm support for a negotiated, UN-backed political resolution to the crisis.¹²⁴

As requested by Congress, the administration needs to clarify its policy toward Libya, and it must make a firm commitment to supporting the UN-backed political process toward brokering a power-sharing agreement that establishes a path for scheduling elections and creating an inclusive transitional government.¹²⁵ The environment in Libya is likely to make assistance implementation difficult for the foreseeable future, but there is no substitute for—and relatively little cost to—U.S. political leadership.

120. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020," U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/State-and-USAID-Appendix-2.pdf>

121. *Ibid.*

122. *Ibid.*

123. *Ibid.*

124. "Menendez, Graham, Murphy, Barrasso Urge Pres. Trump to Support a Peaceful Political Solution to Crisis in Libya," Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 30, 2019 <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/menendez-graham-murphy-barrasso-urge-pres-trump-to-support-a-peaceful-political-solution-to-crisis-in-libya>; "Rep. Lieu Leads Bipartisan Foreign Affairs Committee Letter to Pompeo on Libya Conflict," Rep. Ted Lieu website, June 6, 2019, <https://lieu.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/rep-lieu-leads-bipartisan-foreign-affairs-committee-letter-pompeo-libya>


125. Philip Gordon and Andrew Miller, "Trump's Support for Haftar Won't Help Libya," *Foreign Policy*, April 24, 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/24/trumps-support-for-haftar-wont-help-libya/>




MOROCCO snapshot

- Although the Trump administration has continued to pay little attention to Morocco, the appointment of John Bolton as President Trump's national security advisor has raised concerns within Morocco, where he is thought to be sympathetic to separatists in the disputed territory of Western Sahara.
- While Morocco is a valuable U.S. security partner, Congress should continue to prioritize programs aimed at economic development and improving governance.

TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE in millions of dollars



GOVERNING JUSTLY & DEMOCRATICALLY in millions of dollars



Figures for FY11–FY18 are actual levels, while those for FY19–FY20 are requested levels. Variance in numbers may occur due to rounding.

Following protests in Algeria that led to the resignation of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Morocco's King Mohammed VI is the lone remaining pre-2011 North African ruler still in place. Morocco, however, is not immune to domestic turbulence which began again in earnest in 2016 in the Rif region, an underdeveloped mountainous region in the north of the country where thousands mobilized to demonstrate against the precarious economic conditions and pervasive marginalization of the region.¹²⁶ Over the past year, these protests have expanded into Casablanca and Rabat, in solidarity and support of the Rif demonstrators, known as the Hirak movement, whose leaders have been arrested. Additional protests by striking "contractual teachers" also grew in March 2019 over their lack of job security and government benefits. The Moroccan government has responded to this unrest by cracking down on protesters and journalists covering the protests, and reinstating compulsory military service for all Moroccans under the age of 25, largely seen by activists as an attempt to "tame" unrest.¹²⁷ Despite the crackdown, Moroccans continue to feel emboldened to express their frustrations and push for reform and development.

The Trump administration has continued to pay little attention to Morocco, especially compared to other traditional U.S. partners, and the appointment of John Bolton as President Trump's national security advisor has raised concerns within Morocco, where he is thought to be sympathetic to separatists in the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Since entering the administration, Bolton led an effort at the United Nations to reduce the renewal period for the UN peacekeeping mandate from one year to six months, reignited stalled negotiations between the Moroccan government and Sahrawis for the first time in six years, and overtly supported a possible

referendum for Sahrawi independence at an event in Washington in December 2018.¹²⁸

PARTLY OUT OF CONCERN THAT THERE COULD BE A SHIFT IN THE U.S. POSITION ON WESTERN SAHARA, THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN EAGER TO REMAIN ON GOOD TERMS WITH THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION.

Partly out of concern that there could be a shift in the U.S. position on Western Sahara, the Moroccan government has been eager to remain on good terms with the Trump administration, cutting diplomatic relations with Iran and tacitly supporting the administration's "deal of the century." The kingdom's efforts appear to be bearing fruit; in a February 2019 meeting with Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Nasser Bourita, Secretary Pompeo praised Morocco's "resolute efforts to counter Iran's malign influence in the region". King Mohammed VI also hosted a visit by Jared Kushner, President Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor, in June 2019 during which the U.S. delegation praised the King as an "important friend and ally."¹²⁹

Despite the positive bilateral relationship, the administration's foreign aid request for Morocco remains significantly below congressional appropriation levels. For FY20, the State Department has only requested \$16 million in total assistance for Morocco, which

126. Aida Alami, "Morocco's Stability Is Roiled by Monthslong Protests Over Fishmonger's Death," *New York Times*, December 22, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/world/africa/morocco-berber-rif-nasser-zefzafi.html>

127. Smail Hamoudi, "Morocco's Return to Compulsory Military Service: Reasons and Challenges," Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis, February 11, 2019, <https://mipa.institute/6451>.

128. Nicolas Niarchos, "Is One of Africa's Oldest Conflicts Finally Nearing Its End?" *The New Yorker*, December 29, 2018, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/is-one-of-africas-oldest-conflicts-finally-nearing-its-end>

129. Sophie Pons, "Kushner Meets Morocco King on Trip to Push Peace Plan; Will Visit Israel, Jordan," *The Times of Israel*, May 29, 2019, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/kushner-meets-moroccan-king-on-trip-to-push-us-peace-plan/>

is nearly identical to the \$15.9 million requested in FY19 but 58 percent below the \$38 million Congress appropriated in the FY19 budget act. More than half of the FY20 aid request would support security concerns within Morocco, including violent extremism, illicit trafficking, and organized crime through security assistance accounts IMET, INCLE and NADR. The funding for democracy and governance through the ESDF account is primarily focused on supporting marginalized areas throughout Morocco and will focus on “[decreasing] the risk of instability.” And despite requesting funds for Morocco’s “democratic transition and decentralization efforts,”¹³⁰ according to interviews for this report, the State Department has become reticent to initiate any projects that might be deemed controversial with the Moroccan government, noting that “DRL can’t get anything approved.”

Congress will likely ignore the administration’s aid request for Morocco and continue to provide higher levels of support for the

“CONGRESS WILL LIKELY IGNORE THE ADMINISTRATION’S AID REQUEST FOR MOROCCO AND CONTINUE TO PROVIDE HIGHER LEVELS OF SUPPORT FOR THE NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRY.”


North African country. While Morocco is a valuable U.S. security partner, we recommend that Congress prioritize programs aimed at economic development and improving governance. Unless the king is able to address public concerns in both of these areas, ongoing protests will only grow in intensity and could eventually put Morocco’s stability at risk. King Mohamed VI has so far weathered the storms that have beset the region since 2011, but Morocco’s future will be shaped by the country’s ability to meet burgeoning demands for change.

130. “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020,” U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/State-and-USAID-Appendix-2.pdf>


SYRIA snapshot

- While President Trump's advisors have articulated a series of ambitious goals, including the lasting defeat of ISIS, a political transition, accountability for Assad, and the removal of all Iranian forces from Syria, his own objectives appear to be far more modest.
- The withdrawal of USAID personnel from Syria following the president's call for pulling U.S. troops out of the country has forced the administration to rely more heavily on contractors to execute programming.

TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE in millions of dollars



GOVERNING JUSTLY & DEMOCRATICALLY in millions of dollars



Figures for FY11–FY18 are actual levels, while those for FY19–FY20 are requested levels. Variance in numbers may occur due to rounding.

After eight years of fighting and more than half a million deaths, Bashar al-Assad is on the verge of winning the Syrian Civil War, if not the peace. Regime forces are once again threatening to move into Idlib, the last opposition stronghold in the country. ISIS's territorial caliphate in Syria, as in Iraq, has been defeated, but concerns abound over the group's ability to reconstitute or adapt itself. The U.S.-aligned and Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) controls large swathes of Syria's northeast, but it is not seeking to oust Assad. And the intervention of foreign actors, including Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, Turkey, and Israel, does not appear to be subsiding, creating the potential conditions for one or more international conflicts. The greatest challenge for Assad, as well as other players in Syria, will be the task of rebuilding conquered areas and reintegrating them into a functional state.

Assad's military progress, enabled by outside actors, does not erase the cruelty of his regime or the damage it has wrought. A May *New York Times* report revealed that nearly 128,000 people are missing inside Syria's system of secret prisons, where torture is ubiquitous and many of the missing are presumed dead.¹³¹ Almost six million refugees remain outside of Syria, while another 6.2 million are internally displaced.¹³² Indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations remain the modus operandi of the regime, and, according to the UN, 11.7 million people in Syria require humanitarian assistance.¹³³

The Trump administration's policy toward Syria has been confused, if not incoherent. While the president's advisors have articulated a series of

ambitious goals, including the lasting defeat of ISIS, a political transition, accountability for Assad, and the removal of all Iranian forces from Syria, his own objectives appear to be far more modest. Trump's only consistent priority has been the defeat of ISIS, which he thinks has been accomplished,¹³⁴ but he believes the reconstruction of liberated areas is not the responsibility of the United States.¹³⁵ After freezing \$230 million in FY17 reconstruction assistance for Syria in March 2018, Trump seized on pledges from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, supposed replacements for American aid, as a justification to reprogram the suspended assistance for other countries and prohibit the use of additional U.S. funds for reconstruction.¹³⁶

“TRUMP SEIZED ON PLEDGES FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. . . AS A JUSTIFICATION TO REPROGRAM THE SUSPENDED ASSISTANCE FOR OTHER COUNTRIES AND PROHIBIT THE USE OF ADDITIONAL U.S. FUNDS FOR RECONSTRUCTION.”

In a similar vein, Trump has expressed a strong preference for withdrawing the 2,000 U.S. troops in Syria now that ISIS has supposedly been defeated.¹³⁷ After announcing the full

131. Anne Barnard, “Inside Syria's Secret Torture Prisons: How Bashar al-Assad Crushed Dissent,” *New York Times*, May 11, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/11/world/middleeast/syria-torture-prisons.html>

132. “Fact Sheet 6 -- Syria -- Complex Emergency,” USAID, May 10, 2019, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/05.10.19_-_USG_Syria_Complex_Emergency_Fact_Sheet_6.pdf

133. “Humanitarian Needs Overview,” OCHA, March 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2019_Syr_HNO_Full.pdf

134. Katie Rogers, Rukmini Callimachi and Helene Cooper, “Trump Declares ISIS ‘100%’ Defeated in Syria. ‘100% Not True,’ Ground Reports Say,” *New York Times*, February 28, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/world/middleeast/trump-isis-territory.html>

135. Micheal Burke, “Trump says Saudis will pay to rebuild Syria: ‘Thanks Saudi A,’” *The Hill*, December 24, 2018, <https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/422755-trump-says-saudi-arabia-will-help-rebuild-syria-instead-of-us-thanks>

136. Karen DeYoung, “Trump administration to pull back funding for Syria reconstruction efforts,” *Washington Post*, August 17, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-is-stopping-funding-for-syria-reconstruction-efforts/2018/08/17/1b6a097e-a23e-11e8-8e87-c869fe70a721_story.html

137. Karen DeYoung, Louisa Loveluck, and John Hudson, “U.S. military announces start of Syria withdrawal,” *Washington Post*, January 11, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/us-military-announces-start-of-syria-troop-withdrawal/2019/01/11/77455bda-1585-11e9-90a8-136fa44b80ba_story.html?utm_term=.81bfea1e3e90

and immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops in December 2018 following a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Trump's advisors persuaded him to keep roughly 400 soldiers in northeast Syria and al-Tanf to support mop-up operations against ISIS and deter a Turkish incursion against the SDF.¹³⁸ The administration seems to be genuinely interested in negotiating an agreement between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds, out of a desire to avoid a deeper crisis with a NATO ally and to help our one reliable partner in Syria. Having already expressed a desire to leave Syria, however, President Trump's leverage has been substantially reduced and other actors are sensitive to the possibility that he may once again change his mind and pull out all troops. In the case of Syria, it appears that neither goals nor tactics are widely agreed upon within the U.S. government.

Regarding assistance, the Trump administration proposes zeroing out U.S. aid to Syria for its FY20 request, consistent with the president's belief that other countries should be responsible for rebuilding the war-torn country.¹³⁹ Just last year, the president's budget sought \$174.5 million for Syria, including \$109.5 million for programming in the Peace and Security objective and \$55 million for GJD programs.¹⁴⁰ While the administration is clear that it does not want additional bilateral assistance for Syria, it is still providing humanitarian aid. Since FY12, the United States has spent \$9.5 billion to support humanitarian needs in response to the crisis in Syria. U.S. funding is still theoretically available for reconstruction and stabilization programs, including \$750 million in FY17-18 aid from RRF funds.¹⁴¹ A congressional staffer interviewed for this report, however, said it was highly unlikely

the administration would use any of this funding for Syria.

Despite the moratorium on U.S. funding for reconstruction in Syria, the administration is continuing to implement reconstruction programs with the donations from foreign partners—including Saudi Arabia's \$100 million provided in October 2018 - which have been placed into USAID's accounts.¹⁴² One administration official interviewed for this report lauded the Gulf contributions to Syria's reconstruction, noting that the donors had not placed conditions on how the money could be spent. A Syria analyst, however, told the authors that it was unclear the Saudis and others would continue to contribute to reconstruction, cautioning that even if they did so their priorities for programming may eventually diverge from that of the U.S. government. Moreover, reconstruction is only taking place in the SDF-controlled northeast, not in and around Idlib, to which the administration ended aid in December 2018.¹⁴³ One representative of a democracy promotion organization was highly critical of the U.S. absence from Syria's northwest, saying that the United States had in effect ceded the territory to al-Qaeda.

The confusion of the Trump administration's Syria policy has, moreover, hampered U.S. assistance efforts. Given the unavailability of U.S. funds and the limited size of Gulf contributions, U.S. officials are reluctant to approve new programs that they may not be able to resource. The withdrawal of USAID personnel from Syria following the president's call for pulling U.S. troops out of the country has forced the administration to rely more heavily on contractors to execute programming.

138. Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, "In Latest Shift, Trump Agrees to Leave 400 Troops in Syria," *New York Times*, February 22, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/22/world/middleeast/trump-troops-syria-.html>

139. Kylie Atwood, "Trump admin seeks to zero out Syria stabilization fund," CNN Politics, March 13, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/13/politics/trump-admin-syria-stabilization/index.html>

140. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Fiscal year 2019," U.S. Department of State, February 12, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/FY-2019-Congressional-Budget-Justification-Department-of-State-Foreign-Operations-and-Related-Programs.pdf>

141. *Ibid.*

142. Ben Hubbard, "Saudi Arabia Delivers \$100 Million Pledged to U.S. as Pompeo Lands in Riyadh," *New York Times*, October 16, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/16/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-money-syria.html>

143. Kylie Atwood, "Trump Administration Ends Aid for Northwestern Syria," CBS News, May 18, 2018, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-administration-ends-aid-for-northwestern-syria/>

And the uncertainty regarding the U.S. troop level in Syria has impaired planning for the Syria train and equip program, for which DOD has requested \$300 million for FY20.¹⁴⁴

Congress has deep reservations about President Trump's Syria policy, including his desire to withdraw U.S. troops and his aversion to supporting reconstruction. Many members were particularly aggravated that the administration reprogrammed the \$230 million in Syria aid just before it was to expire, leaving Congress with few tools to prevent the transfer from happening.¹⁴⁵ Capturing the prevailing sentiment on the Hill, Senator Menendez warned that "without sustained investment into development [in Syria], we have no hope of truly defeating ISIS."¹⁴⁶

It is thus no surprise that Congress has supported U.S. aid to Syria, especially reconstruction assistance. In the FY19 appropriations act, Congress appropriated \$206 million in total aid for Syria, 18 percent more than the administration requested that year.¹⁴⁷ Notably, \$40 million was earmarked specifically for reconstruction in an effort to compel President Trump to use U.S. funding to support Syria's recovery.¹⁴⁸ An additional \$5 million was earmarked to support accountability measures in Syria and Iraq, while \$100 million of the \$250 million appropriated for the RRF was recommended for Syria.¹⁴⁹ The FY19 law also clarifies that current and prior-year ESF funds can be used to support religious minorities in

Syria and Iraq, a priority Congress shares with the administration, while prohibiting its use in areas controlled by Assad or in a way that "supports or otherwise legitimizes" Iran and its proxies, Russia, or terrorist groups.¹⁵⁰

“CONGRESS HAS DEEP RESERVATIONS ABOUT PRESIDENT TRUMP'S SYRIA POLICY, INCLUDING HIS DESIRE TO WITHDRAW U.S. TROOPS AND HIS AVERSION TO SUPPORTING RECONSTRUCTION.”

Congress can be expected to appropriate additional funding for Syria in the FY20 bill, both in bilateral assistance and through the RRF. A congressional staffer interviewed for this report said that, at the very least, Congress would earmark another \$40 million for reconstruction in Syria. We recommend that Congress consider additional steps to compel the administration to invest U.S. funding in Syria. While other countries should also contribute to rebuilding Syria and there are limits to what the United States can do single handedly to help the country recover, the U.S. government will struggle to get others more involved if it is unwilling to put its own money on the table.

144. "Justification for FY 2020 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO): Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund (CTEF)," Office of the Secretary of Defense Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2020, March 2019, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/FY2020_CTEF_J-Book.pdf

145. Gardiner Harris and Ben Hubbard, "U.S. Will Not Spend \$230 Million Allocated to Repair Devastated Syrian Cities," *New York Times*, August 17, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/us/politics/syria-stabilization-foreign-aid.html>

146. "Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on USAID Fiscal 2020 Budget Request," The United States Committee on Foreign Relations, May 8, 2019, <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/menendez-opening-remarks-at-hearing-on-usaid-budget-request>

147. U.S. Congress, Senate, "Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2019," (to accompany S. 3108), 115th Cong., 2nd sess., June 21, 2018, <https://www.congress.gov/115/crpt/srpt282/CRPT-115srpt282.pdf>

148. U.S. Congress, House, "Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for Fiscal Year 2019, and for Other Purposes," H.J. Res. 31, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2019, <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/116th-congress/house-report/9/1>

149. U.S. Congress, Senate, "Making appropriations for the Department of State, foreign operations, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2019, and for other purposes," S.3108, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., June 21, 2018, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3108/text>


150. *Ibid.*




TUNISIA snapshot

- President Trump has once again proposed massive cuts to U.S. aid for Tunisia in FY20.
- Representatives of U.S. democracy promotion organizations have expressed serious concern about the administration's proposed reduction in support for democracy and governance programs and what they view as other signs that the United States has become less focused on Tunisia's democratic transition.

TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE in millions of dollars



GOVERNING JUSTLY & DEMOCRATICALLY in millions of dollars



Figures for FY11–FY18 are actual levels, while those for FY19–FY20 are requested levels. Variance in numbers may occur due to rounding.

While Tunisia remains the lone bright spot of the 2011 Arab uprisings, the country's democratic trajectory remains bumpy. If it is to continue on a democratic path, Tunisia will have to address widespread economic woes and overcome relentless political squabbling. The consensus government, initially considered key to a successful democratic transition, ultimately made it too difficult to pass meaningful legislation and ended in September 2018. Parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for late 2019 are sure to be considerably more competitive given the breakdown of the consensus government and broad frustrations with political leadership generally. Meanwhile, transitional justice efforts following the fall of the dictatorship have faltered in the absence of parliamentary support, dampening hopes of democratic consolidation and failing to send a message that those who abuse power will be held accountable.

The Trump administration has paid little heed to Tunisia, even in the wake of growing tensions next door in Libya. While relations between the United States and Tunisia are positive, the Trump administration has pursued only limited high-level engagement, other than a call between President Trump and President Beji Caid Essebsi in February 2017 and a visit by Tunisian Foreign Minister Khemaies Jhinaoui to Washington in July 2018.¹⁵¹ Tunisia is clearly not on Trump's radar, and Secretary Pompeo has not demonstrated a high level of interest in

the North African country. Support for Tunisia exists in the executive branch, but it is largely at the lower- and middle-levels of the bureaucracy.

“THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION HAS PAID LITTLE HEED TO TUNISIA, EVEN IN THE WAKE OF GROWING TENSIONS NEXT DOOR IN LIBYA.”

President Trump has once again proposed massive cuts to U.S. aid for Tunisia in FY20. The total amount of aid requested—\$86.4 million—is slightly less than the FY19 request of \$94.5 million,¹⁵² but a full 55 percent less than the \$191.4 million Congress appropriated in FY19.¹⁵³ Sixty percent—\$51.8 million—of the total amount requested for Tunisia is for the Peace and Security objective, and while this is the only assistance objective in Tunisia for which the administration requested an increase in FY20, it is considerably less than the \$126.4 million that Congress appropriated for Peace and Security funding in FY19.¹⁵⁴ In the CBJ, the administration indicates that the bulk of this funding would go toward “eliminat[ing] domestic violent extremist organizations,” shoring up border security, and supporting regional and NATO missions.¹⁵⁵

151. “Tunisia Weekly Update: Essebsi Announces Intention to Suspend Drug Law,” Project on Middle East Democracy, February 22, 2017, <https://us2.campaign-archive.com/?u=8a185f96ecfeb10569f5120d0&id=f815fd9c4e>; “Tunisia Weekly Update: Parliament Passes Controversial Law Affecting NGOs,” Project on Middle East Democracy, August 2, 2018, https://mailchi.mp/9df37ccd37c4/tunisiaupdate_7_19_2017-844089?

152. “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Supplementary Tables: Fiscal Year 2020,” U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Supplementary-Tables-%E2%80%93-Foreign-Operations.pdf>

153. U.S. Congress, House, “Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for Fiscal Year 2019, and for Other Purposes,” to accompany H.J. Res. 31, 116th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in the House February 13, 2019, <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/116th-congress/house-report/9/1>

154. U.S. Congress, House, “State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2019,” To accompany H.R. 6385, 115th cong., 2nd sess., introduced in the House July 16, 2018, <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/115th-congress/house-report/829/1>

155. “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Supplementary Tables: Fiscal Year 2020”; “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020,” U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/State-and-USAID-Appendix-2.pdf>

The administration is seeking \$18 million in democracy and governance support, a 25 percent reduction from the FY19 request and a full 60 percent reduction from the FY18 enacted levels.¹⁵⁶ The remaining \$16.5 million would go toward private sector growth and employment, which has been a key goal for the Government of Tunisia (GOT) as it seeks to shrink its bloated public sector and encourage economic growth and investment.¹⁵⁷ According to the CBJ, economic aid would specifically support “fiscal reform efforts” and “the establishment of a fair and transparent regulatory environment.”¹⁵⁸

Representatives of U.S. democracy promotion organizations have expressed serious concern about the administration’s proposed reduction in support for democracy and governance programs and what they view as other signs that the United States has become less focused on Tunisia’s democratic transition. The administration makes only passing references to elections in the CBJ, saying that “assistance will support the GOT to enable the participation of all Tunisian citizens (particularly women, youth, and people in marginalized communities) in democratic processes at the national and local level, including elections, budgeting, planning and accountability, and oversight initiatives.”¹⁵⁹ And one NGO representative interviewed for this report described the new U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia Donald Blome, who took up the post in January 2019, as “disappointing” for what is perceived as his reluctance to provide strong support for Tunisia’s democratic development. There is, moreover, a sense among implementing organizations that U.S. democracy projects in Tunisia tend to “diagnose the problem but only go halfway, six months too late.”

Several officials of democracy promotion organizations expressed particular dismay that the United States initially appeared hesitant to provide any funding for international election observation for the fall 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections. The United States

supported international observation for Tunisia’s 2011 and 2014 elections. One NGO official told the authors that this stance was a reflection of USAID’s emphasis on training domestic election monitors. The Tunisian ambassador to the United States, however, reportedly has requested international monitors, which convey international support for Tunisia’s ongoing transition. As of this report’s publication, there was still hope that the Trump administration could be convinced to support international observers, and democracy promotion organizations were in talks with USAID to use an “existing funding mechanism” for an observation mission.

“THERE IS A SENSE AMONG IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONS THAT U.S. DEMOCRACY PROJECTS IN TUNISIA TEND TO “DIAGNOSE THE PROBLEM BUT ONLY GO HALFWAY, SIX MONTHS TOO LATE.”

In past years, administration officials interviewed for this report defending the administration’s lower requests for Tunisia cited concerns regarding Tunisia’s absorption capacity for aid. Part of the problem, however, is that the U.S. embassy and USAID in Tunisia have continued to operate in a 2012 security environment that places limitations on where and how they can operate in the country, despite the marked improvement in safety and in the Tunisian security forces’s ability to manage security threats. The U.S. government has simply run out of space at existing facilities and, unless it is prepared to relax conditions on where U.S. personnel can work, it will remain

156. *Ibid.*

157. “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Supplementary Tables: Fiscal Year 2020.”

158. “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020.”

159. *Ibid.*

difficult to expand operations. While USAID recently notified Congress of its intention to upgrade its operations in Tunis to a full mission, a welcome step, it will not in and of itself resolve the facilities issue.

Congress, for its part, remains broadly supportive of Tunisia. It has consistently rejected the administration's requests, appropriating \$191.4 million in assistance in FY19 plus an additional \$50 million in funding from the RRF.¹⁶⁰ Suggesting that Congress is unlikely to take the administration's request any more seriously this year than it has in the past, the total assistance level for Tunisia in the FY20 House markup remained steady at \$191.4 million, reflecting HACFO's ongoing belief that "a stable and viable democratic Tunisia is critical to regional security."¹⁶¹ In addition to maintaining or increasing assistance levels, Members of Congress have traveled to Tunisia on official visits, expressed support for Tunisian civil society, and voiced support for democratic consolidation.¹⁶² For instance, Senators Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Mitt Romney (R-UT) introduced a resolution in June 2019 reaffirming American support for Tunisian democracy and advocating for continued foreign assistance.¹⁶³

At the same time, Congress is sensitive to the potential for democratic backsliding in Tunisia. In the FY19 Consolidated Appropriations Act, the Senate included a provision requiring the State Department to "submit a report... assessing the content of the proposed NGO law for Tunisia and its implications on the ability of USAID and the Department of State to support Tunisian civil society organizations."¹⁶⁴ While the State Department's report in response to Congress said only that it was "too early

to assess the impact" that a new NGO law would have on assistance programming, we hope that Congress will continue to push the administration to monitor the climate for NGO work in Tunisia.¹⁶⁵ In this vein, we recommend that Congress should include similar language in the FY20 appropriations bill requiring the State Department to review how Law 52 of the National Business Register, which requires not only private companies and corporations but also all NGOs or associations to register with the government, affects civil society work in Tunisia.

**CONGRESS, FOR ITS PART,
REMAINS BROADLY SUPPORTIVE
OF TUNISIA.**

As one representative of a democracy promotion NGO told the authors, "there are numerous ways and opportunities to justify U.S. spending in Tunisia, but the administration just isn't paying much attention." Fortunately, Congress' bipartisan support for Tunisia remains strong, and the country should continue to receive higher levels of U.S. assistance. We urge Congress not only to appropriate robust aid levels for Tunisia, but also to ensure that aid is equally divided between security and non-security programs. Eight years after former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was ousted, Tunisia remains on a democratic path. Both the administration and Congress should do what they can to keep it that way.

160. U.S. Congress, House, "Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019," H.J. Res. 31, 116th Cong., 1st sess., introduced January 3, 2019, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-joint-resolution/31/text>

161. U.S. Congress, House, "State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2020," (to accompany H.R. 2839) 116th Cong., 1st sess., introduced May 20, 2019, <https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt78/CRPT-116hrpt78.pdf>

162. Bryant Harris, "Congress sounds alarm over Tunisia's proposed NGO law," Al-Monitor, July 2, 2018, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/07/congress-sounds-alarm-tunisia-ngo-law.html>

163. "Tunisia Update: Ennahda's Past, Present, and Future," Project on Middle East Democracy, June 6, 2019, https://mailchi.mp/pomed/tunisiaupdate_7_19_2017-845717?e=a587af785b


164. U.S. Congress, Senate, "State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2019," (to accompany S. 3108) 115th Cong. 2nd sess., introduced June 21, 2018, <https://www.congress.gov/115/crpt/srpt282/CRPT-115srpt282.pdf>

165. Department of State, "Report to Congress on Proposed NGO Law for Tunisia," April 2019.


WEST BANK & GAZA snapshot

- The administration's FY20 budget request is a continuation of the pressure campaign against the Palestinians.
- President Trump's efforts to force the Palestinians into submission by cutting all assistance is not only unlikely to work, but it runs counter to the administration's own self-declared interest to "help build a more democratic, stable, and secure region, benefiting Palestinians, Israelis, and Americans."

TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE in millions of dollars



GOVERNING JUSTLY & DEMOCRATICALLY in millions of dollars



Figures for FY11–FY18 are actual levels, while those for FY19–FY20 are requested levels. Variance in numbers may occur due to rounding.

Pressure from the United States, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority (PA) has exacerbated the already precarious living conditions for Palestinians in Gaza. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), nearly 30 percent of Gazans are unemployed and 75 percent require food aid.¹⁶⁶ Protests along the Israel-Gaza border fence against the Israeli blockade of the territory that began last March have continued, and in May 2019 Israel and Hamas seemed on the verge of another war before a ceasefire was brokered by Egypt.¹⁶⁷ In the West Bank, newly appointed PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh has warned that the PA is in a “collapsing situation” due to its severe budget crisis.¹⁶⁸ After the Israeli government passed a law last year that they would withhold Palestinian tax revenues collected by Israel on behalf of the PA, due to its payments to the families of terrorists, President Mahmoud Abbas has refused to accept any of the tax revenue collected by Israel, roughly half of the PA’s revenues, until Israel repeals the controversial law.¹⁶⁹ Both the PA and Hamas have clamped down on dissent in their areas of control; Human Rights Watch has documented scores of arbitrary arrests carried out by the security forces of both governing entities for “peaceful criticism of the authorities, particularly on social media, among independent journalists, on university campuses, and at demonstrations.”¹⁷⁰

U.S. relations with the Palestinians, already badly strained over President Trump’s 2017 decision to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, have deteriorated further over the past year. In

response to PA refusal to meet with Trump administration officials, the administration has taken a series of harsh decisions to pressure the PA to re-engage on its self-proclaimed “deal of the century.” First, the State Department in August 2018 reprogrammed more than \$200 million in FY18 bilateral assistance, nearly all of the assistance appropriated for West Bank and Gaza that year, and also cut \$300 million in funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which provides a wide array of services to over 5 million Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, and neighboring countries.¹⁷¹ Then the Trump administration closed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Washington, the Palestinians’ diplomatic mission to the United States, and revoked the visa for the head of the Palestinian delegation.¹⁷²

“THE ADMINISTRATION HAS TAKEN A SERIES OF HARSH DECISIONS TO PRESSURE THE PA TO RE-ENGAGE ON ITS SELF-PROCLAIMED “DEAL OF THE CENTURY.”

Finally, in March 2019, President Trump downgraded the U.S. mission to the Palestinians from a consulate in Jerusalem that acted as the de facto embassy to the Palestinians to a “Palestinian Affairs Unit” within the U.S.

166. “Fact Sheet - Humanitarian Situation in the Gaza Strip,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, October 2011, <https://www.un.org/unispal/humanitarian-situation-in-the-gaza-strip-fast-facts-ocha-factsheet/>

167. David M. Halbfinger, “Why Do Israel and Gaza Keep Fighting? Because It’s in Their Leaders’ Interests,” *New York Times*, May 6, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-battles-hamas.html>

168. David M. Halbfinger, “New Palestinian Premier Warns of a ‘Very Hot Summer,’” *New York Times*, June 5, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/world/middleeast/palestinian-prime-minister-israel.html>

169. *Ibid.*

170. “Two Authorities, One Way, Zero Dissent: Arbitrary Arrest and Torture Under the Palestinian Authority and Hamas,” Human Rights Watch, October 23, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/10/23/two-authorities-one-way-zero-dissent/arbitrary-arrest-and-torture-under#page>

171. Andrew Miller and Seth Binder, “Why Trump’s Aid Cuts to Syria, Gaza and West Bank Heighten Risk to U.S.,” *Just Security*, September 5, 2018, <https://www.justsecurity.org/60574/trumps-aid-cuts-syria-gaza-west-bank-heighten-risk-u-s/>

172. Yara Bayoumy, “U.S. State Department revokes PLO Ambassador Family Visas: Envoy,” *Reuters*, September 16, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-palestinians/us-state-department-revokes-plo-ambassador-family-visas-envoy-idUSKCN1LW0RE>

Embassy to Israel. As a part of downgrading the U.S. mission in Jerusalem, the administration in April 2019 ordered the USAID mission that served the West Bank and Gaza to lay off 85 percent of its local staff, reducing the number of employees from 100 to 14. Former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Daniel Shapiro suggested that the decision was a “huge mistake,” noting that under any peace plan, which is expected to include major investments in the Palestinian economy, “you will want development experts to help steer where that money goes.”¹⁷³

The administration's FY20 budget request is a continuation of the pressure campaign against the Palestinians. It zeros out all funding for the West Bank and Gaza, except for \$35 million in security assistance through the INCLE account.¹⁷⁴ By contrast, President Trump had requested \$251 million in bilateral assistance for the West Bank and Gaza in FY19, while Congress appropriated \$286 million that year.¹⁷⁵ According to the CBJ, the limited FY20 assistance would “support the long-term sustainability and effectiveness” of the PA security forces and “reform efforts by judicial, corrections, and civil defense institutions.”¹⁷⁶ Unlike with other countries, Congress is more supportive of cutting aid to the Palestinians, partly due to domestic political considerations in the United States. The House FY20 SFOPS markup, for instance, does not earmark any funds for the Palestinians through the traditional bilateral accounts, but does recommend \$226.6 million in multilateral assistance to help address the “rising humanitarian needs and a lack of adequate resources.”¹⁷⁷

U.S. assistance to the Palestinians is also complicated by two pieces of legislation. First, the Taylor Force Act, passed as a part of the FY18 Consolidated Appropriations Act, requires that no ESF funds that directly benefit the PA be provided unless it ends payments to individuals and families involved in acts of terrorism. Second, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA) and President Trump signed the bill into law in October 2018. ATCA makes any recipient of U.S. assistance from the ESF, NADR, or INCLE accounts—not coincidentally the three accounts from which the PA has traditionally received bilateral assistance—liable in U.S. courts for acts of terrorism. Having narrowly avoided responsibility for \$655 million in damages from a 2016 case precisely because a court ruled that the PA was not liable in the U.S. legal system, the PA has been forced to refuse all U.S. assistance since February 2019.¹⁷⁸

“UNLIKE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, CONGRESS IS MORE SUPPORTIVE OF CUTTING AID TO THE PALESTINIANS, PARTLY DUE TO DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.”

173. Daniel Estrin, “U.S. Aid Agency Is Preparing to Lay Off Most Local Staff for Palestinian Projects,” National Public Radio, April 17, 2019, <https://www.npr.org/2019/04/17/714269010/u-s-aid-agency-is-preparing-to-lay-off-most-local-staff-for-palestinian-projects>

174. “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Fiscal Year 2020,” U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/FY-2020-CBJ-FINAL.pdf>

175. “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020,” U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/State-and-USAID-Appendix-2.pdf>; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, “Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2019,” (to accompany S. 3108), 115th Cong., 2d sess., printed June 21, 2018, <https://www.congress.gov/115/crpt/srpt282/CRPT-115srpt282.pdf>

176. “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020.”

177. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, “State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2020,” (to accompany H.R. 2839), 116th Cong., 1st sess., committed May 20, 2019, <https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt78/CRPT-116hrpt78.pdf>

178. Scott R. Anderson, “Congress Has (Less Than) 60 Days to Save Israeli-Palestinian Security Cooperation,” Lawfare, December 7, 2018, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/congress-has-less-60-days-save-israeli-palestinian-security-cooperation>

The PA's inability to accept INCLE funding, which supports the PA security forces, has rankled some in the Israeli security establishment, who recognize the contribution of these units to Israel's own security. In response to these concerns, the State Department began lobbying Congress to "fix" the law so that U.S. security assistance to Palestinian security forces would not be affected. Angered by the administration's actions, Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) in May 2019 placed a hold on the nomination of Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield to serve as ambassador to Turkey, explaining that Satterfield's "consistent efforts to protect the Palestinian Authority and Palestine Liberation Organization from liability and thereby undermine the rights of American victims of Palestinian terrorism. . . stands in sharp contrast to the intent of Congress."¹⁷⁹

President Trump's efforts to force the Palestinians into submission by cutting all assistance is not only unlikely to work, but it runs counter to the administration's own

“AID TO THE PALESTINIANS IS NOT A FAVOR TO THE PA; IT IS AN INVESTMENT IN THE WELFARE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, ISRAEL'S SECURITY, AND U.S. REGIONAL INTERESTS.”

self-declared interest to “help build a more democratic, stable, and secure region benefiting Palestinians, Israelis, and Americans.”¹⁸⁰ The reality is that aid to the Palestinians is not a favor to the PA; it is an investment in the welfare of the Palestinian people, Israel's security, and U.S. regional interests. We urge the Trump administration to work with Congress to both repeal ATCA and restore higher levels of assistance to the Palestinians before the humanitarian situation in Gaza worsens and West Bank stability is jeopardized.


179. Senator Grassley, Speaking on Nomination Hold of David M. Satterfield to Serve as Ambassador to Turkey, 116th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, Vol. 165, No. 82, May 16, 2019, <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2019/5/16/senate-section/article/s2917-3>

180. “West Bank and Gaza,” USAID, June 12, 2019, <https://www.usaid.gov/west-bank-and-gaza>


YEMEN snapshot

- The Trump administration has requested minimal bilateral assistance for war-torn Yemen, which is in the midst of what is described as the world's worst humanitarian crisis.
- More than four years into a war that has claimed the lives of at least 230,000 Yemenis, Congress needs to find veto-proof ways, including arms sales suspensions, to pressure the Saudi and Emirati-led Coalition fighting the Iran-backed Houthi rebels into supporting a negotiated settlement to end the devastating conflict.

TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE in millions of dollars



GOVERNING JUSTLY & DEMOCRATICALLY in millions of dollars



Figures for FY11–FY18 are actual levels, while those for FY19–FY20 are requested levels. Variance in numbers may occur due to rounding.

In February 2019, the United Nations warned that Yemen remains the world's worst humanitarian crisis. The country's ongoing war, which has included a naval blockade by the Saudi and Emirati-led Coalition (SELC), has left 24 million people, nearly 80 percent of the population, in need of assistance and protection, 20 million food insecure and lacking access to adequate healthcare, and nearly 18 million unable to access safe drinking water. According to the UN, humanitarian aid is "increasingly becoming the only lifeline for millions across the country."¹⁸¹ In December 2018, the UN negotiated an agreement between the warring parties to de-escalate and withdraw troops from the vital port city of Hodeidah, to form a committee to discuss the future of the besieged southwestern city of Taiz, exchange prisoners, and to continue negotiations on a broader settlement.¹⁸² Implementation of the so-called Stockholm agreement has, so far, been uneven at best, but it has at least prevented a full-scale offensive by the SELC on Hodeidah, through which 80 percent of the country's commercial goods, aid, and fuel flows.¹⁸³

The Trump administration has continued to view the conflict through an anti-Iran prism and has therefore maintained strong support for the SELC. While it ended aerial refueling for SELC airstrikes in November 2018 under heavy congressional pressure, the administration has continued to provide targeting assistance and intelligence. When challenged by Congress over the coalition's bombing of civilians and civilian infrastructure, the administration has defended U.S. support, as former Secretary of Defense James Mattis did in a press briefing in

August 2018, when he claimed, "the training that we have given them we know has paid off."¹⁸⁴ The administration has regularly paid lip service in support of the UN-led efforts to end the war, but has been unwilling to push the SELC outside of coordinated statements from Secretaries Pompeo and Mattis at the end of October 2018, which helped lead to renewed negotiations between the warring sides.¹⁸⁵

**THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
HAS CONTINUED TO VIEW THE
CONFLICT THROUGH AN
ANTI-IRAN PRISM.**

As in the past two years, the Trump administration has requested minimal bilateral assistance for Yemen, to "build upon the humanitarian response" to the country's war.¹⁸⁶ The FY20 request of \$41 million is a 5 percent reduction from the FY19 request, but 47 percent more than the \$28 million Congress appropriated in FY19. The request would provide \$2.6 million through the NADR account to help "build and train a civilian law enforcement force capable of securing borders, apprehending terrorism suspects, investigating terrorist crimes, and prosecuting terrorism cases," and nearly \$30 million in ESDF to help "enable local communities and government institutions to provide access to and sustain

181. "Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen Remains Worst in the World, Warns UN," UN News, February 14, 2019, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1032811>

182. "Full Text of the Stockholm Agreement," OSESGY: Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, December 13, 2018, <https://osesgy.unmissions.org/full-text-stockholm-agreement>

183. Bethan McKernan, "Yemen Hodeidah Sees 'worst fighting yet' Despite UN Ceasefire Calls," *The Guardian*, November 20, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/20/yemen-hodeidah-fighting-resumes-saudi-led-coalition-houthi-airstrikes>

184. "Department Of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Mattis and General Dunford in the Pentagon Briefing Room," Department of Defense, August 28, 2018, <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1615116/departments-of-defense-press-briefing-by-secretary-mattis-and-general-dunford-in/>

185. Phil Stewart, Eric Beech, and Mohammad Zargham, "Secretary of State Pompeo Calls for End to Fighting in Yemen," Reuters, October 30, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-usa/secretary-of-state-pompeo-calls-for-end-to-fighting-in-yemen-idUSKCN1N502G>

186. "Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Appendix 2: Fiscal Year 2020," U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/State-and-USAID-Appendix-2.pdf>

critical public services.”¹⁸⁷ According to an administration official interviewed for this report, however, USAID is conducting a review of its assistance due to an “operating environment not conducive” to stabilization programming.

Since October 2017, the U.S. government has provided more than \$721 million in humanitarian assistance for Yemen and will continue to help fund the humanitarian situation. At a February 2019 donor conference in Geneva, which extracted commitments for \$2.6 billion of the \$4 billion the United Nations said it needed, the United States announced an additional \$24 million in aid and said it “[remains] committed to helping the people of Yemen.”¹⁸⁸ In the CBJ, the State Department identifies Yemen as one of the primary countries in need of continued humanitarian assistance for FY20, but does not indicate exactly how much the U.S. would provide.

Congress has adopted a fundamentally different position on the war in Yemen, which has arguably become the most contested foreign policy issue between the executive and legislative branches. Members of Congress have taken unprecedented steps to try to disentangle the United States from the SELC. In April 2019, for the first time since the War Powers Act was passed in 1973, Congress passed a resolution requiring the United States to end all assistance in the war under the Act, but Trump subsequently vetoed the resolution.¹⁸⁹ Congress has also sought to

“THE WAR IN YEMEN HAS ARGUABLY BECOME THE MOST CONTESTED FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES.”

prohibit arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that have fueled the war and allowed the two Gulf countries to replace their stockpiles. Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) placed a hold on \$2 billion worth of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in April 2018 over concerns of continued harm to civilians and perpetuation of the conflict.¹⁹⁰ The hold remained in place until the end of May 2019, when the administration announced the sale of \$8.1 billion in 22 separate sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE by employing a rarely-used emergency provision in the Arms Export Control Act—most recently applied in 1990 for tanks and F-15s to Saudi Arabia shortly after Iraq invaded Kuwait—that allowed it to bypass the 30-day congressional review period.¹⁹¹ In response, a bipartisan group of Senators, including Republicans Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Todd Young (R-IN), and Rand Paul (R-KY), introduced 22 separate resolutions of disapproval to try to block the sales.¹⁹² Senators Chris Murphy (D-CT) and Young, moreover,

187. *Ibid.*

188. “United States Announces Additional Humanitarian Assistance to the People of Yemen,” USAID, February 26, 2019, <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/feb-26-2019-us-announces-additional-humanitarian-assistance-people-yemen>

189. U.S. Congress, Senate, “To Direct the Removal of United States Armed Forces from Hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that Have not Been Authorized by Congress (War Powers Act) A Joint Resolution of 2019,” S.J.R. 7, 116th Cong., 1st sess., introduced January 30, 2019, <https://www.congress.gov/bills/116/congress/senate-joint-resolution/7/text>

190. Juan Pachon, “Menendez Demands More Answers from Trump Admin Before Letting Arms Sales to United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia Move Forward,” Bob Menendez for New Jersey, June 28, 2018, <https://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/menendez-demands-more-answers-from-trump-admin-before-letting-arms-sales-to-united-arab-emirates-and-saudi-arabia-move-forward>

191. Jeremy M. Sharp, Coordinator, Christopher M. Blanchard, and Clayton Thomas, “U.S. Arms Sales to the Middle East: Trump Administration Uses Emergency Exception in the Arms Export Control Act,” Congressional Research Service, May 31, 2019, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20190531_IN11127_297d460d051add1042e0334c5d670940a5e2d527.pdf

192. Juan Pachon, “Menendez, Graham, Murphy, Paul, Leahy, Young, Reed Announce 22 Joint Resolutions to Block Weapons Sales to Saudi Arabia and UAE without Congressional Approval,” Bob Menendez for New Jersey, June 5, 2019, <https://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/menendez-graham-murphy-paul-leahy-young-reed-announce-joint-resolutions-to-block-weapons-sales-to-saudi-arabia-and-uae-without-congressional-approval>

invoked a provision from the Foreign Assistance Act that could allow Congress to vote on U.S. assistance to Saudi Arabia, including arms sales, if the Senate first votes to require the State Department to brief Congress on the country's human rights record.¹⁹³ And Democrats in the House are considering amendments in must-pass legislation like the National Defense Authorization Act and appropriations bills that could end U.S. assistance for the war and block arms sales to the coalition.

More than four years into a war that has claimed the lives of at least 230,000 Yemenis, Congress needs to find veto-proof ways, including arms sales suspensions, to pressure the SELC into supporting a negotiated settlement to end the devastating conflict.¹⁹⁴ While there is no guarantee that the Houthis are prepared to negotiate and the United States has little leverage over the group, the U.S. government can create pressure on other actors that have

MORE ROBUST FUNDING IS ALSO NEEDED NOT ONLY TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING OF MILLIONS OF YEMENIS, BUT ALSO TO HELP STABILIZE AND REBUILD THE COUNTRY.

more influence with the Houthis to pressure the rebels by doing likewise with our partners. More robust funding is also needed not only to alleviate the suffering of millions of Yemenis, but also to help stabilize and rebuild the country. U.S. assistance is not the solution to Yemen's problems, but it can help to begin the difficult process of building a more inclusive post-war Yemen that is stable, secure, and free.

193. "Murphy, Young Announce Privileged Resolution to Force Vote on U.S.-Saudi Security Relationship, Recent Arms Sale," Chris Murphy United States Senator for Connecticut, June 9, 2019, <https://www.murphy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/murphy-young-announce-privileged-resolution-to-force-vote-on-us-saudi-security-relationship-recent-arms-sale>

194. Jonathan D. Moyer, David Bohl, Taylor Hanna, Brendan R. Mapes, and Mickey Rafa, "Assessing the Impact of War on Development in Yemen," United Nations Development Programme, 2019, <https://www.undp.org/content/dam/yemen/General/Docs/ImpactOfWarOnDevelopmentInYemen.pdf>

APPENDIX: DATA TABLES

TABLE 1: TOTAL ASSISTANCE BY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE, FY11-FY20 (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

Near East Total	FY11 Actual	%	FY12 Actual	%	FY13 Actual	%	FY14 Actual	%	FY15 Actual	%	FY16 Actual	%	FY17 Actual	%	FY18 Actual	%	FY19 Request	%	FY20 Request	%
Peace and Security	5125.0	73.1	6032.8	73.9	5347.1	73.8	5346.7	75.9	5344.2	79.4	5627.1	75.5	6109.1	82.0	5558.3	74.8	5437.5	77.7	5325.1	80.9
Governing Justly, Democratically (GJD)	422.0	6.0	473.6	5.8	254.9	3.5	250.0	3.5	180.4	2.7	350.8	4.7	522.5	7.0	287.7	3.9	281.6	4.0	196.2	3.0
Investing in People	603.5	8.6	580.0	7.1	700.7	9.7	580.1	8.2	430.7	6.4	574.8	7.7	529.4	7.1	388.0	5.2	463.6	4.0	442.7	6.7
Economic Growth	643.7	9.2	896.9	11.0	803.2	11.1	777.3	11.0	642.5	9.5	661.3	8.9	1053.1	14.1	932.2	12.6	781.3	11.2	615.8	9.4
Humanitarian Assistance	84.1	1.2	101.8	1.2	71.8	1.0	89.8	1.3	133.8	2.0	240.0	3.2	340.5	4.6	269.6	3.6	38.0	0.5	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	7013.3		8158.0		7243.3		7044.0		6731.6		7454.0		7338.4		7422.4		7002.2		6579.8	

TABLE 2: GJD FUNDS BY PROGRAM AREA, FY11-FY20 (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

Near East Total	FY11 Actual	%	FY12 Actual	%	FY13 Actual	%	FY14 Actual	%	FY15 Actual	%	FY16 Actual	%	FY17 Actual	%	FY18 Actual	%	FY19 Request	%	FY20 Request	%
Rule of Law and Human Rights	77.1	18.3	132.2	28.2	82.3	32.3	74.6	29.8	50.6	28.1	72.0	20.5	94.9	27.0	97.2	33.8	69.2	24.6	48.8	24.9
Good Governance	134.9	32.0	93.3	19.9	31.5	12.4	51.5	20.6	44.3	24.5	140.3	40.0	245.9	70.1	106.7	37.1	129.9	46.1	86.7	44.2
Political Competition, Consensus Building	70.9	16.8	56.0	12.0	42.9	16.8	31.8	12.7	24.5	13.6	40.4	11.5	36.3	10.3	32.6	11.3	13.0	4.6	14.7	7.5
Civil Society	139.1	33.0	186.8	39.9	98.2	38.5	92.2	36.9	61.1	33.8	98.1	28.0	145.4	41.5	51.2	17.8	69.5	24.7	46.0	23.4
GJD Total	422.0		468.3		254.9		250.1		180.4		350.8		522.5		287.7		281.6		196.2	

There may be variance in numbers used throughout this report due to rounding.

**TABLE 3 - BILATERAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BY COUNTRY
AND BY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE, FY11-FY20 (MILLIONS USD)**

Algeria	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Peace and Security	1.6	2.2	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.6	1.8	2.1	1.5	2.0
Governing Justly, Democratically (GJD)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Investing in People	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Economic Growth	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Humanitarian Assistance	8.2	8.7	6.6	4.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Bilateral Assistance	9.8	10.9	9.1	7.2	2.7	2.6	1.8	2.1	1.5	2.0
Egypt	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Peace and Security	1304.3	1308.5	1244.2	1304.7	1305.4	1304.3	1239.0	1306.2	1304.5	1305.5
Governing Justly, Democratically (GJD)	46.5	14.3	19.9	21.7	6.4	12.5	7.8	14.2	9.6	14.8
Investing in People	55.5	52.1	135.4	77.3	56.7	62.0	40.0	58.1	31.3	40.0
Economic Growth	147.4	181.6	84.8	102.2	87.3	70.2	66.6	35.2	35.9	22.0
Humanitarian Assistance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Bilateral Assistance	1553.8	1556.5	1484.2	1505.9	1455.8	1449.0	1353.5	1413.7	1381.3	1382.3
Iraq	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Peace and Security	146.4	990.3	516.5	330.3	190.1	302.4	497.8	349.3	149.9	115.9
Governing Justly, Democratically (GJD)	177.5	176.0	46.2	37.3	28.7	49.5	66.0	41.5	42.0	41.6
Investing in People	61.1	46.4	6.2	0.0	9.5	3.0	8.0	2.5	3.0	3.4
Economic Growth	86.8	57.5	20.5	0.0	1.5	0.5	285.5	10.0	5.0	5.0
Humanitarian Assistance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Bilateral Assistance	471.8	1270.3	589.4	367.6	229.8	405.4	861.3	403.3	199.9	165.9
Jordan	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Peace and Security	315.9	315.9	296.4	310.3	396.0	462.6	487.5	442.6	364.2	364.2
Governing Justly, Democratically (GJD)	22.0	28.0	25.0	28.4	35.0	60.0	62.7	76.4	42.0	45.8
Investing in People	111.3	93.0	98.0	126.6	132.5	243.5	249.8	217.8	250.0	322.0
Economic Growth	229.0	339.0	441.4	545.0	447.5	508.9	519.9	788.2	618.8	543.0
Humanitarian Assistance	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0*	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Bilateral Assistance	678.2	775.9	861.4	1010.3	1011.0	1274.9	1319.8	1525.0	1275.0	1275.0

There may be variance in numbers used throughout this report due to rounding.

TABLE 3 - (CONTINUED)
(MILLIONS USD)

Lebanon	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Peace and Security	101.6	106.4	104.8	98.0	103.1	107.0	96.4	126.9	66.8	70.0
Governing Justly, Democratically (GJD)	21.1	21.0	9.8	9.0	9.4	16.5	16.0	27.0	15.0	9.0
Investing in People	48.8	49.0	46.2	44.8	40.2	72.0	54.9	61.0	44.0	41.0
Economic Growth	14.8	14.7	15.2	14.1	13.6	18.0	41.1	31.0	27.0	13.2
Humanitarian Assistance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Bilateral Assistance	186.4	191.1	176.0	166.0	166.3	213.5	208.4	245.9	152.8	133.2
Libya	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Peace and Security	0.0	5.4	8.5	5.4	4.2	8.5	92.4	9.0	13.7	7.0
Governing Justly, Democratically (GJD)	0.0	0.0	9.0	0.5	0.4	10.0	38.6	14.5	12.6	10.7
Investing in People	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Economic Growth	0.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.2	9.6	8.3	4.2
Humanitarian Assistance	5.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Bilateral Assistance	5.7	5.4	22.5	5.9	4.5	18.5	139.2	33.0	34.5	21.8
Morocco	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Peace and Security	15.1	21.6	13.1	13.3	18.5	16.7	18.1	22.7	8.1	8.1
Governing Justly, Democratically (GJD)	9.0	8.6	7.5	5.9	7.2	6.0	9.0	6.5	1.7	3.8
Investing in People	4.5	4.5	6.2	9.9	6.4	4.5	8.0	4.5	3.7	2.7
Economic Growth	5.5	6.5	4.4	5.1	6.4	4.5	3.5	4.9	2.5	1.5
Humanitarian Assistance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Bilateral Assistance	34.1	41.2	31.1	34.2	38.5	31.7	38.6	38.6	15.9	16.0
Syria	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Peace and Security	0.0	3.0	43.5	2.8	45.0	136.0	249.2	0.0	109.5	0.0
Governing Justly, Democratically (GJD)	0.0	52.5	15.9	5.5	0.0	40.6	160.5	0.0	55.0	0.0
Investing in People	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	13.0	0.0	10.0	0.0
Economic Growth	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Humanitarian Assistance	0.0	0.0	18.3	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Bilateral Assistance	0.0	55.5	77.7	8.3	46.9	177.1	422.7	0.0	174.5	0.0

TABLE 3 - (CONTINUED)
(MILLIONS USD)

Tunisia	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Request	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Peace and Security	20.2	54.3	29.7	31.5	40.9	76.0	112.5	83.5	51.4	51.8
Governing Justly, Democratically (GJD)	2.0	1.6	3.0	1.3	0.5	20.9	41.0	44.2	24.2	18.1
Investing in People	1.6	11.6	10.0	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Economic Growth	1.9	21.8	4.5	20.3	20.0	45.0	51.7	37.6	19.0	16.5
Humanitarian Assistance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Bilateral Assistance	25.7	89.3	47.2	57.8	61.4	141.9	205.2	165.3	94.5	86.4
West Bank and Gaza	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Request	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Peace and Security	133.5	60.4	49.3	49.3	59.9	38.8	43.5	43.5	21.5	30.0
Governing Justly, Democratically (GJD)	38.0	56.9	21.2	35.9	31.1	31.5	45.0	17.5	44.5	5.5
Investing in People	292.0	294.0	366.7	276.3	152.0	158.3	112.9	0.0	104.0	0.0
Economic Growth	38.9	62.6	0.0	55.7	47.1	3.0	49.4	0.0	43.0	0.0
Humanitarian Assistance	47.6	36.3	0.0	32.5	76.9	29.7	40.3	0.0	38.0	0.0
Total Bilateral Assistance	550.1	510.3	437.2	449.7	367.0	261.3	291.1	61.0	251.0	35.0
Yemen	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Request	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Peace and Security	26.6	31.8	29.0	27.0	12.5	6.5	31.6	23.2	7.3	9.3
Governing Justly, Democratically (GJD)	3.8	23.0	14.0	1.0	0.0	20.5	21.5	2.1	10.2	0.2
Investing in People	21.7	16.0	20.4	16.5	15.8	11.8	21.4	19.1	16.5	15.0
Economic Growth	8.3	7.6	5.0	5.5	6.3	4.3	0.0	1.5	9.5	16.6
Humanitarian Assistance	22.6	56.8	46.4	52.8	55.0	160.3	296.1	269.6	0.0	0.0
Total Bilateral Assistance	82.9	135.2	114.8	102.8	89.6	203.4	370.6	315.5	43.4	41.0

**TABLE 4 - GOVERNING JUSTLY AND DEMOCRATICALLY (GJD) FUNDING
BY COUNTRY, PROGRAM AREA, FY11-FY20 (MILLIONS USD)**

Egypt	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Rule of Law and Human Rights	10.3	0.8	8.1	11.6	2.5	3.5	7.8	5.8	7.0	7.1
Good Governance	8.8	5.9	7.2	4.2	2.4	6.9	0.0	8.4	2.7	7.7
Political Competition, Consensus Building	21.3	1.4	3.0	1.3	1.5	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Civil Society	6.1	6.2	1.5	4.7	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
GJD Total	46.5	14.3	19.9	21.7	6.4	12.5	7.8	14.2	9.6	14.8
Iraq	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Rule of Law and Human Rights	12.0	68.8	27.3	24.8	7.0	0.0	18.0	12.0	5.0	5.6
Good Governance	89.6	44.5	4.5	4.0	15.7	39.5	45.0	26.5	36.0	35.0
Political Competition, Consensus Building	23.2	14.5	3.3	2.0	6.0	4.0	3.0	3.0	1.0	1.0
Civil Society	52.7	48.2	11.1	6.5	0.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
GJD Total	177.5	176.0	46.2	37.3	28.7	49.5	66.0	41.5	42.0	41.6
Jordan	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Rule of Law and Human Rights	8.0	6.0	6.0	2.5	7.0	15.0	15.4	31.3	13.0	13.0
Good Governance	3.0	4.0	0.0	8.0	7.0	34.7	36.9	23.4	16.0	19.8
Political Competition, Consensus Building	3.0	10.0	5.5	5.0	6.0	0.0	4.0	20.2	7.0	7.0
Civil Society	8.0	8.0	13.5	12.9	15.0	10.3	6.4	1.5	6.0	6.0
GJD Total	22.0	28.0	25.0	28.4	35.0	60.0	62.7	76.4	42.0	45.8
Lebanon	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Rule of Law and Human Rights	10.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	3.5	2.0	12.0	1.0	1.0
Good Governance	7.5	5.1	5.0	6.1	3.5	8.2	10.2	11.7	7.0	4.0
Political Competition, Consensus Building	1.4	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0
Civil Society	2.2	4.6	4.7	2.9	4.8	4.8	3.8	2.3	7.0	4.0
GJD Total	21.1	21.0	9.8	9.0	9.4	16.5	16.0	27.0	15.0	9.0
Libya	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Rule of Law and Human Rights	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.4	0.0	6.2	0.0	2.5	0.0
Good Governance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.4	21.2	9.3	6.6	5.6
Political Competition, Consensus Building	0.0	0.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	2.8	10.8	3.0	2.0	2.7
Civil Society	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.5	2.2	1.5	2.4
GJD Total	0.0	0.0	9.0	0.5	0.4	10.0	38.6	14.5	12.6	10.7

There may be variance in numbers used throughout this report due to rounding.

TABLE 4 (CONTINUED)
(MILLIONS USD)

Morocco	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Rule of Law and Human Rights	3.0	0.6	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.3	1.0
Good Governance	3.0	5.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	1.4	2.8
Political Competition, Consensus Building	1.0	1.0	2.2	2.2	2.0	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Civil Society	2.0	1.5	5.0	3.7	5.2	4.4	8.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
GJD Total	9.0	8.6	7.5	5.9	7.2	6.0	9.0	6.5	1.7	3.8
Syria	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Rule of Law and Human Rights	0.0	3.5	5.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.5	0.0	12.0	0.0
Good Governance	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0	19.0	93.0	0.0	28.0	0.0
Political Competition, Consensus Building	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	1.2	5.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Civil Society	0.0	49.0	10.5	3.1	0.0	20.4	59.0	0.0	15.0	0.0
GJD Total	0.0	52.5	15.9	5.5	0.0	40.6	160.5	0.0	55.0	0.0
Tunisia	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Rule of Law and Human Rights	0.8	0.4	3.0	1.3	0.5	10.9	7.2	4.8	6.1	4.1
Good Governance	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.5	12.1	17.6	11.1	10.0
Political Competition, Consensus Building	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0	5.4	3.0	2.0
Civil Society	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	12.7	16.4	4.0	2.0
GJD Total	2.0	1.6	3.0	1.3	0.5	20.9	41.0	44.2	24.2	18.1
West Bank and Gaza	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Rule of Law and Human Rights	18.8	30.8	18.3	19.5	20.3	19.7	23.3	16.7	17.2	4.7
Good Governance	12.6	19.3	2.9	15.6	10.0	10.1	12.2	0.8	20.8	0.8
Political Competition, Consensus Building	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Civil Society	6.3	6.9	0.0	0.8	0.8	1.7	9.5	0.0	6.5	0.0
GJD Total	38.0	56.9	21.2	35.9	31.1	31.5	45.0	17.5	44.5	5.5
Yemen	FY11 Actual	FY12 Actual	FY13 Actual	FY14 Actual	FY15 Actual	FY16 Actual	FY17 Actual	FY18 Actual	FY19 Request	FY20 Request
Rule of Law and Human Rights	0.9	5.0	2.5	1.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2
Good Governance	1.4	4.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	12.7	2.1	0.0	0.0
Political Competition, Consensus Building	1.0	12.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	2.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Civil Society	0.5	2.0	1.5	0.0	0.0	5.0	6.5	0.0	10.0	0.0
GJD Total	3.8	23.0	14.0	1.0	0.0	20.5	21.5	2.1	10.2	0.2

